Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant, a mother of ten children, was accused of physically abusing several of her children. In November 2017, the court sustained allegations of a petition and ordered the children removed from the parents. Throughout the proceedings, DCFS was given contact information for and/or had contact with a variety of extended family members. However, there was no indication in the record that an ICWA inquiry was made of any of these extended family members.Defendant claims that CFS failed to make an adequate ICWA inquiry because it did not of certain family members. Thus, Defendant asked the court to send the case back to the juvenile court. DCFS countered that Defendant denied any Indian ancestry, which is sufficient to end the inquiry.The Second Appellate District found that there was no evidence conflicting with Defendant's statement that her children were not of Indian ancestry. Additionally, the court concluded that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by finding that DCFS made a proper and adequate inquiry and acted with due diligence. And finally, even if the juvenile court erred by finding DCFS’s inquiry adequate, that error was not prejudicial. View "In re Ezequiel G." on Justia Law

Petitioner-mother J.J. petitioned for extraordinary relief pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 8.452, seeking review of an order denying family reunification services and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued the juvenile court improperly bypassed reunification services, and that real party in interest the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (the Agency) failed to comply with the federal Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978. The Agency disputed both contentions. Because the order denying reunification services was not supported by sufficient evidence, the Court of Appeal granted the petition as to mother’s first contention. Because the ICWA issue was premature, the Court rejected mother’s second contention. View "J.J. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Appellant appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights to her daughter. She did not challenge the basis of the termination of her rights. Her sole contention is that the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) did not comply with its initial duty of inquiry under Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b).1 Specifically, Appellant acknowledged she denied Indian heritage, but she contends DCFS failed to ask maternal extended family members whether J.W. is an “Indian child” within the meaning of Section 1903 of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s order. The court found the juvenile court erred in determining that ICWA did not apply without evidence that DCFS questioned extended family members despite having contact with those same family members. However, the court concluded that the error was harmless because the daughter was placed for adoption with her maternal grandmother. As a second ground, the court found no prejudice because there was nothing in the record to suggest that the daughter had Indian heritage or that the mother’s denial of Indian heritage was uninformed or incorrect. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

S.A. (mother) appealed a juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights and ordering G.A. (minor) be placed for adoption. Mother contended the San Joaquin County Human Services Agency (Agency) and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) because the Agency did not contact extended family members to inquire about the ICWA and the juvenile court made no findings regarding agency compliance in that regard. Mother added that no express ICWA findings were made by the juvenile court during the course of the proceedings, compounding the error, and asked the Court of Appeal to remand the case for ICWA compliance. The Court of Appeal determined that while the juvenile court failed to make an ICWA finding, the error was harmless because the Agency satisfied its duty of inquiry, and there was no reason to believe the minor was an Indian child: "the parents consistently stated they had no reason to believe they had Native American ancestry and did not object to the Agency’s reports that consistently concluded they did not. No further duty to inquire was triggered in this case, as the court and Agency had no reason to believe that an Indian child was involved." From this the Court found no prejudice flowing from the Agency's failure to interview extended family members. The case was remanded for the juvenile court to formally enter its ICWA finding on the record. View "In re G.A." on Justia Law

A child was declared a dependent child of the juvenile court and removed from Defendants (her parents), after the court sustained an amended petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) (serious physical harm), (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (j) (abuse of sibling), due to the mother’s history of violent behavior and the parent's history of substance abuse. On appeal, the mother contended the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“Department”) violated the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), by failing to make an adequate “further inquiry” after she advised the Department and the court, she and the child may have Cherokee ancestry through the maternal grandfather.   The Second Appellate district conditionally affirmed the disposition order. The court wrote that the Department misapplied the rationale of In re H.B. The Department argued its multiple violations of express statutory requirements should be deemed harmless because, although she advised the juvenile court she may have Cherokee ancestry through her maternal grandfather, the mother provided no additional evidence on appeal demonstrating the child is, in fact, an Indian child within the meaning of ICWA.   The court wrote that further inquiry is required in this case. On remand, the juvenile court must promptly direct the Department to make a meaningful and thorough inquiry regarding the child’s possible Indian ancestry, including interviews with extended family members and any other persons who may reasonably be expected to have information regarding the child’s tribal membership or eligibility for membership and contact with the Cherokee tribe or any other tribes that may have such information. View "In re Rylei S." on Justia Law

Mother D.S. (“Mother”) appealed the order terminating her parental rights to daughter, M.M., arguing the adoption assessment prepared by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“Department)” was inadequate, the court abused its discretion when it denied her request for a bonding study, and the Department conducted an inadequate initial inquiry under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA).   The Second Appellate District affirmed. Mother argued the Department’s adoption assessment was inadequate and failed to sufficiently include a review of the nature and frequency of the contact between Mother and M.M. The court held that Mother’s claim fails on its merits. Section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i) provides an exception to termination of parental rights if “[t]he parents have maintained regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing the relationship.” Here, the court found that Mother did not satisfy the first prong of the exception because her visitation had been inconsistent.   Further, the court found that there was no abuse of discretion in denying Mother’s belated request for a bonding study and continuance, on the day of the section 366.26 hearing that had been pending for several months. Mother had not maintained regular visitation, so the parental-benefit exception was inapplicable.   Finally, there is nothing in the record indicating Mother and Father might have been unaware of having Indian ancestry. The court, therefore, rejected Mother’s “unvarnished contention that additional interviews of [relatives] would have meaningfully elucidated the children’s Indian ancestry.” View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Now four-year-old M.G. is fed through a G-tube due to his diagnoses of esophageal reflux, generalized intestinal dysmotility, and laryngomalacia. He is also eligible for Regional Center Services due to a developmental disability. Both parents are Regional Center consumers due to their developmental disabilities and are former foster children. During a medical appointment, the parents did not know M.G.’s feeding schedule and told the treating physician they were aggressive and hit each other. M.G. was temporarily placed in a medical foster home. DCFS filed a petition. The court found that the parents have violent altercations and mental and emotional problems and developmental delays rendering them incapable of caring for M.G., ordered M.G. removed from the custody of his parents, and ordered reunification services and monitored visitation for both parents. Ultimately, the court terminated their parental rights.The court of appeal reversed. The juvenile court did not conduct a correct beneficial parent-child relationship analysis as set out by the California Supreme Court in “Caden C.” (2021) and instead considered factors Caden C. deems improper. Substantial evidence does not support the finding of “no bond.” The focus is not on whether M.G.’s parents can assume their parental roles but on whether M.G. will be harmed by the termination of the relationship. View "In re M.G." on Justia Law

G.V. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights as to his newborn daughter (E.V.) and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. He argued the court and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to adequately inquire into the child’s Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 SSA conceded there were two errors with respect to duties under ICWA, but they were harmless. Alternatively, SSA moved the Court of Appeal to receive additional new evidence (that was not previously presented to the juvenile court) that allegedly rendered the appeal moot, or at least demonstrated any inquiry errors as to ICWA had to be deemed harmless. The Court denied the motion, and found that under In re A.R., 77 Cal.App.5th 197 (2022), all cases where the ICWA inquiry rules were not followed mandated reversal. Judgment was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for compliance with ICWA. View "In re E.V." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage) related to all three of her children. After hearing the evidence of Defendant's untreated mental health issues and her abuse of her oldest daughter, C.S., the court immediately terminated dependency jurisdiction over C.S. The court entered a juvenile custody order granting sole physical and legal custody of C.S. to the child's father with monitored visitation for Defendant in a therapeutic setting when C.S.'s therapist thought that she was ready. Defendant appealed.On appeal, Defendant claimed that the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction after it granted sole physical and legal custody to C.S.'s father without first providing services that attempted to repair the relationship between Defendant and C.S. and that the court's order impermissibly delegated the authority to C.S.'s therapist.The Second Appellate District affirmed. At the point when the juvenile court determined that Defendant posed a risk to C.S. and the court's decision to allow monitored visits resolved that issue. Thus, there was no reason for the court to retain jurisdiction over the case. Because C.S. remained with her father, Defendant did not have a right to reunification services. Regarding Defendant's impermissible-delegation claim, the court held that it was one of two viable options, the other being to deny visitation altogether. Here, C.S.'s therapist does not have any discretion about whether visits would be allowed, only when they should commence. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

Appellant the mother of six-year-old M.B., appealed the August 31, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and the notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe failed to include the birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great-grandfather as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) and related California law.   The Department argued that Appellant’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and that any omission of required information from the ICWA-030 notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe was harmless because its post-appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the May 13, 2021 order denying Appellant’s section 388 petition. However, the court conditionally affirmed the August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. The court explained that rather than attempt to moot Appellant’s appeal by belatedly conducting the investigation required by section 224.2, the Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a conditional reversal with directions for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law.   Further, the court wrote for its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, far more is required than passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its statutory obligations. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law