Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two defendants, Fredi Analberto Lopez-Flores and Christian Alejandro May Quintero, were convicted of multiple sex crimes, including forcible rape, sodomy, and oral copulation in concert, after they abducted an inebriated woman, Jane Doe, from the streets of San Francisco, drove her 50 miles away, and assaulted her. The prosecution used terms like "monsters" and "predators" during closing arguments, which the defendants later claimed violated the California Racial Justice Act (RJA) and constituted prosecutorial misconduct.In the lower court, the jury found both defendants guilty on all counts. Lopez-Flores was also found to have a prior conviction, which was considered during sentencing. The trial court imposed consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (d), finding that the offenses occurred on separate occasions. The court also stated that even if this finding was incorrect, it would impose consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), based on the nature of the crimes and aggravating factors.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court concluded that the prosecution's use of the terms "monsters" and "predators" did not violate the RJA, as these terms were race-neutral and based on the defendants' conduct. The court also found no prosecutorial misconduct, determining that the comments were within the permissible range of descriptive commentary based on the evidence. The court held that the trial court did not err in imposing consecutive sentences under section 667.6, subdivision (c), and any potential error under subdivision (d) was harmless because the court provided adequate reasons for its discretionary decision. The judgments were affirmed. View "P. v. Quintero" on Justia Law

Angel Garcia and Armando Alvarado, members of the Logan Red Steps gang in San Diego, were convicted by a jury of murdering Eduardo S., attempting to murder Ruben T., and committing robbery. Alvarado was also found guilty of shooting at an occupied structure, and Garcia of an additional robbery. The jury found true various firearm allegations and a robbery murder special circumstance. The trial court sentenced both to life without parole for the murder and special circumstance.The Superior Court of San Diego County admitted gang-related evidence despite bifurcating the gang enhancements. The court excluded evidence that Eduardo had stolen a BB gun and refused to instruct on lesser included offenses of second-degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. Garcia argued cumulative errors required reversal, and both appellants claimed their sentences constituted cruel and unusual punishment. Alvarado also contended errors regarding a firearm enhancement and concurrent sentencing for shooting at an occupied dwelling. The People conceded Alvarado was entitled to additional custody credit and correction of the abstract of judgment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, found the trial court prejudicially erred by admitting gang-related evidence, which was more prejudicial than probative and not relevant to proving the substantive crimes. The court concluded this error likely influenced the jury's verdict, particularly affecting the credibility contest between Ruben and Alvarado. Consequently, the court reversed the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. The court did not address the instructional error claims, as they were moot given the reversal of the convictions. View "P. v. Garcia" on Justia Law

Jason Robert Hodge filed a notice of appeal from a trial court order denying two requests for relief: a motion under the Racial Justice Act and a request for resentencing under section 1172.1. Hodge had pleaded no contest in 2012 to three felony counts of battery and assault with a deadly weapon and was sentenced to an aggregate term of 21 years. On January 5, 2024, Hodge filed a motion for relief due to discrimination and a request for recall of sentence and resentencing. The trial court denied both requests in a single order dated February 6, 2024.The trial court declined to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence under section 1172.1. Hodge appealed, and appellate counsel filed a brief under People v. Delgadillo, raising no arguable issues. Hodge filed his own supplemental brief but did not address the issue of appealability. The appellate court requested briefing on the appealability of the trial court’s denial of Hodge’s request for resentencing in light of People v. Loper. The parties subsequently briefed the issue.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, concluded that neither component of the trial court’s order was appealable. The court held that the trial court’s decision not to exercise its discretion to recall Hodge’s sentence did not affect Hodge’s substantial rights under section 1237, subdivision (b), because the trial court had no statutory obligation to act on Hodge’s request. Additionally, the trial court did not have jurisdiction to consider Hodge’s motion under the Racial Justice Act, as incarcerated defendants whose convictions are final may only raise claims under that act in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed. View "P. v. Hodge" on Justia Law

A Black man, known for his career in the NFL, was accused by an intellectually disabled woman of raping her at gunpoint during a babysitting job interview at his home. The jury found him guilty of forcible rape, forcible oral copulation, and false imprisonment, with firearm use in the first two offenses. He was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. The prosecution argued that the police did not search his house due to his fame and race, suggesting a search would have caused controversy.The trial began in March 2020 but was paused due to the COVID-19 pandemic, resuming three months later. The jury acquitted him on two counts related to the victim's incapacity to consent. The trial court sentenced him in October 2020. The defendant appealed, arguing that the prosecution's statements violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 by appealing to racial bias.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the prosecution violated the Racial Justice Act by explicitly asserting that the defendant's race influenced the police's decision not to search his house, implying he gained an undeserved advantage at trial because he was Black. The court concluded that the prosecution's statements constituted racially discriminatory language under Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(2). The court held that Penal Code section 745, subdivision (e)(2)(A) precludes harmless error analysis and mandates vacating the conviction and sentence. Consequently, the court reversed the judgment, vacated the conviction and sentence, and remanded for new proceedings consistent with the Racial Justice Act. View "P. v. Stubblefield" on Justia Law

Fredy Cordero Gudiel, a member of the West Side Locos gang, was convicted of second-degree murder for his involvement in the 2004 killing of William Maldonado, a member of the rival Toonerville gang. Gudiel, along with fellow gang members William Torres and Pedro Pena, attacked Maldonado after confronting him in Toonerville territory. During the attack, Pena and Torres struck Maldonado with bats, and Gudiel punched, kicked, and threw a bicycle at him. Maldonado sustained severe head injuries and died four days later from blunt head trauma.In 2007, a jury convicted Gudiel of second-degree murder, and he was sentenced to 15 years to life in prison. Gudiel's conviction was affirmed on appeal. In 2022, Gudiel filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that he could not be convicted of murder under the amended laws. The trial court appointed counsel, and after a series of hearings, the court held an evidentiary hearing in May 2023.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's denial of Gudiel's petition for resentencing. The court found that substantial evidence supported the trial court's conclusion that Gudiel aided and abetted an implied malice murder. The court determined that Gudiel knew his co-defendants intended to commit a life-endangering act, intended to aid them, and acted with conscious disregard for human life. The court rejected Gudiel's argument that the trial court should have applied the "reckless indifference to human life" standard, noting that it is distinct from the "conscious disregard for human life" standard required for implied malice second-degree murder. View "P. v. Gudiel" on Justia Law

Luis Mendez was charged with two misdemeanors in one case and several felonies and a misdemeanor in a separate case. The trial court found him mentally incompetent and suspended criminal proceedings in both cases. After determining that Mendez's mental competency was restored, the court reinstated all charges and denied Mendez's motion to dismiss the misdemeanor case under Penal Code section 1370.01.The Superior Court of Orange County initially suspended criminal proceedings in both cases and committed Mendez to the State Department of State Hospitals. Mendez's counsel moved to dismiss the misdemeanor charges, arguing that section 1370.01 applied, which does not provide for restoring competency in misdemeanor cases. The trial court denied the motion, stating that section 1370 applied because Mendez was charged with felonies, and reinstated criminal proceedings after finding Mendez competent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that section 1370 applies to a person charged with a felony, even if misdemeanors are charged in a separate document. The court interpreted section 1367(b) to mean that section 1370.01 applies only when a defendant is charged with misdemeanors and no felonies. Since Mendez was charged with felonies, section 1370 applied to all charges. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in applying section 1370, reinstating criminal proceedings, or denying the motion to dismiss. The petition for a writ of mandate/prohibition was denied. View "Mendez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The case involves Lori Ann Wiley, who, along with Charles Wallace Hanson, engaged in a verbal altercation at a Kern High School District (KHSD) high school. The incident began when a school employee blocked a handicap parking spot they intended to use. Wiley later submitted a written complaint about the incident to the school. Subsequently, KHSD police officer Michael Whiting recommended various misdemeanor charges against Wiley, leading to her being cited and a prosecutor filing a criminal complaint with three misdemeanor charges. After a mistrial, the court dismissed Wiley’s charges in the interest of justice.Wiley sued KHSD police officers Edward Komin, Michael Whiting, Luis Peña, and Steven Alvidrez, alleging violations of her First Amendment rights, malicious prosecution, and abuse of process. She brought causes of action under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, the Bane Act, and common law torts for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. The trial court sustained the defendants’ demurrer to Wiley’s causes of action in the second amended complaint on multiple grounds without leave to amend and granted a motion to strike Wiley’s punitive damages allegations without leave to amend.The California Court of Appeal, Fifth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the trial court’s decision in part and reversed it in part. The appellate court held that Wiley failed to adequately plead her claims under section 1983 for malicious/retaliatory prosecution and abuse of process, as well as her claims under the Bane Act. The court also found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity and that Wiley did not sufficiently allege facts to support her claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and negligence. However, the court granted Wiley leave to amend her section 1983 claim but denied leave to amend her other causes of action. The court affirmed the trial court’s order granting the motion to strike without leave to amend. View "Wiley v. Kern High School District" on Justia Law

The appellant, Shawn Lee Perrot, was convicted in 2004 of multiple sexual offenses involving minors, including forcible rape, lewd acts on a child, and distribution of lewd material to a minor. After serving over 16 years of a 21-year sentence, he was paroled with specific conditions. Perrot violated three parole conditions: accessing and using computer devices, associating with known sex offenders, and possessing sexually stimulating devices. He challenged these conditions as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad.Upon his release, Perrot refused to sign parole conditions, leading to civil commitment proceedings, which were later dismissed. He was evaluated as high risk for reoffending. Perrot signed parole conditions, including prohibitions on computer access, associating with sex offenders, and possessing sexually stimulating devices. He filed grievances and a habeas corpus petition challenging these conditions, which were largely denied, though he was temporarily allowed limited computer use for legal research.The Department of Adult Parole Operations filed a petition for parole revocation, alleging Perrot violated the conditions. Evidence showed he possessed multiple unauthorized devices, operated a business assisting sex offenders, and had sexually stimulating devices. The court found probable cause and revoked his parole, sentencing him to a 60-day jail term, followed by reinstatement to parole.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court rejected Perrot's claims, holding that the parole conditions were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. The court found the conditions were sufficiently precise and narrowly tailored to address the state's compelling interest in preventing Perrot from reoffending. The order revoking Perrot's parole was affirmed. View "P. v. Perrot" on Justia Law

Roderick Barnes III was convicted by a jury of three counts of attempted murder, three counts of attempted robbery, and three counts of assault with a firearm. The jury also found that Barnes personally discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury and that he participated in a criminal street gang, committing the crimes for the benefit of the gang. Barnes was sentenced to 70 years to life in prison.Barnes appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in overruling his objection to the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge against a Black prospective juror, failing to instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 332, and that there was insufficient evidence to support the gang participation conviction and enhancements. The People conceded the latter two points but argued that the gang-related offenses could be retried.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court found that the trial court erred in overruling Barnes’s objection to the peremptory challenge. The court determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking the juror were not valid and that the trial court improperly considered reasons not stated by the prosecutor. The court also found that substantial evidence did not support the gang participation conviction and enhancements, as the prosecution failed to provide a sufficient foundation for the expert’s opinion that the murder of P.M. commonly benefited the gang.The Court of Appeal reversed the judgment in its entirety and remanded the case for a new trial on counts 1 through 9. The court held that the prosecution could not retry Barnes for the gang participation offense or the gang enhancements due to insufficient evidence. View "People v. Barnes" on Justia Law

In 2008, Charome Davis was charged with the murder of Rudy Henderson, Jr. and possession of a firearm by a felon. Davis pleaded guilty to voluntary manslaughter and admitted to using a firearm in the commission of the offense, resulting in a 21-year prison sentence. In April 2022, Davis filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing that recent changes to the murder statutes meant he could not be convicted of murder.The Alameda County Superior Court held an evidentiary hearing where the prosecution presented evidence, including a police interview with a witness, R.L., and the preliminary hearing transcript. R.L. had initially told police that Davis was involved in the shooting and described the events leading up to Henderson's death. However, at the preliminary hearing, R.L. was uncooperative and claimed not to remember the events or her previous statements.The trial court found R.L.'s initial police interview more credible than her preliminary hearing testimony. Based on R.L.'s detailed account and other circumstantial evidence, the court concluded that Davis was the actual killer and had acted with reckless indifference to human life. The court denied Davis's petition for resentencing, finding sufficient evidence to support the original conviction.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that Davis was the actual killer, based on R.L.'s statements and the circumstantial evidence presented. Consequently, the denial of Davis's petition for resentencing under section 1172.6 was upheld. View "People v. Davis" on Justia Law