Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The co-trustees and a beneficiary of the trust filed petitions under Probate Code section 850 alleging that defendant misappropriated trust assets and committed elder abuse against the trustor. The litigants settled and the guardian ad litem for defendant's minor children entered into an agreement with the co-trustees and certain trust beneficiaries, but not defendant (the first GAL agreement). Defendant and the children subsequently challenge the trial court's orders (1) enforcing the oral settlement agreement; (2) granting the GAL's petition to approve the second GAL agreement; (3) appointing the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem in certain probate cases; and (4) denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as the children's guardian ad litem.In the published portion of the opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's orders and concluded that defendant failed to establish procedural and substantive unconscionability. The court rejected the argument that the GAL lacked capacity to make a contract in Jacqueline's name. The court also concluded that the trial court did not err by determining that defendant is precluded from repudiating the agreement because her objection is inconsistent with the children's interests. Furthermore, the court rejected the children's contention that they disaffirmed the settlement agreement and the second GAL agreement when they filed their repudiations of the agreements. Finally, the court concluded that there was no conflict of interest and thus no error in denying defendant's motion to remove the GAL as guardian ad litem. View "Chui v. Chui" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's order denying father's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and vacated the order terminating parental rights as to the child. The court concluded that the evidence before the juvenile court in this case was woefully inadequate to support a finding that the Department exercised reasonable diligence trying to find father, given the unique facts already known to the Department. The court also concluded that the juvenile court erred in relying on Mia's best interests as a basis for overcoming the lack of notice to father and denying father's section 388 petition. Furthermore, the record does not support the Department's implied argument that father was to blame for the delay. Considered against the absence of any documentary evidence showing that the Department timely provided father a copy of the petition or required notices about how to assert paternity and request appointment of counsel, the court found prejudicial error. The court remanded for a new jurisdiction and disposition hearing as to father only. View "In re Mia M." on Justia Law

Mark Shenefield filed a request for order (RFO) seeking joint legal and physical custody of the child he shared with Jennifer Shenefield. In his declaration, Mark quoted from and referenced the contents of a confidential, court-ordered psychological evaluation undertaken during Jennifer’s previous marital dissolution. Mark’s attorney Karolyn Kovtun filed the paperwork. Jennifer opposed Mark’s request and sought sanctions for violations of Family Code sections 3111(d) and 3025.5, for unwarranted disclosure of the confidential custody evaluation. The trial court ordered the sanctions issue be heard at trial. Jennifer’s trial brief detailed her arguments for why the court should impose sanctions on both Mark and Kovtun. Mark did not file a trial brief. Following trial, the court issued sanctions against Mark in the amount of $10,000 and Kovtun in the amount of $15,000. Kovtun challenged the sanctions, filing a motion under Code of Civil Procedure section 473(d). A different court heard Kovtun’s request to vacate the sanctions imposed against her and denied the request. On appeal, Kovtun argued the court improperly sanctioned her because: (1) attorneys could not be sanctioned under section 3111; (2) the notice she received did not comply with due process standards; (3) the court lacked personal jurisdiction over her; (4) the court failed to enforce the safe harbor provision of Code of Civil Procedure section 128.7; and (5) the court improperly admitted and relied on a transcript of a meeting between Kovtun, Mark, and Jennifer. The Court found Kovtun’s arguments meritless, and affirmed the sanctions. View "Shenefield v. Shenefield" on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. She argued that the Department of Children and Family Services and the court failed to comply with Code section 224.2 by inquiring whether her child is or might be an Indian child within the meaning of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Mother had “denied Native American ancestry for the family.”The court of appeal affirmed, finding any error harmless. The maternal grandmother is the only person Mother identified as a person who should have been asked about Indian ancestry; she had expressed her desire to adopt the child and to have the child placed with her. Under ICWA, when an Indian child is the subject of foster care or adoptive placement proceedings, “preference shall be given, in the absence of good cause to the contrary, to a placement with .. a member of the Indian child’s extended family,” 25 U.S.C. 1915(a), (b). Maternal grandmother, Mother’s counsel, and the child.’s counsel, each of whom requested placement with the maternal grandmother, would have had a strong incentive to bring to the court’s attention any facts that suggest that she is an Indian child. Their failure to do so implies that the maternal grandmother is unaware of such facts. View "In re S.S." on Justia Law

Maria appealed the termination of her parental rights over her three children, who all have the same father, arguing that the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) failed to interview her extended family members about their Indian ancestry. The Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. 1901, gives Indian tribes concurrent jurisdiction over state court child custody proceedings that involve Indian children living off of a reservation; where possible, an Indian child should remain in the Indian community. California Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2 lists requirements to effectuate the Act’s policies. The court of appeal affirmed. The record does not support Maria’s argument that readily obtainable information would have shed meaningful light on whether the children are Indian children. There was a prior juvenile court finding that two of Maria’s children are not Indian children, the juvenile court asked Maria, the father, and paternal aunt about Indian ancestry, both parents eschewed Indian ancestry, and Maria was living with extended family members whom she could have asked about potential Indian ancestry. It was unlikely that any further inquiry of family members would have yielded information about Indian ancestry. View "In re Darian R." on Justia Law

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition that alleged the mother (S.V.) had brandished a knife and pushed a female companion in the now-three-year-old child’s presence.A social worker inquired of S.V. about the child’s Indian ancestry; she did not give the social worker any reason to believe the child was or might be an Indian child. In preparing the detention report, a social worker interviewed the child’s maternal great-grandmother and maternal great-grandfather. It is not clear whether the social worker asked any relatives about the child’s Indian ancestry. S.V. filed a form stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry as far as she knew. If that changed, S.V. was to inform the court and the social worker. The juvenile court then inquired whether S.V. knew if alleged the father had Indian ancestry. She indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry. The court found it had no reason to know that the alleged father had Indian ancestry; his whereabouts were unknown.The court of appeal remanded. The first-step inquiry duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1903(2), requires the Department to interview, among others, extended family members and others who had an interest in the child. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Katherine was in dependency court for five years while her parents struggled with significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the juvenile court terminated services and the parental rights of both parents rejecting her father’s claim of a “beneficial parental relationship” (Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)). While recognizing that he had maintained regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, while his ongoing instability had caused additional instability and trauma.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that the father had previously concealed a crash caused by driving under the influence and then refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a series of abrupt changes in Katherine’s placement. He physically assaulted his mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he concealed and downplayed. Katherine had confided at times she feared her father and did not want to speak to him. The negative impact of the father’s unresolved issues on Katherine was antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 366.26. View "In re Katherine J." on Justia Law

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law

After husband John Thompson petitioned for separation from Wife Olivia Thompson in California, wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage in Massachusetts. Husband then amended his California petition to seek dissolution. Wife, in turn, filed a request for order to quash and abate the California proceedings, arguing her dissolution proceeding in Massachusetts was first and was a better suited forum. The trial court ordered the California case abated and stayed, finding wife’s dissolution petition was first in time, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over wife, and “equitable factors” weighed in favor of Massachusetts. On appeal, husband contended his dissolution petition was first in time because it related back to his petition for separation, and regardless, the trial court abused its discretion in abating the action based on the erroneous conclusion it lacked personal jurisdiction over wife. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not have in personam jurisdiction over wife at the time husband filed his original petition for separation or his amended petition seeking marital dissolution. "Because the first in time rule applies only when the court has acquired both in rem and in personam jurisdiction, husband’s first in time theory fails." View "Marriage of Thompson" on Justia Law