Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Eric Woolery appealed a trial court order denying his motion seeking an award of attorney fees. Woolery filed his motion after he successfully defended against the verified petition for a peremptory writ of mandate that his political opponent, John Wayne Willard, had filed against Neal Kelley, in his official capacity as Registrar of Voters for Orange County. In his petition, Willard challenged the portion of Woolery's candidate designation under Elections Code section 13107, stating his occupation was “Orange Treasurer/CPA.” The trial court denied the petition on the ground that Woolery established that his stated occupation satisfied the statute's requirements. The Court of Appeal affirmed: the trial court did not err by denying the motion for attorney fees because Woolery's successful defense in this matter neither resulted in the enforcement of an important right affecting the public interest, nor conferred a significant benefit on the general public or a large class of persons, within the meaning of section 1021.5. View "Willard v. Kelley" on Justia Law

Three small political parties and several party members and candidates sought to invalidate California’s electoral system for statewide and legislative offices, contending the system, which consists of an open nonpartisan election followed by a runoff between the top-two candidates, deprives them of equal protection and associational and voting rights secured by the state and federal Constitutions. According to plaintiffs, because “minor” party candidates are typically eliminated in the primary election, they are denied the constitutional right to participate in the general election upon a showing of substantial public support. Plaintiffs also contend their associational rights are violated by the effective limitation of their participation to the primary election, when voter participation is typically less than half that of the general election; that the electoral system denies them equal protection because they are no longer able to regularly participate in the general election, as they were under the prior electoral system; and that the trial court erred in dismissing their complaint, without permitting them a hearing on the evidentiary support for their claims. The court of appeal affirmed The dismissal. View "Rubin v. Padilla" on Justia Law

This case centered two policy issues that are often viewed as controversial: (1) racial, ethnic, and gender preferences; and (2) the decennial redistricting process. In 2008 and 2010, the People of California, exercising their reserved initiative powers, changed the way California's State Senate, State Assembly, Congressional, and Board of Equalization voting districts are adjusted after each national census, assigning the corresponding duties to the California Citizens Redistricting Commission. Plaintiffs Ward Connerly and the American Civil Rights Foundation (collectively, Connerly) sued defendants State of California (State), the State Auditor, and the Commission, alleging the method of selecting members of the Commission violated Proposition 209 (Cal. Const., art. I, sec. 31), in that it gave improper preferences based on race, ethnicity, and gender. Connerly then filed an amended complaint, again asserting the selection process for the last six commissioners violated Proposition 209, but adding that the "Applicant Review Panel" also improperly considered race, ethnicity, and gender. These were characterized as “facial” challenges to Government Code section 8252, subdivision (g) based on Proposition 209, for which various remedies were sought. The State and State Auditor demurred in part on the grounds that Proposition 209 did not apply to the selection of public officers, only to public employees. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend on this ground. Connerly appealed. Connerly effectively abandoned his amended complaint, and proposed a new legal theory on appeal--but no new facts--in his opening brief, explicitly citing the authority of Code Civ. Proc. section 472c, subdivision (a). Both the State and State Auditor contended it was unfair for Connerly to raise this theory on appeal because they did not get a chance to disprove it factually. They almost entirely ignored section 472c, which allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal. "Connerly has not strayed from his central factual claim that the composition of the Commission was infected by invidious discrimination. There is no reason to deviate from the well-established rule that section 472c allows a plaintiff to propose new theories on appeal from the sustaining of a demurrer without leave to amend. [. . .] The fact that the instant complaint was found wanting raises precisely the circumstance section 472c was designed to address--to give the plaintiff a final opportunity to propose new facts or legal theories to establish a cause of action. Thus, from the parties' briefing, it appears Connerly can plead at least a prima facie case of equal protection violations. The answer is to apply section 472c, subdivision (a), allow Connerly to amend the complaint again to clarify his new theories, and give respondents the chance to defend the Commission's selection provisions to try to show they comport with federal equal protection principles." View "Connerly v. California" on Justia Law

In this appeal, the issue before the Court of Appeal centered on whether an election held by the City of San Diego to authorize the levying of a special tax complied with articles XIII A, XIII C and XIII D of the California Constitution. In the election at issue, the City did not permit the City's registered voters to vote on the special tax. Instead, the City passed an ordinance that specifically defined the electorate to consist solely of: (1) the owners of real property in the City on which a hotel is located, and (2) the lessees of real property owned by a governmental entity on which a hotel is located. The Court concluded the election was invalid under the California Constitution because such landowners and lessees were neither "qualified electors" of the City for purposes of article XIII A, section 4, nor did they comprise a proper "electorate" under article XIII C, section 2, subdivision (d). Furthermore, the Court concluded the election was invalid under the San Diego City Charter because City Charter section 76.1 required the approval of two-thirds of the "qualified electors" voting in an election on a special tax, and section 6 of the City Charter defined "[q]ualified [e]lectors" as those persons who are registered to vote in general state elections under state law. Accordingly, the Court reversed the trial court's judgment validating the special tax and remanded the matter to the trial court with directions to enter judgment against the City. View "City of San Diego v. Shapiro" on Justia Law