Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

John Sandy Campbell, a Resource Specialist Teacher at Chavez Social Justice Humanitas Academy from 2015 to 2017, was dismissed from her employment with the Los Angeles Unified School District due to excessive absences and other issues. The Commission on Professional Competence upheld her dismissal, and Campbell challenged this decision by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court. The superior court, exercising its independent judgment, denied Campbell’s petition and upheld her dismissal.The proceedings to adjudicate Campbell’s dismissal were extensive, with the administrative hearing spanning 11 days. Campbell contended that the superior court erred in affirming her dismissal because the Commission miscited and applied the wrong statutory subdivisions at her dismissal hearing, and the court failed to apply “new” precedent when determining Campbell’s fitness to teach. The superior court recognized that the Commission cited incorrect subdivisions of section 44932 in its legal conclusions but noted that the Commission accurately listed, by name, the correct section 44932 causes for Campbell’s dismissal in these legal conclusions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Eight affirmed the superior court's decision. The appellate court found that Campbell had not demonstrated error in the lower court's decision. The court also rejected Campbell's insufficiency challenge due to her failure to present all the relevant evidence. Furthermore, the court found Campbell's argument that the superior court erred by not applying a more recent case law unconvincing. The court concluded that Campbell failed to overcome the presumption that the result was correct and affirmed the judgment, awarding costs to the District. View "Campbell v. Los Angeles Unified School District" on Justia Law

The case involves two public school districts, Cajon Valley Union School District (CVUSD) and Grossmont Union High School District (GUHSD), located within the boundaries of the former El Cajon Redevelopment Agency (RDA) in San Diego County. In 1988, the districts entered into “pass-through” agreements with the RDA, which agreed to provide the districts a portion of its annual property tax increment revenue up to a specified dollar cap. After the RDA was dissolved in 2012, the San Diego County Auditor-Controller continued to make payments according to the agreements. The districts sought a writ of mandate to compel the Auditor-Controller to make statutorily defined pass-through payments to them after the caps in their respective agreements were reached. The Auditor-Controller responded that she would not make further pass-through payments to the districts once their respective caps were reached.The trial court denied the requested relief. The court found that under the plain and unambiguous language of the statute, when the RDA adopted an amendment lifting the time limit to establish loans, advances, and indebtedness, it triggered a statutory obligation to pay one or the other of two things to affected taxing entities, depending on whether the RDA had entered into a pass-through agreement with any particular entity before January 1, 1994, that required pass-through payments to that entity. If such an agreement did exist, the RDA would need to make the contractually defined pass-through payments. If such an agreement did not exist, the RDA would need to make statutorily defined pass-through payments. The court concluded that the statute does not require other payments and it would not read such a requirement into the plain language of the statute.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District affirmed the judgment of the trial court. The appellate court agreed with the trial court's interpretation of the statute and found that the districts were not entitled to receive statutorily defined pass-through payments once the payment caps in the agreements were reached. View "Cajon Valley Union School District v. Drager" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), who was dismissed and denied emeritus status for sexually abusing a fellow academic at an off-campus academic conference and a UCSC student whom he volunteered to walk home from an off-campus graduation party. Balakrishnan appealed the decision, arguing that the university lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims were not university students, the university misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and policies, he did not receive notice of all charges, and the sanctions were excessive.In the lower courts, Balakrishnan filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate to set aside the findings and decision of the Regents of the University of California to terminate his employment and deny him emeritus status. The trial court denied his petition, upholding the university's decision.In the Court of Appeal of the State of California, the court rejected Balakrishnan's contentions and affirmed the trial court’s judgment. The court found that the university had the authority to discipline Balakrishnan for his off-campus behavior based on its internal policies, rules, and regulations. The court also found that Balakrishnan had received notice of the charges and that the sanctions were not excessive given the severity of his conduct. View "Balakrishnan v. Regents of the University of California" on Justia Law

The case involves Matthew Boermeester, a former University of Southern California (USC) football player, who was expelled from USC for engaging in intimate partner violence. Post-expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied, leading to an appeal. Initially, the Court of Appeal reversed the trial court’s judgment, holding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at the live hearing. However, the California Supreme Court granted USC’s petition for review, reversed the opinion, and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.In the remanded case, the Court of Appeal held that substantial evidence supports USC’s decision and found no denial of fair process in USC’s use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process. Boermeester claimed USC’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC’s use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The court found that the combined investigator-adjudicator process, without more, does not deny fair process and that Boermeester received considerable, adequate appellate process. Hence, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

The case involves an appeal by a student, Matthew Boermeester, who was expelled from the University of Southern California (USC) for intimate partner violence. Following his expulsion, Boermeester filed a petition for a writ of administrative mandate in the superior court, which was denied. He then appealed to the California Court of Appeal, which initially ruled in his favor, concluding that Boermeester had a right to cross-examine adverse witnesses. However, the California Supreme Court reversed this decision and held that Boermeester did not have such a right.After the case was remanded back to the Court of Appeal, Boermeester argued that USC's decision was not supported by substantial evidence and that USC's use of a combined investigator-adjudicator procedure denied him fair process. The Court of Appeal disagreed and found that substantial evidence supported USC's decision and there was no denial of fair process in USC's use of an investigator-adjudicator or in its appeals process.The court also noted that Boermeester's claims of investigator bias were unsupported and that he was provided a substantial amount of process, including multiple layers of review. Boermeester's argument that the investigator's conduct of phone interviews contravened USC's policy was also rejected. The court concluded that there was nothing inherently unfair about USC's combined investigator-adjudicator model or the specific procedures followed in this case. Therefore, the denial of the writ was affirmed. View "Boermeester v. Carry" on Justia Law

The case involves Dr. Gopal Balakrishnan, a former tenured professor at the University of California, Santa Cruz (UCSC), who was dismissed and denied emeritus status following an investigation into allegations of sexual abuse. The allegations involved a fellow academic, identified as Jane Doe, who was sexually harassed by Balakrishnan at an off-campus academic event, and a UCSC student that Balakrishnan harassed after an off-campus graduation party. Balakrishnan appealed the University's decision, arguing that the University lacked jurisdiction to discipline him because the victims were not University students, that the University misinterpreted and misapplied its own regulations and policies, that he did not receive notice of all charges, and that the sanctions were excessive.The Court of Appeal of the State of California First Appellate District affirmed the trial court's judgment denying Balakrishnan's petition. The appellate court rejected the professor's jurisdiction argument, stating that the University's sexual harassment policy applied to both incidents. The court also found that the professor had notice of the charges against him. Lastly, the court held that the sanctions were not excessive given the severity of the professor's conduct. View "Balakrishnan v. The Regents of the University of Cal." on Justia Law

In the case, a group of students from the University of San Francisco (USF) sued the university for breach of contract, alleging that the university did not deliver on its promise to provide in-person instruction and should refund a portion of their tuition fees due to the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, Division Three affirmed the trial court's decision, which granted USF's motion for summary adjudication, concluding that the students failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding whether USF promised to provide exclusively in-person instruction.The court determined that there was an implied-in-fact contract between USF and the student appellants, established through matriculation and the payment of tuition. However, the court found that the contract did not explicitly promise exclusively in-person instruction. The court also distinguished between general expectations of in-person classes and enforceable contractual promises for exclusively in-person instruction. The court held that the students failed to establish a breach of contract based on the transition to remote learning during the COVID-19 pandemic.The court further held that the students could not pursue quasi-contract claims, as a valid and enforceable contract existed between the students and USF. The students' promissory estoppel claim also failed, as they did not establish any clear and unequivocal promises from USF for in-person instruction. The court stated that the record did not reflect any such promise.The court dismissed the students' claims relating to the Fall 2020 and Spring 2021 semesters, as they were aware these semesters would be conducted either entirely remotely or in a hybrid format prior to enrolling or paying tuition for those semesters. Thus, the students could not reasonably have believed USF contractually promised to provide in-person education for these semesters. View "Berlanga v. University of San Francisco" on Justia Law

This is an appeal before the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One regarding an attorney fees dispute between multiple charter school entities and two school districts. The case arose from a dispute over whether certain charter schools were operating within the geographic boundaries of the Grossmont Union High School District and San Diego Unified School District in violation of the California Charter Schools Act. After a series of litigation and appeals, the charter school entities, which included Diego Plus Education Corporation, Western Educational Corporation, Lifelong Learning Administration Corporation, and Educational Advancement Corporation, were successful in defending their right to operate the schools. They subsequently sought attorney fees pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5. The trial court granted the motion and ordered the school districts to pay attorney fees amounting to $582,927. The school districts appealed this decision. The appellate court conditionally reversed the order for attorney fees and remanded the case, finding that the trial court did not properly evaluate whether the financial burden of private enforcement warranted an award of attorney fees under section 1021.5. The appellate court instructed the trial court to apply the proper legal standard on remand. View "Grossmont Union High School Dist. v. Diego Plus Education Corp." on Justia Law

This case concerns John HR Doe and other Doe plaintiffs, who alleged that William Babcock, a counselor at an elementary school in the Marysville Joint Unified School District, committed sexual misconduct causing them injury and damages. The Doe plaintiffs filed three separate lawsuits against the School District. The first two, filed in state court, were voluntarily dismissed. The third, filed in federal court, also alleged violations of federal law. The School District moved to dismiss the federal court action, claiming immunity under the Eleventh Amendment for most of the claims. The Doe Plaintiffs then voluntarily dismissed their federal court action and filed a third state court action.The School District demurred to the third state court complaint, arguing res judicata based on the plaintiffs' voluntary dismissal of the second action in federal court. The trial court sustained the demurrer and dismissed the complaint, ruling that the dismissal of the federal court action constituted res judicata. On appeal, the Doe plaintiffs contended that the federal court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the claims on the merits because the School District argued Eleventh Amendment immunity. They also argued that California state law controls, under which a second voluntary dismissal does not constitute res judicata.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Third Appellate District, affirmed the trial court's decision. The appellate court found that the federal court did have subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiffs' claims because it had jurisdiction over the federal law claims, with supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law claims. Moreover, the court held that res judicata applied because federal law determines the claim-preclusive effect of a federal court judgment in a federal question case, and under federal law, a second voluntary dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits. The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that California law should control, stating that states must accord federal court judgments the effect that federal law prescribes. As such, the Doe plaintiffs' third state court action was barred by res judicata due to their second voluntary dismissal in federal court. View "Doe v. Marysville Joint Unified Sch. Dist." on Justia Law

Ricardo Campbell, a student of the Career Development Institute, Inc., was dismissed from its vocational nursing program. Following his dismissal, Campbell filed a writ under section 1094.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The trial court denied the petition, stating that the Institute's policies did not necessitate a hearing. In response, Campbell appealed this decision, with the Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District Division Eight, vacating the previous judgment for reconsideration in light of a recent Supreme Court ruling on the doctrine of fair procedure.The Court of Appeal noted that the Institute's student handbook and school catalog outlined student discipline procedures, but did not require a hearing or any other opportunity for students to be heard before being dismissed. Campbell was dismissed following an incident reported by three nurses at his clinical placement, which was followed by a letter from the Institute's director of nursing stating that Campbell had been dismissed. The Institute also claimed that this was not the first problem it had with Campbell, although the dismissal letter only mentioned the said incident.The trial court had previously ruled that because the Institute was not a state actor and Campbell did not argue that a statute required the Institute to provide hearings, the Institute could only be subject to administrative mandamus if its own rules and regulations required hearings. The court concluded that Campbell was not entitled to relief under section 1094.5 as the Institute's procedures did not require it to provide hearings.The Court of Appeal remanded the case for the trial court to consider whether the doctrine of fair procedure applies and, if so, whether Campbell was entitled to more process under this doctrine. The Court of Appeal advised that if the court finds Campbell was entitled to a hearing, it must address the merits of his petition. The Court of Appeal vacated the judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "Campbell v. Career Development Institute" on Justia Law