Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The controversial “8 Washington Street Project,” a plan to develop waterfront land near the San Francisco Ferry Building, includes “Seawall Lot 351,” which is currently owned by the City and County of San Francisco through its Port Commission, subject to the public trust for uses benefiting the people of California. The public trust restriction on the use of Seawall Lot 351 is inconsistent with the 8 Washington Street Project as conceived by the project developers. To remove this inconsistency, the Developers and the City devised a plan to transfer Seawall Lot 351 out of the public trust and replace it with a different parcel in a land exchange agreement with the State Lands Commission (SLC). SLC approved land exchange agreement, finding that the agreement was a statutorily exempt activity under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA) (Pub. Resources Code, 21000. Opponents challenged SLC’s reliance on a CEQA exemption for “settlements of title and boundary problems by the State Lands Commission and to exchanges or leases in connection with those settlements.” The trial court held and the court of appeal affirmed that the proposed land exchange agreement is not statutorily exempt from CEQA review. View "Defend Our Waterfront v. Cal State Lands Comm'n" on Justia Law

Great Oaks, a water retailer, challenged a groundwater extraction fee imposed on water it draws from wells on its property. The power to impose such a fee is statutorily vested in the Santa Clara Valley Water Management District. The trial court awarded a refund of charges paid by Great Oaks, finding that the charge violated the provisions of both the District Act and Article XIII D of the California Constitution, which imposes procedural and substantive constraints on fees and charges imposed by local public entities. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the fee is a property-related charge for purposes of Article 13D, subject to some constraints, but is also a charge for water service, exempt from the requirement of voter ratification. A pre-suit claim submitted by Great Oaks did not preserve any monetary remedy against the District for violations of Article 13D and, because the matter was treated as a simple action for damages when it should have been treated as a petition for a writ of mandate, the trial court failed to apply a properly deferential standard of review to the question whether the District’s setting of the fee, or its use of the resulting proceeds, complied with the District Act. View "Great Oaks Water Co. v. Santa Clara Valley Water Dist." on Justia Law

Rancho Pauma Mutual Water Company filed a petition to enforce a water rights judgment against the Yuima Municipal Water District entered about 60 years earlier. The District appealed the trial court's order, contending the trial court misunderstood subsequent amendments to the judgment and improperly limited the amount of water the District could withdraw. Rancho Pauma argued the appeal should have been dismissed as the order was not appealable. Upon review, the Court of Appeal rejected Rancho Pauma's argument regarding appealability of the order. The Court also rejected the District's arguments and affirmed the order. View "Rancho Pauma Mut. Water Co. v. Yuima Mun. Water Dist." on Justia Law

The City appealed the trial court's judgment directing it to approve Carson Harbor Village's application to convert its mobilehome park from a rental facility to a subdivision of resident-owned lots. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the City’s findings that allowing the conversion would be inconsistent with the open space element of its general plan by placing at risk a state and federally regulated wetlands area within the confines of the mobilehome park. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment and remanded. View "Carson Harbor Village v. City of Carson" on Justia Law

Plaintiff-appellant Albert Paulek petitioned the trial court for a writ of mandate, alleging defendant-respondent Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority (the Agency) erred by concluding: (1) a particular activity was not a project under the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA); and (2) that, if it were a project, then it was exempt from CEQA. The activity at issue involved removing a conservation designation from one parcel of land, and placing the designation on two others. The trial court found Paulek had standing and the moving of the conservation designation qualified as a "project" under CEQA. The trial court denied the writ petition because it found the project fell within a CEQA exemption. Paulek argued on appeal of that judgment that: (1) he had standing; (2) the moving of the restrictions was a CEQA project; and (3) the project did not fall within the identified CEQA exemptions. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the judgment, finding substantial evidence did not support application of the Class 7 and Class 8 exemptions relied upon in the resolution. "[i]f the Agency seeks to proceed with the criteria refinement, then the Agency must move to the next step of the analysis and conduct an initial threshold study to see if the criteria refinement will have a significant impact on the environment, in order to determine whether a negative declaration may be issued." The trial court was directed to grant Paulek’s petition for a writ of mandamus and require the Western Riverside County Regional Conservation Authority to: (1) vacate and set aside its February 6, 2012, passing, approval, and adoption of Resolution No. 12-002 certifying and approving the Warm Springs Criteria Refinement; and (2) rescind the February 6, 2012, Notice of Exemption concerning the MSHCP Criteria Refinement. View "Paulek v. Western Riverside Co. Regional Conserv. Auth." on Justia Law

The Department of Fish and Wildlife appealed a judgment in favor of the Siskiyou County Farm Bureau (Farm Bureau), interpreting a Fish and Game Code section 1602 requiring notification when an entity plans to "substantially divert" water from a river or stream. "The trial court appears to have been led astray by a questionable and aborted enforcement policy" issued by a single Department employee, as well as the deluge of extrinsic material proffered by the Farm Bureau in its effort to demonstrate a latent ambiguity in the statute. Although extrinsic evidence may reveal a latent ambiguity in a statute, "such ambiguity must reside in the statutory language itself. It cannot exist in the abstract, or by ignoring the statutory language." Here, the Court of Appeal found extrinsic evidence revealed no ambiguity in the statute: the term "divert" had a long-established meaning in the context of water law before enactment of the statute. Regardless of an entity’s legal right to take water, such as for agricultural purposes, and regardless of whether the taking alters the streambed itself, section 1602 unambiguously required notification to the Department if an entity plans to "substantially divert" water. After notification, a statutory mechanism--arbitration followed by court review--exists to resolve disputes about diversions. This notification requirement neither encroaches on any entity’s water rights, nor impairs the powers and duties of the State Water Resources Control Board. The Court of Appeals therefore reversed because the trial court incorrectly found the statute, section 1602, to be ambiguous, and then resolved the perceived ambiguity in a manner inconsistent with the plain language of the statute. View "Siskiyou Co. Farm Bureau v. Dept. Fish & Wildlife" on Justia Law

Banning Ranch was a 400-acre parcel of largely undeveloped coastal property with active oilfield facilities and operations. Project proponents sought to develop one-fourth of Banning Ranch for residential and commercial purposes, and to preserve the remaining acreage as open space and parks, removing and remediating much of the oil production equipment and facilities. The City of Newport Beach and its City Council (collectively the City) approved the Project. Banning Ranch Conservancy filed a mandamus action against the City. The trial court agreed with the Conservancy’s claim that the City violated the Planning and Zoning Law and its own general plan by its alleged failure to adequately coordinate with the California Coastal Commission before its approval of the Project. The court rejected the Conservancy’s claim that the City violated the California Environmental Quality Act by failing to identify in the environmental impact report (EIR) the “environmentally sensitive habitat areas” (ESHAs). All interested parties appealed. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court’s CEQA ruling but concluded the court erred by finding the City violated its general plan. Therefore the Court reversed the judgment to the extent it provided mandamus relief to the Conservancy. View "Banning Ranch Conservancy v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

In this eminent domain proceeding, plaintiff Sacramento Area Flood Control Agency (SAFCA) acquired a fee simple interest in, a roadway easement over, and a temporary construction easement over a portion of defendant Ranjit Dhaliwal’s roughly 131-acre property in the Natomas Basin for use in connection with the Natomas Levee Improvement Program. The jury awarded Dhaliwal $178,703 for the property taken and $29,100 in severance damages. Brinderjit Dhaliwal and Gurdeep Dhaliwal, as co-executors of Dhaliwal’s estate, appealed the compensation award, arguing mainly that the trial court prejudicially erred in allowing SAFCA to introduce evidence concerning “future access” to the property. He claimed that such evidence was speculative because “[a]fter this case is concluded, the County and SAFCA would be able to deny Dhaliwal access to the property,” leaving him landlocked. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the trial court did not err in admitting the challenged evidence because such evidence had the potential to affect the property’s market value, and was not conjectural, speculative, or remote, and did not contradict the scope of the taking as defined by the resolution of necessity. Dhaliwal also argued that the trial court erred in allowing SAFCA’s appraiser to critique his appraiser’s valuation of the property, and that SAFCA’s counsel committed misconduct during closing argument by commenting on Dhaliwal’s absence and referring to SAFCA’s inability to pay more than fair market value for the property. The Court of Appeal concluded that neither of these contentions had merit, and affirmed the trial court's ruling on those. View "Sacramento Area Flood Agency v. Dhaliwal" on Justia Law

Santa Clara County adopted a mitigated negative declaration and granted a use permit allowing Wozniak to host up to 28 weddings and other events annually, with up to 100 attendees, on 14.46 acres on Highway 35 in the Santa Cruz Mountains. The property houses vineyards for the Redwood Ridge Estates Winery, llama and alpaca grazing land, barns, and a residence where Wozniak lives. It is adjacent to the Bear Creek Redwoods Open Space Preserve, which currently is open to the public by permit only. The remainder of the surrounding area is characterized by single-family residences on heavily wooded lots that are over two acres in size. Before obtaining the permit, Wozniak had hosted unpermitted events. Neighbors had complained. An association of neighboring owners successfully petitioned for a writ of mandate on the ground that the County violated the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA), Public Resources Code 21000, in adopting the mitigated negative declaration instead of requiring an environmental impact report. The court of appeal affirmed, noting evidence of likely significant traffic and noise impacts. View "Keep Our Mountains Quiet v. Cnty. of Santa Clara" on Justia Law

Environmental Law Foundation (ELF), sued Beech-Nut and other food manufacturers, distributors, and retailers, seeking enforcement of the Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, commonly referred to as Proposition 65 (Health & Saf. Code, 25249.5). ELF alleged certain of defendants’ products contain toxic amounts of lead sufficient to trigger the duty to provide warnings to consumers. The trial court entered judgment in favor of defendants, concluding they had no duty to warn because they satisfactorily demonstrated that the average consumer’s reasonably anticipated rate of exposure to lead from their products falls below relevant regulatory thresholds. The court of appeal affirmed, analyzing regulations promulgated by the Office of Environmental Health Hazard Assessment. View "Environmental Law Found. v. Beech-Nut Nutrition" on Justia Law