Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A married couple initiated divorce proceedings, with the primary dispute centering on the date of their separation. The wife, Tara, initially claimed in her petition that the separation occurred in 2009, while the husband, Thomas, claimed it was in September 2020. Tara later amended her petition, with the assistance of counsel, to allege a separation date of June 2, 2020. Despite this, in subsequent filings and during trial preparation, Tara consistently asserted that the actual separation occurred in 2012 and provided evidence and argument to support this claim. Both parties, through multiple attorneys and case management statements, continued to treat the date of separation as a contested issue, preparing for trial on whether the separation occurred in 2012 or 2020.The Contra Costa County Superior Court addressed the issue during a bifurcated trial. On the day of trial, the court, on its own initiative, declared that Tara was bound by the June 2, 2020 separation date alleged in her amended petition, characterizing it as a binding judicial admission. The court reasoned that Tara’s failure to formally amend her petition again prevented her from arguing a different date. When Thomas ultimately accepted the June 2, 2020 date to avoid trial, the court adopted this date as the legal separation and denied Tara’s subsequent motion to set aside the order or to permit another amendment to her petition.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It held that under the circumstances, the trial court erred in treating the separation date in the amended petition as a judicial admission binding Tara. The appellate court explained that a judicial admission requires the adverse party not to contest the allegation, which did not occur here, as Thomas continued to dispute the separation date throughout the proceedings until the trial began. The order was reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings to determine the actual date of separation. The appellate court declined to order reassignment to a different trial judge. View "Marriage of Starr" on Justia Law

A father and mother, previously married and sharing a child, were involved in an ongoing custody arrangement. After initial divorce proceedings, the mother was permitted unmonitored visitation with the child. In late 2023 and early 2024, the father alleged that the mother’s behavior had become increasingly erratic, including stalking, repeated unwanted visits to his home, entering his residence and car without permission, incessant calls and texts, following him and the child in her car, and making threats related to his employment and family. The father stated these actions caused fear for both himself and their child, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and restored monitored visitation for the mother. The mother denied the allegations, attributing her actions to concern for the child’s safety and referencing her mental health history.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County heard testimony from both parties and considered evidence including text messages, videos, and the mother’s admissions. The court acknowledged that the mother’s conduct was obsessive and alarming but found that the behavior stemmed from her mental health condition rather than malicious intent. The court concluded that the father had not established, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the mother’s actions constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), specifically focusing on whether her conduct was intentionally threatening or intimidating. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professionally monitored visitation.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, found that the trial court misapplied the standard for abuse under the DVPA by requiring proof of intent to threaten or intimidate, rather than considering the totality of the circumstances and the effect of the conduct. The appellate court held that the uncontradicted evidence established abuse as defined by the DVPA and reversed the trial court’s order, remanding with directions to enter the requested DVRO. View "R.R. v. C.R." on Justia Law

Robert Rinker and Cindi Rinker, formerly married and sharing custody of their son, W., have a history of contentious interactions related to custody and visitation. After their separation, Robert was granted primary physical custody with monitored, and later unmonitored, visitation for Cindi. Beginning in late 2023, Robert alleged that Cindi’s behavior had deteriorated, including stalking him and W., entering his home and car without permission, making persistent and unwanted contact, and threatening communications. He claimed these actions caused fear for his and his son’s safety, prompting him to seek a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) and a return to monitored visitation for Cindi.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Family Court, held a hearing on Robert’s DVRO request. Both parties testified, with Robert detailing incidents of obsessive and alarming behavior, and Cindi admitting much of the conduct but denying malicious intent, attributing her actions to concern for her son and her mental health issues. The court found evidence of obsessive behavior by Cindi but concluded that Robert had not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that her conduct constituted abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), focusing on whether her actions were intentionally threatening. The court denied the DVRO but ordered professional monitoring of Cindi’s visitation due to the “alarming” nature of her behavior.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Four, reviewed the case. It found that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard by narrowly focusing on Cindi’s intent rather than considering the totality of her conduct and its impact, as required by the DVPA. The appellate court held that Robert had met his burden to show past acts of abuse, including stalking and disturbing the peace, regardless of Cindi’s intent. The court reversed the denial of the DVRO and remanded with instructions to enter the restraining order as requested. View "Rinker v. Rinker" on Justia Law

Lily and Nikhil Patel were married in 2002 and have two children, both born in Georgia. The family moved to California in late 2019, and then to Georgia in July 2023, where the children attended school and the family searched for a new home. In December 2023, Lily took the children to California to visit her family, with plans to return to Georgia, but a disagreement arose regarding the children’s return. This led to conflicting claims by each parent about the circumstances of their separation.In January 2024, Lily filed for a domestic violence restraining order and requested custody of the children in the Superior Court of Orange County, California, which issued temporary orders. She also filed a petition for legal separation in California, requesting custody. Meanwhile, Nikhil filed for divorce in Georgia. Nikhil moved to dismiss Lily’s custody request on jurisdictional grounds under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Enforcement Act (UCCJEA), and separately moved to dismiss Lily’s petition for legal separation, arguing that California Family Code section 2345 requires the consent of both spouses for legal separation and he did not consent.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three reviewed the family court’s dismissal of Lily’s petition for legal separation. The appellate court held that, under Family Code section 2345, a judgment of legal separation cannot be rendered without the consent of both parties unless the judgment is taken by default. The court found that the family court had inherent authority to dismiss the petition when the statutory consent requirement could not be met. The order dismissing Lily’s petition for legal separation was affirmed, and the court clarified that the family court did not err in dismissing the petition under the record presented. View "In re Marriage of Patel" on Justia Law

A married couple underwent in vitro fertilization and created two frozen embryos, signing a written agreement with the IVF provider that specified options for disposing of the embryos in the event of legal separation or divorce. The agreement offered several choices, including discarding the embryos, donating them, or making them available to one partner if desired. The couple selected and initialed the option stating the embryos would be “made available to the partner if he/she wishes.” After the couple separated, the husband sought to have the embryos discarded, while the wife wanted to use them to attempt pregnancy.In the Superior Court of Orange County, the husband filed a motion to discard the embryos, and the wife requested immediate rights to them. Following an evidentiary hearing at which both parties acknowledged the agreement and their signatures, the court found the contract valid, clear, and unambiguous, and awarded the embryos to the wife. The court issued a minute order and later a formal order reflecting this decision.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, determined the order was not directly appealable but exercised its discretion to treat the appeal as a petition for writ of mandate. Reviewing the IVF agreement independently, the appellate court held that when parties have entered a valid contract specifying the disposition of embryos in the event of divorce, that agreement governs. The court found the contract’s language unambiguous and concluded the embryos should be made available to the wife, as specified. The court further found no violation of public policy or constitutional rights and denied the husband’s petition, affirming that the wife was entitled to the embryos under the contract. View "Pham v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Following a divorce, a father was granted supervised visitation with his two minor children. The supervision was to be conducted by a licensed therapist selected by the mother, as the parents could not agree on a supervisor. The therapist, after supervising some visits, suspended the father’s visitation, stating that the sessions could not proceed successfully unless the father admitted to charges of kidnapping and neglect and recognized their impact on his children.The father subsequently filed suit against the therapist, bringing three claims, including one for reckless infliction of emotional distress stemming from the suspension of visitation. In the Superior Court of Santa Cruz County, the therapist moved for summary judgment. The father conceded two of his claims, leaving only the emotional distress claim regarding the suspension of visitation. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the therapist, finding that the claim was barred by the litigation privilege and quasi-judicial immunity, and further concluding that the alleged conduct did not support a valid claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.On appeal, the California Court of Appeal, Sixth Appellate District, reviewed only the emotional distress claim related to the suspension of visitation. Applying a de novo standard of review, the appellate court held that quasi-judicial immunity bars the claim. The court determined that the therapist was performing a judicial function delegated by the court—specifically, the authority to suspend visitation under the California Standards of Judicial Administration. The opinion found this function to be indistinguishable from those protected by quasi-judicial immunity in prior precedents. As a result, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the therapist. View "Vergara v. Ouse" on Justia Law

The petitioner and real party in interest are the parents of a minor son, Xander. The petitioner, who has primary physical custody, was found in contempt by the Superior Court of Orange County for five alleged violations of custody-related court orders. The contempt findings were based on the petitioner’s unilateral decisions involving Xander’s participation in school sports and orthodontic treatment, as well as scheduling activities that overlapped with the other parent’s visitation time. The central factual disputes involved whether the petitioner’s actions—signing Xander up for sports teams and braces—constituted violations of joint legal custody and scheduling orders.After a high-conflict parentage case, the trial court (Superior Court of Orange County) conducted a contempt proceeding based on an amended Order to Show Cause filed by the real party in interest. Initially, 36 violations were alleged; after dismissal of many counts, a trial was held on five remaining counts. The trial court found the petitioner guilty on all counts, imposing a $10,000 sanction. The findings were largely based on a pattern of the petitioner presenting decisions to the other parent as a fait accompli.On review, the California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, strictly construed the underlying orders and held that the contempt judgment was unsupported by substantial evidence of willful violation. The court found that the joint legal custody order did not require mutual consent for specific activities and did not prohibit unilateral decision-making, while the scheduling order did not extend to the petitioner’s authorization of Xander’s participation in events scheduled by third parties. The Court of Appeal granted the petition for writ of certiorari and annulled the contempt judgment, concluding that the orders lacked the specificity necessary to support a finding of contempt. The petitioner was awarded costs for the proceeding. View "Houser v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

A woman filed for dissolution of her marriage after six months, seeking a permanent domestic violence restraining order against her husband. The parties share a young daughter, S.R., and the wife has two other daughters, K.R. and D.R., from a prior relationship. The wife alleged that K.R., age 13, had disclosed incidents of sexual abuse by the husband. K.R. described being touched inappropriately by the husband on two occasions, one occurring recently and one two years prior. These allegations were relayed to law enforcement and a school counselor, and the wife filed a declaration detailing K.R.’s statements as part of her restraining order request.The Superior Court of Orange County held an evidentiary hearing in which the wife testified about K.R.’s statements. The trial court admitted these statements over the husband’s hearsay objections, found the wife credible, and granted a restraining order protecting the wife, K.R., D.R., and S.R. The order included sole legal and physical custody of S.R. to the wife, with the husband permitted professional monitored visitation with S.R. once a month, citing concerns that the monitor could not understand Spanish, S.R.’s primary language. The trial court also took judicial notice of pending criminal charges against the husband, and subsequently entered judgment dissolving the marriage.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that K.R.’s out-of-court statements were admissible for their truth under the child dependency hearsay exception recognized in In re Cindy L., and clarified that this exception applies in domestic violence restraining order proceedings involving sexual abuse of a minor. The court found error in the trial court’s reliance on pending criminal charges as substantive evidence, but determined the error was not prejudicial. The appellate court reversed the part of the restraining order limiting visitation with S.R., concluding the trial court misapplied the law regarding professional monitors’ language requirements, and remanded for reconsideration of visitation. The restraining order was otherwise affirmed. View "Marriage of M.P. and M.C." on Justia Law

After separating from his wife Monique in 2016, Brett, a sculptor, was ordered in a dissolution proceeding to pay spousal and child support. Brett accumulated approximately $2 million in unpaid support obligations and, according to his own testimony, held no assets apart from a copyright in certain works associated with Michael Jackson. Monique moved to have a receiver appointed and to compel Brett to assign the copyright to the receiver for purposes of monetization to satisfy the outstanding support debt.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County granted Monique’s request, appointing a receiver and ordering Brett to assign his copyright to that receiver. Brett did not dispute his debt or the fact that his copyright was his only asset but argued that existing law did not authorize courts to compel the assignment of a copyright, contending that such authority existed only for patents. He timely appealed from this order.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reviewed the case. The court held that, under Code of Civil Procedure section 695.010, subdivision (a), all property of a judgment debtor, including copyrights, is subject to enforcement of a money judgment unless a specific exception applies. The court found no exception for copyrights. It further reasoned that although no published California case had previously addressed forced assignment of copyrights, statutes and past cases regarding other intellectual property, such as patents, supported the trial court’s authority. The court also found persuasive support in analogous federal and out-of-state decisions. Consequently, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order compelling Brett to assign his copyright to the receiver and denied Monique’s request for appellate sanctions. Respondent was awarded costs on appeal. View "In re Marriage of Strong" on Justia Law

In March 2015, Henry J. Lugo III signed a voluntary declaration of paternity (VDOP) identifying himself as the biological father of a child, and this declaration was filed with the Department of Child Support Services. In 2023, the County of Los Angeles initiated a child support action against Lugo based on the VDOP. Lugo denied being the child’s father and subsequently, after the trial court entered an order and a judgment requiring him to pay child support, he filed a request to set aside the VDOP on the ground of fraud, alleging he had been misled about the child's paternity and supported this with DNA evidence indicating he was not the biological father.Previously, the Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Lugo’s request to set aside the VDOP as untimely, reasoning that under the current version of Family Code section 7576, such a challenge must be brought within two years of the VDOP’s filing. Lugo argued that, according to Judicial Council form FL-281, which interprets the statute, the applicable time frame for VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020, is within six months after an initial court order for custody, visitation, or child support is made based on the VDOP. The trial court rejected this argument, finding the request untimely since Lugo filed it more than nine years after the VDOP was executed.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and held that for VDOPs filed before January 1, 2020, a request to set aside may be timely filed under the time frame permitted by former Family Code section 7575, subdivision (c)(1). Specifically, the request is timely if brought within a reasonable time, not exceeding six months, after an initial court order for custody, visitation, or child support based on the VDOP. Because Lugo filed his request within this period, the appellate court reversed the trial court’s order and remanded the matter for consideration of the request’s merits. View "County of Los Angeles v. Lugo" on Justia Law