Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

G.V. (Father) appealed a juvenile court’s judgment terminating his parental rights as to his newborn daughter (E.V.) and selecting adoption as the permanent plan. He argued the court and the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) failed to adequately inquire into the child’s Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 SSA conceded there were two errors with respect to duties under ICWA, but they were harmless. Alternatively, SSA moved the Court of Appeal to receive additional new evidence (that was not previously presented to the juvenile court) that allegedly rendered the appeal moot, or at least demonstrated any inquiry errors as to ICWA had to be deemed harmless. The Court denied the motion, and found that under In re A.R., 77 Cal.App.5th 197 (2022), all cases where the ICWA inquiry rules were not followed mandated reversal. Judgment was conditionally reversed and the matter remanded for compliance with ICWA. View "In re E.V." on Justia Law

Defendant entered a no contest plea to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (b)(1) (failure to protect) and (c) (serious emotional damage) related to all three of her children. After hearing the evidence of Defendant's untreated mental health issues and her abuse of her oldest daughter, C.S., the court immediately terminated dependency jurisdiction over C.S. The court entered a juvenile custody order granting sole physical and legal custody of C.S. to the child's father with monitored visitation for Defendant in a therapeutic setting when C.S.'s therapist thought that she was ready. Defendant appealed.On appeal, Defendant claimed that the juvenile court erred in terminating jurisdiction after it granted sole physical and legal custody to C.S.'s father without first providing services that attempted to repair the relationship between Defendant and C.S. and that the court's order impermissibly delegated the authority to C.S.'s therapist.The Second Appellate District affirmed. At the point when the juvenile court determined that Defendant posed a risk to C.S. and the court's decision to allow monitored visits resolved that issue. Thus, there was no reason for the court to retain jurisdiction over the case. Because C.S. remained with her father, Defendant did not have a right to reunification services. Regarding Defendant's impermissible-delegation claim, the court held that it was one of two viable options, the other being to deny visitation altogether. Here, C.S.'s therapist does not have any discretion about whether visits would be allowed, only when they should commence. View "In re C.S." on Justia Law

Appellant the mother of six-year-old M.B., appealed the August 31, 2021 order terminating her parental rights, contending the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services failed to adequately investigate her claim of Indian ancestry through interviews with maternal relatives and the notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe failed to include the birthdates of M.B.’s maternal grandfather and great-grandfather as required by federal regulations implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. Section 1901 et seq.) and related California law.   The Department argued that Appellant’s appeal of the adequacy of its investigation has been mooted by further interviews with maternal relatives and that any omission of required information from the ICWA-030 notices sent to the Blackfeet Tribe was harmless because its post-appeal investigation established ICWA notices were not required.   The Second Appellate District affirmed the May 13, 2021 order denying Appellant’s section 388 petition. However, the court conditionally affirmed the August 31, 2021 section 366.26 order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. The court explained that rather than attempt to moot Appellant’s appeal by belatedly conducting the investigation required by section 224.2, the Department’s proper course of action was to stipulate to a conditional reversal with directions for full compliance with the inquiry and notice provisions of ICWA and related California law.   Further, the court wrote for its part, the juvenile court failed to ensure the Department adequately investigated M.B.’s Indian ancestry, far more is required than passively accepting the Department’s reports as fulfilling its statutory obligations. View "In re M.B." on Justia Law

Patricia and Thomas married in 1989 and had twins in 1996. A judgment dissolving their marriage was entered in 2002. Thomas began representing himself. In 2005, the court deemed Thomas a vexatious litigant and issued an order prohibiting him from filing new motions or litigation when representing himself without first obtaining leave of the presiding judge (Code Civil Procedure 391.7). In 2018, the trial court reaffirmed its vexatious litigant finding and again imposed a prefiling order. Representing himself, Thomas appealed. His briefs contained “menacing” and “odious” language making “implicit threats" against members of the judiciary and attorneys. Thomas challenged those orders and rulings made years earlier.In 2020, the court of appeal declined to consider Thomas’s challenges to the long-final orders and warned Thomas that further “use of the appellate process to threaten” would “result in an order of sanctions.” The court upheld the 2018 vexatious litigant and prefiling orders. In 2021, Thomas filed seven requests to file new litigation, along with numerous other documents. The court determined the requests to file lacked merit and had “no basis or legitimate purpose.” The court of appeal denied a writ petition and notified Thomas it was considering dismissing the appeal as frivolous, giving him the opportunity to address possible sanctions. The court subsequently dismissed the appeal as “objectively and subjectively frivolous.” View "Marriage of Deal" on Justia Law

Parents of the two children at issue in a juvenile dependency case repeatedly denied having any American Indian heritage. The social services agency spoke with several of the parents’ relatives but never asked those relatives whether the children had any American Indian heritage. Nearly 30 months into the proceedings and on appeal from the termination of her parental rights, the biological mother objected that the agency did not discharge its statutory duty to inquire whether her children might be “Indian children” within the meaning of the state’s broader version of the federal Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”).   The Second Appellate District affirmed the trial court’s ruling. The court explained that there is no dispute that the agency did not properly discharge its statutory duty. However, the critical inquiry is whether the error was harmless and how harmlessness is to be assessed. The court offered a fourth rule: An agency’s failure to discharge its statutory duty of initial inquiry is harmless unless the record contains information suggesting a reason to believe that the children at issue may be “Indian child[ren],” in which case further inquiry may lead to a different ICWA finding by the juvenile court.   Here, the court held that the error was harmless, because the record contains the parents’ repeated denials of American Indian heritage, because the parents were raised by their biological relatives, and because there is nothing else in the record to suggest any reason to believe that the parents’ knowledge of their heritage is incorrect. View "In re Dezi C." on Justia Law

Santa Cruz County Human Services Department filed a juvenile dependency petition, Welfare & Institutions Code section 361(c), concerning an 11-year-old girl, then residing with her father. The whereabouts of her mother were unknown. It was alleged that father had physically abused the minor. The juvenile court ordered the minor detained, found the allegations of the petition true, and adjudged the minor a dependent of the court. Father received family reunification services for 17 months. The court found legal guardianship with the minor’s maternal grandparents to be the appropriate permanent plan, found that visitation of the minor by father would be detrimental, and ordered that father have no contact with the minor.After a contested six-month post-permanency review hearing in which the court heard testimony, it reaffirmed the detriment finding and denied visitation. Father renewed his request for visitation at the 12-month post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court denied father’s request for a contested hearing, reaffirmed the detriment order, and denied his request for visitation. The court of appeal affirmed. Father, as the parent of a child where the permanent plan is legal guardianship, did not have an unqualified statutory right nor an unfettered due process right to a contested post-permanency review hearing. The juvenile court did not err in requiring him to make an offer of proof in support of his request for a hearing. View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

In March 2011, when husband Pedro Aviles and wife Jessica Vulovic got married, Jessica’s divorce from a former husband was not yet final. She later testified she was unaware of this; she discovered it only in May 2011, and she obtained a final judgment of divorce in March 2012. In April 2013, Pedro and Jessica went through a second marriage ceremony; in September 2013, they went through a third marriage ceremony. In 2020, Pedro filed the present divorce proceeding. The trial court found that Jessica was at least a putative spouse; on that basis, it awarded her spousal support and attorney fees. Pedro contended that, as a matter of law, Jessica did not qualify as a putative spouse. Pedro also contended the trial court erred by basing spousal support on his 2020 income rather than his 2021 income. The Court of Appeal concluded Jessica qualified as a putative spouse because she adequately showed that, at the time of the original marriage, she had a good faith belief that she was unmarried. The Court found Pedro filed a false income and expense declaration for 2020, therefore, the trial court could reasonably disregard his income and expense declaration for 2021 and rely instead on what Jessica showed was his true 2020 income. View "Marriage of Aviles & Vulovic" on Justia Law

Eleven-year-old A.F. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against her father, Jeffrey F. (Father), who held joint legal custody with her mother, Andrea F. (Mother). The petition was filed by Mother on A.F.’s behalf. Mother sought appointment as A.F.’s guardian ad litem (GAL) in the domestic violence (DV) matter at the same time. The court granted the request for GAL appointment. A.F. was represented by attorney Edward Castro in the domestic violence matter. Castro previously represented Mother in her marital dissolution from Father. Father objected to Mother’s appointment as GAL and to Castro’s representation of A.F., contending Castro had a conflict of interest under Rule 1.7(a), (b) of the State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct. The court removed Mother as GAL and granted Father’s request to disqualify Castro. A.F. appealed, contending: (1) Father lacked standing to challenge Castro’s representation of A.F.; (2) the court incorrectly concluded Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F. and consequently abused its discretion by applying Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro; and (3) the court should have considered the rules governing successive representation and denied the request for disqualification. The Court of Appeal assumed Father had standing to challenge Castro’s representation of his minor child A.F. However, the Court concluded the record lacked substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that Castro simultaneously represented Mother and A.F., and it was therefore an abuse of discretion to apply Rule 1.7 to disqualify Castro. Accordingly, the order disqualifying Castro as attorney was reversed, and the matter was remanded for further proceedings. View "A.F. v. Jeffrey F." on Justia Law

While Samir Elali was married to Angeles Elali and lived with her in California, Samir married Mayssa Marchoud in Lebanon. After Samir attempted to terminate the Lebanese marriage, Mayssa filed a petition in California for spousal support without dissolution against Samir. The trial court ruled the Lebanese marriage was bigamous and therefore void under Family Code section 2201(a). Mayssa appealed the judgment of nullity, contending: (1) the trial court erred in relying on section 2201(a) to declare the Lebanese marriage was void; (2) the parties’ pleading allegations admitting there was a marriage required the trial court to find the Lebanese marriage was valid; (3) there was insufficient evidence to overcome the presumption that the Lebanese marriage was valid; and (4) a ruling that the Lebanese marriage was valid precluded a different judge from subsequently ruling the marriage was void. After review, the Court of Appeal rejected Mayssa’s contentions, and found the trial court did not err in ruling the Lebanese marriage was void under California law. View "Marriage of Elali & Marchoud" on Justia Law

Daniel Hsu (Daniel) asked the Court of Appeal to reverse the trial court’s decision denying him need-based attorney fees under California Family Code section 2030. This case was a marriage dissolution proceeding between Daniel and Christine Nakamoto (Christine; together, the spouses). But the dispute at issue was between Daniel and his two siblings, Charleson Hsu (Chau) and Melissa Hsu See (Melissa). After their parents passed away, Daniel claimed Chau was concealing a portion of his inheritance. The siblings met to discuss Daniel’s claims and reached an agreement at the meeting, which Daniel documented on a two-page handwritten memorandum. Among other things, the Handwritten Agreement stated Daniel was to be paid $4 million. Several months later, the three siblings executed a formal Compromise Agreement for Structured Settlement. The Compromise Agreement contained many of the terms set forth in the Handwritten Agreement but did not mention the $4 million payment. The spouses claimed Daniel was never paid the $4 million, which would have been a community asset, and that it was still owed to Daniel under the Handwritten Agreement. Chau and Melissa argued the Handwritten Agreement was not a binding contract and that Daniel had already been paid $4 million through a separate transaction outside the Compromise Agreement. Chau, Melissa, and several business entities they owned (together, claimants) were involuntarily joined to this dissolution proceeding to settle this dispute. At trial, the primary question facing the lower court was whether the Handwritten Agreement or the Compromise Agreement was the enforceable contract. The court found in favor of claimants, ruling the Compromise Agreement was enforceable while the Handwritten Agreement was not. Meanwhile, over the course of Daniel’s litigation against claimants, the court awarded him $140,000 in attorney fees under section 2030. After the court issued a tentative ruling finding the Handwritten Agreement was not enforceable, Daniel requested an additional $50,000 for attorney fees incurred during trial plus another $30,000 to appeal. The court denied his request. The Court of Appeal found no error in the attorney fees ruling. View "Marriage of Nakamoto and Hsu" on Justia Law