Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Brandy filed a probate petition seeking to be appointed the personal representative of her late husband’s (Scott) estate. The trial court denied her petition based on a premarital agreement that waived Brandy’s interests in her husband’s separate property. The court named his parents as co-administrators of the estate. The court of appeal held Brandy was entitled to introduce extrinsic evidence in support of her argument that she and her late husband mistakenly believed the premarital agreement would apply only in the event of divorce, rather than upon death. On remand, the trial court found that the mistake was a unilateral mistake on Brandy’s part and that she was not entitled to rescission. The court expressly found “there was insufficient evidence that Scott encouraged or fostered Brandy’s mistaken belief.”The court of appeal affirmed. Because Brandy failed to read the agreement and meet with her attorney to discuss it before signing it, she bore the risk of her mistake and is not entitled to rescission. View "Estate of Eskra" on Justia Law

In 2017, Joanne Slaieh filed a divorce action against her husband, Nabeel Slaieh. A few years later, while the action was still pending, Nabeel was arrested on allegations of stalking and making criminal threats against Joanne, resulting in the opening of a criminal case against him. When Nabeel subsequently sought to depose Joanne in the divorce action, Joanne objected, citing a victim’s right under California's Marsy’s Law to refuse being interviewed or deposed by the defendant. Nabeel responded by filing a motion to compel her deposition, arguing Marsy’s Law applied to criminal proceedings only. After a hearing on the issue, the trial judge agreed with Joanne and denied Nabeel’s motion to compel. Nabeel filed a petition for writ of mandate asking the Court of Appeal to vacate the trial judge’s order and conclude the right to refuse a deposition contained in article I, section 28, subdivision (b)(5) of the California Constitution did not apply to a civil action like a marriage dissolution proceeding. He argued the text of Marsy’s Law made clear its protections applied in criminal proceedings only. To this the Court of Appeal agreed and therefore granted the petition. View "Slaieh v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

M.G. (Mother) appealed the termination of her parental rights to her 11-year-old daughter, A.R., and her 10-year-old son, C.R., and placing them in a permanent plan of adoption by their paternal grandparents. M.G. did not challenge the merits of the order; instead, she argued it had to be reversed because the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to conduct an inquiry into whether the children had Native American ancestry, as required by the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The Court of Appeal found an ICWA inquiry should be conducted in every case. "The tribes have a compelling, legally protected interest in the inquiry itself. It is only by ensuring that the issue of Native American ancestry is addressed in every case that we can ensure the collective interests of the Native American tribes will be protected. Thus, the failure to conduct the inquiry in each case constitutes a miscarriage of justice." In the interest of limiting any further delay, the Court conditionally reversed and remanded the case with instructions that SSA conduct the inquiry immediately, and that the trial court likewise resolve the issue as soon as possible. If the initial inquiry revealed no Native American heritage, then the judgment would be reinstated forthwith. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court’s jurisdiction and disposition orders pertaining to her children, citing the court’s findings that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA; 25 U.S.C. 1901) did not apply to the dependency proceedings. She argued that evidence of her children’s Native American ancestry triggered the duty under state law (Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2(e)) to further investigate whether her children come within the federal Act.The court of appeal vacated and remanded. The Department of Family and Children’s Services failed to comply with the statutory duty to further investigate whether the children are Indian children; the juvenile court’s negative ICWA findings were based on insufficient evidence. The social worker’s initial inquiry established a reason to believe the children are Indian children; both the mother and the maternal grandfather stated that “a maternal great grandfather may have Native American ancestry in Minnesota.” The court rejected an argument that further inquiry would be futile, and specifically that contacting the Bureau of Indian Affairs or the State Department of Social Services would be an idle act. View "In re I.F." on Justia Law

At birth, Appellants’ son tested positive for methadone and marijuana. Appellant A.S., the child’s mother, admitted to using marijuana days before giving birth. The juvenile court detained J.C. and placed him with Appellant J.C.’s mother.Based on Appellants’ criminal histories and substance abuse issues, the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (“the Department”), the couple’s son was declared a dependent of the court. At a 12-month hearing, appellants had not made substantial progress towards alleviating or mitigating the causes that led to their son’s placement. The court terminated Appellants’ parental rights. In doing so, the court relied on appellants’ statements that they had no known Indian ancestry.On appeal, appellants argued that the Department failed to conduct an adequate investigation into whether either parent was of Indian ancestry and that the trial court failed to ensure that the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) applied. The court held that the Department did not fulfill its duty under the ICWA because it did not speak to extended family members who were available. Additionally, the trial court failed to ensure that the Department fulfilled its duties by neglecting to ask the Department what efforts it made to ensure the ICWA did not apply.The court conditionally affirmed the trial court’s order, remanding the case to the trial court to ensure that the Department conducts the necessary inquiries, including speaking with extended family members. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

In California, the practice of “splitting” jurisdiction and/or disposition hearings, by purporting to hold them separately “as to mother” and “as to father,” was unauthorized and erroneous. The Court of Appeal concluded that jurisdiction splitting occurred in this case, and it "complicated the entire record ... caused confusion, unnecessary procedural difficulties and delays." S.J., father of minor A.J., appealed a juvenile court bypassing reunification services. He argued the juvenile court erred by denying his request for a continuance and proceeding with a disposition hearing without transporting him from his place of incarceration to the hearing. Although the Court of Appeal found error in the manner in which these proceedings were conducted, but it did not find error in denying father a continuance of the hearing. The juvenile court's orders were affirmed, but the Court reiterated that jurisdiction splitting was "unauthorized and erroneous," and in this case, " resulted in the (likely unintentional) forfeiture of appellant’s claim on appeal." View "In re A.J." on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District modified its opinion in the case dated March 3, 2022. First, the court modified references to “child support,” changing them to “spousal support.” Next, after entering a fee order on March 17, 2017, the court’s amended fee order, dated May 10, 2017, superseded that order. Further, the court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court’s arithmetic regarding the fee award was in error. The court reasoned that the respondent’s argument is based upon a prior and superseded version of the fee order that was later modified. Finally, the disposition is changed to remove the second full sentence beginning with the words, “The attorney fee award is corrected.” Thus, the court stated that these modifications changed the judgment, and the petitions for rehearing are denied. View "Marriage of Zucker" on Justia Law

The parties are married and have three sons born between 2005 and 2013. After the parties separated, M.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO, Fam. Code 6200) against A.S. for herself and her sons, alleging that A.S. enlisted her friends and mother to talk her into reconciling with A.S., that he threatened to kill M.S.’s male friend and followed him to his home, and that he engaged their children to spy on her.The court granted the DVRO specifying M.S. and her children as protected parties after hearing evidence of A.S. stalking and harassing M.S. and that A.S. often slapped the children “upside the head,” pushed them down, and choked them “in the name of playing,” screamed at the children, called them derogatory names, and encouraged them to engage in physical violence with each other for entertainment, in addition to the “spying.” The court also granted M.S. temporary physical and legal custody of the children with supervised visitation for A.S. The court of appeal affirmed the three-year DVRO. There was sufficient evidence of good cause for including the children in the DVRO. View "M.S. v. A.S." on Justia Law

David and Sara share joint legal custody of their five-year-old child. Initially, the child spent nearly 80 percent of his time with Sara. In 2017, David’s monthly income was $15,000; he paid $1,525 in monthly child support. Sara also received a $5,000 monthly gift from her father, which later increased to $7,500. In 2020, David moved to modify the child support order. His time with the child had increased to 42 percent; his monthly income had risen to $17,500. He also sought a seek-work order. Sara had not worked since 2013, The court reduced monthly child support to $891, retroactive to February 2020. In imposing a seek-work order, the court explained, “the policy of the State of California is that both parents should work and provide support for their minor child,” and that the order was in the “best interest of the child.”The court of appeal affirmed. Under Family Code section 4053, the trial court has the discretion to impose a seek-work order in an appropriate circumstance. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that such an order was in the “best interest of the child” and the order is consistent with various principles in section 4053. View "Haley v. Antunovich" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law