Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a dispute over ownership of two parcels of real property between Som, her husband, Joshua, and Joshua's mother, Sharon, the trial court ruled in favor of Sharon. The court of appeal concluded that the trial court abused its discretion when it amended Sharon's complaint to include a cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty and erroneously determined that conditional delivery of the deed was valid. The court reversed the judgment on the claims for slander of title, quiet title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. The court concluded that the trial court's findings and orders interfered with issues under the jurisdiction of the family law court; the trial court did not err when it admitted impeachment evidence about Som's financial circumstances in 2009 and did not deprive Som of a fair trial by cutting off her trial time unexpectedly.The court of appeal subsequently modified its opinion to read: the judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Sharon is reversed with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title to the properties in favor of Joshua, per the July 29, 2010 deed and the July 18, 2011 deed. The judgment is also reversed as to the causes of action for slander of title, declaratory relief, and cancellation of deeds. View "McMillin v. Eare" on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained a Welfare and Institutions Code section 3002 petition that alleged the mother (S.V.) had brandished a knife and pushed a female companion in the now-three-year-old child’s presence.A social worker inquired of S.V. about the child’s Indian ancestry; she did not give the social worker any reason to believe the child was or might be an Indian child. In preparing the detention report, a social worker interviewed the child’s maternal great-grandmother and maternal great-grandfather. It is not clear whether the social worker asked any relatives about the child’s Indian ancestry. S.V. filed a form stating that she did not have any Indian ancestry as far as she knew. If that changed, S.V. was to inform the court and the social worker. The juvenile court then inquired whether S.V. knew if alleged the father had Indian ancestry. She indicated that he did not have Indian ancestry. The court found it had no reason to know that the alleged father had Indian ancestry; his whereabouts were unknown.The court of appeal remanded. The first-step inquiry duty under the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1903(2), requires the Department to interview, among others, extended family members and others who had an interest in the child. View "In re H.V." on Justia Law

Eight-year-old Katherine was in dependency court for five years while her parents struggled with significant ongoing issues of domestic violence and substance abuse. Following multiple failed efforts at reunification, the juvenile court terminated services and the parental rights of both parents rejecting her father’s claim of a “beneficial parental relationship” (Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)). While recognizing that he had maintained regular visitation, the juvenile court concluded that these visits created only an “incidental benefit” to Katherine, while his ongoing instability had caused additional instability and trauma.The court of appeal affirmed, noting that the father had previously concealed a crash caused by driving under the influence and then refused to implement protective measures for Katherine’s benefit. He refused to move out of his parents’ home, which resulted in a series of abrupt changes in Katherine’s placement. He physically assaulted his mother, in the presence of Katherine, resulting in multiple facial injuries requiring medical assistance, which he concealed and downplayed. Katherine had confided at times she feared her father and did not want to speak to him. The negative impact of the father’s unresolved issues on Katherine was antithetical to the kind of beneficial parental relationship required by section 366.26. View "In re Katherine J." on Justia Law

After the juvenile court removed her from her parents at eight weeks old, Abigail lived with Heather for almost two years. The juvenile court declared Abigail a dependent child of the court and denied her parents family reunification services. Abigail had a 12-year-old half-sister, Anahi, who was also a dependent of the juvenile court. Heather let Anahi move in with her and Abigail. The relationship deteriorated. Anahi and Heather made allegations against each other. Anahi was ultimately placed with her aunt and uncle in Arizona. Heather filed a request for de facto parent status with respect to Abigail. The Department would not recommend Heather as the prospective adoptive parent of Abigail and notified Heather it intended to place Abigail with Anahi in Arizona. The court placed Abigail on an extended visit with Anahi in Arizona, denied Heather’s request for de facto parent status, and described her motion as “moot.” Abigail has been placed with Anahi’s relatives in Arizona since November 2020.The court of appeal reversed. Heather’s request was not moot and she did not receive proper notice of the hearing. She retains a limited interest in “the companionship, care, custody and management” of Abigail, which was not extinguished when the juvenile court placed Abigail with Anahi’s relatives. View "In re Abigail L." on Justia Law

After husband John Thompson petitioned for separation from Wife Olivia Thompson in California, wife petitioned for dissolution of marriage in Massachusetts. Husband then amended his California petition to seek dissolution. Wife, in turn, filed a request for order to quash and abate the California proceedings, arguing her dissolution proceeding in Massachusetts was first and was a better suited forum. The trial court ordered the California case abated and stayed, finding wife’s dissolution petition was first in time, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over wife, and “equitable factors” weighed in favor of Massachusetts. On appeal, husband contended his dissolution petition was first in time because it related back to his petition for separation, and regardless, the trial court abused its discretion in abating the action based on the erroneous conclusion it lacked personal jurisdiction over wife. The Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not have in personam jurisdiction over wife at the time husband filed his original petition for separation or his amended petition seeking marital dissolution. "Because the first in time rule applies only when the court has acquired both in rem and in personam jurisdiction, husband’s first in time theory fails." View "Marriage of Thompson" on Justia Law

The children, born in 2016 and 2017, were taken into protective custody in July 2020 after their younger sibling, R., suffered non-accidental fatal head injuries while in the care of their father. Continuances, due in part to the pandemic, significantly delayed the jurisdiction and disposition hearings, which took place in February and May 2021. The juvenile court found there was a substantial risk of detriment to the children if returned to Mother’s care, ordered their removal from her physical custody, and ordered family reunification services for her. The court granted the Department of Family and Children’s Services' unopposed request to combine the six-month and 12-month review hearings. While the appeal was pending, the juvenile court held the 18-month review hearing and returned the children to Mother on a plan of family maintenance.The court of appeal affirmed. in light of the strict statutory limits set out in the dependency scheme, Mother failed to establish error with respect to combining the six-month and 12-month hearings. Mother’s claim that she faces the potential loss of a full and fair opportunity to reunify in the event the children are removed again is not ripe for review. Mother has not shown that her trial counsel’s failure to object to the setting of the combined review hearing was deficient or prejudicial. View "In re M.F." on Justia Law

In November 2018, the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services filed a petition (Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001) relative to three-year-old A.L. A.L. was living with her father; she was placed into protective custody after her father left A.L. with a daycare provider for several days without making arrangements for her care. Father was in custody. The Department could not locate A.L.’s mother. In March 2019, the juvenile court declared A.L. a dependent child, removed her from her father’s care, and ordered family reunification services. Father received services for 16 months. In July 2020, the court terminated those services and scheduled a selection and implementation hearing (section 366.26). Father then filed a section 388 petition. seeking the return of A.L. to his care. In January 2021, after a combined hearing on the 388 petition and selection and implementation, the court found A.L. adoptable and terminated the father’s parental rights.The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the father’s claim of the beneficial parental relationship exception to adoption and did not apply the correct legal standard by basing its determination that the exception did not apply on the finding that father did not occupy a strong parental role in A.L’s life. View "In re A.L." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the order denying mother's Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition and remanded for the juvenile court to reconsider her request for additional reunification services on the merits. The court stated that, although section 361.5, subdivision (a), generally limits family reunification services to a period not exceeding 18 months after the date a child was originally removed from the physical custody of the child's parent, nearly 30 years ago in In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, the Supreme Court held that a parent may utilize the section 388 petition procedure to demonstrate circumstances have changed and additional reunification services would be in the child's best interest. Furthermore, section 366.3, subdivisions (e) and (f), expressly authorize the juvenile court at post-permanent plan review hearings to order a second period of reunification services if it would be in the child's best interest to do so, ample statutory authority for the relief mother requested.In this case, the juvenile court's failure to evaluate mother's actual request for reunification services, rather than for an immediate return of all seven children to her custody, was not harmless. The court remanded for the juvenile court to conduct a new section 388 hearing and evaluate under the proper standards whether mother has maintained her sobriety and whether, under the circumstances as they exist at the time of the new hearing, additional reunification services would be in the best interest of any of the children. View "In re Malik T." on Justia Law

The court of appeal affirmed an order terminating parental rights over eight-year-old Eli and his sister, seven-year-old A.B., who have been living together in foster care for nearly four years. After noting that the father has died, the court proceeded on the merits and rejected an argument that the juvenile court erred in declining to apply the beneficial relationship exception concerning either parent. In light of all of the circumstances, the juvenile court had the discretion to weigh the harms and benefits of terminating the mother’s parental rights in the manner that it did, even if the children had a significant, positive emotional bond to her. Substantial evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that the mother did not prove the existence of a significant, positive emotional attachment with either child. The juvenile court could infer from one violent incident, and the lack of judgment mother displayed on that occasion with a different child, that her anger and inability to control her aggression could potentially have a detrimental influence on Eli’s and A.B.’s mental health, if not also their physical safety were she ever to expose them to continued domestic violence. View "In re Eli B." on Justia Law

The juvenile court exercised dependency jurisdiction over minor A.V. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removed her from the custody of her mother, S.V. (mother). Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the court’s exercise of jurisdiction as well as the resulting disposition order. She argued in the alternative that the court denied her due process right to be heard at the jurisdictional hearing when it made the challenged findings in her absence. The Court of Appeal agreed with mother’s latter contention and reversed without reaching her sufficiency of the evidence challenge. View "In re A.V." on Justia Law