Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 1989, the predecessor to the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), the agency charged with implementing California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65) (Health & Saf. Code 25249.5), adopted a regulation setting a “maximum allowable dose level” (MADL) for lead as a reproductive toxicant. In 2015, Mateel sought to compel OEHHA to repeal regulations setting a MADL for lead as a reproductive toxicant and to invalidate the “safe harbor” level for lead. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of OEHHA, rejecting Mateel’s argument that OEHHA failed to comply with Proposition 65's mandate that the MADL be based on an exposure having “no observable effect” when it utilized a “surrogate” “no observable effect level” (NOEL) derived from the “permissible exposure limit” (PEL) for lead set by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The court also rejected arguments that even if the OSHA blood lead level should be maintained for people who wished to plan pregnancies were appropriate to consider as a NOEL, thHA PEL was not set at a level to achieve this target; that OEHHA failed to make a downward adjustment to account for this disconnect between the PEL and the target NOEL; and that nothing in the record indicates OEHHA considered this issue in setting the MADL. View "Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment" on Justia Law

In 1989, the predecessor to the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment (OEHHA), the agency charged with implementing California’s Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65) (Health & Saf. Code 25249.5), adopted a regulation setting a “maximum allowable dose level” (MADL) for lead as a reproductive toxicant. In 2015, Mateel sought to compel OEHHA to repeal regulations setting a MADL for lead as a reproductive toxicant and to invalidate the “safe harbor” level for lead. The court of appeal affirmed judgment in favor of OEHHA, rejecting Mateel’s argument that OEHHA failed to comply with Proposition 65's mandate that the MADL be based on an exposure having “no observable effect” when it utilized a “surrogate” “no observable effect level” (NOEL) derived from the “permissible exposure limit” (PEL) for lead set by the U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Administration. The court also rejected arguments that even if the OSHA blood lead level should be maintained for people who wished to plan pregnancies were appropriate to consider as a NOEL, thHA PEL was not set at a level to achieve this target; that OEHHA failed to make a downward adjustment to account for this disconnect between the PEL and the target NOEL; and that nothing in the record indicates OEHHA considered this issue in setting the MADL. View "Mateel Environmental Justice Foundation v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment" on Justia Law

The California Court of Appeal consolidated cases to address a novel question regarding jurisdiction under the unique and complex cooperative federalism scheme of the federal Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.) (Act). The Act authorized the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (Agency) to promulgate national primary and secondary ambient air quality standards. States, however, have the “primary responsibility for assuring air quality” and must each devise, adopt, and implement a state implementation plan (SIP) specifying how the state will achieve and maintain the national air quality standards. The SIP is submitted to the Agency’s administrator (Administrator) for approval. The cases here sought the same relief and practical objective: to invalidate and render unenforceable, in whole or in part (albeit on different grounds), a state regulation known as the Truck and Bus Regulation (Regulation), which was approved by the Administrator as part of and incorporated into California’s SIP. Plaintiff Jack Cody argued the Regulation violated the dormant commerce clause of the United States Constitution because it discriminated against out-of-state truckers by imposing a disproportionate compliance burden on them. Plaintiff Alliance for California Business (Alliance) argued the Regulation was unlawful because part of its mandate conflicted with state and federal safety laws. Defendants, including the California Air Resources Board (Board), raised lack of subject matter jurisdiction under section 307(b)(1) of the Act in both cases on appeal. The issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review centered on whether section 307(b)(1) vested exclusive and original jurisdiction over these challenges to the Regulation incorporated into and approved as part of California’s SIP in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The Court concluded it did and affirmed the judgments for lack of jurisdiction. View "Alliance for Calif. Business v. State Air Resources Bd." on Justia Law

Santa Rosa decided to turn a 69-bed defunct hospital into the "Dream Center" to house 63 people, ages 18-24, and provide individual and family counseling, education and job training, a health and wellness center serving the community for ages five through 24, and activities for residents, including a pottery throwing area, a half-court basketball area, and a garden. Neighbors challenged the project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000), arguing that noise impacts required preparation of an environmental impact report (EIR). The city issued a negative declaration, indication that the project would not have a significant environmental effect and an EIR would not be required. On appeal, the neighbors focused on traffic noise from the south parking lot adjacent to the Dream Center, and noise from the residents’ outdoor recreational activities. The court of appeal affirmed, finding no substantial evidence that there would be a significant noise impact from those sources. The predicted parking lot noise impacts are largely hypothetical, given the city’s parking restrictions in that lot; neighbors' impact calculations were based on data from a different project that cannot reasonably be applied to the Dream Center. An argument that the noise from residents’ outdoor activities would constitute a significant environmental impact was also based on a flawed analysis. View "Jensen v. City of Santa Rosa" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-homeowners alleged the copper piping in their homes was damaged by a chemical the defendant water districts added to tap water. Adding the chemical was authorized by regulation, however, and it was undisputed that the water districts complied with all statutory and regulatory standards. After a bifurcated bench trial on certain legal issues, the trial court entered judgment for the water districts, finding plaintiffs’ causes of action for nuisance and inverse condemnation were preempted by federal and state laws, and otherwise insufficient on the merits. The plaintiff homeowners appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded plaintiffs’ causes of action failed on the merits, and thus affirmed. View "Williams v. Moulton Niguel Water Dist." on Justia Law

Appellants challenged the trial court's order and judgment dismissing appellants' petition for writ of mandate and complaint. At issue was whether Proposition 65's reliance on the International Agency for Research on Cancer to identify known carcinogens violated various provisions and doctrines of the California and United States Constitutions. The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment, rejecting appellants' arguments that the Labor Code listing mechanism violated article II, section 12 of the California Constitution, because the Agency did not qualify as a private corporation under the constitutional provision; that the Labor Code listing mechanism was an unlawful delegation of authority; that the Labor Code listing mechanism violated procedural due process rights; and that the Labor Code listing mechanism violated the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution. View "Monsanto Co. v. Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment" on Justia Law

Contra Costa County certified an environmental impact report (EIR) and approved a land use permit for a “Propane Recovery Project” at a Rodeo oil refinery owned and operated by Phillips 66. The trial court ordered the county to set aside the certification of the EIR and approval of the land use permit and to correct specified inadequacies in the EIR in the analysis of air quality issues. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments by project opponents that the trial court erred in rejecting its additional arguments that the project description and the analysis of greenhouse gas emissions and environmental hazards failed to comply with the requirements of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code 21000). With respect to the description, the court noted substantial evidence that Phillips’ propane recovery project is independent of any purported change in the crude oil feedstock used at the Refinery and will not increase its present capacity to refine heavier crude oils. View "Rodeo Citizens Association. v. County of Contra Costa" on Justia Law

Verizon Wireless obtained approval from the City of San Diego (the City, together respondents) to construct a wireless telecommunications facility (WCF, the Project) in Ridgewood Neighborhood Park (the Park), a dedicated park. Don't Cell Our Parks (DCOP), a not-for-profit entity, filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the City's determination. The trial court denied the petition, concluding that under San Diego City Charter section 55 (Charter 55), the City had control and management of dedicated parks and the discretion to determine whether a particular park use would change the use or purpose of the Park and thus require a public vote. The Court of Appeal concluded the Project did not constitute a changed use or purpose that required voter approval. DCOP also claimed the Project did not qualify under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) for a categorical exemption under CEQA Guidelines section 153031 which pertained to the construction of new small facilities. The Court rejected this argument too, and thus affirmed the trial court in full. View "Don't Cell Our Parks v. City of San Diego" on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law

In 2003, the Legislature enacted Water Code section 1525, which required the holders of permits and licenses to appropriate water to pay an annual fee according to a fee schedule established by the Board. At the same time, the Legislature enacted sections 1540 and 1560, which allowed the Board to allocate the annual fee imposed on a permit or license holder who refuses to pay the fee on sovereign immunity grounds to persons or entities who contracted for the delivery of water from that permit or license holder. Plaintiffs Northern California Water Association, California Farm Bureau Federation, and individual fee payors claimed that the annual fee imposed in fiscal year 2003-2004 constituted an unlawful tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee because it required fee payors to pay more than a de minimis amount for regulatory activities that benefited nonfee-paying right holders. Plaintiffs also claimed that the fees allocated to the water supply contractors violated the supremacy clause of the United States Constitution because they exceeded the contractors’ beneficial interests in the USBR’s water rights. The California Supreme Court previously ruled sections 1525, 1540, and 1560 were constitutional on their face. The Supreme Court found that the record was unclear as to: (1) “whether the fees were reasonably apportioned in terms of the regulatory activity’s costs and the fees assessed;” and (2) “the extent and value of the [contractors’ beneficial] interests.” Accordingly, the Supreme Court directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to the trial court to make findings on those issues. Following a 10-day bench trial, the trial court issued a statement of decision that determined inter alia that the statutory scheme as applied through its implementing regulations imposed a tax, as opposed to a valid regulatory fee, by allocating the entire cost of the Division’s regulatory activities to permit and license holders, while nonpaying-water-right holders who benefit from and place burdens on the Division’s activities pay nothing. The trial court likewise found that the fees passed through to the water supply contractors in fiscal year 2003-2004 pursuant to regulation 1073 ran afoul of the supremacy clause “because the allocation of fees [was] not limited to the contractors’ beneficial or possessory use of the [USBR’s] water rights.” In addition, the trial court found that the fee regulations were invalid because they operated in an arbitrary manner as to a single payor, Imperial Irrigation District. Accordingly, the trial court invalidated regulations 1066 and 1073, “as adopted by Resolution 2003-0077 in 2003-2004.” The Board appealed, contending the trial court erred in invalidating the fee regulations. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court’s central premise was wholly incorrect because it failed to recognize the role that general fund money played in fiscal year 2003-2004: the fees assessed on permit and license holders were proportionate to the benefits derived by them or the burdens they placed on the Division. The trial court erred in determining that the fee regulations were invalid based on their application to a single payor. Accordingly, the Court reversed the judgment invalidating the fee regulations. View "No. CA Water Assn. v. St. Water Resources Control Bd." on Justia Law