Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-respondent Barstow Unified School District Board of Education approved closing two of its elementary schools: Thomson Elementary School and Hinkley Elementary School. Students from those schools were transferred to other District “receptor” schools. The District determined that the closures and transfers were exempt from environmental review under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) because they fell within the categorical exemption for “minor additions” to schools. A citizens group, plaintiff-appellant, Save Our Schools (SOS), petitioned the trial court for a peremptory writ setting aside the District’s resolutions approving the closures and transfers and finding them exempt from CEQA. The petition was denied and SOS appealed, claiming: (1) insufficient evidence supported the District’s determinations that the closures and transfers were exempt from CEQA; and (2) if the closures were exempt, then SOS met its burden showing that two exceptions to CEQA’s categorical exemptions applied. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the administrative record contained insufficient evidence of the “original student capacity” (or total enrollment before the transfers) of any of the receptor schools. It was therefore impossible for the District to determine, based on the record before it, that the closures and transfers would not increase the total student enrollment of any of the receptor schools beyond the levels allowed under the minor additions exemption. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded the matter with directions to the trial court to issue a peremptory writ (1) voiding the District’s resolutions approving the school closures and student transfers and (2) directing the District to reconsider its determination that the closures and transfers were exempt from CEQA review. On remand, the District may accept and consider additional evidence not before it when it made its original exemption determinations. View "Save Our Schools v. Barstow Unified" on Justia Law

Individuals requested documents under the California Public Records Act (Gov. Code, 6250) from Newark Unified School District. The District inadvertently included 100 documents that, the District contends, are subject to attorney-client or attorney work product privileges. Within hours of the release, the District sent e-mails asking for return of the documents. The recipients cited section 6254.5, contending that inadvertent release had waived the privileges. Under that statute, the disclosure of a document to the public waives any claim by an agency that the document is exempt from release. The District filed suit, seeking return or destruction of the documents. The trial court granted a temporary restraining order preventing dissemination, but ultimately agreed that section 6254.5 effected a waiver of confidentiality. The court of appeal reversed, finding that the legislative history demonstrates the intent to prevent public agencies from disclosing documents to some members of the public while asserting confidentiality as to others. Waiver as a result of an inadvertent release, while not necessarily inconsistent with that intent, was not within its contemplation. To harmonize section 6254.5 with Evidence Code 912, which has been construed not to effect a waiver of the privileges from an inadvertent disclosure, the court construed section 6254.5 not to apply to inadvertent release. View "Newark Unifed Sch. Dist. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

WSCS objected to the District's offer of classrooms and related space at Crenshaw High School and filed a petition for writ of mandate, seeking a peremptory writ ordering the District to comply with its obligations under Proposition 39, Ed. Code, 47614. The trial court denied the writ petition. Under Proposition 39, the District must “make reasonable efforts to provide the charter school with facilities near to where the charter school wishes to locate.” The court rejected WSCS’s contentions that the District did not make reasonable efforts to place WSCS near its desired location; the offer of space at Crenshaw represented facilities near WSCS’s desired location; WSCS was not entitled to a specific location of its choosing, only reasonable efforts to place it near its desired location; and the District did not abuse its discretion by placing WSCS at Crenshaw instead of two other schools. View "Westchester Secondary Charter Sch. v. LA Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit challenging a noncompetitive bid contract between Fresno Unified and Contractor for the construction of a middle school, alleging that the project should have been competitively bid because the lease-leaseback arrangement did not create a true leaseback or satisfy the criteria for the exception in section 17406 of the Education Code. The trial court sustained demurrers filed by Fresno Unified and Contractor. The court concluded that the competitive bidding process required by section 17417 is subject to the exception contained in section 17406 and plaintiff adequately alleged three grounds for why section 17406’s exception did not apply to the lease-leaseback arrangement. The court also concluded that Government Code section 1090’s prohibition of such conflicts extends to corporate consultants. Plaintiff has stated a violation of Government Code section 1090 by alleging facts showing Contractor, as a consultant to Fresno Unified, participated in the making of a contract in which Contractor subsequently became financially interested. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment. View "Davis v. Fresno Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

The issue before the Court of Appeal in this case was one of yoga: whether a school district's implementation of a yoga program as a component of its physical education curriculum was an impermissible establishment of religion in violation of the California Constitution. Appellants Stephen and Jennifer Sedlock (and their two minor children), filed suit against the Encinitas Union School District, the school's superintendent and the District's five governing board members, alleging that an Ashtanga yoga program violated various religious freedom provisions of the Constitution. The Sedlocks sought a writ of mandate and brought claims for injunctive and declaratory relief in which they requested that the court enjoin the District from continuing to implement its yoga program and declare the program unconstitutional. The Sedlocks were ultimately unsuccessful in having yoga declared unconstitutional, and they appealed that judgment. "While the practice of yoga may be religious in some contexts, yoga classes as taught in the District are, as the trial court determined, 'devoid of any religious, mystical, or spiritual trappings.'" The Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court properly determined the District's yoga program did not constitute an establishment of religion in violation of article I, section 4 of the California Constitution. View "Sedlock v. Baird" on Justia Law

The Foundation, a non-profit corporation, acts as a conduit for tax exempt gifts to benefit UCLA. Luskin, a director, pledged $40 million to support construction of a UCLA campus conference center. Save Westwood sought to rescind the donation and to require the Regents of the University of California to pay the city taxes allegedly owing, alleging that the Foundation is “mandated by its by-laws and incorporation documents to exclusively fund charitable undertakings,” that this limitation “applies to the financing of the construction of buildings for exempt purposes,” and that the Luskin grant was applied toward activities that exceed the Foundation’s powers. The defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion, Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16. Save Westwood argued that neither free speech rights, nor rights of petition were implicated because the claims sought enforcement of the Regents’s fiduciary duties, citing an exemption for public interest lawsuits. It voluntarily dismissed Luskin and the Foundation. The trial court granted the motion to strike. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that claims against Luskin were based on letters about the donation and constructon, which constituted an exercise of free speech on a matter of public interest. The Foundation’s pledge toward the conference center was also an exercise of free speech. Neither Luskin nor the Foundation was a governmental entity, so their actions cannot be “an illegal expenditure or waste.” They owed no mandatory duty to avoid donating funds in a manner that might jeopardize the Foundation’s tax exempt status. View "Save Westwood Vill. v. Luskin" on Justia Law

Sallie Mae, real party in interest, appealed an order awarding plaintiffs attorney fees and costs after plaintiffs successfully opposed Sallie Mae's motion to quash a business records subpoena seeking electronically stored information regarding student loans. The court concluded that the trial court did not err by concluding that Sallie Mae lacked substantial factual justification for refusing to comply with the second subpoena. Therefore, the award of attorney fees was not an abuse of discretion and the court affirmed the judgment.View "Vasquez v. CA School of Culinary Arts" on Justia Law

Daniel Berman appealed a judgment denying his petition for writ of mandate against the Regents of the University of California. He wanted to overturn a two-quarter suspension from the University of California San Diego (UCSD), which was imposed against him for hitting another student in the head with sufficient force to knock the other student to the ground and to cause that other student to lose consciousness, sustain a concussion and require medical attention. Berman did not challenge the factual finding he violated UCSD's Student Conduct Code, rather, he argued the Code did not authorize either the student conduct officer responsible for his case (who is also a Dean of Student Affairs) or the Council of Deans of Student Affairs to impose suspension as a sanction when the student conduct review board did not recommend suspension. The Court of Appeal reviewed the case, disagreed with Berman's arguments and affirmed the suspension.View "Berman v. Regents of UCSD" on Justia Law

Kao earned a Ph.D. in applied mathematics from Princeton, began teaching mathematics at University of San Francisco in 1991, and became a tenured professor in 1997. Kao was concerned about a lack of diversity of the faculty of the math and computer science departments, and submitted a 485-page complaint to the school in 2006 alleging race-based discrimination and harassment. He lodged a 41-page addendum to the complaint in 2007 school’s failure to advertise in professional journals. During meetings concerning the issue, Kao became “very, very upset,” and started “yelling and screaming.” USF directed Kao to have a fitness-for-duty examination after faculty members and school administrators reported that his behavior was frightening them, and the university terminated his employment when he refused to participate in the examination. Kao sued under the Fair Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, 12900), the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, 51), the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code, 56), and the state constitution’s right to privacy. His defamation claim was dismissed and a jury ruled against him on his other claims. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting an argument that USF could not lawfully require an examination.View "Kao v. Univ. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant, a member of the University of California faculty, was prosecuted under Government Code section 1090 for participating in a decision to hire his wife as a program assistant for a four-week summer study abroad course. The trial court dismissed the information under Penal Code section 995. The district attorney, on behalf of the People, argued that defendant committed a felony under section 1090 because he was "financially interested" in a contract made by him in his official capacity to hire his wife. Finding no grounds for forfeiture, the court concluded on the merits that neither the plain language nor the legislative history of section 1090 reflect an intent to include the University and its employees within the ambit of the statute; there is no case law applying section 1090 to the University; and the Williamson rule does not apply in this case. The court further concluded that this contract does not involve a matter of statewide concern and its application impinges upon exclusively internal University affairs and municipal home rule cases do not apply. Allowing the People to prosecute defendant under section 1090 would impair the Regents' ability to govern and would contravene article IX section 9 of the California Constitution. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order dismissing the information. View "People v. Lofchie" on Justia Law