Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal dismissed Mother's appeal of the juvenile court's declaration that her son is a dependent child of the court after sustaining an amended petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). The court concluded that Mother is correct that termination of dependency jurisdiction does not necessarily moot an appeal from a jurisdiction finding that directly results in an adverse juvenile custody order. However, the court explained that in most cases, including the one at bar, for the court to be able to provide effective relief, the parent must appeal not only from the jurisdiction finding and disposition order but also from the orders terminating jurisdiction and modifying the parent's prior custody status. Therefore, without the second appeal, the court cannot correct the continuing adverse consequences of the allegedly erroneous jurisdiction finding. In regard to Mother's alternative contention, the court concluded that this case does not present an issue of broad public interest. View "In re Rashad D." on Justia Law

Wang initiated the dissolution of marriage proceedings against Zhou. The parties have a daughter, born in 2013 in China. Daughter lived primarily in China with Zhou but made frequent, extended trips to the U.S. to visit Wang, who worked in California. The court assumed emergency jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA, Fam. Code 3400): Daughter would return to China with Zhou, and then return to California for extended periods. The parties agreed they would either register the California order or create an identical order in China "so that there will be a fully enforceable order in both jurisdictions.”In 2018, Zhou sought to register a Chinese judgment. Zhou had alleged to the Chinese court that Wang “tricked” her; that court denied Wang’s request to implement the California judgment and determined that Zhou should have sole custody. Wang opposed the registration of the order and asked the court to order Zhou to return Daughter to the U.S. for visitation. Wang had participated in the Chinese proceedings and was appealing the Chinese judgment. The court ordered Zhou to comply with the 2016 order and denied Zhou’s request to register the Chinese judgment.The court of appeal affirmed. The trial court did not explicitly rule that it had UCCJEA jurisdiction, nor did Wang argue that the court had superior jurisdiction over the Chinese court regarding child custody. The court properly denied registration because Wang established that the Chinese court, as a court with jurisdiction, stayed the judgment. View "Marriage of Wang & Zhou" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding as to Father and reversed the dispositional order removing J.N. from Father's custody. The court agreed with father that the jurisdictional finding and removal order were solely based on Father's incarceration and criminal record and that such evidence is insufficient to support either jurisdiction or removal. In this case, substantial evidence does not support an actual nexus between this criminal history and any specifically identified, substantial, current risk of serious physical harm to J.N. Furthermore, the record does not contain substantial evidence to support removal of J.N. from father.Father also challenges the trial court's denial of reunification services based on a detrimental finding under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.5, subdivision (e). The court concluded that section 361.5 is inapplicable and that Father was not entitled to reunification services, regardless of any potential detriment to J.N. therefrom. The court nevertheless vacated the trial court's detrimental finding because it could prejudice Father in future dependency proceedings. View "In re J.N." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring mother's 16-year-old daughter J.S. and her 12-year-old son M.S. dependents of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and removing J.S. and M.S. from her custody under section 361, subdivision (c). Mother also contends the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act and related California law.In the published portion of the opinion, the court held that the Department conducted an appropriate further inquiry, as required by section 224.2, subdivision (e), and California Rules of Court, rule 5.481(a)(4), into the children's possible status as Indian children, including with respect to the paternal relatives' ancestry.com results showing "Native American" ethnic origin. In this case, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings that there was no reason to know that the children were Indian children and that the ICWA did not apply. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's dispositional orders denying mother visitation with her son and allowing the child's therapist to decide when conjoint counseling should occur. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's finding that visitation with mother would be detrimental to the child. In this case, the record shows that mother was physically and emotionally abusive to him, hitting, kicking, or pinching him on a regular basis, frequently causing bruises; she often pretended to strike the child and laughed at him when he flinched; and his adult siblings confirmed that they had been abused as children while in mother's care and expressed concern for the child's safety. Furthermore, the child engaged in self-harming behaviors and refused all contact with mother, becoming anxious and stressed when mother made harassing phone calls to his caregiver and insisted on speaking to him.The court also concluded that mother forfeited her challenge to the order for conjoint counseling by failing to raise any objection in the juvenile court. Finally, the juvenile court's decision to order conjoint counseling when deemed appropriate by the child's therapist was not an improper delegation of judicial power. View "In re F.P." on Justia Law

Father and Mother lived together for a few years and are the parents of Minor, who was born in 2014. By 2018, Mother was raising her children—Minor and Minor’s three older half-siblings—on her own, and she did not know Father’s whereabouts. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a juvenile dependency petition on behalf of the children, listing Father’s name but stating his address was unknown. On November 12, 2019, the Agency filed a status review report for the six-month review hearing; 13 months after the original petition was filed, the Agency first listed an address for Father as the California State Prison. Father subsequently was deemed Minor’s presumed father and was released from custody. The juvenile court summarily denied his motion under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 to set aside prior findings, without a hearing.The court of appeal set aside the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing under section 366.26 to consider termination of parental rights, guardianship, or another permanent plan. Father sufficiently raised the possibility that the Agency failed to use due diligence to locate him and sufficiently stated a notice violation to warrant an evidentiary hearing. View "In re R.A." on Justia Law

After a domestic violence incident between mother and father that was witnessed by the children, DCFS started dependency proceedings on behalf of both children. The juvenile court found jurisdiction over the children under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1), and ordered I.R. removed from father and released to mother.The Court of Appeal concluded that the evidence does not support either of the findings necessary to justify removal under section 361, subdivision (c)(1). In this case, the record does not contain substantial evidence that I.R. would be in "substantial danger" in father's care, nor does it contain substantial evidence that there were no "reasonable means" to protect I.R. other than removing her from father. Given the lack of any connection between drug use and the domestic violence underlying the petition, the court concluded that the juvenile court was acting within its discretion in denying I.R.'s request that mother submit to more extensive drug testing. Accordingly, the court reversed the dispositional order against father and remanded. View "In re I.R." on Justia Law

Mother appeals from the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders, contending that the record lacks evidence sufficient to support those orders. In this case, Nathan E. and his siblings were removed from their parents after DCFS investigated a report of a domestic violence incident.The Court of Appeal found substantial evidence to sustain the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional findings. In this case, the history of domestic violence between mother and father that DCFS outlined for the juvenile court spanned for the entire duration of their marriage. In the same year that they were married, mother stabbed father and was arrested for domestic violence and resisting an executive officer. Furthermore, DCFS's investigation revealed that the parents had their violent altercations in the presence of the children. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the finding that the parents' ongoing domestic violence issues created a substantial risk of harm to the children; at the time of the dispositional hearing, returning the children to mother's custody posed a risk of substantial danger to them; and there existed no reasonable means of protecting the children other than removing them from mother. View "In re Nathan E." on Justia Law

Lucille and Lewis Keading created a trust for the benefit of their children, Kenton and Hilja. During their lifetimes, they provided financial assistance to Kenton but not to Hilja. Kenton had been imprisoned for nine years. In 2015, Hilja returned to her parents’ home to care for them, clean their house, and organize their finances. Lewis died a few months after Lucille. Days after Lewis died, Kenton recorded a deed, transferring the property from the trust to him and his father as joint tenants. He sold Lewis’s car and kept the proceeds.After discovering that Kenton had represented himself as their father’s attorney-in-fact and had executed the deed, Hilja filed suit. A court-appointed trustee joined Hilja’s suit. The court found the transfer invalid, set aside the deed, and vested title to the property with the trustee. Meanwhile, Kenton sued Hilja for libel. The court granted Hilja’s anti-SLAPP motion, concluded Kenton was liable for elder abuse and that the property transfers resulted from elder abuse.The court of appeal affirmed the judgment that found Kenton liable for elder financial abuse through undue influence and ordered him to pay $1.5 million in damages and upheld a prejudgment right to attach order. Probate Code section 859 authorizes an award of double damages for the commission of elder financial abuse without a separate finding of bad faith. The court also upheld the dismissal of Kenton’s libel action. View "Keading v. Keading" on Justia Law

In April 2015, during marriage dissolution proceedings, plaintiff filed a request for a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against defendant, her then-husband. The trial court granted a two-year DVRO. Defendant appealed. While that appeal remained pending, a little more than a month before the original DVRO was set to expire, plaintiff filed a request to renew the DVRO. After a hearing, the trial court granted plaintiff’s request, renewing the DVRO for five years. In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeal affirmed the issuance of the original DVRO. Defendant, an attorney appearing in propria persona, appealed the grant of the renewed DVRO, asserting that: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to renew the DVRO while the appeal from the granting of the original DVRO remained pending; (2) the trial court erred in rendering its decision without reading the pleadings; (3) the trial court erred in excluding the witnesses and exhibits he offered; (4) the trial court erred in rendering its decision without considering the case law in the pleadings; (5) the trial court did not afford him sufficient time to present his defense; and, (6) in effect, substantial evidence did not support renewal of the DVRO. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the renewed DVRO. View "Marriage of Carlisle" on Justia Law