Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Susan Diamond appealed an order denying her request to set aside a judgment in her marital dissolution proceeding. Susan argued that the judgment should be vacated due to duress and mental incapacity during the dissolution process. The Family Code does not define mental incapacity or duress, but the court found guidance in the Probate Code and Code of Civil Procedure, which address an individual's ability to make decisions regarding assets, medical options, and ongoing legal actions.In the lower court, Susan and Troy Diamond were married in 1992 and separated in 2008. Susan filed for dissolution in 2013. Susan's attorney withdrew due to her lack of communication, and she represented herself thereafter. Susan did not appear at the trial in May 2015, leading to an uncontested trial where the court awarded Troy custody of their daughter, child support, and a significant monetary judgment. Susan later sought to set aside the judgment, claiming she was unaware of the trial and was incapacitated due to health issues. Her initial request was denied based on the disentitlement doctrine and lack of evidence of mistake.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Seven, reviewed the case. The court concluded that Susan did not meet her burden to show she was mentally incapacitated or under duress during the dissolution proceedings. The court found that Susan's actions during the relevant period, such as selling her home and handling financial transactions, indicated she understood the nature and consequences of her actions. The court also found no evidence that Troy used threats or pressure to induce Susan not to participate in the proceedings. The court affirmed the lower court's decision, holding that Susan did not establish grounds for relief under Family Code section 2122. View "Marriage of Diamond" on Justia Law

Lois and David divorced in 1992, with David ordered to pay child and spousal support. The child support obligation ended in 2001 when their daughter turned 18 and graduated high school, but wage garnishments continued until 2008. In 2021, David sought reimbursement for overpaid child support, claiming he overpaid $46,061.55. Lois opposed, arguing the delay was unreasonable and would cause her financial hardship.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied David's request, finding he did not act timely and his reasons for the delay were insufficient to overcome the prejudice to Lois. The court noted David had previously acted to terminate spousal support but did not do so for child support. The court also found Lois had unclean hands, as she likely knew she was receiving overpayments. However, the court granted David $3,000 in attorney fees as sanctions against Lois for failing to comply with court orders.On appeal, David argued that reimbursement of overpaid child support is mandatory under Family Code section 4007 and that laches should not apply. The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, affirmed the lower court's decision. The appellate court found that the defense of laches did not apply due to Lois's unclean hands but disagreed with David's interpretation of Family Code section 4007. The court noted that the original support order did not require Lois to notify David of the termination of the child support obligation, and it was David's responsibility to terminate the wage garnishment order. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying David's request for reimbursement due to the significant delay and resulting prejudice to Lois. View "In re Marriage of Saraye" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Shayan appealed an order denying his motion to quash a writ of execution for attorney fees filed by Zohreh McIntyre Shayan. The couple married in 2002, had two children, and Zohreh petitioned for dissolution in 2007. In 2010, the family court awarded Zohreh $125,000 in attorney fees. In April 2022, Zohreh sought a writ of execution on the judgment, which Shahriyar contested, arguing it had expired under the 10-year limitation of Code of Civil Procedure section 683.020 and was not renewed as required by section 683.130.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County denied Shahriyar's request to set aside the writ, leading to his appeal. Shahriyar contended that the attorney fees judgment should be subject to the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, and that Family Code section 291’s exemptions did not apply to such judgments.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, reviewed the case de novo. The court held that Family Code section 291, which exempts money judgments entered under the Family Code from the 10-year limitation and renewal requirements, includes judgments for attorney fees. The court found the language of Family Code section 291 unambiguous and supported by legislative history, which aimed to simplify enforcement rules for family law judgments and protect litigants' rights. The court affirmed the lower court's order, concluding that the judgment for attorney fees was enforceable until paid in full and did not require renewal. View "In re Marriage of Shayan" on Justia Law

The case involves a dispute over whether the proceeds of an Individual Retirement Account (IRA) should be included in the estate of a deceased individual, Thomas Reich, for the purpose of calculating the share of his surviving spouse, Pamela Reich, as an "omitted spouse" under California law. Thomas had created a revocable trust in 2003, which was amended in 2016, to distribute his assets upon his death. He designated his daughter and granddaughter as beneficiaries of the IRA, which had a balance of approximately $1.5 million at the time of his death. Thomas married Pamela in 2020 but did not update his trust to provide for her before his death in 2021.Pamela initially filed a petition seeking an omitted spouse's share of Thomas's estate, including the IRA proceeds. The Los Angeles County Superior Court overruled a demurrer by the trust's beneficiaries, suggesting that the IRA proceeds might be included in the estate. However, a partial settlement was reached, excluding the IRA proceeds from Pamela's share. Pamela then filed two new petitions regarding her entitlement to the IRA proceeds, which were assigned to a different judge.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case and affirmed the probate court's orders dismissing Pamela's petitions. The court held that the IRA proceeds are nonprobate assets and do not pass through the decedent's testamentary trust to the separate trusts created for the beneficiaries. Therefore, the IRA proceeds are not part of Thomas's "estate" for the purpose of calculating Pamela's omitted spouse's share. The court also noted that the prior demurrer ruling was not controlling in this context. View "Reich v. Reich" on Justia Law

A mother sought child support from the father for their adult son, who has autism and receives government aid. The mother argued that the father, who earns a substantial income, should contribute to their son's support. The father contended that the son's receipt of government aid under the State Supplementary Program for Aged, Blind, and Disabled (SSP) relieved him of any financial responsibility under Family Code section 3910, which mandates parental support for adult children who are incapacitated and without sufficient means.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County ruled in favor of the father, interpreting Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 to mean that the receipt of government aid barred the mother from seeking child support from the father. The court also limited the attorney’s fees awarded to the mother, reasoning that the case presented a narrow legal issue that did not justify extensive litigation costs.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division One, reversed the lower court's decision. The appellate court held that Welfare and Institutions Code section 12350 only prevents government entities from seeking reimbursement from relatives for the cost of aid provided to recipients. It does not bar a parent from seeking child support from the other parent under Family Code section 3910. The court emphasized that the legislative intent behind these statutes was to prevent the public from bearing the financial burden of supporting individuals who have relatives capable of providing support.The appellate court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine the appropriate amount of child support and to reconsider the attorney’s fees award in light of its ruling. The court clarified that the family court must now address whether the son is incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means, and if so, determine the appropriate support amount. View "Marriage of Cady & Gamick" on Justia Law

The case involves Edward Wayne Reid, who was charged with two crimes against Jane Doe: assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury and willfully inflicting corporal injury upon a domestic partner resulting in a traumatic condition. Jane testified that Reid grabbed her by the throat, applied pressure, caused her difficulty in breathing and swallowing, and made her feel dizzy. A deputy corroborated Jane's account, noting she reported seeing stars and feeling faint during the incident.The magistrate at the preliminary hearing found probable cause for the assault charge but dismissed the domestic violence charge, stating there was no evidence of a "traumatic injury." The People refiled the information with both charges, and Reid moved to dismiss the domestic violence charge again. The trial court granted Reid's motion, agreeing with the magistrate's assessment.The California Court of Appeal, Fourth Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case. The court held that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing provided a rational ground for assuming Reid inflicted corporal injury upon Jane through choking, which resulted in a traumatic condition as defined by the statute. The court emphasized that the statutory definition of a traumatic condition includes impeding normal breathing or circulation of blood by applying pressure on the throat or neck. The court found that Jane's difficulty in breathing and feeling dizzy or faint met this definition.The appellate court reversed the trial court's order dismissing the domestic violence charge and remanded the case with directions to allow Reid to withdraw his plea to the assault charge. The court concluded that there was sufficient evidence to support the charge of willfully inflicting corporal injury resulting in a traumatic condition. View "P. v. Reid" on Justia Law

Jose Cardona appealed a trial court order granting Karina Soto, the mother of his child, a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against him. The DVRO, which expired in November 2023, protected Soto and their daughter. The appeal was not moot despite the DVRO’s expiration because the finding of domestic violence created a five-year statutory presumption against Cardona’s custody of their daughter.The Contra Costa County Superior Court initially granted the DVRO based on an incident where Cardona, while drunk, beat his current wife in the presence of their daughter, who he also slapped. Soto claimed Cardona had verbally abused their daughter and forced her to carry his gun on multiple occasions. Cardona admitted to the incident but denied ongoing abuse and claimed Soto was lying to gain full custody. During the hearing, the court interviewed the daughter in chambers without the parties present, and the interview was not reported or documented.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division One, found that Cardona’s due process rights were violated because he was not informed of the substance of his daughter’s testimony and thus could not respond to it. The court emphasized that while in-chambers interviews of minors are permissible, there must be safeguards to ensure the parent can respond to the testimony. The failure to make any record of the daughter’s testimony left the evidentiary basis for the DVRO unreviewable on appeal. Consequently, the court reversed the DVRO due to the due process violation, though it did not preclude future reliance on other evidence of domestic violence presented. View "Cardona v Soto" on Justia Law

C.C. and D.V., who share two children, had joint legal and physical custody established in 2016. In January 2022, C.C. sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against D.V., alleging persistent harassment, including sending explicit images and verbal abuse. The court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO) granting C.C. sole legal and primary physical custody. The parties later stipulated to extend the TRO and address custody separately. In April 2023, they agreed to a one-year restraining order after hearing (ROAH), which did not address custody.The Marin County Superior Court issued a joint custody order in September 2022, despite C.C.'s pending DVRO request and her invocation of Family Code section 3044, which presumes that awarding custody to a perpetrator of domestic violence is detrimental to the child's best interest. C.C. appealed the ROAH and the subsequent July 2023 custody order, arguing the court erred by not determining D.V. had overcome the section 3044 presumption.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, held that the presumption in section 3044 is triggered whenever an ROAH is issued, even if stipulated. The court found that the trial court did not err in issuing the ROAH without modifying custody, as custody was addressed separately. However, the court erred in its July 2023 order by not determining that D.V. had overcome the section 3044 presumption before awarding joint custody. The appellate court reversed the July 2023 order but affirmed the April 2023 ROAH. The case was deemed moot due to subsequent legal proceedings, but the appellate court retained the appeal to resolve the significant legal issue. C.C. was awarded her costs on appeal. View "C.C. v. D.V." on Justia Law

Bobby Feehan sought extraordinary writ relief from the trial court’s order denying them temporary visitation during the pendency of their petition to establish a parental relationship with minor L.S. Feehan and Lauren Seto were in a romantic relationship while Seto was pregnant with L.S., who was later adopted by Seto’s partner, Jude Guide. Feehan claimed to have acted as a parent to L.S. from birth until the relationship with Seto ended, after which Seto cut off almost all contact between Feehan and L.S. Feehan filed a petition to determine their parental relationship and requested temporary visitation, which Seto and Guide opposed.The Superior Court of Alameda County denied Feehan’s request for temporary visitation, citing a lack of authority under Family Code sections 7604 and 6436 to order pendente lite custody and visitation. The court rejected Feehan’s argument that it had equitable authority to issue such orders when a prima facie case for parentage is made. Feehan then filed a petition for writ of mandate, which led to the current appeal.The California Court of Appeal, First Appellate District, Division Three, reviewed the case and found that the trial court had broad equitable authority to grant pendente lite visitation in parentage cases under Family Code sections 3022 and 3100, subdivision (a). The appellate court concluded that the trial court erred in determining it lacked authority to grant Feehan’s request. The court held that trial courts have discretion to enter temporary visitation orders if the requesting party makes a preliminary showing of being a presumed parent and if the order is in the best interests of the child. The appellate court issued a peremptory writ of mandate commanding the trial court to vacate its order and reconsider Feehan’s request for pendente lite visitation. View "Feehan v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Elizabeth T. was taking her three children to see their father when she fell on a bus after consuming alcohol. An anonymous caller reported her to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), alleging she was intoxicated and her children were neglected. Elizabeth denied being heavily intoxicated and claimed her children were well cared for. DCFS filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), alleging Elizabeth's substance abuse posed a risk to her children.The Superior Court of Los Angeles County sustained the petition, citing a prior sustained allegation of substance abuse from 2018. The court ordered informal supervision under section 360, subdivision (b). Elizabeth appealed, arguing that one incident of alcohol abuse did not support the finding that she posed a risk to her children at the time of the jurisdiction hearing.The California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, reviewed the case. The court found that the evidence of the bus incident, along with the four-year-old allegation, did not support the finding that Elizabeth's conduct created a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to her children. The court noted that Elizabeth had cooperated with DCFS, submitted to drug and alcohol testing, and her children were healthy and well cared for. The court concluded that there was no substantial evidence of a current risk to the children and reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders. View "In re Gilberto G." on Justia Law