Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2006, William Jay Price was admitted to the State Department of State Hospitals as a sexually violent predator. In 2022, the superior court found Price suitable for conditional release. However, before placing him in the community, the court reconsidered its order, held a new hearing, and found him unsuitable for release. Price argued that the superior court erred by denying him the assistance of experts in defending his suitability and that the ruling was not supported by sufficient evidence. The real party in interest conceded that the court erred in denying Price the assistance of experts.The superior court initially found Price suitable for conditional release in October 2022. However, due to difficulties in finding a suitable residential placement and concerns about Price's behavior, the court reconsidered its decision. In July 2023, the court granted a six-month continuance for further review of Price's readiness for release. In November 2023, after considering new evidence and testimony, the court found Price unsuitable for conditional release, citing his behavior and concerns raised by Liberty Healthcare and the Department of State Hospitals.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the superior court erred in finding Price unsuitable for conditional release without providing him the assistance of experts, as required by law. The court held that Price was entitled to a new hearing with the procedural protections provided by section 6608, including the appointment of experts. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandate directing the superior court to vacate its order finding Price unsuitable for conditional release and to conduct a new hearing consistent with the opinion. View "Price v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition and was placed on felony probation for three years with specified conditions. He requested a transfer of his case from Riverside County to San Bernardino County, where he resided. The San Bernardino County Probation Department recommended additional drug and alcohol-related probation conditions. At the transfer hearing, the San Bernardino court added these recommended conditions.The Riverside County District Attorney initially charged the defendant with infliction of corporal injury, threatening a witness, and vandalism. The defendant entered a plea agreement and pled guilty to the first charge. He also pled guilty in a separate case to misdemeanor driving with a suspended license due to a prior DUI conviction. The court sentenced him to 180 days in county jail with a suspended four-year prison sentence and placed him on probation for three years. In the misdemeanor case, the court denied probation and sentenced him to 69 days in county jail, resulting in a terminal disposition. The Riverside County Superior Court later granted the transfer of his case to San Bernardino County without modifying his probation conditions.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction by modifying the defendant’s probation conditions without a change in circumstances. The court found that the transfer of the defendant’s probation to San Bernardino County did not constitute the requisite change in circumstances to justify the additional conditions. Consequently, the court struck the added drug and alcohol-related conditions and affirmed the order as modified. View "P. v. Rogers" on Justia Law

The defendant, Freddy Rivera Corbi, was bullied by gang members in his community for years. In July 2019, he was seriously injured by a gang member. A month later, Corbi encountered another gang member, Lazaro Orozco, and fatally shot him after an argument. At trial, the main issue was whether the shooting was in self-defense or an act of revenge. The jury convicted Corbi of second-degree murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County reviewed the case. Corbi argued that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing the prosecution’s gang expert to offer certain opinions and that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 during closing arguments. He also claimed the court erred in considering whether to dismiss a firearm enhancement at sentencing. The trial court imposed a sentence of 15 years to life for the murder, plus 10 years for a reduced firearm enhancement.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found no reversible error regarding the expert testimony, determining that the gang expert’s opinions were not speculative and did not prejudice the jury’s decision. The court also held that Corbi forfeited his Racial Justice Act claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Finally, the court concluded that the trial court properly imposed the firearm enhancement, as it had discretion to impose or dismiss the enhancement and had considered the relevant mitigating factors. The judgment was affirmed. View "P. v. Corbi" on Justia Law

In April 1996, James Alvin Thompson was convicted of first-degree murder with special circumstances, including committing the murder during a robbery and having a prior murder conviction. The jury sentenced him to death. Thompson's conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal. Following the enactment of Senate Bill No. 1437, which amended the felony murder rule, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing. The trial court summarily denied the petition, citing the special circumstances findings as rendering him ineligible for relief.The California Supreme Court had previously affirmed Thompson's conviction and sentence. Thompson also filed a habeas corpus petition, which was transferred to the Riverside County Superior Court and subsequently denied. Thompson appealed the denial, but the appeal was stayed due to funding issues for appellate habeas counsel. In January 2022, Thompson filed a petition for resentencing under Senate Bill No. 1437, which the trial court denied at the prima facie stage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court concluded that a capital defendant is entitled to seek resentencing relief under section 1172.6, but must do so through a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to section 1509, in compliance with Proposition 66. The court vacated the trial court's order denying Thompson's resentencing petition and remanded the case with directions to allow Thompson to file a limited petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his murder conviction under section 1172.6. The court emphasized that the trial court must follow the procedures outlined in section 1172.6, including appointing counsel if requested and holding a hearing to determine if Thompson has made a prima facie case for relief. View "P. v. Thompson" on Justia Law

Khyle Armando Briscoe, at age 21, participated in a robbery during which his accomplice, Shaun P., was fatally shot by the victim, Ben P. Briscoe was convicted of first-degree murder, robbery, and burglary, with a special circumstance finding under Penal Code section 190.2, subdivision (d), which led to a life without parole sentence. This special circumstance applies to non-killer participants in felonies who act with reckless indifference to human life.The trial court sentenced Briscoe to life without parole, and the conviction was affirmed on appeal. Briscoe later sought a parole hearing under Penal Code section 3051, which allows certain youth offenders to seek parole but excludes those sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. The trial court denied his motion, and Briscoe appealed.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. The court noted that section 3051 was intended to provide youth offenders with a meaningful opportunity for release based on demonstrated growth and rehabilitation. However, the statute excludes youth offenders sentenced to life without parole for special circumstance murder. Briscoe argued that this exclusion violated equal protection, particularly because section 190.2, subdivision (d) employs the same standard of liability as section 189, subdivision (e)(3), which does not exclude youth offenders from parole consideration.The Court of Appeal agreed with Briscoe, finding that the exclusion of youth offenders sentenced under section 190.2, subdivision (d) from parole consideration under section 3051 violated equal protection. The court reversed the trial court's order and remanded the case for a parole hearing and related proceedings. View "P. v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

In 1998, the defendant was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon and had two prior serious felony convictions. He was initially sentenced to 25 years to life in prison, plus 11 years for enhancements. In December 2023, the trial court resentenced him to 25 years to life. In January 2024, the defendant filed a motion for discovery under the California Racial Justice Act, seeking information to support a claim of racially disparate charging by the Sacramento County District Attorney’s Office. The trial court denied the motion, finding the defendant failed to provide a plausible factual foundation for a potential violation of the Act.The defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his discovery motion. The Fourth Appellate District, Division One, in In re Montgomery, held that an order denying a postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable. The trial court did not address its jurisdiction to consider the motion but denied it on the merits. The defendant also filed a separate petition for writ of mandate challenging the same order.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and concluded that the Act permits a defendant to file a stand-alone postjudgment discovery motion before filing a habeas corpus petition. The court agreed with the Montgomery decision that an order denying a postjudgment discovery motion under the Act is not appealable. The court found that the Act’s language allows for discovery before filing a habeas corpus petition and that such orders should be reviewed by a writ of mandate rather than by appeal. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Serrano" on Justia Law

In June 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to a drive-by shooting where they found a man with six gunshot wounds. The victim was taken to the hospital and later died. Javier Villagrana and his cousin Jaime Chavez were charged with the murder of Juan Vasquez, with gang and firearm enhancements. Villagrana pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to the gang enhancement and personal use of a firearm, resulting in a 26-year prison sentence. Chavez also pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter but did not admit to using a firearm.Villagrana later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not now be convicted of murder. The trial court found he had established a prima facie case and issued an order to show cause. However, after an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, finding Villagrana ineligible for resentencing as he was the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to the murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing. The court noted that Villagrana’s plea and admissions, including his use of a firearm and the gang-related nature of the crime, indicated he acted with malice. The court affirmed the trial court’s order, concluding that Villagrana could still be found guilty of murder under the amended laws. View "P. v. Villagrana" on Justia Law

Cristian Omar Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code section 1473.7. He then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, which the trial court denied. Martinez appealed, arguing that section 1473.7 does not allow the trial court to reinstate the original charges and that doing so violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General contended that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss is not appealable and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially granted Martinez’s motion to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea. However, when Martinez subsequently moved to dismiss the charges, the trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1473.7 does not provide for dismissal after a plea is set aside.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Attorney General that the order denying the motion to dismiss is not appealable. However, the court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Upon examining the merits, the court concluded that section 1473.7 does not mandate the dismissal of charges after a conviction is vacated and a plea is withdrawn. The court also found that section 1203.4, which provides for the dismissal of charges upon successful completion of probation, does not preclude the refiling of charges once a conviction is vacated under section 1473.7. Additionally, the court held that the original charges could be reinstated as felonies despite their prior reduction to misdemeanors. The court denied the petition for writ of mandate and directed the parties to proceed on the reinstated information. View "Martinez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

On November 5, 2021, officers from the Mountain View Police Department investigated a reported armed robbery at Brendan Krepchin’s apartment. They found no evidence of a robbery but discovered a note suggesting a plan for violence, law enforcement equipment, and firearms. The police department petitioned for a gun violence restraining order (GVRO), which the Santa Clara County Superior Court issued initially as an emergency order and later as a three-year order after a hearing in January 2023. The order barred Krepchin from possessing firearms or ammunition.The Santa Clara County Superior Court issued the emergency GVRO on November 5, 2021, and later a three-year GVRO after a hearing in January 2023. The court found clear and convincing evidence that Krepchin posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by possessing firearms. Krepchin appealed, arguing the GVRO violated his Second Amendment rights, was procedurally defective, and that the trial court erred in qualifying an officer as a threat assessment expert and admitting hearsay evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the GVRO did not violate the Second Amendment, referencing the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, which upheld firearm restrictions for individuals posing a threat. The court also found no procedural defects in the GVRO issuance and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the officer as an expert or admitting hearsay evidence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the GVRO, affirming the lower court’s decision. View "Mountain View Police Dept. v. Krepchin" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that one of the investigating officers had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the officer’s department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense counsel requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA). Concurrently, the petitioner filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material from the officer’s personnel file. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the disclosure of the records related to the officer’s dishonesty, but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate the protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The trial court had issued the protective order under Evidence Code section 1045(e), which restricts the use of disclosed records to the court proceeding.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case. The court noted that Senate Bill No. 1421 amended sections 832.7 and 832.8 to make certain law enforcement personnel records, including those involving sustained findings of dishonesty, nonconfidential and subject to public disclosure. The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for records that are nonconfidential under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer’s sustained finding of dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law