Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The issue in this appeal is whether section 5241 precludes the obligee from seeking a determination of arrearages allegedly owed by the obligor, where the obligor’s employer is subject to a valid earnings assignment order. The family court ruled section 5241 precludes such a request, but reached that conclusion by answering a different question: whether section 5241 precludes an obligee from seeking to enforce arrearages against an obligor whose employer is subject to an earnings assignment order. The court concluded section 5241 precludes such a request. As a result, the family court denied a request by Plainitff for an order to determine child and spousal support arrearages against her former husband, Defendant. The court also granted Defendant’s request for monetary sanctions against Plaintiff’s attorney.   The Second Appellate District reversed the family court’s order and directed the court to determine the amount of arrearages, if any, Defendant owes Plaintiff.  The court explained that based on the language and legislative history of section 5241, we conclude that, where an employer is subject to an earnings assignment order, section 5241 protects obligors only from being held in contempt or subject to criminal prosecution for nonpayment of the support. Contrary to the family court’s ruling the statute does not preclude an obligee like Plaintiff from seeking arrearages or a determination of arrearages from an obligor like Defendant. Which in turn means Plaintiff’s request for an order determining arrearages was not frivolous for the reasons stated by the family court and did not support an award of sanctions against Appellant. View "Brubaker v. Strum" on Justia Law

C.K. (Father) and I.B. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating their parental rights to their infant child, D.B. They argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services failed to comply with its duty of initial inquiry into Father’s Indian ancestry under the federal Indian Child Welfare Act, and related California law (ICWA), and thus the juvenile court erroneously found that ICWA did not apply. To this, the Court of Appeal agreed and found that the error was prejudicial. It therefore conditionally reversed and remanded to allow the Department to fully comply with ICWA. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services filed a petition alleging that the minor had been sexually abused by her father. Mother was not named as an offending parent in the petition. The juvenile court found that the Department failed to prove the sexual abuse allegations against the father but did not dismiss the petition. Instead, the court found that the evidence supported jurisdiction based upon unpleaded allegations of emotional abuse by the mother, a position urged by the minor’s counsel but opposed by the Department. The court subsequently entered a disposition order.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court violated the mother’s due process rights when it established jurisdiction based on the conduct of a parent the Department never alleged was an offending parent, and on a factual and legal theory not raised in the Department’s petition. Parents have a due process right to be informed of the nature of the proceedings and the allegations upon which the deprivation of custody is predicated so that they can make an informed decision on whether to appear, prepare, and contest the allegations. View "In re S.V." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from a family court’s self-described sua sponte sanctions order under Family Code section 271.1 The family court judge ordered Appellants (Mother) and her attorney, to each pay $10,000 to Respondent (Father) and partly justified the sanctions on its finding that Appellants unjustifiably accused the judge of being biased (or appearing to be biased).   The Second Appellate District considered whether the sanctions order represents an abuse of the family court’s discretion and reversed the family court’s order. The court explained that as to the attorney, the family court’s sanctions award is obviously wrong: Section 271 permits imposing sanctions only on a party, not a party’s attorney, and the sanctions award against the attorney is, therefore, improper. As against Mother, the sanctions award is an error, too, even if a marginally less obvious one. There is a question as to whether section 271 even authorizes a family court to issue sanctions on its own motion, but the court explained it need not decide that issue because the conduct relied on by the family court to impose sanctions here, even considered in the aggregate, does not rise to the level of meriting sanctions. The family court abused its discretion in concluding otherwise. View "Featherstone v. Martinez" on Justia Law

Petitioners W.M. (minor), and Amber G. (her prospective adoptive parent/de facto parent) sought an extraordinary writ from the juvenile court’s order removing W.M. from Amber’s care and placing her with out-of-state relatives she has never met. The California Legislature enacted a "complex scheme of placement preferences," and Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) conflated the considerations involved in the placement of a child with those involved in removing a child posttermination from a prospective adoptive parent’s home. "While placement with relatives is generally favored when the need arises, removal from any stable, permanent, loving home (with non-relatives or relatives), particularly after a child has been freed for adoption, is not. By failing to recognize its burden in recommending W.M.’s removal, SSA obscured the critical decision the juvenile court needed to make: Was removing W.M. from her current placement in her best interest?" After carefully reviewing the entire record, the Court of Appeal found SSA was obligated to do much more pursuant to the prospective adoptive parent (PAP) preference. The statute also required the court to hold a hearing and review all material evidence relating to SSA’s removal decision before approving or rejecting it. In this case, it appears the court focused on the reasons for the delay in placing W.M. with her relatives, and neglected to sufficiently consider Welfare & Institutions Code section 366.26(n)’s directive. Petitioners argued there was insufficient evidence that it would be in W.M.'s best interest to remove her from the only family she has ever known, and eliminate any chance she has of connecting with her siblings, for the opportunity to live with out-of-state blood relatives who are strangers to her. The Court of Appeal granted the petitions and vacated the juvenile court’s removal order. View "Amber G. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court order terminating her parental rights to her child Adrian L. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 She contends the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its duty under section 224.2, subdivision (b) to inquire of extended family members, including maternal grandmother, paternal grandmother, and paternal aunt, regarding Adrian’s potential status as an Indian child as defined in the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded additional inquiry would not have yielded information that was likely to bear meaningfully on the question of whether Adrian is an Indian child. The court explained that its review of the record as a whole does not disclose that unquestioned extended family members were likely to have had information that would have borne meaningfully on whether Adrian is an Indian child. Accordingly, any ICWA inquiry error under section 224.2, subdivision (b), was harmless. View "In re Adrian L." on Justia Law

Mother appeals from an order terminating her parental rights to her daughter under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Mother contends the juvenile court erred when it determined the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) satisfied its inquiry obligations under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and related California law as to daughter’s possible Indian heritage. No interested party filed a respondent’s brief; instead, the mother, DCFS, and daughter filed a joint application and stipulation for conditional affirmance and remand to the juvenile court to order DCFS to inquire of a non-relative extended family member (NREFM) caring for the child, and available maternal and paternal extended family members in compliance with ICWA and related California law.   The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed. The court explained that the juvenile court shall order DCFS to make reasonable efforts to interview the NREFM (I.C.) and available maternal and paternal family members about the daughter’s Indian ancestry. The court wrote that this case involves reversible error because the parties agree, and we concur, there was noncompliance with the inquiry requirements of ICWA and related California provisions. Here, DCFS only inquired of the parents regarding Native American ancestry. DCFS did not ask the NREFM I.C. (daughter’s caregiver and prospective adoptive parent), or the extended known maternal and paternal family members about Indian heritage. Pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), DCFS had a duty to ask daughter’s “extended family members” and “others who have an interest in the child” whether daughter is an Indian child. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Stephen Salmon (Husband) and Melissa Salmon (Wife) filed competing requests for domestic violence restraining orders against each other pursuant to the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). At the conclusion of the hearing on both petitions, the trial court issued an order granting Wife’s petition and denying Husband’s. Husband appealed. He did not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court’s factual findings or to support the issuance of a DVPA restraining order in favor of Wife. Instead, he challenged only the trial court’s denial of his petition, arguing: (1) the trial court misunderstood the scope of its discretion to the extent it believed Family Code section 6305 constrained its authority to simultaneously grant both requests for protective orders in this case; (2) even if section 6305 applied, the trial court abused its discretion by choosing between two identified aggressors in order to grant relief to only one of them; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by failing to grant Husband’s request for custody of the parties’ children. The Court of Appeal concluded section 6305 indeed governed the parties' competing requests for competing protective orders; the statute expressly permitted the trial court to weigh the acts of the parties to determine if one should be considered the dominant aggressor before issuing a mutual restraining order; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Husband's custody request. View "Salmon v. Salmon" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court’s jurisdictional finding and dispositional order as to her minor child, G.Z. First, Mother contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court’s finding that her minor son’s subdural hematomas were the result of her neglectful acts. Second, Mother argues her due process rights were violated when the juvenile court relied on Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1’s rebuttable presumption in finding neglect by Mother when it “never notified its intent to do so until all parties had argued and submitted the case.”   The Second Appellate District vacated the court’s factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. The court reversed the juvenile court’s order given the lack of substantial evidence. The court explained that here, as set forth in the preceding section, Mother presented evidence that G.Z.’s subdural hematomas were not the result of abuse or negligence by her, rebutting the presumption of section 355.1, subdivision (a). Mother’s family members who were interviewed all told the CSW they have no concerns of neglect or physical abuse by Mother. Because Mother provided rebuttal evidence, the burden shifted back to DCFS to prove the petition’s allegations. Here, substantial evidence does not support the juvenile court’s jurisdictional findings. View "In re G.Z." on Justia Law

Timothy W. and Julie W. were in the midst of a dissolution of their marriage. The underlying dispute here relates to Julie’s disclosure of certain facts about Timothy’s past (the sensitive information) that Julie revealed to her codefendant and private investigator, Ronnie Echavarria, Sr. (Echavarria), in connection with the dissolution case. Echavarria revealed the sensitive information to at least one other person, which resulted in several other individuals learning the information. Timothy filed a civil case against Julie and Echavarria (defendants), alleging 12 separate causes of action, many of which were duplicative or not properly pleaded as separate claims. Defendants moved pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 (the anti-SLAPP statute) to dismiss. The trial court granted the motions as to 10 of the 12 causes of action, all based in tort, and denied the motion as to two contract-based claims. Timothy appealed, arguing the court erred by granting the motion. Julie cross-appealed, arguing the remaining two causes of action should also have been dismissed. The Court of Appeal concluded that Timothy’s claims directly arose from the dissolution case, and that all of the claims were barred by the litigation privilege. His contract claims were barred on several additional grounds. Accordingly, the Court found that the trial court properly granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion as to the tort claims and incorrectly denied it as to the two breach of contract claims. View "Timothy W. v. Julie W." on Justia Law