Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings over daughter and termination of the case with a juvenile custody order. The court held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's findings. In this case, the confluence of five factors supported the juvenile court's finding of a risk of serious emotional damage to daughter: violence, systematic verbal abuse, racism, impulsivity, and lack of insight. The court concluded that this combination created substantial evidence that daughter suffered severe anxiety, which in turn was evidence of a substantial risk daughter would suffer serious emotional damage. Finally, the court held that the juvenile court did not err by terminating jurisdiction and that the juvenile court's order did not unreasonably restrict the family court's power to modify custody or visitation. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed dispositional orders designating the children dependents of the court. The court held that, although the "follow all recommendations" language in the case plan failed to satisfy Welfare and Institutions Code section 1650.1, subdivision (g)(2), the inclusion of the broad language in the case plan was harmless. Furthermore, the court found no Indian Child Welfare Act violation. In this case, mother's claim that she "may have Indian ancestry" was insufficient to trigger the Act's notice requirements, and the agency did not satisfy its duty of inquiry. View "In re M.R." on Justia Law

Anthony and Taylor, the parents of Aubrey, born in 2011, had an on-again-off-again relationship. At the time of the birth, Taylor was staying with Aubrey’s maternal great-grandparents. Anthony was present at Aubrey’s birth but was not named on the birth certificate. Weeks later, Taylor and Aubrey moved in with Anthony; when Aubrey was six months old, they got married. According to Taylor, Anthony was often absent because he had a serious alcohol and drug abuse problem and sometimes committed acts of domestic violence against Taylor. When Aubrey was three years old, Anthony and Taylor separated. Taylor and Aubrey moved in with Aubrey's great-grandparents. Taylor obtained a temporary restraining order against Anthony that precluded contact with her or Aubrey. After the TRO was lifted, Taylor allowed Anthony to have visits with Aubrey outside the great-grandparents’ home. In November 2015, after learning that Taylor was missing, Anthony filed a petition for the dissolution of the marriage and sought custody of Aubrey. The juvenile court terminated Anthony’s paternal rights under Family Code section 7822 and declared Aubrey free for adoption by her great-grandparents.The court of appeal reversed. The evidence did not support a finding that Anthony’s efforts to have contact with Aubrey were mere token communications that did not overcome the statutory presumption of abandonment; there was no substantial evidence that Anthony intended to abandon Aubrey during the relevant period. View "In re Aubrey T." on Justia Law

Defendants-appellants A.C. (Father) and K.C. (Mother) were the parents of G.I., G.A. and J.C. Father, with Mother joining, appealed the juvenile court’s dispositional order removing G.I., J.C., and G.A. (collectively, the children) from Father’s and Mother’s (collectively, Parents) custody. In 2019, plaintiff-respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) received an immediate response referral alleging general neglect of the children by Mother. It was reported that the home was filthy, the floors were covered in feces and urine, a majority of the food in the refrigerator was expired, the food in the cabinets had mold, and the home smelled of marijuana. When a social worker arrived at the home, Mother had already been taken into custody, and she was having suicidal disclosures. Law enforcement was at the home with the children because Father was deployed and no one was available to care for the children. Following a hearing, the juvenile court found true: (1) Mother failed to provide adequate care and shelter for the children because the home was found to be filthy, creating a hazard due to dirty clothing, trash, feces and lack of provisions, which placed the children at substantial risk of serious physical harm; (2) Mother had an untreated substance abuse issue that prevented her from being able to adequately parent the children, and marijuana was within reach of the children; (3) Mother had been diagnosed with ADHD, anxiety, depression and other mental health issues, Mother had failed to take medication since it was stolen, and if her mental health issues were left untreated, she placed the children at risk of serious physical harm; (4) and Father failed to protect the children from Mother’s behavior, and he knew or should have known the dangers to which they were exposed while under her care. An allegation that Father was deployed and unable to make appropriate arrangements for the children was found not true. After review of the juvenile court record, the Court of Appeal was satisfied substantial evidence was presented to support removal of the children from the parents' custody. View "In re G.C." on Justia Law

A transmutation that does not meet the requirements of Family Code section 852 is voidable, rather than void. After a married couple filed a fraud action against multiple defendants, husband filed for divorce and entered into a written marital property agreement with wife, characterizing any recovery in the fraud action as the separate property of each spouse. The judgment was entered against defendants in the fraud action, but husband filed for bankruptcy prior to enforcement of the judgment. The fraud defendants entered into a settlement with the bankruptcy trustee, and moved to stay collection proceedings brought by wife in the fraud action. The trial court granted the protective order.The Court of Appeal held that defendants were not parties to the marital property agreement, and thus they cannot rely on section 852 to invalidate the agreement. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings to determine the effect of the marital property agreement under ordinary rules of contract interpretation. View "Safarian v. Govgassian" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional orders concerning seven of Mother's children. Leslie is the presumed father of the four older children and Edward is the presumed father of the three younger children.The court held that the juvenile court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). In this case, California was the children's home state for purposes of the UCCJEA, and thus California courts have jurisdiction to make an initial child custody determination. The court also held that the duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 were not met with respect to Edward's side of the family, but were met with respect to Mother's and Leslie's side of the family. View "In re Austin J." on Justia Law

The sole issue in this appeal was how to allocate the value of a Rancho Cucamonga residential property lived in by plaintiff-respondent Jodie Mohler and defendant-appellant Greg Mohler during their marriage. Greg entered the marriage owning a home that the parties lived in as spouses for over 12 years. The parties agreed that application of the "Moore/Marsden" rule through the date of their separation resulted in the community beneficially owning 33.66 percent of the property. However, by the time of their dissolution trial, the husband had lived in the property for more than six years post-separation, paying the mortgage with his separate income. At the wife’s request, the trial court found that the community’s interest in the property continued to increase throughout those years, just as if community funds had been used to pay the mortgage during that time, resulting in the community obtaining a 64.9 percent interest in the property. The Court of Appeal concluded that was error: the Moore/Marsden rule applied only insofar as community funds were used to build equity in an asset, a situation which often terminates, as it did here, upon separation. "Watts" charges equitably compensate the community for one spouse’s use of a community-owned home. Therefore, as a matter of first impression, the Court held Watts charges could be levied against a spouse for his or her post-separation occupation of a property where the property is not entirely community property, but rather was treated as partially community property due to the Moore/Marsden rule. The trial court's judgment was vacated and the matter remanded for the proper application of Moore/Marsden and calculation of any Watts charges. View "Marriage of Mohler" on Justia Law

Jennifer and Shane are the parents of a daughter they have jointly parented since her birth in 2009. In 2017, 10 years after a “dating” relationship ended, Jennifer sought a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) from the San Francisco County Superior Court, stating that Shane “has been verbally abusive and physically violent with me since I met him … our daughter is the product of a rape … having endured his abuse for many years, abuse which continues.”The court denied the request for a DVRO, dissolved a temporary restraining order, and explained the bases of its determinations at considerable length. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding a finding that one of Shane’s alleged prior acts, punching a refrigerator close to Jennifer’s head, did not constitute “abuse” under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. The court reasoned that the issue was credibility and deferred to the trial court’s finding that the act was not “an intentional or reckless act that causes or attempts to cause bodily injury.” The court rejected an argument that gender bias disqualified the judge as a matter of due process. “An objective assessment of Judge Darwin’s conduct reveals it to be exemplary in every respect.” View "Jennifer K. v. Shane K." on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that defendants interfered with her relationship with her mother, Lucy, by unduly influencing Lucy and distorting her understanding and perception of plaintiff such that Lucy would fully reject and exclude plaintiff from her life. Plaintiff further alleged that she suffered emotional harm from the deprivation of the society, care, and affection of her mother.The Court of Appeal agreed with the trial court that plaintiff's allegations failed to state a cause of action for intentional interference with parental consortium. The court explained that the Legislature amended the Civil Code to omit a cause of action for parental abduction, including by persuasion or enticement, and to bar claims for alienation of affection. In line with case precedent, the Legislature thereby removed from California law the right of action asserted by plaintiff. In this case, it was immaterial that plaintiff asserted her claims under multiple theories, including intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of parental consortium, elder abuse of plaintiff, and false light invasion of privacy, because all were based on allegations that defendants turned Lucy against plaintiff, and all harms flowed from Lucy's severing ties with plaintiff. Finally, the court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying a continuance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Tarin v. Lind" on Justia Law

A.M. (Mother) appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating her parental rights as to her two children, 11-year-old A.M. and six-year-old J.T., Jr. In late 2017, DPSS received an immediate response referral with allegations of general neglect and sexual abuse. It was reported that Mother had allowed her two sons to go into a hotel room for hours with an 18-year-old male stranger who sexually abused them. After Mother discovered the sexual abuse, she failed to report the alleged crime to law enforcement. Instead, the suspect disclosed what he had done to his mother, who then drove the suspect to the police station to turn himself in. On appeal, Mother argued: (1) the order terminating her parental rights should have been reversed because the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) failed to comply with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) and with Welfare and Institutions Code section 224 et seq; and (2) all orders had to be reversed because the juvenile court failed to comply with the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) because California did not have subject matter jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal rejected Mother’s contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "In re A.M." on Justia Law