Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

M.A. (mother) and A.O. (father) appealed the termination of their parental rights to their three children. In January 2019, Children and Family Services (Agency) received a report that the home was filthy. It received a separate report that the maternal grandparents hit the children and the parents were methamphetamine addicts. Both parents had prior arrests for possession of a controlled substance. The parents and grandparents actively avoided detention warrants executed to the home. In June 2019, a police officer on an unrelated call found the family at the home and detained the children. The next month, two children were placed in foster care; the parents had a third child, L.A.-O (L) in May 2020, whom the the Agency detained and filed a dependency petition. In July 2020, at the jurisdictional/dispositional hearing as to L., the juvenile court found that it had jurisdiction based on failure to protect, failure to support, and abuse of a sibling, and formally removed L. from the parents’ custody and ordered reunification services. At the section 366.26 hearing, the juvenile court found that the children were adoptable and that there was no applicable exception to termination of parental rights. It therefore terminated parental rights. The Court of Appeal addressed two novel issues raised by the parents' appeal: (1) the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re Caden C., 11 Cal.5th 614 (2021) overruled lower appellate court decisions holding that a parent asserting the parental-benefit exception must show that he or she occupied a “parental role;” and (2) the juvenile court erred by “ignor[ing]” evidence in social worker’s reports filed in connection with earlier hearings and that these reports established that the parental-benefit exception applied. The trial court found that the parental-benefit exception did not apply partly because the parents “ha[d] not acted in a parental role in a long time” and partly because the prospective adoptive parents “ha[d] been acting in a parental role.” Because the trial court used this terminology, the Court of Appeal could not tell whether its ruling conformed with Caden C. Hence, judgment was remanded for reconsideration of the parental-benefit exception. With regard to the second issue, the appellate court disagreed: the reports were not introduced into evidence at the section 366.26 hearing; hence, neither the Court of Appeal nor the juvenile court could consider them. "The parents will be free to introduce them on remand." View "In re L.A.-O." on Justia Law

DCFS alleged, and the juvenile court found true, three allegations that mother had physically abused, failed to protect, and medically neglected her daughter, Emily L., within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). While this appeal was pending, Emily turned 18 and is no longer subject to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.The Court of Appeal concluded that, although the appeal is moot as to Emily, the court will exercise its discretion to address the merits. In this case, substantial evidence does not support the jurisdictional finding of the juvenile court. Given the lack of substantial evidence of any risk of future harm to Emily at the time of the jurisdictional hearing, the court concluded that the juvenile court erred in assuming jurisdiction over this action. The court reversed the juvenile court's order asserting jurisdiction, vacated the juvenile court's factual findings, and directed the juvenile court upon remand to dismiss the petition. View "In re Emily L." on Justia Law

Appellants, Soncino (Celine’s brother), Celine, and Yoram (Celine’s husband) created for-profit organizations, that provided music enrichment and formed a nonprofit organization to contract with public entities. The for-profit organizations provided services, which the nonprofit paid for. The siblings sued Yoram and the businesses, alleging Yoram had misappropriated property belonging to the businesses. The complaint was joined to Celine's and Yoram's divorce proceedings. The parties filed a “Confidential Protective Order,” which prevented Celine from disclosing information and documents she obtained from Yoram’s desk and the marital residence without Yoram's knowledge.The court concluded that Soncino was a partner in the businesses and that the appellants used the business funds for personal expenses. The dissolution was finalized. The Attorney General subsequently filed a complaint against the family businesses and appellants and moved to unseal court records in the dissolution, alleging comingling of charitable funds and using those assets for personal expenses. Ultimately, the family court ordered that records from the dissolution and Soncino v. Tamir be unsealed, and the protective orders lifted.After holding that the family court had the authority to rule on the motion, that the Attorney General is entitled to seek the records on behalf of the public, and that the appellants failed to identify a privacy interest that outweighs the public right to access, the court of appeal reversed and remanded. The family court failed to assess whether the documents at issue were used at trial or submitted as a basis for adjudication, and erred in setting aside the protective orders. View "Marriage of Tamir" on Justia Law

The children, born in 2009 and 2012, were placed in the dependency system. They were placed in the care of their paternal grandmother, who formally adopted both children but had significant problems caring for them. Grandmother contacted Adoption Connection and asked that the children be re-placed for adoption, indicating that the children must remain part of the family and that the openness of the adoptions was of primary importance. The new adoptive parents signed an open adoption contract. Difficulties arose after the adoption was finalized and Grandmother learned that the agreement had not been provided to the adoption court and was not considered or made part of the original adoption order. Adoption Connection filed a request to “Amend Judgment of Adoption to Include Post Adoption Contact Agreement.”The trial court determined that it had no jurisdiction because the court which had originally granted the adoptions had not made the necessary judicial determinations as to whether the post-adoption contact agreement was executed voluntarily and in the best interests of the children. The court of appeal reversed. The trial court could have used its equitable powers to amend the judgments to include the parties’ agreement in the interests of fairness and justice. The trial court also erroneously held that evidence of fraud or an intentional or deliberate misrepresentation was necessary for the grandparents to show the adoptive parents were barred from opposing the amendment under the doctrine of equitable estoppel. View "Adoption of S.S." on Justia Law

Scott and Tal were married for 17 years and had three children together. They divorced in 2014. In the stipulated dissolution judgment, Scott's gross annual income was listed as $196,440. He was ordered to pay $4,326 per month in spousal support and $3,674 per month in child support. In 2017, Scott sought to modify child and spousal support. The court found his yearly gross income had declined to $185,664 and the parties’ oldest child had aged out of child support, which constituted a change in circumstances. The court reduced spousal support to $3,800 per month.Two years later, Scott filed another request to modify spousal support. The court found that his income had not decreased, that Tal had “made efforts” to become self-sufficient, and that in addition to threatening to file several requests to modify support, Scott had unsuccessfully filed a motion for sanctions “rehashing the issues in 2017” and ordered him to pay Tal’s attorney fees ($5,000) incurred in opposing the latest request. The court of appeal affirmed the denial of the request, rejecting arguments that the trial court failed to consider required criteria under Family Code section 4320, erroneously excluded live testimony at the motion hearing, and abused its discretion in issuing attorney fee sanctions. View "Marriage of Kahan & Diamond" on Justia Law

Scarlett was born in Honduras in 2013. Her family moved to the United States in 2015. The Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services received a referral claiming that her father, Franklin, had attacked her mother, Karen. The Department filed a Welfare and Institutions Code 300(a), (b)(1) petition. The court found true the allegations that, because of multiple instances of domestic violence, and because Franklin had hit Scarlett with a belt, Franklin placed Scarlett at risk of serious physical harm and Karen failed to protect her.Scarlett subsequently filed a request for Special Immigrant Juvenile (SIJ) findings under Code of Civil Procedure 155.1. A child is eligible for SIJ status if: the child is a dependent of a juvenile court, in the custody of a state agency by court order, or in the custody of an individual or entity appointed by the court; the child cannot reunify with one or both parents due to abuse, neglect, abandonment, or a similar basis; and it is not in the child’s best interest to return to his or her home country or the home country of her parents. The juvenile court denied the request, ruling the findings were “discretionary.” The court of appeal reversed. The lower court was required to consider the evidence submitted and Scarlett submitted unimpeached and uncontradicted evidence that required the court to enter an order with the findings Scarlett requested under section 155. View "In re Scarlett V." on Justia Law

Blizzard invested in a tire pyrolysis project in Kansas and subsequently sued Schaefers. A Kansas jury returned a $3.825 million fraud judgment, which was entered in California. The California court added a judgment debtor (BKS) pursuant to the “outside reverse veil piercing” doctrine, which arises when the request for piercing comes from a third party outside the targeted business entity. The targeted entity was BKS. Schaefers owns a 50 percent interest in that LLC. Schaefers’ wife, Karin, owns the other 50 percent. Neither Karin nor BKS was a defendant in the Kansas action. The California court found that BKS is Schaefers’ alter ego.The court of appeal affirmed in part. The evidence is sufficient to support the finding that BKS is Schaefers’ alter ego. The court remanded for further proceedings so that the trial court may weigh competing equities that bear on the veil-piercing issue. Blizzard is entitled to recover the damages awarded by the Kansas judgment, but Karin may be an innocent third party who would suffer substantial harm if recovery is accomplished through the reverse veil piercing; there is no indication that she was involved in the fraud committed by Schaefers. Karin may not be responsible for debts incurred by Schaefers after their separation in 1996. View "Blizzard Energy, Inc. v. Schaefers" on Justia Law

The parties’ son was born in November 2018. Mother initiated a claim for child support. Testing established father’s paternity. and a stipulated judgment entered. In February 2019, father requested protective orders under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act and sought sole custody, submitting evidence of mother’s repeated online cyberstalking and harassment. Criminal charges were filed against mother. Much of the harassing behavior involves the child. In March 2019, the court awarded father sole custody of the child. Proceedings on the domestic violence restraining order were stayed pending resolution of felony charges against mother. In August 2020, the court denied mother’s request to modify custody and continued her supervised visitation.In connection with requests for modification of the custody and visitation orders, mother requested attorney fees. Following a hearing, the court denied mother’s request for fees, noting that father had not exhibited any conduct to warrant a sanction-based award. Other statutes apply only to married parties and were inapplicable; there has been no finding that father made false allegations of child abuse. Mother is not the prevailing party in an action to enforce an out-of-state custody order. The court of appeal reversed in part. Mother may be entitled to attorney fees under Family Code 7605, which requires a court to “ensure that each party has access to legal representation to preserve each party’s rights,” using the appropriate needs-based criteria. View "C.T. v. K.W." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's denial of her request for a permanent restraining order protecting her from father. While mother's appeal was pending, the juvenile court terminated jurisdiction in an order from which mother did not appeal.The Court of Appeal held that mother's failure to appeal the termination of juvenile court jurisdiction does not render mother's restraining order appeal moot. In so holding, the court disagreed with certain cases to the extent they stand for the broad proposition that an appellate court can never grant effective relief in a dependency appeal following the unappealed termination of juvenile court jurisdiction. The court explained that if it were to conclude that the juvenile court's denial of mother's restraining order request constitutes reversible error and directed the issuance of the restraining order, the remittitur would vest jurisdiction in the juvenile court for the limited purpose of correcting that error. Therefore, correcting an erroneous denial of mother's restraining order request would immediately afford mother effective relief.The court also held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying mother's requested restraining order where the evidence does not compel the conclusion that mother's safety would be in jeopardy without such an order. Furthermore, the juvenile court did not apply an incorrect legal standard in ruling on her request. The court stated that, even assuming there was error, such error would not warrant reversal because it is not reasonably probable that mother would have obtained a more favorable result under the correct standard. View "In re S.G." on Justia Law

Desirae and Forestt have two children, now eight and five years old. Desirae filed a dissolution of marriage petition. She separately requested a domestic violence restraining order against Forestt; that case was dismissed after Desirae failed to serve him. The family court granted the dissolution petition by default and awarded Desirae sole custody of the children. Desirae moved to Utah to join the children, who were living with her parents. Forestt later claimed he was unaware of the divorce proceeding and believed they were sending the children to Utah so they could work on their marriage. Forestt moved to set aside the default, claiming he had not been served properly and sought to prevent Desirae from leaving the state with the children. Desirae obtained a temporary domestic violence restraining order from a Utah court and submitted to the family court evidence that she had been subjected to domestic violence for several years. The family court set aside the default and awarded joint custody of the children to Forestt.The court of appeal vacated the order. Family Code section 30441 establishes a rebuttable presumption that it is not in the child’s best interest to award joint or sole legal or physical custody to a parent who a court has found to have committed domestic violence against the other parent within the previous five years. The family court erred in failing to apply the presumption. View "Noble v. Superior Court" on Justia Law