Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a juvenile court places a child who has been declared a dependent with a relative and declares the relative to be a "de facto parent," when the social services agency later seeks to remove the child from the relative, Welfare and Institutions Code section 387 governs. Section 387 authorizes a juvenile court to "chang[e] or modif[y] a previous [placement] order by removing a child from the physical custody of a parent, guardian, relative, or friend and directing” a different placement.Although the juvenile court followed the incorrect procedures in this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the removal orders because the error was not prejudicial. The court explained that the juvenile court's error in evaluating the Department's request under section 385 rather than section 387 was not prejudicial for two reasons. First, the Department's initial decision to follow all of the section 387 procedures up until its last-minute change of mind means that grandmother was effectively accorded all of the process she was due under section 387. Second, the juvenile court's modification order is supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Brianna S." on Justia Law

The parties entered into a settlement agreement, in the form of a verbal stipulation, regarding the terms of their marital dissolution. The stipulation included an equal division of the community property portion of the wife's retirement plan without any mention of the plan’s survivor benefits. The parties could not agree as to whether the husband had survivor benefits under that retirement plan and asked the court to resolve their dispute. In the alternative, the wife asked the court to vacate the stipulation.The trial court ruled that the survivor benefits were an “omitted asset” (Fam. Code, 2556) subject to an equal division under section 2610(a)(2) and the wife was not entitled to an order vacating the stipulation. The court awarded the husband $800 in attorney fees and $180 in costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. The court of appeal affirmed that the husband is to receive a survivor benefit related to his community property share of the retirement plan. The court reversed, in part; section 271 does not permit an award of fees to a self-represented party. The court denied the husband’s separate motion for sanctions for the filing of a frivolous appeal and to cause a delay. View "Marriage of Erndt & Terhorst" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's orders exercising jurisdiction over mother's three children and removing them from their parents. The court held that the trial court properly found that the mother's conduct put her children at substantial risk of serious physical harm. The court explained that the mother routinely disappeared from her children's lives at about 5:00 p.m. until they woke her the next morning for school; it was reasonable for the juvenile court to infer the mother's drug use had something to do with this conduct; and the resulting failure to supervise the children put them at serious risk. The court also held that sufficient evidence supports the finding that father's substance abuse put one of the children, J.N., at a substantial risk of serious physical harm. Finally, sufficient evidence supports the juvenile court's dispositional order removing the children. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Martha Nevai (wife) contended the trial court erred in various orders of reimbursement to the community for spending related to wife’s separate property. She also argued the trial court erred in setting spousal support and in refusing to award her attorney fees. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed the trial court erred in fixing the permanent spousal support award and in reimbursing John Klemunes (husband) for mortgage interest and property taxes on wife’s vacation home. Further, the trial court also erred in ordering that each side pay their own attorney fees. The Court reversed the relevant portions of the judgment and remanded the matter for recalculation and further consideration. Judgment was affirmed in all other respects. View "Marriage of Nevai and Klemunes" on Justia Law

Anna Wozniak challenged the trial court’s characterization of a particular residence as the parties' community property. The property at issue was originally owned by Anna as her separate property, but that at some point prior to 2006, Anna transmuted this property into community property. In 2006, Grzegorz Wozniak prepared and executed an interspousal transfer deed, which, if effective, would have passed his community property interest in the residence to Anna. At trial, the parties disputed Anna’s response to Grzegorz’s attempted delivery of the interspousal transfer deed; Grzegorz testified that Anna rejected the deed, and Anna testified that she was surprised when Grzegorz presented the executed deed to her but that she ultimately took possession of it. Over the next six years, the deed was not recorded and both parties appeared to agree that it remained in the martial residence. In 2012, after an incident in which a protective order was granted in favor of Grzegorz and against Anna, Anna took possession of the deed and recorded it. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court stated in its findings that it found Grzegorz’s testimony about the deed to be credible and concluded that Anna had rejected the deed in 2006, and that as a result, no transmutation had been consummated between the parties at that time. The court further found that when Anna recorded the deed in 2012, Grzegorz no longer had the intent to transmute his community property interest to Anna. The trial court thus concluded that the property at issue was community property. On appeal, Anna contended the trial court erred in concluding that the residence was community property. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err in its analysis of the law regarding the transmutation of property between spouses, and that the court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence. View "Marriage of Wozniak" on Justia Law

Anna Navarrete is the 33-year-old adult child of Maria Navarrete (mother) and Rodolfo Navarrete, Sr. (father), who had cerebral palsy and a speech disorder which limit her ability to answer questions and express her needs and desires. Mother has been her primary caregiver. Mother and father split up during the dispute that lead to this appeal. Mother filed a petition asking to be appointed Navarrete’s probate conservator. Navarrete’s father and older brother objected to mother’s petition, and her brother filed a competing petition asking to be appointed instead. Mother and father also sought domestic violence restraining orders against each other. An accusation was lodged against the father, that he sexually assaulted and raped Navarrette. At trial, Navarrete’s therapist, mother, and younger brother, Adrian Navarrete (Adrian), said Navarrete told them her father sexually assaulted and raped her and she fears her father. Father testified and denied the accusations. The trial court interviewed Navarrete, but concluded she wasn’t a competent witness before eliciting any testimony from her about the assaults. In the end, though the court expressed uncertainty about what had happened, it found mother hadn’t proven the accusations of sexual assault by a preponderance of the evidence, but also found Navarrete had genuine fear of her father and didn’t want to see him. The trial court appointed mother as Navarrete’s probate conservator and denied the brother’s petition. Later, after further hearings, the trial court granted father visitation and ordered Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father. The court concluded, over the objection of Navarrete, her conservator, and her attorney, that such visits were in her best interest because it would allow reconciliation in the event the accusations of sexual assault weren’t true. The visitation order was the only part of the case challenged on appeal. The Court of Appeal held trial court didi not have the authority to order Navarrete to attend joint counseling sessions with her father, and therefore reversed the order. View "Conservatorship of Navarrete" on Justia Law

Based on a Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b)(1) petition, A.G, then four years old, was placed into protective custody after his mother, S.B., twice drove a car in which A.G. was a passenger while she was under the influence. Mother's reunification services were terminated at the 12-month review hearing. At a selection and implementation hearing, S.G. requested a contested hearing on statutory exceptions to adoption and the termination of parental rights: the beneficial parental relationship and the sibling relationship. The court found her offer of proof insufficient, denied her request for a contested hearing, found the minor adoptable, and terminated S.G.'s parental rights.The court of appeal reversed the denial of a contested hearing. The offer of proof must address two components of the parental relationship exception: the parent’s regular contact with the child and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. It need not address whether the existence of that relationship constitutes a compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child. S.G.'s offer of proof was adequate, addressing both her regular contact with A.G. and the existence of a beneficial parent-child relationship. Because the termination of parental rights is at stake, the court, particularly where the parent’s regular contact with the child is not in dispute, should exercise caution before denying a contested hearing and should construe the parent’s offer of proof liberally. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

At issue in these two appeals is whether the juvenile court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services complied with their duties of inquiry and notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law.The Court of Appeal agreed that the Department failed to adequately investigate mother's claim of Indian ancestry and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before concluding, if it ever actually did, ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. Therefore, the court disagreed with the holding In re Austin J. (2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 870, 888-889, that amendments enacted by Assembly Bill No. 3176 were intended to limit the Department's robust duty of inquiry. The court conditionally reversed the orders for legal guardianship and remanded the matters to allow the Department and the juvenile court to rectify their errors and to take all other necessary corrective actions. View "In re T.G." on Justia Law

In this opinion, the Court of Appeal addressed three consolidated appeals relating to a judgment for the return of a child in an international custody dispute. This case was retried after the Court reversed an earlier judgment marred by due process violations. After remand, the trial court again granted father’s petition under the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (the Convention) and the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA), for return of the child to her father’s custody in Denmark, her country of habitual residence. The court also awarded father his attorney fees and other expenses as the prevailing party under the Convention and ICARA. Mother filed separate appeals of the return order and the fees award and two post judgment sealing orders related to the parties’ use of the transcript of the trial judge’s confidential interview with the child during the trial. The Court of Appeal determined mother’s appeal of the return order was moot because the child was nearly 18 years old, and the Convention did not apply after the child who was the subject of the return petition turns 16. The Court reversed the fees award, because mother had no opportunity for a full and fair hearing on father’s motion for fees. As for mother’s appeal of the postjudgment sealing orders, the Court found no merit to the appeal and affirmed the orders. View "Noergaard v. Noergaard" on Justia Law

In 2001, a Minnesota state court ordered James to pay $89,582.15 in child support arrears to his ex-wife, Rosemary, for their two children. James was then living in California. In 2005 the Minnesota order was registered for enforcement purposes in Santa Cruz County Superior Court under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act. In 2018, in connection with registration in California of a renewed judgment from Minnesota, the Santa Cruz County court stayed enforcement of a portion of James’s child support arrears determined by the 2001 Minnesota order because the children had intermittently lived with James between 1993 and 2002. The trial court found the remainder of the arrears enforceable. The Santa Cruz County Department of Child Support Services, which has assisted in the enforcement and collection of James’s child support arrears, contends that the court lacked authority under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act to stay the arrears owed by James because the 2001 Minnesota order at issue was registered and confirmed in California in 2005, and James did not timely challenge its registration. The court of appeal agreed and reversed the portion of the 2018 order staying enforcement of $28,890 of the arrears, while affirming that the remainder of the arrears ($60,692.15) was enforceable. View "Marriage of Sawyer" on Justia Law