Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant John Fenley was elected to the Trinity County Board of Supervisors in the June 7, 2016 election. Contestant Firenza Pini filed a contest in the superior court 20 days after certification of the final canvass, alleging mistakes, errors, and misconduct in counting the ballots. The superior court, treating the contest as involving a primary election, summarily dismissed the contest because it was filed more than five days after certification of the final canvass. The Court of Appeal reversed: because Fenley was elected by a majority of votes, and not merely nominated, Pini had 30 days after certification of the final canvass to file her contest. View "Pini v. Fenley" on Justia Law

In February 2016 proponents submitted to the Napa County Registrar of Voters their initiative petition. After initially certifying that the initiative qualified for placement on the ballot, the registrar rejected the petition based on advice from county counsel that the measure did not comply with the full-text requirement of Elections Code section 9101. The measure consists of 10 sections filling 18 pages. Its stated purpose is “to protect the water quality, biological productivity and economic and environmental value of Napa County’s streams, watersheds, wetlands and forests, and to safeguard the public health, safety and welfare of the county’s residents.” It would amend the goals and policies of the general plan; require additional water quality buffer zones along streams and wetlands; increase the minimum ratio for replacing lost oak woodlands in an agricultural watershed zoning district; and add to the Code an “Oak Removal Permit Program,” requiring compliance with the best management practices set forth in the “Napa County Voluntary Oak Woodland Management Plan (2010)” without including the text of those practices. The court of appeals affirmed. The measure does not simply cross-reference another provision of law but would enact as binding conditions for permission to remove certain trees what are now only recommended measures for voluntary compliance. View "Wilson v. County of Napa" on Justia Law

Eblovi was a proponent of a citizen-sponsored initiative appearing on the City of Half Moon Bay June 7, 2016 ballot as Measure F. Eblovi sought an order directing the interim city clerk to strike "Primary Argument Against Measure F" and "Rebuttal to Argument in Favor of Measure F.” Eblovi alleged that because Measure F was placed on the ballot by petition, by statute, only the city council had authority to submit an argument against the ballot measure. Elections Code 9282(a) states: For measures placed on the ballot by petition, the persons filing an initiative petition pursuant to this article may file a written argument in favor of the ordinance, and the legislative body may submit an argument against the ordinance. The Arguments had been submitted by five electors. Denying the motion, the court reasoned that section 9282(a) should be interpreted to favor permissive participation in the electoral process, not restrictive participation. The court of appeal affirmed, noting the “long-standing” interpretation of the word “may” in this context. View "Eblovi v. Blair" on Justia Law

Plaintiff James Reed appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants James Gallagher and Gallagher For Assembly 2014 (together, Gallagher) after the trial court granted Gallagher’s special motion to strike pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, the anti-SLAPP statute (strategic lawsuits against public participation). Reed and Gallagher were rival candidates for the California Assembly. During the final weeks of the campaign, Gallagher ran a 30-second television ad characterizing Reed as an “unscrupulous lawyer.” After losing the election, Reed sued Gallagher for defamation based on statements made in the ad. Gallagher responded with a demurrer and special motion to strike under section 425.16. The trial court sustained the demurrer and granted the special motion to strike finding, with respect to the latter motion, that the allegedly defamatory statements arose from protected activity and Reed failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on his claim. Finding no reversible error in that judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Reed v. Gallagher" on Justia Law

The County filed suit against defendants seeking to enjoin the operation of a medical marijuana dispensary in an unincorporated area of Kern County. Defendants appealed the trial court's grant of a preliminary injunction. The court interpreted the phrase “entirely repeal the ordinance,” pursuant to Elections Code section 9144, to mean that a board of supervisors must (1) revoke the protested ordinance in all its parts and (2) not take additional action that has the practical effect of implementing the essential feature of the protested ordinance. Applying this interpretation, the court concluded that the board of supervisors did more than entirely repeal the protested ordinance banning dispensaries when it revoked that ordinance and took the additional action of repealing the 2009 ordinance, which authorized dispensaries. The practical effect of repealing the 2009 ordinance was to prohibit dispensaries, which was essentially the same as the ban of dispensaries protested by voters. Therefore, the court concluded that the County violated section 9145 by repealing the 2009 ordinance and, as a result, the court regarded the 2009 ordinance as remaining in full force and effect. Accordingly, defendants' dispensary, which is located in a commercial zone, remains an authorized use and the County cannot establish a likelihood of succeeding on the merits of its claim that defendants were operating an unauthorized dispensary. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "County of Kern v. T.C.E.F., Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Ralph White sought to remove Ann Johnston as mayor of the City of Stockton and to enjoin placing her name on the municipal election ballot of June 2012 for reelection as mayor. White contended Johnston was ineligible to sit as mayor and to run for reelection under section 606 of the Stockton City Charter. Because Johnston had served two terms as a council member prior to being elected mayor, White asserted she was ineligible to serve as mayor and to run for reelection. The trial court denied White’s petition for an alternative writ. Johnston’s name was placed on the June 2012 ballot, as was White’s, who also was running for mayor. Johnston received the most votes in the election and qualified for a runoff election. White did not qualify. That November, Johnston lost the general election. The trial court denied White’s petition for writ of mandate, finding section 606 was ambiguous because it did not clearly and plainly impose a cumulative term limit. It then found the City’s construction of section 606 as not imposing a cumulative limit was reasonable and not clearly erroneous in light of the official ballot pamphlet used when the voters adopted section 606 and the City’s consistent practice of not reading section 606 as imposing a cumulative limit. The City of argued, and the trial court found, the measure did not impose a cumulative limit. The Court of Appeal agreed with the City and affirmed the judgment. View "White v. City of Stockton" on Justia Law

In November 2014, a run-off election was held for a seat on the Chula Vista City Council. In early December 2014, Michael Vu, the San Diego County Registrar of Voters, certified the official canvas results showing that John McCann was the winner with 18,448 votes - two more than Steve Padilla, who received 18,446 votes. Contestant Aurora Clark appealed the trial court's denial of her election contest challenging 12 uncounted ballots. She alleged that each of the contested ballots (provisional or mail) was cast by a properly registered voter in Chula Vista and should have been counted. This appeal principally dealt with the handling of provisional ballots where the voter does not provide a current residence address on the ballot envelope. Because the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that the elections official did not abuse his discretion, the Court affirmed the dismissal. View "Clark v. McCann" on Justia Law

In November 2009, County of Alameda voters approved Measures I and J levying special parcel taxes by the Albany Unified School District. Plaintiff-appellant Golden Gate Hill Development Company, Inc. was the owner of a parcel of real property in the City of Albany subject to the tax. In February 2014, appellant filed suit against the County and District seeking a refund of taxes paid under the Measures. Golden Gage Hill alleged the tax rates in the Measures were improper because different rates are imposed on residential and nonresidential properties, as well as nonresidential properties of different sizes. The complaint referenced a recent decision in this district, “Borikas v. Alameda Unified School Dist.” (214 Cal.App.4th 135 (2013)), which declared invalid a different parcel tax with similar rate classifications. Respondents moved to dismiss, contending the complaint failed to state a claim because, under Code of Civil Procedure section 860, et seq. (“the validation statutes”), appellant was required to present its claims in a “reverse validation action” within 60 days of passage of the Measures. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. Because appellant has not shown there was a basis for its refund claim independent of the alleged invalidity of the Measures, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Golden Gate Hill Development Co. v. County of Alameda" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant Chris Korpi and plaintiff-respondent Julie Collier were supporters of competing candidates in a local school board election. To educate voters about the candidates he supported, Korpi registered Collier's name and the name of an advocacy group she formed as domain names, and then redirected all Internet users who visited those Web sites to the Web sites for the candidates he supported. Collier filed this action against Korpi, alleging he registered the domain names and illegally used them to mislead the public into thinking she supported his candidates. Korpi moved to strike Collier's complaint under the anti-SLAPP statute. The trial court denied Korpi's motion because it found he failed to show Collier's claims arose from free speech activities protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. Although the court acknowledged political commentary was the quintessential form of free speech, it concluded Korpi's conduct in registering the domain names and redirecting Internet traffic did not further Korpi's free speech rights. The Court of Appeal disagreed, reversed and remanded. Registering the domain names and redirecting Internet users to the other Web sites assisted Korpi in exercising his free speech rights because those acts provided him with additional forums to reach the public with information about the school board candidates. "The statute required nothing more." Regardless whether Korpi's conduct advanced or assisted him in exercising his free speech rights, Collier argued the anti-SLAPP statute did not protect Korpi's criminal impersonation of another to deceive the public. "It is not enough that the defendant's conduct violated a civil statute; the defendant's conduct must be criminal to deprive the defendant of the broad protection the anti-SLAPP statute provides for free speech and petition activities. [. . .] Korpi does not concede his conduct was criminal and Collier failed to offer evidence establishing Korpi's conduct was criminal as a matter of law." Accordingly, the trial court erred in denying Korpi's motion without determining Collier presented evidence establishing a probability of prevailing on her claims. "Our conclusion the anti-SLAPP statute applies to Korpi's conduct should not be construed as an approval of his conduct." View "Collier v. Harris" on Justia Law

Eric Woolery appealed a trial court order denying his motion seeking an award of attorney fees. Woolery filed his motion after he successfully defended against the verified petition for a peremptory writ of mandate that his political opponent, John Wayne Willard, had filed against Neal Kelley, in his official capacity as Registrar of Voters for Orange County. In his petition, Willard challenged the portion of Woolery's candidate designation under Elections Code section 13107, stating his occupation was “Orange Treasurer/CPA.” The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Woolery established that his stated occupation satisfied the statute's requirements. The Court of Appeal affirmed: the trial court did not err by denying the motion for attorney fees because Woolery's successful defense in this matter neither resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, nor conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, within the meaning of section 1021.5. View "Willard v. Kelley" on Justia Law