Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Appellant R.L., presumed father (father) of minor C.L. (the minor), appealed the juvenile court’s order terminating father’s parental rights and freeing the minor for adoption. The minor was removed from his parents through a protective custody warrant under Welfare and Institutions Code section 340. Father contended the Amador County Department of Social Services (the department) failed to comply with the initial inquiry requirements of California law implementing the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) because the department did not inquire of extended family members as to the minor’s Indian ancestry when he was removed. The Court of Appeal agreed with father and held that the duty to inquire of extended family members applied when removal is made via a section 340 protective custody warrant. Because the department failed to comply with this duty, remand was required. Remand was also required because father stated that his great-grandmother was full-blooded Cherokee at the detention hearing, triggering a duty of further inquiry into the minor’s Indian ancestry. This further inquiry duty was not satisfied. The Court therefore conditionally reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re C.L." on Justia Law

The juvenile court sustained the petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services alleging that Maira H. and Appellant, had a history of engaging in violent physical and verbal altercations in the presence of the children. At disposition the court declared the children dependents of the court, removed them from Appellant’s care and released them to Maira. Appellant appealed the December 2, 2021, findings and orders. Prior to Appellant’s filing of his opening brief on appeal, the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction and issued custody orders, based on the parents’ mediated agreement, providing for joint legal and physical custody of the children with their primary residence to be with Maira. The custody orders include a parenting plan that specifies a visitation schedule for Appellant and allows for additional visitation as agreed by both parents. Appellant did not appeal the order terminating jurisdiction or the custody orders. The Department contends termination of dependency jurisdiction moots Appellant’s appeal.   The Second Appellate District agreed with the Department and dismissed Appellant’s appeal as moot. The court explained that although Appellant is no doubt correct that the jurisdiction findings impacted the custody orders entered by the juvenile court, to provide Appellant with effective relief, the court would have to reverse not only the jurisdiction findings and disposition orders but also the orders terminating jurisdiction and determining visitation. Accordingly, the court explained that because he did not appeal the September 22, 2022, custody and visitation orders, those orders are not now before the court or otherwise subject to appellate review. View "In re Jose C." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from the five-year domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) issued against him at the request of his former spouse, Plaintiff. He contended the trial court abused its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO because the record does not demonstrate he engaged in conduct rising to the level of abuse under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA). Defendant also asserted the trial court erred by ordering him to change the beneficiary of the $4 million insurance policy he owns on Plaintiff’s life from himself to a charity of her choice. Lastly, Defendant argued that the trial court’s order awarding $200,000 in attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff as the prevailing party under section 6344 must also be reversed.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting Plaintiff’s request for a DVRO. In addition, the court rejected contentions regarding the life insurance policy. Thus, the court found that it has no reason to reverse the order awarding attorneys’ fees to Plaintiff. The court also concluded reversal is not required based on the denial of Defendant’s requests for a statement of decision. The court explained that Defendant has not shown that courts must apply an objective, reasonable person standard when deciding whether a person has “disturbed the peace of the other party” within the meaning of section 6320. Instead, the relevant inquiry is simply whether the person against whom the DVRO is sought engaged in “conduct that, based on the totality of the circumstances, destroyed the mental or emotional calm of the other party.” View "Parris J. v. Christopher U." on Justia Law

This is an appeal from post-judgment findings and an order determining the amount of attorney fees and sanctions payable by Appellant to ex-wife. The family court ordered Appellant to pay a total of $70,000 ($22,000 and $48,000) in attorney fees and costs in the nature of sanctions. Appellant appealed. He argued the trial court abused its discretion in ordering him to pay “excessive” attorney fees and “an egregious amount of sanctions as a result of ex-wife’s litigation.” He contends the trial court erred because he cooperated throughout the case, produced the accounting and documents requested, and “demonstrated willingness to settle.”   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that the record is replete with evidence demonstrating Deric’s steadfast, continued disregard of the court’s orders and the terms of the parties’ settlement agreement and judgment. He delayed listing the Oklahoma property for sale. He delayed providing an accounting of rental income received, along with bank statements, receipts, and proof of expenditures. He delayed paying court-ordered attorney fees and costs to his ex-wife and her counsel. The court explained that this warranted an imposition of attorney fees and costs in the nature of section 271 sanctions. The court found that there is no unreasonable financial burden on Appellant, as he has approximately $26,928 as his one-half of rental income and $102,000 in sale proceeds in his possession, which can be used to pay the attorney fees and sanctions award. View "Marriage of Rangell" on Justia Law

Jennifer and Alan Simonis were married for 27 years and separated in September 2015. While married the parties ran a farm where they grew crops, and they raised cattle. Jennifer bore some recordkeeping responsibility for the farm operations during the parties’ initial period of separation, and Alan maintained Jennifer was in control of accounting for marital assets for at least a month after the parties separated. But other than that early period of control over accounting records, between the date of separation and the date of trial on reserved issues to divide the community estate approximately five years later, Alan retained control of the three main non-real estate assets that belonged to the community: cash on hand, crop income from 2015 crops, and a herd of cattle ("TCB Herd"). In the time during which Alan controlled the assets, he commingled the cattle, cash, and income with his separate property. Alan also made payments on various community debts using commingled funds. At trial in 2020, the trial court looked to long-established precedent regarding the tracing of commingled assets during marriage, found that Alan had failed to meet his burden to trace his separate property interest in the cattle or his use of separate property to pay down community debts, and divided the bulk of the community estate accordingly. The court made no specific order regarding the value of the cash on hand or the 2015 crop income, but it noted the court’s continuing jurisdiction over unadjudicated assets and liabilities under Family Code section 2556 when ruling on posttrial motions. Alan appealed the trial court's judgment, arguing the trial court incorrectly interpreted and applied case law regarding how to characterize the separate and community interests in commingled assets and payments on community debts. Additionally, Alan argued the trial court ought to have determined the value of the non-real estate community assets at the date of separation. Finding no reversible error in the trial court's judgment, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Marriage of Simonis" on Justia Law

C.D. (Mother) appeals from the trial court’s post-judgment order granting a request from G.D. (Father) that she enroll their minor daughters in public school. Mother contends the order must be vacated because, without a change in custody, Father has no decision-making authority regarding their daughters’ education.   The Second Appellate District agreed with Mother and vacated the order. The court explained that A parent with “sole legal custody” has “the right and the responsibility to make the decisions relating to the health, education, and welfare of a child.” Here, Father requested a say in his daughters’ education by asking the trial court to order Mother to enroll them in public school. But because Mother has sole legal custody of the girls, Father has no right or responsibility concerning their education. To obtain those, Father had to secure joint legal custody by showing a significant change in circumstances. The court explained that the trial court erred when it granted Father’s request for an order directing Mother to send their daughters to public school. Prior to issuing such an order, the trial court was required to find that Father demonstrated a change in circumstances warranting modification of its initial custody order. Not making that finding was an abuse of discretion. View "Marriage of C.D. & G.D." on Justia Law

A.R. (Father) and S.R. (Mother) appealed from the juvenile court’s orders terminating their parental rights to three of their children, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1. Father’s sole claim, joined by Mother, is that because Stanislaus County Community Services Agency (agency) failed to conduct a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry into whether the children are or may be Indian children, the juvenile court erred when it found that the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) did not apply.   The Fifth Appellate District conditionally reversed the juvenile court’s finding that ICWA does not apply. The court explained that Section 224.2, subdivision (b), imposes on the county welfare department a broad duty to inquire whether a child placed into the temporary custody of the county under section 306 is or may be an Indian child. The court explained that at issue is whether a child taken into protective custody by warrant under section 340, subdivision (a) or (b) falls within the ambit of section 306, subdivision (a)(1). The court explained that based on the plain language of the statutes, it agrees with Delila D. that the answer is yes and, therefore, the inquiry mandated under section 224.2, subdivision (b), applies. The court further concluded that the juvenile court erred in finding the agency conducted a proper, adequate, and duly diligent inquiry and that the error is prejudicial, which necessitates a conditional reversal of the court’s finding that ICWA does not apply and a limited remand so that an inquiry that comports with section 224.2, subdivision (b), may be conducted. View "In re Jerry R." on Justia Law

G.D. (Father) appealed the judgment approving the dissolution of his marriage to C.D. (Mother), granting her full custody of their minor daughters and barring all visitation. Father contends the custody and visitation orders attached to the judgment should be vacated. Father contends the custody and visitation orders should be vacated because there was insufficient evidence that he sexually abused F.D. and S.D. To him, only an evaluation conducted pursuant to section 3118 could provide the evidentiary basis necessary to permit the trial court to find that he abused his daughters.   The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that There are several problems with Father’s contentions. First, the trial court’s decision not to order a section 3118 evaluation was made, at least in part, at Father’s behest. Second, even if Father had not invited any error, he could not show prejudice. Third, no section 3118 evaluation was required here. If a trial court appoints a child custody evaluator and “determines that there is a serious allegation of child sexual abuse,” it must order a section 3118 evaluation. The court explained that the trial court below did not determine there had been a serious allegation of child sexual abuse. It was thus not required to order a section 3118 evaluation. Fourth, Section 3118 requires a trial court to order an evaluation when it appoints a child custody evaluator and determines there has been a serious allegation of child sexual abuse. But section 3118 also grants a court the discretion to order an evaluation when abuse allegations arise in other contexts. View "Marriage of C.D. & G.D." on Justia Law

In December 2019, the Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)(1) and (j)) regarding infant V.C., with allegations that his mother tested positive for methamphetamine at V.C.’s birth, resulting in V.C. experiencing withdrawal symptoms. A social worker had spoken with both parents, who each “denied any Native American ancestry.” Both parents completed and filed “Parental Notification of Indian Status” forms, checking the box: “I have no Indian ancestry as far as I know,” under penalty of perjury.In March 2020, the juvenile court found the allegations true, declared the children dependents, removed them from parental custody, and ordered reunification services, concluding that each child “is not an Indian child and no further notice is required under” the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) (25 U.S.C. 1901). In February 2021, the court terminated reunification services, set a section 366.26 hearing, and again concluded that ICWA did not apply. On remand for a new hearing concerning the beneficial relationship exception, the juvenile court again terminated parental rights, found “ICWA does not apply,” and identified adoption as the children’s permanent plan.The court of appeal conditionally reversed. The agency failed to comply with ICWA by not asking available extended family members about possible Indian ancestry. View "In re V.C." on Justia Law

Defendant-Mother appealed the juvenile court’s order denying her post-permanency Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition that asked the court to grant her reunification services with her thirteen-year-old son N.F. The juvenile court terminated its dependency jurisdiction over N.F. in January 2021 after appointing paternal uncle as his legal guardian. Mother does not contest the merits of the court’s denial of her section 388 petition. Rather, she argued the juvenile court’s legal guardianship order must be reversed because the court and the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (Department) did not comply with their initial inquiry duties under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law.The Second Appellate District affirmed. The court explained that Mother had the right to appeal from the court’s legal guardianship order, including the court’s implicit finding it continued to have no reason to know N.F. was an Indian child and the Department had satisfied its duty of ICWA inquiry. However, the time to so do expired many months ago. The court explained that Mother cannot now use her appeal from her post-permanency section 388 petition to challenge the legal guardianship order and findings made at the section 366.26 hearing—including the finding that ICWA did not apply. Further, the court explained that as the juvenile court did not vacate its order terminating its dependency jurisdiction over N.F. when it heard Mother’s section 388 petition—and a section 300 petition was not being filed on N.F.’s behalf—the court’s and the Department’s continuing duty of inquiry under section 224.2 was not implicated. View "In re N.F." on Justia Law