Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Leonardo Garcia filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, seeking relief from his convictions for second-degree murder and attempted premeditated murder. The trial court found Garcia had made a prima facie case for relief, issued an order to show cause, and set an evidentiary hearing. Garcia's counsel subpoenaed the LAPD for contact information of two witnesses, but the trial court granted the LAPD's motion to quash, ruling that section 1172.6 did not allow for postconviction discovery. Garcia then filed a petition for a writ of mandate challenging this decision.Previously, the trial court had found Garcia guilty of first-degree murder and other charges, with the jury finding true various firearm and gang-related enhancements. On appeal, the first-degree murder conviction was reduced to second-degree murder, and Garcia's sentence was adjusted to 120 years to life. Garcia's subsequent petitions for resentencing were initially denied until the current petition was found to state a prima facie case for relief.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that section 1172.6 allows for postconviction discovery after an order to show cause is issued. The court reasoned that denying such discovery would hinder the petitioner's ability to defend against new theories of liability that the prosecution might present at the evidentiary hearing. The court found that the trial court abused its discretion by quashing the subpoena, as it prevented Garcia from obtaining potentially relevant evidence. The appellate court granted Garcia's petition for a writ of mandate, directing the trial court to vacate its order granting the motion to quash and to issue a new order denying the motion. View "Garcia v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In September 2017, Attorney Karolyn Kovtun held a meeting with Jennifer Shenefield and her client Mark Shenefield, despite a criminal protective order prohibiting Mark from contacting Jennifer. During the meeting, Mark and Kovtun verbally and emotionally abused Jennifer, and Kovtun threatened to remove their daughter from Jennifer’s custody if she did not sign a custody agreement. Jennifer signed the agreement under duress and contacted the police. Kovtun continued to represent Mark, who was later convicted of violating the protective order. Kovtun then sued Jennifer for recording the meeting without consent, prompting Jennifer to file a cross-complaint against Kovtun.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied Kovtun’s two anti-SLAPP motions and sustained her demurrer to two of Jennifer’s six causes of action. After a bench trial, the court found Kovtun liable for negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation, awarding Jennifer $50,000 in damages. Kovtun appealed, arguing that Jennifer’s claims were barred by the statute of limitations and the litigation privilege.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, California, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Kovtun waived the statute of limitations defense by failing to timely and properly plead it. Additionally, the court determined that the litigation privilege did not apply to Kovtun’s communications during the meeting, as they were not made in good faith contemplation of litigation. The court affirmed the judgment against Kovtun, upholding the $50,000 damages award to Jennifer. View "Shenefield v. Kovtun" on Justia Law

The defendant, Eliseo Martinez, restrained Nicasio Calixto Pascual while his cousin, Valente Martinez, stabbed Calixto 18 times. During an interview with detectives, Martinez admitted his participation in the stabbing. Martinez claimed the trial court improperly denied an instruction on voluntary manslaughter based on heat of passion, arguing it was not supported by the evidence and was prohibited under Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) due to the victim’s sexual orientation. Martinez also contended that his constitutional and statutory rights were violated when the court found him voluntarily absent from the trial.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County found Martinez guilty of attempted murder and determined several aggravating circumstances, including that the crime was a hate crime. Martinez was sentenced to 23 years in state prison. Martinez appealed, arguing the trial court erred in not instructing the jury on attempted voluntary manslaughter and in proceeding with the trial in his absence.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court correctly denied the instruction on voluntary manslaughter because there was no substantial evidence that Martinez acted in the heat of passion due to sufficient provocation. The court also found that Penal Code section 192, subdivision (f)(1) rendered any provocation related to the victim’s sexual orientation objectively unreasonable. Additionally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Martinez voluntarily absented himself from the trial, and thus, his right to be present was not violated. The judgment of the lower court was affirmed. View "P. v. Martinez" on Justia Law

In March 2011, Prentice Robinson was indicted on multiple felony charges, including attempted murder, for crimes committed between January and February 2011. Robinson pleaded no contest to several charges, including attempted murder, and admitted to using a firearm during the crime. He was sentenced to 22 years in prison. In January 2022, Robinson filed a petition for resentencing, which was denied by the trial court. Robinson appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by considering grand jury testimony, which he claimed was inadmissible hearsay.The Superior Court of San Joaquin County initially handled the case, where Robinson pleaded no contest and was sentenced. In 2022, Robinson sought resentencing, but the trial court denied his petition after considering grand jury transcripts. Robinson contended that the grand jury testimony should not have been considered, as it constituted inadmissible hearsay and violated his Sixth Amendment rights.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court held that the grand jury testimony was admissible under section 1172.6, subdivision (d)(3), which allows for the consideration of evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing or trial if it remains admissible under current law. The court found that the grand jury proceedings were analogous to preliminary hearings and thus fell within the scope of "any prior hearing." The court also determined that Robinson's Sixth Amendment rights were not violated, as the section 1172.6 hearing is a postconviction collateral proceeding, not a new criminal prosecution, and thus does not afford the same constitutional protections.The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's decision, concluding that the grand jury testimony was properly considered and that Robinson's due process rights were not violated. View "P. v. Robinson" on Justia Law

Enrique Sanchez, the petitioner, sought a writ of mandate to vacate a trial court order that directed the San Bernardino County Public Defender to assign a new attorney to represent him. This order was issued after the current deputy public defender made remarks during plea negotiations that invoked Sanchez's race, potentially violating the Racial Justice Act (RJA). Sanchez argued that the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the reassignment.The trial court received a motion from the prosecutor to disclose exculpatory evidence and evaluate a conflict of interest after the deputy public defender made racially charged comments. During a closed hearing, Sanchez expressed his desire to retain his current counsel. However, the trial court ordered the reassignment of the deputy public defender, citing potential issues under the RJA and the risk of ineffective assistance of counsel.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in removing the deputy public defender. The appellate court noted that the RJA's provisions and the potential for implicit bias created an actual conflict of interest that the deputy public defender could not objectively investigate. Additionally, the court found that the trial court's decision to prevent a potential future RJA claim was within its discretion to avoid substantial impairment of the proceedings.The appellate court concluded that Sanchez's arguments regarding constitutional violations and the necessity of an actual conflict were without merit. The court emphasized that the trial court's order was narrowly tailored and did not violate Sanchez's rights. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the stay on trial court proceedings was vacated. View "Sanchez v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The petitioner was charged with first-degree murder. During the investigation, the prosecution informed the defense that an investigating officer had a sustained finding of dishonesty, and the police department intended to release related records under Penal Code section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The defense requested these records under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) and filed a Pitchess motion seeking additional Brady material. The trial court, after an in-camera review, found no additional Brady material and ordered the release of the dishonesty records but issued a protective order limiting their dissemination.The trial court's protective order restricted the defense from sharing the records outside the defense team. The petitioner sought an extraordinary writ of mandate to vacate this protective order, arguing that the records were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The Court of Appeal initially denied the petition, but the Supreme Court directed the appellate court to reconsider.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case de novo and concluded that the records of the officer's sustained finding of dishonesty were nonconfidential and subject to public inspection under section 832.7(b)(1)(C). The court held that the trial court should not have issued a protective order for these records, as they were not confidential. Consequently, the appellate court granted the petition for writ of mandate and directed the trial court to vacate its protective order concerning the records of the officer's dishonesty. View "Banuelos v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In November 2021, Brendan Krepchin reported an armed robbery at his apartment. Upon investigation, the Mountain View Police Department found no evidence of a robbery but discovered a note suggesting potential violence, law enforcement equipment, and firearms. The police department sought and obtained an emergency gun violence restraining order (GVRO) from the Santa Clara County Superior Court, which was later extended to a three-year order after a hearing in January 2023.The trial court found clear and convincing evidence that Krepchin posed a significant danger of causing personal injury by possessing firearms. The court emphasized the note found in his apartment and his inability to explain it. Krepchin appealed, arguing that the GVRO violated his Second Amendment rights, was procedurally defective, and that the trial court erred in qualifying an officer as a threat assessment expert and admitting hearsay evidence.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court held that the GVRO did not violate the Second Amendment, referencing the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Rahimi, which upheld firearm restrictions for individuals posing a threat. The court also found no procedural defects in the GVRO's issuance and ruled that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in qualifying the officer as an expert or in admitting hearsay evidence. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the trial court's findings, including the note and other evidence indicating Krepchin's potential for violence. View "Mountain View Police Dept. v. Krepchin" on Justia Law

Cristian Omar Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction and withdraw his plea under Penal Code section 1473.7. He then filed a motion to dismiss the charges against him, which the trial court denied. Martinez appealed, arguing that section 1473.7 does not allow the trial court to reinstate the original charges and that doing so violates the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment. The Attorney General contended that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss is not appealable and that the trial court did not err in denying the motion.The Santa Clara County Superior Court initially charged Martinez with felony counts of inflicting corporal injury and unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor, and a misdemeanor count of damaging a wireless communication device. Martinez pleaded no contest to all charges in exchange for a reduced sentence. After completing probation, he moved to reduce his felony charges and clear his record, which the trial court granted. Later, Martinez successfully moved to vacate his conviction under section 1473.7, but the trial court reinstated the original charges. Martinez’s subsequent motion to dismiss these charges was denied.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court agreed with the Attorney General that the order denying Martinez’s motion to dismiss was not appealable. However, the court exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. On the merits, the court concluded that section 1473.7 does not mandate the dismissal of refiled charges and that the statute does not preclude the refiling of the original charges as felonies. The court also found that double jeopardy does not bar further proceedings on the underlying charges. Consequently, the petition for writ of mandate was denied, and the parties were instructed to proceed on the reinstated information. View "Martinez v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In June 2013, Los Angeles Sheriff’s deputies responded to a drive-by shooting, finding a man with six gunshot wounds who later died. Javier Villagrana and his cousin Jaime Chavez were charged with the murder of Juan Vasquez, with gang and firearm enhancements. Villagrana pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter, admitting to gang involvement and personal use of a firearm, and was sentenced to 26 years in prison. Chavez also pleaded no contest to voluntary manslaughter but did not admit to using a firearm.Villagrana later filed a petition for resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, arguing he could not now be convicted of murder. The trial court found he had established a prima facie case and issued an order to show cause. However, after an evidentiary hearing, the court denied the petition, finding Villagrana ineligible for resentencing as he was the actual killer or a direct aider and abettor to the murder.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the trial court’s decision. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court’s finding that Villagrana was ineligible for resentencing. The court noted that Villagrana’s plea and admissions, including his use of a firearm and gang involvement, indicated he acted with malice. The court also rejected Villagrana’s contention that the trial court applied an erroneous standard of proof, affirming that the trial court correctly found beyond a reasonable doubt that Villagrana could be convicted of murder under the new law. View "P. v. Villagrana" on Justia Law

The defendant, Freddy Rivera Corbi, was bullied by gang members in his community for years. In July 2019, he was seriously injured by a gang member. A month later, Corbi encountered another gang member, Lazaro Orozco, and fatally shot him during an argument. At trial, the main issue was whether the shooting was in self-defense or an act of revenge. The jury convicted Corbi of second-degree murder.The Superior Court of San Diego County allowed the prosecution’s gang expert to testify about the significance of Corbi following Orozco before the shooting. Corbi argued on appeal that this testimony was speculative and prejudicial. He also claimed that the prosecutor violated the California Racial Justice Act of 2020 by highlighting his interest in white women during closing arguments. Additionally, Corbi contended that the trial court erred in considering whether to dismiss a firearm enhancement at sentencing.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that while the gang expert’s testimony exceeded the proper scope of expert testimony, it was not prejudicial enough to affect the outcome. The court also determined that Corbi forfeited his Racial Justice Act claim by failing to raise it in the trial court. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not err in imposing the firearm enhancement, as it had the discretion to impose or dismiss the enhancement and had considered the relevant mitigating factors.The judgment of the Superior Court was affirmed. View "P. v. Corbi" on Justia Law