Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In California, the practice of “splitting” jurisdiction and/or disposition hearings, by purporting to hold them separately “as to mother” and “as to father,” was unauthorized and erroneous. The Court of Appeal concluded that jurisdiction splitting occurred in this case, and it "complicated the entire record ... caused confusion, unnecessary procedural difficulties and delays." S.J., father of minor A.J., appealed a juvenile court bypassing reunification services. He argued the juvenile court erred by denying his request for a continuance and proceeding with a disposition hearing without transporting him from his place of incarceration to the hearing. Although the Court of Appeal found error in the manner in which these proceedings were conducted, but it did not find error in denying father a continuance of the hearing. The juvenile court's orders were affirmed, but the Court reiterated that jurisdiction splitting was "unauthorized and erroneous," and in this case, " resulted in the (likely unintentional) forfeiture of appellant’s claim on appeal." View "In re A.J." on Justia Law

The Second Appellate District modified its opinion in the case dated March 3, 2022. First, the court modified references to “child support,” changing them to “spousal support.” Next, after entering a fee order on March 17, 2017, the court’s amended fee order, dated May 10, 2017, superseded that order. Further, the court rejected the respondent’s argument that the trial court’s arithmetic regarding the fee award was in error. The court reasoned that the respondent’s argument is based upon a prior and superseded version of the fee order that was later modified. Finally, the disposition is changed to remove the second full sentence beginning with the words, “The attorney fee award is corrected.” Thus, the court stated that these modifications changed the judgment, and the petitions for rehearing are denied. View "Marriage of Zucker" on Justia Law

The parties are married and have three sons born between 2005 and 2013. After the parties separated, M.S. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO, Fam. Code 6200) against A.S. for herself and her sons, alleging that A.S. enlisted her friends and mother to talk her into reconciling with A.S., that he threatened to kill M.S.’s male friend and followed him to his home, and that he engaged their children to spy on her.The court granted the DVRO specifying M.S. and her children as protected parties after hearing evidence of A.S. stalking and harassing M.S. and that A.S. often slapped the children “upside the head,” pushed them down, and choked them “in the name of playing,” screamed at the children, called them derogatory names, and encouraged them to engage in physical violence with each other for entertainment, in addition to the “spying.” The court also granted M.S. temporary physical and legal custody of the children with supervised visitation for A.S. The court of appeal affirmed the three-year DVRO. There was sufficient evidence of good cause for including the children in the DVRO. View "M.S. v. A.S." on Justia Law

David and Sara share joint legal custody of their five-year-old child. Initially, the child spent nearly 80 percent of his time with Sara. In 2017, David’s monthly income was $15,000; he paid $1,525 in monthly child support. Sara also received a $5,000 monthly gift from her father, which later increased to $7,500. In 2020, David moved to modify the child support order. His time with the child had increased to 42 percent; his monthly income had risen to $17,500. He also sought a seek-work order. Sara had not worked since 2013, The court reduced monthly child support to $891, retroactive to February 2020. In imposing a seek-work order, the court explained, “the policy of the State of California is that both parents should work and provide support for their minor child,” and that the order was in the “best interest of the child.”The court of appeal affirmed. Under Family Code section 4053, the trial court has the discretion to impose a seek-work order in an appropriate circumstance. Substantial evidence supports the court’s finding that such an order was in the “best interest of the child” and the order is consistent with various principles in section 4053. View "Haley v. Antunovich" on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal of the termination of parental rights was whether San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) conducted further inquiry into whether the Indian Child Welfare Act’s (ICWA) applied if there was “reason to believe” an Indian child was involved in the dependency proceedings involving nine-year-old K.T. and his two-year-old sister, D. Early on in the case, the children’s mother and K.T.’s father (father) reported they had possible Cherokee, Choctaw, and Blackfeet ancestry and gave CFS contact information for family members who might be able to provide more detail. CFS never followed up, and the juvenile court found ICWA didn’t apply without first ensuring CFS had pursued these leads. About two years into the proceedings, after the parents failed to reunify with the children, the court determined they were likely to be adopted and terminated parental rights. On appeal, mother and father argued that despite having reason to believe K.T. and D. were Indian children, CFS failed to conduct adequate further inquiry to determine whether ICWA applies. CFS conceded their error. As a result, the record did not support the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA did not apply, and the Court of Appeal reversed the orders terminating parental rights and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "In re K.T." on Justia Law

Family Code section 30441 creates a rebuttable presumption that an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to a person who has perpetrated domestic violence against the other party seeking custody within the past five years is detrimental to the child. If the court determines the presumption has been overcome, it must state its reasons in writing or on the record. The trial court issued a restraining order protecting a mother from the father of a child (born in 2015) and, citing the statute, granted the mother sole legal and physical custody. The court left intact a visitation schedule under which the child lived with each parent approximately half of the time. There were problems with the father not returning the child after his visitation. The court of appeal reversed the visitation order, stating that the case illustrates the need for clear and specific findings to facilitate appellate review and to inform the parties and ensure consideration of the proper factors in the first instance. The schedule amounted to joint physical custody, in violation of the statute. The trial court erred in refusing her request for a statement of decision. View "City & County of San Francisco v. H.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's order granting the request of paternal relatives in Arizona to place J.Y. with them, although he barely knew them and had no bond with them. The principal reason stated by the trial court for its decision to send J.Y. to Arizona was the trial court's unfounded conclusion that the Department failed in its duty under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3 to give preferential consideration to other relatives in California (not the Arizona relatives) who requested placement back when the parents were receiving reunification services. The court concluded that the trial court abused its discretion by deciding, without any support in the record, the Department failed in its duty to assess other relatives, and by ordering removal of the child from his de facto parents although there was no evidence that removal was necessary or in the child's best interest. View "In re J.Y." on Justia Law

J.O. and M.B. married in 2007 and for more than 15 years also have been in what they describe as a committed, polyamorous relationship with appellant. In 2018, appellant, J.O., and M.B. decided to have a child together. They agreed J.O. and M.B. would be the child’s biological parents, appellant would adopt the child, and J.O. and M.B. would maintain their parental rights. Together, the three of them would share equally in parenting rights and responsibilities. After E.B. was born, appellant began adoption proceedings. Consistent with the requirements for an independent adoption, California’s State Department of Social Services (CDSS) conducted an investigation and concluded the adoption was in E.B.’s best interest. Accordingly, CDSS recommended the uncontested adoption be granted. Rejecting CDSS’s recommendation, the trial court denied appellant’s petition to adopt E.B. Relying on Family Code section 7612, the trial court found appellant had not yet fulfilled E.B.’s needs for a substantial period of time, and there was no likelihood that E.B. would be taken from appellant, resulting in detriment to the child. Appellant moved the court to vacate its order. The trial court denied that motion too. To the Court of Appeals, appellant and CDSS argued the trial court applied the incorrect law to appellant’s adoption petition and, under the correct law, section 8617, the petition to adopt E.B. should have been granted. The Court agreed the trial court applied the incorrect law and remanded the matter to allow the trial court to exercise its discretion under the applicable statute. View "Adoption of E.B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the order terminating her parental rights to four-year-old Antonio R. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, contending that the Department and the juvenile court failed to comply with the inquiry and notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA).The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that Welfare and Institutions Code section 224.2, subdivision (b), required the Department to inquire of the maternal extended family members, and the juvenile court erred in finding ICWA did not apply despite the Department's insufficient inquiry. The court also concluded that the information in the hands of the extended family members was likely to be meaningful in determining whether the child is an Indian child. In this case, the error was prejudicial because the court did not know what information the maternal relatives would have provided had the Department or court inquired. Accordingly, the court conditionally affirmed and remanded for the juvenile court and the Department to comply with the inquiry provisions of ICWA and California law. View "In re Antonio R." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the order granting respondent's request to move their daughter, H.P., from California to Illinois. The court concluded that the Family Code permitted counsel to determine what was in H.P.'s best interest and make that position known to the trial court; any reliance on hearsay did not prejudice petitioner; and substantial evidence supports the trial court's determination that circumstances had changed so significantly that granting the move-away request was in H.P.'s best interest. View "Ramsden v. Peterson" on Justia Law