Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant (mother), who appealed the order terminating parental rights to her minor child J.K. with a permanent plan of adoption contends the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply because Santa Barbara County Child Welfare Services (CWS) and the juvenile court failed to ask J.K.’s extended family members about his possible Indian status. Defendant asked the Second Appellate District to order that the matter be remanded so these duties can be satisfied.   The Second Appellate District conditionally affirmed the judgment. The court concluded the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA does not apply where, as here, the record does not establish that the expanded duty of initial inquiry set forth in section 224.2, subdivision (b), has been satisfied. The court also concluded that a conditional affirmance with a limited remand for full satisfaction of the duties of inquiry and notice is necessary and appropriate because (1) CWS and the juvenile court have “an affirmative and continuing duty” to inquire into J.K.’s potential Indian status and (2) the record on appeal does not “affirmatively reflect that the protections intended to be afforded through the exercise of that duty have been provided.” View "In re J.K." on Justia Law

Elouise Harber and Delores Williams filed cross-petitions to be appointed as guardians of two children. The trial court ordered them to exchange lists of the witnesses they intended to call, specifically including party witnesses; it also specifically ordered that they would not be permitted to call a witness who was not on their lists. Harber failed to exchange a witness list. When the case was called for trial, her counsel explained that her only witness was Harber herself, and that counsel mistakenly believed that the pretrial order did not require her to list party witnesses. Pursuant to its pretrial order, the trial court dismissed Harber’s petition and granted Williams’s petition. In the published portion of its opinion, the Court of Appeal held that, under the circumstances of this case, the trial court abused its discretion by imposing a terminating sanction View "Guardianship of A.H." on Justia Law

Appellant made a request for pendente lite attorney fees was made early in the marriage dissolution proceedings and had been pending for over a year when the trial started. By that time, Appellant was unemployed and representing herself. Nonetheless, her request for pendente lite attorney fees was never ruled on by the family court. Instead, the court waited until after the trial to address attorney fees in its final judgment of reserved issues.   The Fifth Appellate District explained that Appellant has demonstrated the family court’s failures to comply with its obligations under section 2030 were prejudicial. To remedy this prejudicial error, the court explained it must reverse the judgment (which places all reserved issues at large) and remand the case for further proceedings. Those proceedings shall include a hearing on Appellant’s request for pendente lite attorney fees and a decision on that request before the new trial is started. Because over four years have passed since Appellant filed her May 2018 request for an order awarding pendente lite attorney fees and costs, the court shall allow Appellant to file a new request for order and shall allow Blair to file a response before hearing the request for pendente lite attorney fees and costs. View "Marriage of Knox" on Justia Law

J.T. (father) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating his parental rights to Kenneth D. (minor) and adopting the recommended findings and orders of the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services (Department). Father’s contentions on appeal were limited to the Department’s and juvenile court’s compliance with the requirements of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), complaining the juvenile court and the Department failed to make the required initial inquiries of father’s ICWA status prior to finding the ICWA inapplicable and terminating his parental rights. Father also argued the Department’s investigation into mother’s possible Native American heritage was inadequate. He contended these errors were prejudicial requiring reversal and that posttermination ICWA inquiries did not cure the alleged noncompliance. To this, the Court of Appeal disagreed: Father did not show the juvenile court’s ICWA determination premised upon information provided by mother was unsupported by substantial evidence, and in light of the augmented record filed May 5, 2022, Father could not show the juvenile court’s and Department’s failure to initially comply with their ICWA duties was prejudicial. Accordingly, judgment was affirmed. View "In re Kenneth D." on Justia Law

J.V. (Father) appealed a Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26 order terminating his parental rights to his then three-year-old daughter, Y.M. His sole contention was that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not comply with its initial duty to inquire regarding Y.M.’s possible Indian ancestry under section 224.2 (b), which implemented in part the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Agency conceded that it did not comply with its duty of initial inquiry, but argued its error was harmless. Applying the standard set forth in In re Benjamin M., 70 Cal.App.5th 735 (2021), the Court of Appeal concluded the Agency's section 224.2 (b) initial inquiry error was not prejudicial. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the section 366.26 order. View "In re Y.M." on Justia Law

N.G. (Mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights to her children, Ricky R. and Jayden R. Mother argued the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry under state law implementing the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). DPSS did not dispute that it failed to discharge its duty of initial inquiry, but it argued that the error was harmless. DPSS also moved to dismiss the appeal as moot on the basis of postjudgment evidence, and it asked the Court of Appeal to consider that evidence under several theories. After review, the Court concluded DPSS prejudicially erred by failing to comply with its duty of initial inquiry under ICWA-related state law. The Court also denied DPSS’s motion to dismiss the appeal and declined to consider the postjudgment evidence of ICWA inquiries conducted while this appeal was pending. To this end, the Court held the juvenile court should consider that evidence in the first instance and determine whether DPSS discharged its duties under ICWA and related state law. View "In re Ricky R." on Justia Law

D.L. (Mother) is the biological mother of four children: E.L., Child 1, now 15 years old; E.R.O., Child 2, now 11; L.O., Child 3, now 10; and E.O.O., Child 4, now 7. E.O. (Father) is the presumed father of Child 1 and the biological father of the other children. In January 2015, Father began a two-year term in the Ventura County jail. Aida R. was appointed legal guardian of the children.   Mother contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying her request to reopen the evidence to allow her to testify. Mother contends the trial court failed to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). Mother argues that ICWA is a substantial right, and her counsel may not waive a substantial right without her consent.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the orders and found that the ICWA does not apply. The court explained that the circumstances here, however, warrant application of Code of Civil Procedure section 909. The court wrote that remand would unnecessarily delay the likelihood of adoption of the children and would achieve the same result the court found here. View "In re E.L." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating his and Mother’s parental rights and finding that the child, J.R., was adoptable. The Second Appellate District conditionally reversed that order because the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the agency) violated Mother’s due process rights.The court explained that the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides that “[n]o State shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” (U.S. Const., 14th Amend., Section 1.) Except in emergent circumstances, this provision guarantees reasonable notice and a meaningful opportunity to be heard before the state may deprive a person of a protected liberty or property interest. Because parents have a fundamental liberty interest in the companionship, care, custody, and management of their children, the due process clause requires child welfare agencies to exercise reasonable diligence in attempting to locate and notify them of dependency proceedings.   The court explained that this case presents a textbook example of a due process violation. DCFS initiated dependency proceedings concerning J.R. on the ground that his father physically abused him. Even though Father told the agency at the outset of the proceedings that Mother resided in El Salvador, the record does not show that DCFS made any attempt to ascertain Mother’s location in that country. The court concluded that Father has standing to assert DCFS’s violation of Mother’s due process rights. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law

T.T. (Mother) challenged a juvenile court’s finding that the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply to the dependency proceedings concerning her son, Dominick D. She argued the juvenile court failed to ensure that San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) discharged its duty of initial inquiry into Dominick’s possible Indian ancestry under California Welfare & Institutions Code section 224.2(b). To this, the Court of Appeal agreed, but declined to address the parties’ arguments concerning harmlessness, because ICWA inquiry and notice errors did not warrant reversal of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional or dispositional findings and orders other than the finding that ICWA did not apply. The Court accordingly vacated that finding and remanded for compliance with ICWA and related California law, but otherwise affirmed. View "In re Dominick D." on Justia Law

The boys were removed from the custody of their (married) parents by the Humboldt County Department of Health and Human Services in 2020, after a string of child abuse and neglect referrals stemming from repeated bouts of domestic violence between the couple, concerns over parental substance abuse and, in mother’s case, mental health concerns. The boys, then 19 months and 6 months old, were placed into foster care together, later joined by a sister who was detained in a separate case after mother tested positive for drugs at her birth. The juvenile court sustained allegations that the boys were at substantial risk of serious physical and emotional harm.Mother appealed a subsequent termination of her parental rights, arguing that the juvenile court erred in its consideration of the beneficial relationship exception (Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)), under “Caden C.,” a 2021 decision. The court of appeal affirmed the orders terminating parental rights, without reaching the merits. The record does not contain evidence that would support the application of the beneficial relationship exception. When a juvenile court applies the wrong legal standard in rejecting the beneficial relationship exception, reversal is not warranted if the parent did not introduce evidence that would permit a finding in their favor under the correct legal standard. View "In re J.R." on Justia Law