Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Santa Cruz County Human Services Department filed a juvenile dependency petition, Welfare & Institutions Code section 361(c), concerning an 11-year-old girl, then residing with her father. The whereabouts of her mother were unknown. It was alleged that father had physically abused the minor. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, found the allegations of the petition true, and adjudged the minor a dependent of the court. Father received family reunification services for 17 months. The court found legal guardianship with the minor’s maternal grandparents to be the appropriate permanent plan, found that visitation of the minor by father would be detrimental, and ordered that father have no contact with the minor.After a contested six-month post-permanency review hearing in which the court heard testimony, it reaffirmed the detriment finding and denied visitation. Father renewed his request for visitation at the 12-month post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court denied father’s request for a contested hearing, reaffirmed the detriment order, and denied his request for visitation. The court of appeal affirmed. Father, as the parent of a child where the permanent plan is legal guardianship, did not have an unqualified statutory right nor an unfettered due process right to a contested post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court did not err in requiring him to make an offer of proof in support of his request for a hearing. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

In March 2011, when husband Pedro Aviles and wife Jessica Vulovic got married, Jessica’s divorce from a former husband was not yet final. She later testified she was unaware of this; she discovered it only in May 2011, and she obtained a final judgment of divorce in March 2012. In April 2013, Pedro and Jessica went through a second marriage ceremony; in September 2013, they went through a third marriage ceremony. In 2020, Pedro filed the present divorce proceeding. The trial court found that Jessica was at least a putative spouse; on that basis, it awarded her spousal support and attorney fees. Pedro contended that, as a matter of law, Jessica did not qualify as a putative spouse. Pedro also contended the trial court erred by basing spousal support on his 2020 income rather than his 2021 income. The Court of Appeal concluded Jessica qualified as a putative spouse because she adequately showed that, at the time of the original marriage, she had a good faith belief that she was unmarried. The Court found Pedro filed a false income and expense declaration for 2020, therefore, the trial court could reasonably disregard his income and expense declaration for 2021 and rely instead on what Jessica showed was his true 2020 income. View "Marriage of Aviles & Vulovic" on Justia Law

Eleven-year-old A.F. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F. (Father), who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. (Mother). The petition was filed by Mother on A.F.’s behalf. Mother sought appointment as A.F.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the domestic violence (DV) matter at the same time. The court granted the request for GAL appointment. A.F. was represented by attorney Edward Castro in the domestic violence matter. Castro previously represented Mother in her marital dissolution from Father. Father objected to Mother’s appointment as GAL and to Castro’s representation of A.F., contending Castro had a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a), (b) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. The court removed Mother as GAL and granted Father’s request to disqualify Castro. A.F. appealed, contending: (1) Father lacked standing to challenge Castro’s representation of A.F.; (2) the court incorrectly concluded Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F. and consequently abused its discretion by applying Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro; and (3) the court should have considered the rules governing successive representation and denied the request for disqualification. The Court of Appeal assumed Father had standing to challenge Castro’s representation of his minor child A.F. However, the Court concluded the record lacked substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F., and it was therefore an abuse of discretion to apply Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro. Accordingly, the order disqualifying Castro as attorney was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

While Samir Elali was married to Angeles Elali and lived with her in California, Samir married Mayssa Marchoud in Lebanon. After Samir attempted to terminate the Lebanese marriage, Mayssa filed a petition in California for spousal support without dissolution against Samir. The trial court ruled the Lebanese marriage was bigamous and therefore void under Family Code section 2201(a). Mayssa appealed the judgment of nullity, contending: (1) the trial court erred in relying on section 2201(a) to declare the Lebanese marriage was void; (2) the parties’ pleading allegations admitting there was a marriage required the trial court to find the Lebanese marriage was valid; (3) there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the Lebanese marriage was valid; and (4) a ruling that the Lebanese marriage was valid precluded a different judge from subsequently ruling the marriage was void. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected Mayssa’s contentions, and found the trial court did not err in ruling the Lebanese marriage was void under California law. View "Marriage of Elali & Marchoud" on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs appealed a probate court’s order denying Plaintiffs' Petition for Recovery of Property under Probate Code section 850 and sustaining objections thereto by Defendant; denying Plaintiff’s Petition for Letters of Administration; and granting Defendant’s Petition for Probate of Will.   At issue is whether a mediation settlement agreement (“MSA”) that Defendant and his now-deceased wife entered into after separation and in anticipation of the dissolution of their marriage is a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145, which operates as a statutory waiver of certain of Defendant’s rights as a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141, including the right to inherit from his deceased wife and to be appointed as the personal representative of her estate.   The Second Appellate reversed the probate court’s order and held that the MSA did effect a waiver of Defendant’s rights of a surviving spouse enumerated in section 141. The court reasoned that based on its independent review of the MSA and the undisputed record evidence, the written MSA signed by Defendant and his wife, each with the advice of counsel, constituted a “complete property settlement” within the meaning of section 145. Further, the MSA is an enforceable waiver of his rights as a surviving spouse, as Defendant failed to point to any evidence he was not provided with “[a] fair and reasonable disclosure of the property or financial obligations” of his wife prior to signing the MSA, as required by section 143, subdivision (a). View "Welch v. Welch" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed after a court terminated her parental rights pertaining to three of her five children. On appeal, Defendant claimed that the Department of Children and Family Services ("DCFS") failed to comply with its duty under California law to inquire whether the children are Indian children within the meaning of the Indian Child Welfare Act.DCFA filed a motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal, claiming post-appeal evidence mooted Defendant's appeal.The Second Appellate District granted DCFS's motion to dismiss Defendant's appeal. The court found that although DCFS was not timely in interviewing Defendant's children's relatives, DCFS eventually did so, making any prior failure harmless. The court also held that DCFS is not required to interview a child's great-grandparents because they are not considered "Extended family members under 25 U.S.C. Sec. 1903(2). View "In re Allison B." on Justia Law

C.M., mother of four minors (mother), appealed juvenile court’s orders terminating parental rights and freeing the minors for adoption. Her sole contention on appeal was that the Placer County Department of Health and Human Services and juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and remanded for the limited purpose of ensuring compliance with the ICWA. View "In re M.E." on Justia Law

C.O. (mother) appealed a court order terminating her parental rights to her daughter Z.O. The juvenile court appointed a guardian ad litem (GAL) for mother without providing grounds or explanation in the record, as it was required to do. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother that this error deprived her not only of the ability to participate at critical stages in the proceedings, but also the ability to effectively appeal and challenge the juvenile court’s reasoning for the appointment of the GAL (i.e., that mother lacked competence to understand the nature or consequences of the proceedings and to assist counsel regarding the underlying litigation). The Court concluded the trial court record did not give it "sufficient confidence" that the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. And as a result, the Court reverse the termination and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Z.O." on Justia Law

After declaring them dependents of the court, a California juvenile court removed M.V. and I.V. (together, Children) from the physical custody of their parents, J.V. (Father) and M.Z. (Mother), and placed them with a relative caregiver pending reunification efforts. Father, Mother, and the Children appealed those dispositional orders, arguing substantial evidence did not support the court’s findings, by clear and convincing evidence, that there was substantial danger to the Children if they were returned home and that there were no reasonable means to protect them without removing them from their parents’ custody. After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the dispositional orders as to both Father and Mother. View "In re M.V." on Justia Law