Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, nine students who were attending California public schools filed suit against the State and several state officials, seeking a court order declaring various provisions of California’s Education Code unconstitutional. Plaintiffs alleged that the provisions, which govern how K-12 public school teachers obtain tenure, how they are dismissed, and how they are laid off on the basis of seniority, violate the California Constitution’s guarantee that all citizens enjoy the “equal protection of the laws.” The trial court declared five sections of the Education Code unconstitutional and void. The court reversed, concluding that plaintiffs failed to establish that the challenged statutes violate equal protection, primarily because they did not show that the statutes inevitably cause a certain group of students to receive an education inferior to the education received by other students. Although the statutes may lead to the hiring and retention of more ineffective teachers than a hypothetical alternative system would, the statutes do not address the assignment of teachers; instead, administrators - not the statutes - ultimately determine where teachers within a district are assigned to teach. Critically, plaintiffs failed to show that the statutes themselves make any certain group of students more likely to be taught by ineffective teachers than any other group of students. Because plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the statutes violate equal protection on their face, the court reversed the judgment. View "Vergara v. State of California" on Justia Law

A school district is entitled to levy fees on new residential construction. Government Code section 66020 applies to partial refunds of fees paid, such as the refund sought by appellant. At issue in this appeal is whether Civil Code section 3287, which provides for interest when damages are awarded, applies specifically to interest on a refund for a development fee paid to the District. The court concluded that section 3287 does not apply because section 66020, subdivision (e) more specifically sets forth the interest available on the development fee refund. Therefore, the trial court correctly concluded that section 3287 did not apply in this case and properly sustained the school district's demurrer and dismissed the lawsuit. The court affirmed the judgment. View "Merkoh Assoc., LLC v. L.A. Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The district and its faculty entered into a collective bargaining agreement that grants part-time, temporary faculty who have taught at least five consecutive semesters a preferential reemployment status that can be revoked, as pertinent here, only upon “written notice” and, as reasonably interpreted by the arbitrators in this case, upon a showing that the faculty member was “guilty of misconduct” as defined in the Education Code. At issue on appeal is whether a community college district’s authority to revoke a part-time, temporary faculty member’s annual reappointment rights is governed by section 87665 of the Education Code or instead by the terms of the collective bargaining agreement negotiated pursuant to section 87482.9. The court concluded that section 87482.9 controls where, as here, a district elects to revoke a faculty member’s reappointment right rather than terminate that faculty member. Accordingly, the court reversed the trial court's order to the contrary, and reinstated the arbitrator's awards for all three faculty members. View "Santa Monica College Faculty v. Santa Monica Community College" on Justia Law

While Bikkina was in a Ph.D. program at the University of Tulsa, Mahadevan, Bikkina’s first dissertation advisor and supervisor, repeatedly charged that Bikkina falsified data in published papers and plagiarized Mahadevan’s work. In each case, the University found no wrong doing by Bikkina, but that Mahadevan had violated the University‘s harassment policies. Bikkina completed his Ph.D. and began working at Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (LBNL). Mahadevan contacted Bikkina‘s superiors to state that Bikkina had falsified data, then made a presentation at LBNL and told Bikkina‘s colleagues that Bikkina had published a paper using false data., Bikkina filed a complaint for damages against Mahadevan, who filed an anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against public participation) motion to strike under Code of Civil Procedure 425.16. Mahadevan argued that Bikkina improperly sought to chill public discourse on carbon sequestration and its impacts on global warming. Mahadevan asserted that his statements concerned important public issues and constituted protected speech. The court of appeal affirmed denial of the motion, finding that Mahadevan had not engated in protected conduct, even if the conduct arose from protected activity, Bikkina’s claims have sufficient merit to survive a motion to strike. View "Bikkina v. Mahadevan" on Justia Law

Katherine Rosen filed a negligence action against defendants, alleging that they breached their duty of care by failing to adopt reasonable measures that would have protected her from another student’s foreseeable violent conduct. The student, Damon Thompson, was treated by the school months before the attack for symptoms indicative of schizophrenia disorder, including auditory hallucinations and paranoid thinking. The trial court denied defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court concluded that UCLA did not owe a legal duty to protect Rosen from third party criminal conduct based on her status as a student; UCLA did not owe a duty to protect Rosen based on her status as an invitee onto the property; Rosen failed to establish a triable issue of material fact whether UCLA owed a duty of care under the negligent undertaking doctrine; Rosen failed to produce evidence establishing the existence of a triable issue of material fact whether a UCLA psychologist who treated Thompson had a duty to warn under Civil Code section 43.92; and Rosen failed to establish the existence of a triable issue of fact regarding either of her newly-raised theories of liability. Accordingly, the court granted defendants' petition for writ of mandate. View "Regents v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

In this case, J.M. did not comply with certain conditions of the Government Claims Act (Government Code, section 810 et seq.): he did not present a claim with the board of the Huntington Beach Union High School District (the District) within six months of the date on which his causes of action accrued, as required by sections 945.4 and 911.2. He retained counsel, who presented an application under section 911.4 to present a late claim on the ground J.M. was a minor. The District did not act on the application, and, as a consequence, under the express language of section 911.6, subdivision (c), his application was deemed denied by operation of law. Still represented by counsel, J.M. filed a petition under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement. The superior court denied his petition as untimely because it was not filed within six months of the date on which his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M. appealed the superior court’s order denying his petition for relief under section 946.6. "The plain, unambiguous language of sections 911.6 and 946.6 compel[led]" the Court of Appeal to affirm: J.M.’s application to present a late claim was made under section 911.6, subdivision (b)(2) on the ground that he was a minor at the time he was required to present a claim. Because the District did not act, under the plain language of section 911.6(c), J.M.’s application was deemed denied by operation of law on the 45th day after it was presented. "When an application is denied by operation of law under section 911.6(c), a claimant can challenge that denial only by petition to the superior court under section 946.6 for relief from the claim requirement." J.M. filed his petition to the superior court more than six months after his application to present a late claim was deemed denied by operation of law. J.M.’s petition therefore was untimely, and the superior court did not err by denying it. View "J.M. v. Huntington Beach Union High School Dist." on Justia Law

Education Code (47605.8) authorizes the State Board of Education (Board) to grant (or deny) an application for a “state charter school” and directs the Board to adopt regulations. The Administrative Procedure Act (APA) governs both quasi-judicial proceedings and adjudicatory proceedings by an agency. The Education Code refers to the APA section concerning adjudicatory proceedings. The Board claimed that the reference was an error and that, in directing the Board to “implement” the statute, the Legislature intended to refer to APA rule-making provisions. The California School Boards Association argued—and the trial court agreed—that the statutory language is plain and cannot be disregarded. The court of appeal reversed. The statute governs approval or denial of a charter school application, which is a quasi-legislative function—requiring consideration of policy questions and the opportunity for public input—and is fundamentally at odds with adjudicatory procedures. Legislative directives to adopt regulations for the implementation of a statute invariably call for a rule-making process pursuant to the APA’s adjudicatory provisions, so the reference is a complete anomaly. The use of an adjudicatory proceeding to approve or deny state charters would be inconsistent with all other like provisions in the Charter School Act, none of which entail quasi-judicial proceedings. View "Cal. Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. State Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Defendant-respondent Barstow Unified School District Board of Education approved closing two of its elementary schools: Thomson Elementary School and Hinkley Elementary School. Students from those schools were transferred to other District “receptor” schools. The District determined that the closures and transfers were exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because they fell within the categorical exemption for “minor additions” to schools. A citizens group, plaintiff-appellant, Save Our Schools (SOS), petitioned the trial court for a peremptory writ setting aside the District’s resolutions approving the closures and transfers and finding them exempt from CEQA. The petition was denied and SOS appealed, claiming: (1) insufficient evidence supported the District’s determinations that the closures and transfers were exempt from CEQA; and (2) if the closures were exempt, then SOS met its burden showing that two exceptions to CEQA’s categorical exemptions applied. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the administrative record contained insufficient evidence of the “original student capacity” (or total enrollment before the transfers) of any of the receptor schools. It was therefore impossible for the District to determine, based on the record before it, that the closures and transfers would not increase the total student enrollment of any of the receptor schools beyond the levels allowed under the minor additions exemption. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to issue a peremptory writ (1) voiding the District’s resolutions approving the school closures and student transfers and (2) directing the District to reconsider its determination that the closures and transfers were exempt from CEQA review. On remand, the District may accept and consider additional evidence not before it when it made its original exemption determinations. View "Save Our Schools v. Barstow Unified" on Justia Law

Individuals requested documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) from Newark Unified School District. The District inadvertently included 100 documents that, the District contends, are subject to attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Within hours of the release, the District sent e-mails asking for return of the documents. The recipients cited section 6254.5, contending that inadvertent release had waived the privileges. Under that statute, the disclosure of a document to the public waives any claim by an agency that the document is exempt from release. The District filed suit, seeking return or destruction of the documents. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing dissemination, but ultimately agreed that section 6254.5 effected a waiver of confidentiality. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the legislative history demonstrates the intent to prevent public agencies from disclosing documents to some members of the public while asserting confidentiality as to others. Waiver as a result of an inadvertent release, while not necessarily inconsistent with that intent, was not within its contemplation. To harmonize section 6254.5 with Evidence Code 912, which has been construed not to effect a waiver of the privileges from an inadvertent disclosure, the court construed section 6254.5 not to apply to inadvertent release. View "Newark Unifed Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

WSCS objected to the District's offer of classrooms and related space at Crenshaw High School and filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a peremptory writ ordering the District to comply with its obligations under Proposition 39, Ed. Code, 47614. The trial court denied the writ petition. Under Proposition 39, the District must “make reasonable efforts to provide the charter school with facilities near to where the charter school wishes to locate.” The court rejected WSCS’s contentions that the District did not make reasonable efforts to place WSCS near its desired location; the offer of space at Crenshaw represented facilities near WSCS’s desired location; WSCS was not entitled to a specific location of its choosing, only reasonable efforts to place it near its desired location; and the District did not abuse its discretion by placing WSCS at Crenshaw instead of two other schools. View "Westchester Secondary Charter Sch. v. LA Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law