Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Charles Rogers pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and was placed on felony probation for three years. He later requested a transfer of his case from Riverside County to San Bernardino County, where he resided. The San Bernardino County Probation Department recommended additional drug and alcohol-related probation conditions. At the transfer hearing, the San Bernardino court added these conditions.The Riverside County Superior Court initially sentenced Rogers to 180 days in county jail with a suspended four-year prison sentence and placed him on probation for three years. In a separate misdemeanor case, Rogers was sentenced to 69 days in county jail for driving with a suspended license due to a prior DUI conviction. The Riverside County Probation Department later filed a motion to transfer Rogers' case to San Bernardino County, which was granted without modifying his probation conditions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. Rogers contended that the San Bernardino court lacked jurisdiction to modify his probation conditions without a change in circumstances and that the added conditions were invalid under People v. Lent. The appellate court agreed that the San Bernardino court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying Rogers' probation conditions without a change in circumstances. The court found no new facts or changes in circumstances to justify the additional conditions. Consequently, the appellate court struck the added drug and alcohol-related conditions and affirmed the order as modified. View "P. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

In April 1996, James Alvin Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, including committing the murder during a robbery and having a prior murder conviction. The jury sentenced him to death. Thompson's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied the petition, citing the special circumstances findings as rendering him ineligible for relief.The California Supreme Court had previously affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence. Thompson also filed a habeas corpus petition, which was transferred to the Riverside County Superior Court and denied. He appealed the denial, but the appeal was stayed due to funding issues for appellate habeas counsel. Thompson then filed a petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a capital defendant is entitled to seek resentencing relief under section 1172.6, but the relief must be sought through a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1509, in compliance with Proposition 66. The court vacated the trial court's order denying the resentencing petition and remanded the case with directions to allow Thompson to file a limited petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the murder conviction under section 1172.6. The court emphasized that the trial court must follow the procedures outlined in section 1172.6, including appointing counsel if requested and holding a hearing to determine if Thompson has made a prima facie case for relief. View "P. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Khyle Armando Briscoe, a youth offender, was sentenced to life without parole for a special circumstance murder committed when he was 21. The murder occurred during a robbery where Briscoe and an accomplice, Shaun P., attacked an acquaintance, Ben P. During the struggle, Ben P. managed to take Briscoe’s gun and fatally shot Shaun P. Briscoe was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with the jury finding true the special circumstance that he acted with reckless indifference to human life and was a major participant in the underlying felonies.The trial court sentenced Briscoe to life without parole, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Briscoe later filed a motion for a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which grants certain youth offenders the opportunity to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole. The trial court denied his motion, and Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that section 3051’s exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for special circumstance murder, while including those convicted of first-degree felony murder under section 189, subdivision (e)(3), violated equal protection. Both statutes employ the same standard of liability, and the underlying felonies were the same. The court held that there was no rational basis for treating these offenders differently under section 3051.The court reversed the trial court’s order denying Briscoe a section 3051 hearing and remanded the case for the trial court to conduct a Franklin proceeding and a parole hearing. The court reformed section 3051 to include youth offenders like Briscoe, who were sentenced to life without parole under section 190.2, subdivision (d) for murder during a robbery or burglary. View "P. v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

In 1998, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and had two prior serious felony convictions. He was initially sentenced to 25 years to life, plus 11 years for enhancements. In December 2023, the trial court resentenced him to 25 years to life. In January 2024, the defendant filed a motion for discovery under the California Racial Justice Act, seeking information to support a claim of racially disparate charging by the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office. The trial court denied the motion, stating the defendant failed to provide a plausible factual foundation for a potential violation of the Act.The defendant appealed the trial court’s decision. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court first addressed whether the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion. It concluded that the Act permits a defendant to file a stand-alone postjudgment discovery motion before filing a habeas corpus petition. However, the court agreed with the Fourth Appellate District’s decision in In re Montgomery that an order denying such a motion is not appealable.The Court of Appeal held that the trial court had jurisdiction to consider the motion but that the order denying the postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable. The appropriate remedy for challenging such an order is through a petition for writ of mandate, not an appeal. Consequently, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

In 2006, the petitioner was admitted to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator (SVP). In 2022, the superior court found him suitable for conditional release. However, before placing him in the community, the court reconsidered its decision, held a new hearing, and found him unsuitable for release. The petitioner argued that the superior court erred by denying him the assistance of experts during the contested hearing and that the ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence. The real party in interest conceded that the court erred in denying expert assistance but maintained that the court had the authority to reconsider its order.The superior court initially found the petitioner suitable for conditional release in October 2022, but difficulties in securing housing led to multiple placement hearings. In July 2023, Liberty Healthcare expressed concerns about the petitioner’s readiness for release and requested additional time for further review. The court granted a six-month continuance. In November 2023, the court reconsidered its previous order based on new circumstances and found the petitioner unsuitable for conditional release, citing his behavior and a report from the Department of State Hospitals.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court erred in finding the petitioner unsuitable for conditional release without providing him the assistance of experts, as required by law. The court held that the petitioner was entitled to a new hearing with the procedural protections outlined in section 6608, including the appointment of experts. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order and, if reconsideration is sought, to conduct a new hearing consistent with the statutory requirements. View "Price v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2008, Juan Alazar was charged with attempted murder, assault with a firearm, and possession of a firearm by a felon. The charges included allegations of premeditation and personal use of a firearm causing great bodily injury. At a preliminary hearing, a witness testified that Alazar shot at a new tenant, Rutilio Navarro Hernandez, hitting him in the arm. Alazar pleaded no contest to attempted murder and admitted to personally and intentionally discharging a firearm in exchange for a 29-year sentence, with other charges dismissed. His counsel stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript contained a factual basis for the plea.The trial court denied Alazar's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6, which allows for resentencing if a conviction was based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine. The court found that Alazar was the sole perpetrator and thus ineligible for relief. Alazar argued that the court improperly engaged in judicial factfinding at the prima facie stage.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Six, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court erred in its prima facie determination. The appellate court found that the record did not conclusively establish that Alazar harbored the intent to kill, as required under the current versions of sections 188 and 189. The court noted that Alazar's West plea allowed him to maintain his innocence while accepting a plea bargain, and his stipulation to the preliminary hearing transcript did not equate to an admission of the facts therein.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for an evidentiary hearing to determine whether to vacate Alazar's attempted murder conviction, recall his sentence, and resentence him. The court emphasized that it expressed no opinion on the merits of the resentencing petition. View "P. v. Alazar" on Justia Law

In 2010, the defendant was prosecuted for multiple counts of attempted murder, assault with a semiautomatic firearm, and other charges. He pleaded no contest to one count of attempted murder and admitted to several enhancements, resulting in a 30-year prison sentence. In 2022, he filed a petition to vacate his conviction under Penal Code section 1172.6, which the trial court found made a prima facie case for an evidentiary hearing. The defendant then sought discovery of peace officer personnel records, which the trial court partially granted after an in-camera review.The Monterey County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied the petition. The defendant appealed, requesting the appellate court to review the trial court's application of Pitchess standards to the discovery motion. The appellate court requested supplemental briefing on whether the trial court's review should also encompass Brady principles, which require the disclosure of exculpatory evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, determined that a petitioner may obtain disclosure of peace officer personnel information under Brady principles through Pitchess procedures in advance of a section 1172.6 evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court did not clearly consider Brady principles when ruling on the discovery motion. Consequently, the appellate court conditionally reversed the trial court's order denying the petition and remanded the case for further proceedings to ensure compliance with Brady requirements. If the trial court finds additional discoverable information, it must allow the defendant to demonstrate prejudice and potentially order a new evidentiary hearing. View "People v. Nuno" on Justia Law

Frank Moseley was charged with murder after he killed his fiancé, who had told him she might be pregnant with another man's child. Moseley, a combat veteran diagnosed with PTSD, testified that his condition contributed to the crime. The jury found him guilty of voluntary manslaughter (heat of passion) and a weapon enhancement.The Superior Court of Orange County sentenced Moseley to 11 years in state prison, striking the additional punishment for the weapon use. The court acknowledged Moseley’s PTSD as a mitigating factor but did not explicitly consider the relevant service-related statutes (Penal Code §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91) when denying probation. Moseley’s counsel mentioned these statutes at the sentencing hearing but stated they were not "directly applicable." The probation department’s report and the sentencing briefs from both parties also failed to cite these statutes.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court did not expressly consider Moseley’s service-related PTSD as required by §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. These statutes mandate that a trial court must consider a defendant’s service-related PTSD as a factor in mitigation when deciding on probation and sentencing. The appellate court determined that the record was ambiguous regarding whether the trial court was aware of its statutory obligations under these sections.The appellate court reversed Moseley’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, directing the trial court to comply with its statutory obligations under §§ 1170.9 and 1170.91. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Moseley" on Justia Law

Romeo Deonte Knowles, a 23-year-old unhoused individual, attacked a security guard, William Bullock, at a homeless shelter. The altercation led to Bullock falling, hitting his head, and subsequently dying from blunt force trauma. Knowles claimed self-defense, citing intimidation by Bullock. He was charged with murder but later pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter.The Los Angeles County Superior Court received various reports and memoranda before sentencing. These included a mitigation packet detailing Knowles's traumatic childhood and mental health issues, a diagnostic report from the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, and sentencing memoranda from both the defense and prosecution. The defense argued for the low term of three years, citing Knowles's age, mental health, and lack of a criminal record. The prosecution recommended the midterm of six years, emphasizing Bullock's non-aggressive behavior and Knowles's failure to take full responsibility.The Superior Court sentenced Knowles to the midterm of six years, finding that the aggravating factors, such as the victim's vulnerability and Knowles's behavior while in custody, outweighed the mitigating factors. Knowles appealed, arguing that the court erred by not imposing the low term.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and found no abuse of discretion by the lower court. The appellate court held that the trial court correctly understood the scope of its sentencing discretion and appropriately weighed the aggravating and mitigating factors. The judgment of conviction was affirmed. View "People v. Knowles" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted of 20 counts of aggravated sexual assault, rape, sexual penetration, and oral copulation of unconscious or intoxicated persons involving four different victims. The crimes occurred after the defendant provided the victims with alcoholic beverages, rendering them intoxicated and unconscious. The jury found the defendant guilty of multiple offenses against each victim, including aggravated sexual assault, rape of an unconscious person, and rape of an intoxicated person.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially sentenced the defendant to 40 years in prison, including several upper-term sentences based on aggravating factors not admitted by the defendant or found true by a jury. The Court of Appeal vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under new sentencing reforms, Assembly Bill 518 and Senate Bill 567, which affected the court's discretion under Penal Code sections 654 and 1170, respectively. At resentencing, the trial court imposed mandatory full-term consecutive sentences for three counts of rape of an intoxicated person under Penal Code section 667.6(d) because they involved different victims. The court also imposed upper-term sentences based on the same fact that the crimes involved multiple victims, despite the defendant's objection to this dual use of facts.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and held that the trial court erred by using the same fact (multiple victims) to impose both upper-term and mandatory consecutive sentences under section 667.6(d). The appellate court concluded that the dual use prohibition applies even when consecutive sentencing is mandatory. As a result, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for a full resentencing hearing on the record as it stands, without allowing the prosecution to seek a trial on aggravating factors. The judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "People v. Dorado" on Justia Law