Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Department filed a petition for writs of administrative and traditional mandamus, and declaratory relief, seeking, among other things, an order compelling the Director of the Department of General Services, OAH, to set aside the order and decision issued by one of its ALJs in the matter of Parents on Behalf of Student v. Tuolumne County California Children’s Services, OAH Case No. 2012100238. The District and County, as well as the student's parents, opposed the Department's petition. The trial court affirmed the ALJ's order and decision, denying all of the Department's requests. The court agreed with the Department's contentions that the trial court erred when it summarily denied the petition for writ of administrative mandamus and failed to conduct an independent review on the petition for writs of administrative and traditional mandamus. The court concluded, however, that the trial court did not err in denying the requests for writs of mandamus and declaratory relief, and awarding attorney fees to the student. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Department of Health Care Services v. Office of Administrative Hearings" on Justia Law

"John Doe" and "Jane Roe" were students at the University of California, San Diego (UCSD) when they began a romantic relationship. A few months after their relationship ended, Jane made a complaint to UCSD's Office of Student Conduct (OSC) that John had sexually assaulted her. The investigator produced a report indicating it was more likely than not that John digitally penetrated Jane's vagina without consent but that there was insufficient evidence to support two other claims Jane had alleged against John: (1) John had sexual intercourse with Jane without her effective consent on January 31, 2014; and (2) John retaliated against Jane at an off campus party on May 14, 2014. After a meeting with the relevant dean in which John did not take responsibility for the alleged misconduct, UCSD held a student conduct review hearing regarding Jane's complaint where a student conduct review panel (Panel) heard testimony and considered evidence. Ultimately, the Panel found that John had violated UCSD's Student Conduct Code. In addition to other sanctions, the Panel recommended John be suspended from UCSD for one quarter. After considering the Panel's recommendation, the evidence, and statements from both John and Jane, the relevant dean suspended John for an entire year in addition to prescribing other sanctions. John appealed the Panel's decision as well as the sanctions to the council of provosts, but the council found the Panel's decision supported by the evidence and the sanctions were not too excessive. In fact, the council of provosts increased the length of John's suspension by a quarter. John petitioned for a writ of mandate in the superior court, arguing he was not afforded a fair hearing, substantial evidence did not support the Panel's decision, and both the dean and the Regents of the University of California (Regents) improperly increased his punishment in response to his appealing the Panel's decision and recommended sanctions. The superior court granted the petition, agreeing with John on all grounds and entered judgement requiring the Regents to set aside their findings and the sanctions issued against John. The Regents appeal the judgment, arguing the trial court erred in granting the petition for writ of mandamus. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that the superior court erred in rendering judgment in favor of John. The judgment was reversed and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "Doe v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

This case presented an issue of statutory interpretation of the scope of the geographic restrictions of the Charter Schools Act of 1992, as amended by the Legislature in 2002. Specifically, the issue was whether the comprehensive statutory scheme governing charter schools permitted an authorized charter school to locate a resource center outside the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district but within the same county. The 2002 amendments generally required charter schools to operate within the geographic boundaries of the authorizing school district, with limited exceptions. One such exception was for a resource center, meeting space, or other satellite facility located in an adjacent county, provided certain conditions were met. Shasta Secondary Home School (SSHS) operated a nonclassroom-based charter school, providing educational support for students who are home schooled. SSHS operates two resource centers in Redding which provide educational services, labs, a meeting place for the student and his or her facilitator, work spaces, and some optional classes. In 2013, SSHS opened a third resource center in a room at the East Cottonwood Elementary School- within Shasta County, but outside the boundaries of the Shasta Union High School District. Instead, it was within the boundaries of plaintiff Anderson Union High School District (AUHSD). AUHSD brought suit, seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, contending the location of this resource center violated the Charter Schools Act, as well as the charter of SSHS. AUHSD claimed it was harmed by the location of the resource center because it had lost funding when students within its district chose to go to SSHS. The trial court denied both injunctive and declaratory relief, finding the geographic and site limitations of the Charter Schools Act did not apply to resource centers. The Court of Appeals concluded the language of the Charter Schools Act did not support that interpretation, and reversed. View "Anderson Union High Sch. Dist. v. Shasta Secondary Home Sch." on Justia Law

The College Network, Inc. (TCN) appealed an order denying its motion to compel arbitration of a consumer fraud and breach of contract action brought by Plaintiffs Bernadette Magno, Rosanna Garcia, and Sheree Rudio. TCN argued the arbitration provision in Plaintiffs' purchase agreements was valid and enforceable and contended the trial court erred when it ruled the provision unconscionable. Alternatively, TCN argued that if the forum selection clause was unconscionable, the court abused its discretion in voiding the arbitration provision altogether rather than severing the objectionable provisions and enforcing the remainder. After review of the provision at issue, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court correctly determined the arbitration provision to be procedurally and substantively unconscionable and did not abuse its discretion in voiding it in its entirety. View "Magno v. The College Network, Inc." on Justia Law

Harris is the principal at Peterson Middle School in the Santa Clara Unified School District. Stampolis, a district board member, has a son who attends Peterson. In October 2014, Harris obtained a civil harassment restraining order (Code Civ. Proc., 527.6) against Stampolis after he became aggressive toward her when she confronted him about how he was regularly late to pick up his son after school. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that sufficient evidence supported conclusions that Stampolis made a credible threat of violence toward Harris on August 27, 2014; that it is reasonably probable that unlawful harassment may occur in the future absent a restraining order; and that the harassment caused Harris emotional distress. View "Harris v. Stampolis" on Justia Law

In 2010-2011, the San Francisco Unified School District employed 11 substitute teachers who worked on an as-needed basis and 15 paraprofessional classified employees. Each of the 26 employees received a letter during the spring of the 2010-2011 school year advising that they had a reasonable assurance of employment for the following 2011-2012 school year. The 26 sought unemployment benefits for the period between the last date of the regular session of the 2010-2011 school year, May 27, 2011, and the first day of instruction for the 2011-2012 school year, August 15, 2011. The Employment Development Department denied benefits. The California Unemployment Insurance Appeals Board reversed. The trial court and court of appeals ruled in favor of the District: “in effect what the claimants ... are requesting is … a full year‘s income … they have agreed to work and be paid for only 41 weeks of each year. … school employees can plan for those periods of unemployment and thus are not experiencing the suffering from unanticipated layoffs that the employment-security law was intended to alleviate.” View "United Educators of San Francisco. v. Cal. Unemp. Ins. Appeals Bd." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Uriel Jimenez was injured at a middle school within defendant Roseville City School District. The 14-year old Jimenez was in a classroom where fellow middle school students were purportedly practicing break dancing, but in which some were also performing “flips.” Students had been ordered not to perform flips; and the teacher who allowed the students to use his classroom for dancing violated school policy by leaving them unsupervised. Jimenez was seriously injured when other students waited for the teacher to leave them unsupervised, and then induced Jimenez to attempt a flip. The trial court granted the District summary judgment, concluding Jimenez assumed the risk of injury by participating in break dancing. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Jimenez, the Court of Appeal found two viable theories of liability, and as such, reversed and remanded with directions to the trial court to deny the District’s summary judgment motion. View "Jimenez v. Roseville City School Dist." on Justia Law

Education Code section 17406 governs lease-leaseback construction agreements. Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the lease-leaseback agreements entered into by defendants were a sham to avoid the competitive bid process and are therefore void. The court concluded that the trial court properly sustained the demurrer to all causes of action alleging the district was required to obtain competitive bids where competitive bids were not required under section 17406. The court also concluded that the trial court should have overruled the demurrer to the conflict of interest cause of action for violation of Government Code section 1090 where, at this early stage in the proceedings, section 1090 may apply. The court rejected defendants' arguments that plaintiffs lack standing to raise the issue and that section 1090 always excludes all independent contractors. Finally, the court concluded that the sanctions against plaintiffs' attorney must be reversed because the litigation is not frivolous. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part. View "McGee v. Balfour Beatty Constr." on Justia Law

After Diagnostics obtained a judgment against plaintiff, plaintiff filed a Claim of Exemption seeking a judicial declaration that seven of his Fidelity Investments accounts were exempt from levy. The court held that the money that a person sets aside for the “qualified higher education expenses” of his children under Internal Revenue Code section 529 (so-called “section 529 savings accounts”) are not exempt from the collection efforts under the California Enforcement of Judgments Law, Code of Civil Procedure section 680.010 et seq., of a creditor who has a valid judgment against that person. Therefore, the court reversed the trial court's ruling to the contrary and reversed the trial court's finding that plaintiff's retirement accounts are fully exempt from collection because the trial court did not apply the proper legal standard in evaluating the exemption for private retirement accounts. View "O'Brien v. AMBS Diagnostics" on Justia Law

One of the cases (consolidated on appeal) was filed by nonprofit associations and guardians ad litem for minor public school students, one adult taxpayer and homeowner and two adult taxpayers and homeowners who are parents of students. The other was filed by nonprofit associations, guardians ad litem, and several California school districts. The California Teachers Association intervened. The suits sought declaratory and injunctive relief based on allegations of violations of sections 1 and 5 of California Constitution article IX. The suits claim that all public school children have a constitutional right to an education of “some quality,” and that the Legislature is currently failing to meet its constitutional duty by employing an irrational educational funding scheme. The court of appeal affirmed dismissal, finding no implied constitutional rights to an education of “some quality” for public school children or minimum level of expenditures for education. The language of the cited constitutional sections do not include qualitative or funding elements that may be judicially enforced by the courts, but leave the difficult and policy-laden questions associated with educational adequacy and funding to the legislative branch. View "Campaign for Quality Educ. v. California" on Justia Law