Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Shawn Agnone subpoenaed third-party witness Kenneth Madick in a marital dissolution action against her former husband, Frank Charles Agnone II. During Madick’s remote deposition, his attorney refused to turn on his webcam, prompting Shawn to file a motion to compel compliance with the subpoena and request sanctions. Before Shawn filed her reply brief, she and Frank settled the dissolution action, rendering the motion to compel moot. Shawn withdrew her motion but argued that sanctions were still warranted due to Madick’s and his counsel’s conduct during the deposition. The trial court granted the request for sanctions in part, ordering Madick to pay Shawn $9,981.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County reviewed the case and imposed sanctions on Madick. The court concluded that sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 did not independently authorize the trial court to impose monetary sanctions for discovery misuses. However, the Supreme Court granted Shawn’s petition for review and deferred further action pending consideration of a related issue in City of Los Angeles v. PricewaterhouseCoopers, LLP (PwC). The Supreme Court held that a trial court may invoke its independent authority to impose monetary sanctions under sections 2023.010 and 2023.030 for unusual forms of discovery abuse not addressed by method-specific sanctions provisions.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Three, reconsidered the case in light of PwC and concluded that the trial court had the authority to impose sanctions against Madick. The court affirmed the order, holding that the trial court reasonably exercised its discretion to impose sanctions for the unusual form of discovery abuse that frustrated the deposition’s truth-seeking function. The court found that the trial court’s order was supported by substantial evidence and that Madick’s arguments were unconvincing. View "Agnone v. Agnone" on Justia Law

A juvenile court in a dependency proceeding granted a restraining order requested by a mother, K.B., against her 17-year-old dependent child, D.B. The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services had received multiple referrals over the years concerning D.B.'s well-being due to alleged abuse and neglect by the mother. D.B. had a history of physical altercations with her mother and was placed in protective custody after her mother refused to allow her back home following an arrest for assault.The Santa Clara County Superior Court assumed jurisdiction over D.B. and declared her a dependent child. The court adopted a case plan that included supervised visitation with the mother. However, D.B. struggled in her placement and exhibited behavioral issues. The mother later requested termination of reunification services, which the court granted with D.B.'s agreement.Subsequently, the mother filed for a restraining order against D.B., citing threats and harassment. The court issued a temporary restraining order and later a one-year restraining order after a hearing. The court found that section 213.5 of the Welfare and Institutions Code authorized it to issue restraining orders against a dependent child and determined that it was in D.B.'s best interest to do so.The California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the juvenile court's decision. The appellate court held that section 213.5, subdivision (a), grants the juvenile dependency court authority to issue restraining orders against a dependent child, provided the child's best interest is considered. The court found substantial evidence supporting the restraining order and concluded that it did not violate D.B.'s constitutional rights, as reunification services had already been terminated with D.B.'s consent. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, had a daughter in August 2019, and separated in April 2023. A.M. filed for divorce and they signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into a judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a DVTRO on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled an evidentiary hearing for June 6, 2024, which was later continued to August 2025. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings pending the appeal, which was denied.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. The court found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and supporting evidence. The court held that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO based on the context of dissolution and custody disputes. The appellate court concluded that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending a noticed hearing, but this must be explicitly stated.The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the case for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances, including any events since the original ruling. The court expressed no view on how the trial court should exercise its discretion on remand. View "In re Marriage of A.M. & R.Y." on Justia Law

A.L. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court's decision to assume dependency jurisdiction over her one-year-old daughter, Minor, following a single-vehicle drunk driving accident in which Minor suffered a severe brain injury. Mother also contested the court's decision to require monitored visitation. The accident occurred after Mother consumed alcohol at a party and drove at high speeds, resulting in a crash that caused significant injuries to Minor. At the scene, Mother attempted to prevent a bystander from calling for help, fearing her child would be taken away. Both Mother and Minor were transported to medical facilities, where Minor was found to have a brain bleed and required surgery.The San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) filed a petition alleging Minor needed dependency protection. The juvenile court found a prima facie basis for the petition and placed Minor in foster care after her hospital stay. CFS recommended that Minor be placed in the sole custody of her father, S.L. (Father), with no reunification services for Mother. The court continued the jurisdiction and disposition hearing multiple times, during which Mother complied with her case plan, including parenting classes and substance abuse counseling. Despite her progress, CFS maintained that sole custody should be vested with Father, and the matter should be transferred to family court.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, reviewed the case. The court affirmed the juvenile court's decision to assume dependency jurisdiction under both section 300, subdivision (b) [failure to protect] and subdivision (e) [severe physical abuse]. The court found substantial evidence supporting the jurisdictional findings, noting the severity of Minor's injuries and Mother's actions at the scene. The court also upheld the monitored visitation requirement, emphasizing the need for continued supervision to ensure Minor's safety. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not err in its rulings. View "In re B.L." on Justia Law

In this juvenile dependency case, the San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) removed two children from their mother's home due to concerns of neglect. The juvenile court detained the children and ordered family reunification services for both parents, allowing CFS to provide relative visits as appropriate. The children were placed with their paternal grandmother. The maternal grandmother, R.H., frequently interfered with the parents' visitation schedules, leading to conflicts and an altercation at the children's school.The juvenile court found that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being and ordered that she have no further visits. R.H. filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to reinstate her visits, but the court summarily denied the petition, finding no new evidence or changed circumstances and that visits were not in the children's best interest.R.H. appealed, claiming the juvenile court violated her due process rights by acting on an oral motion without following procedural requirements. The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Two, held that grandparents who are not acting in a parental role have no constitutionally protected right to visit dependent children, and thus, R.H.'s due process challenge failed. The court also found that the juvenile court had the authority to modify the visitation order on its own motion and that any procedural error was harmless.The appellate court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's finding that visits with the maternal grandmother were detrimental to the children's well-being. The orders denying her further visits and summarily denying her section 388 petition were not abuses of discretion. Therefore, the appellate court affirmed the juvenile court's orders. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

In this case, the mother (K.G.) and father (J.G.) were involved in a custody dispute following their divorce. The mother was a victim of domestic violence perpetrated by the father, which triggered a rebuttable presumption under Family Code section 3044 that awarding custody to the father would be detrimental to the child's best interest. Despite this, the parents initially agreed to joint legal custody.The Superior Court of El Dorado County initially found that the father had committed domestic violence but awarded joint legal custody based on the parents' agreement. Later, the mother requested a modification to award her sole custody. A second judge reviewed the case and denied the mother's request, stating that the presumption had been rebutted, although no specific findings were made to support this conclusion.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and found that the lower court had erred by not making the required findings to rebut the presumption under section 3044. The appellate court noted that the lower court failed to address the statutory factors and did not provide reasons for its decision in writing or on the record. The appellate court emphasized that the presumption is mandatory and must be properly applied, with specific findings made to determine if it has been rebutted.The appellate court reversed the lower court's decision and remanded the case for a new hearing to reassess custody in light of the current circumstances and the presumption set forth in section 3044. The court directed the family court to enter a new custody order after applying the presumption and making the necessary findings. The mother was awarded her costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of J.G." on Justia Law

A.M. and R.Y. were married in April 2019, separated in April 2023, and have a daughter born in August 2019. A.M. filed for divorce in April 2023, and the parties signed a marital settlement agreement (MSA) in December 2023, which was incorporated into an uncontested judgment of dissolution in February 2024. The MSA gave A.M. sole legal and primary physical custody of their daughter, with R.Y. having supervised weekend visitation. In May 2024, A.M. filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against R.Y., alleging psychological, verbal, and emotional abuse, as well as coercive control.The Superior Court of San Diego County denied A.M.'s request for a domestic violence temporary restraining order (DVTRO) on the same day it was filed, citing insufficient evidence of past abuse and lack of detail about recent incidents. The court scheduled a hearing for a permanent DVRO but did not grant a temporary order pending the hearing. A.M. appealed the denial of the DVTRO and requested a stay of further proceedings in the trial court, which was denied. The court set the permanent DVRO request for an evidentiary hearing in August 2024, later continued to August 2025.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case and found that A.M. made a prima facie showing of abuse based on her declaration and accompanying evidence. The court concluded that the trial court erred in finding A.M.'s evidence insufficient and in denying the DVTRO without proper reasons. The appellate court held that the trial court has discretion to deny a DVTRO if it reasonably concludes that it is not necessary to protect the petitioner pending the noticed hearing. The appellate court reversed the order denying the DVTRO and remanded the matter for further consideration based on the totality of circumstances. View "Marriage of A.M. and R.Y." on Justia Law

Christina DeBenedetti and Morgan Ensburg were involved in a marital dissolution case where the trial court assigned four of Morgan’s ERISA-governed retirement accounts to Christina through Qualified Domestic Relations Orders (QDROs). This assignment was to satisfy an award made against Morgan after the court found he breached his fiduciary duty to Christina, resulting in a loss of community property. The total amount ordered for reimbursement and attorney fees exceeded $2 million.The Superior Court of San Diego County initially issued QDROs dividing the community property interests in Morgan’s retirement accounts. After a trial on reserved financial disputes, the court found Morgan had mismanaged community property and awarded Christina $1,831,250 for her share of the lost assets and $230,000 in attorney fees. Christina later sought to enforce this award through new QDROs, which the trial court granted, assigning her 100% of Morgan’s remaining interests in the retirement plans.The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, State of California, reviewed the case. Morgan argued that the QDROs did not relate to “marital property rights” and violated ERISA’s purpose of protecting retirement income. He also claimed the QDROs were invalid under California law and that the trial court did not value the retirement accounts. The appellate court rejected Morgan’s contentions, holding that the QDROs related to marital property rights, complied with ERISA, and that California laws cited by Morgan were either preempted by ERISA or did not invalidate the orders. The court also found that Morgan’s argument regarding the valuation of the retirement accounts was not raised in the trial court and could not be considered on appeal. The appellate court affirmed the trial court’s orders. View "In re Marriage of DeBenedetti" on Justia Law

A.T. was born in May 2024 and tested positive for amphetamine and methamphetamine, as did her mother, M.T. The mother admitted to drug addiction and using methamphetamine throughout her pregnancy. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) was notified, and A.T. was placed with a relative caregiver, Gloria T. The father, W.M., had a history of domestic violence and substance abuse issues, and had previously been involved in dependency proceedings for his other children, Y.M. and J.G.The Superior Court of San Diego County found that A.T. was a dependent child under section 300 of the Welfare and Institutions Code and ordered her removal from her mother's custody. The court also found that placing A.T. with her father would be detrimental to her well-being, citing his history of domestic violence, ongoing relationship with the mother, and lack of cooperation with the Agency.The father appealed, arguing that section 361, subdivision (d) should apply, which requires a higher standard of proof for removal, and that there was no clear and convincing evidence to support the finding of detriment. The Agency argued that section 361.2, subdivision (a) applied because the father did not have physical custody of A.T. at the time of disposition and sought to assume custody.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division One, concluded that section 361.2 applied because the father was the noncustodial parent seeking custody. The court found clear and convincing evidence supporting the juvenile court's finding that placing A.T. with the father would be detrimental to her safety and well-being. The court affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional order, maintaining A.T.'s placement with the relative caregiver and granting the father liberal unsupervised visitation. View "In re A.T." on Justia Law

Sarah Ann Miles and Jeffrey Gerstein entered into an oral traditional surrogacy agreement in which Miles agreed to conceive and carry a child using her ova and Gerstein's sperm, with the understanding that Gerstein would be the sole parent. The child, E., was born in December 2013, and both parties adhered to the terms of the agreement for seven years, with Gerstein acting as E.'s sole parent and Miles not assuming any parental role.The Superior Court of Sacramento County found that the oral surrogacy agreement was valid and enforceable, determining that Miles was not E.'s parent under the agreement. The court concluded that the parties had a clear understanding that Gerstein would be the sole parent and that Miles would not be involved in the child's upbringing. The court also found that it was not in E.'s best interest for Miles to enter her life as a parent.The California Court of Appeal, Third Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the lower court's judgment. The appellate court held that traditional surrogacy agreements do not need to be in writing to be enforceable under California law. The court found that the oral agreement between Miles and Gerstein was valid and that the parties' conduct over the years supported the existence of the agreement. The court also determined that the agreement did not violate public policy or constitutional principles, as Miles never intended to be E.'s parent and did not assume a parental role in E.'s life. The judgment was affirmed, and Miles was ordered to pay Gerstein's costs on appeal. View "Miles v. Gerstein" on Justia Law