Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, affirmed a lower court's judgment that the relationship between the plaintiff, M.A., and the defendant, B.F., did not constitute a dating relationship under Family Code section 6210, thus not supporting a tort claim for domestic violence. The plaintiff and defendant had characterized their relationship as “friends with benefits,” and while they had several sexual encounters, they did not go on dates or have social outings together. The court noted that the determination of whether a dating relationship exists is a fact-intensive inquiry and cannot be resolved based on shorthand labels or descriptors. The court held that the frequency and intimacy of the interactions did not amount to a dating relationship as defined by Family Code section 6210, which requires "frequent, intimate associations primarily characterized by the expectation of affection or sexual involvement independent of financial considerations." View "M.A. v. B.F." on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Second Appellate District Division Three, the mother (B.S.) appealed the court's decision to exercise jurisdiction over her child (R.M.) under the Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) and (g), based on her and the father's incarceration.The parents were arrested on murder charges, and no prior arrangements had been made for the care of their minor child. The child was taken into protective custody by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services. The court exercised jurisdiction over the child because it believed the parents had not made plans for the child's care prior to their arrest.However, the Court of Appeal reversed the lower court's decision, ruling that the court's exercise of jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence. The appellate court noted that the parents' incarceration alone was not sufficient for the exercise of jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court stressed that the law does not require parents to make an appropriate advance plan for the child's ongoing care and supervision to prevent the exercise of jurisdiction.The Court of Appeal found that the Department didn't prove that there was something more than the mere fact of the parents' incarceration to support jurisdiction under section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) and (g). Furthermore, the court found that the lower court applied an incorrect legal standard in concluding that jurisdiction was appropriate. Therefore, the court's jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders were reversed. View "In re R.M." on Justia Law

The appellant C.B., the biological father of minor A.K., appealed from the January 2023 order of the juvenile court terminating his parental rights. The appellant argued that the juvenile court and the Calaveras County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) denied his due process rights to notice and an opportunity to participate in dependency proceedings to establish presumed father status. T.K., the minor’s mother (mother), joined in C.B.’s arguments. The Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District agreed, finding that the juvenile court and the Agency did not comply with duties to try to identify all of the minor’s alleged fathers, to give adequate notice to C.B. that his parental rights were at stake in the proceedings, or to give C.B. notice of specific important hearings. Thus, it reversed the order terminating parental rights. The facts of the case reveal that when the minor was born, the Agency received a report that the mother tested positive for methamphetamine, benzodiazepines, and sexually transmitted diseases. The mother did not inform C.B. about her pregnancy and initially identified D.C. as the alleged father of the minor. However, paternity testing later showed that D.C. was not the biological father, and C.B. was identified as the potential father. Despite this, C.B. was not given proper notice of the proceedings or properly informed about their importance, and his due process rights were violated. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

The case involves Adrian Lamont Brooks, who was found guilty of inflicting corporal injury on his domestic partner, R.J., and committing assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury. On appeal, Brooks argued that the trial court erred in instructing the jury that R.J. had invoked her Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination because she was never called and sworn. He also asserted that the trial court erred in refusing to replace a juror who was allegedly biased. The Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District Division One State of California affirmed the judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County. The appellate court found that R.J. had validly asserted her Fifth Amendment privilege through her counsel and that the juror's potential bias did not warrant removal. The court also held that the trial court did not err in its instructions to the jury regarding R.J.'s refusal to testify. View "People v. Brooks" on Justia Law

In February 2022, Gracia Bovis, an elder woman, signed documents transferring the title of her house to her daughter, Marina Casey. According to Bovis, Casey had misled her into signing the documents to protect her from rising property taxes. However, the documents transferred the property into Casey's name. Casey argued that the transfer was meant to protect the property from tax reassessment under Proposition 19. Bovis sought an Elder Abuse Restraining Order (EARO) against Casey, alleging financial abuse. The trial court granted the EARO and subsequently declared the deed transferring the property void ab initio (invalid from the outset). Casey appealed these decisions.The Court of Appeal of the State of California, First Appellate District, affirmed the issuance of the restraining orders, finding sufficient evidence of financial abuse, but reversed the order declaring the deed void. The appellate court concluded that the trial court exceeded its statutory authority under Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657.03 in declaring the deed void. The statute allows for the issuance of restraining orders to protect elders from further abuse, but does not provide the court with the authority to declare a deed void. The court noted that other permanent remedies, such as the return of property, can be pursued through a civil action under other provisions of the Elder Abuse Act. View "Newman v. Casey" on Justia Law

In a domestic violence dispute that led to dueling restraining orders, the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, affirmed the trial court's decision to award attorney's fees to Peter Henri Dragones III, the prevailing party. Both Dragones and his opponent, Kerry Calkins, had sought restraining orders against each other in 2022. The trial court granted Dragones's request and denied Calkins's. Subsequently, Dragones moved for attorney's fees under Family Code section 6344. While the case was pending, the legislature repealed the prior version of section 6344 and enacted a new one, which made it easier for a prevailing petitioner to obtain fees. Both parties contended that the prior version of section 6344 should apply. However, the appellate court held that the current version of section 6344 applies retroactively to all cases pending on its effective date, including this case. This decision was based on California's general rule of retroactivity for amendments to the Family Code and the established principle that newly enacted attorney fee statutes apply to cases pending on their effective date. The court also held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney’s fees under the new statute. View "Dragones v. Calkins" on Justia Law

In early 2022, a three-year-old child, L.C., was taken from his mother, D.C., after she was arrested for transporting fentanyl pills with L.C. in the car. After the juvenile court removed L.C. from his mother's care, D.C. returned to Mexico on the advice of her criminal defense attorney. Despite being in Mexico, D.C. maintained a relationship with L.C. through weekly video calls and completed necessary programs as part of her case plan, including a drug treatment program, individual counseling, and parenting classes. However, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services expressed concerns about the validity of her drug tests performed by Mexico's child protection agency. At a 12-month status review hearing, the juvenile court terminated D.C.'s reunification services, citing her failure to return to California for drug testing and other services, speculation about L.C.'s developmental services in Mexico, and D.C.'s refusal to surrender herself in response to an arrest warrant.L.C. sought relief, arguing that there was no substantial evidence to support the juvenile court's finding that returning him to his mother would create a substantial risk of detriment to his safety or well-being. The Court of Appeal of the State of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven agreed with L.C. and found that the mother had complied with her case plan, maintained a bond with L.C., and that Mexico's child protection agency could provide services to the mother and L.C. Therefore, the court granted the petition, vacated the juvenile court's termination of reunification services, and ordered a new review hearing to consider any developments since the last hearing. View "L.C. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In an appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County, five minors, aged between one and fourteen years, challenged the juvenile court's decision to order reunification services for their parents, identified as A.B. (mother) and A.S. (father). The minors were adjudged dependent children due to ongoing domestic violence and substance abuse in their home. The court had to interpret and apply the provisions of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (b)(13), which allows a court to bypass reunification services for parents with a history of extensive, abusive, and chronic use of drugs or alcohol who have resisted prior court-ordered treatment in the three years prior to the filing of the petition.The Court of Appeal of the State of California Fifth Appellate District concluded that the juvenile court had misapplied the law when it decided it could not deny reunification services to the parents while they were participating in treatment. The court emphasized that the statute requires proof of the parent’s resistance during the three years preceding the petition, regardless of their engagement in treatment at the time of the disposition hearing.The court reversed the juvenile court's dispositional order providing reunification services to the parents for all five children and remanded the case for a new disposition hearing based on the family's present circumstances. This decision was made despite subsequent events that rendered the case potentially moot, as the court deemed the issue of statutory interpretation important. View "In re L.B." on Justia Law

In the case of a contested divorce between Quin Whitman and Douglas F. Whitman, the founder of a once successful hedge fund, the Court of Appeal of the State of California ruled on several issues. The court affirmed that Doug failed to prove he retained any separate property interest in the hedge fund at the time of dissolution, despite an initial $300,000 investment of his own separate funds. The court also ruled that the community was not financially responsible for any of the legal fees Doug incurred to defend against criminal charges brought against him for insider trading or the $250,000 fine imposed on him in that case. However, the court erred in holding the community responsible for the $935,000 penalty imposed by the Securities and Exchange Commission for illegal insider trading. Quin did not demonstrate that the court erred in holding the community responsible for legal fees expended by the hedge fund when it intervened as a third party into these proceedings. The court also concluded that Quin failed to prove her claim that Doug breached his fiduciary duty in connection with the sale of the couple’s luxury home. The court concluded that the couple’s entire interest in the hedge fund is community property, subject to equal division. The court also found that Doug's legal expenses incurred in defending against insider trading charges and the $250,000 fine imposed on him were his separate debts. View "In re Whitman" on Justia Law

In the case before the Court of Appeal of the State of California Third Appellate District, a dispute arose from the marital dissolution proceedings of Daniel Gilbert-Valencia (husband) and Kate McEachen (wife). The husband argued that the family court erred in awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the parties’ quasi-marital property to the wife, excluding evidence of domestic violence perpetrated by the wife, and retroactively modifying the tax deductibility of spousal support payments made by the husband.The facts of the case reveal that the husband sold the house over the wife’s objections during the dissolution proceedings, believing it was his personal property. He used the net proceeds from the sale exclusively for personal purposes. The family court decided that the wife was a putative spouse, the house was quasi-marital property, and the husband had breached his fiduciary duty to the wife by selling the house and using the proceeds for personal purposes. Consequently, the court awarded 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the house to the wife.The appellate court agreed with the husband's first two contentions. It held that the family court committed an error by awarding 100 percent of the net proceeds from the sale of the quasi-marital property to the wife without finding oppression, fraud, or malice by the husband. This decision was an abuse of discretion because it contradicted the requirement under Family Code section 1101 for such findings to justify an unequal division of community property.The appellate court also held that the family court erred in excluding a videotape that was documented evidence of the wife’s domestic violence. In addition, it found that the family court failed to consider the husband's request for a domestic violence restraining order, admitted into evidence with the wife's consent, when deciding on spousal support. This failure was deemed a reversible error.The appellate court reversed the family court's orders and remanded the case for reconsideration of the division of quasi-marital property and spousal support, and a decision on the tax deductibility of the husband's spousal support payments. View "Marriage of Gilbert-Valencia & McEachen" on Justia Law