Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This case presented two issues for the Court of Appeals' review: (1) whether the nonmarital biological child of an absentee father who never openly held her out as his own have standing under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.60 to sue for his wrongful death if she failed to obtain a court order declaring paternity during his lifetime?; and (2) if she did not have standing, did section 377.60 violate the state or federal equal protection clauses? Upon the specific facts of this case, the Court concluded the child did not have standing, and there was no equal protection violation. "We cannot imagine the Legislature intended to confer wrongful death standing on a child who had no relationship whatsoever with the decedent to the exclusion of the decedent’s other family members with whom he did have a relationship." View "Stennett v. Miller" on Justia Law

In 1986, Mother’s first child was detained at birth after mother and child tested positive for marijuana and cocaine. The pattern continued for 30 years: each of Mother’s six children would be removed from her care—sometimes several times—based on Mother's substance abuse, inability to care for her children, and domestic violence in the household. Caden, born in 2009, was taken into protective custody in 2013 and was diagnosed with disruptive behavior disorder and PTSD, with symptoms of aggression, impairment of social relationships, tantrums, regressions, and emotional dysregulation. Mother failed to take advantage of numerous services. The juvenile court determined that Mother had established a beneficial relationship with Caden (Juvenile Code section 366.26(c)(1)(B)(i)), sufficient to justify a permanent plan of long-term foster care rather than the statutorily preferred plan of adoption. The court of appeal reversed. Reliance on the beneficial relationship exception was an abuse of discretion. While Caden had a beneficial relationship with his mother, uncontroverted evidence established that long-term foster care posed risks of further destabilizing the vulnerable child, fostered unhealthy interactions, and robbed Caden of a stable and permanent home with an exceptional caregiver. Caden has suffered years of trauma and instability as a result of Mother’sunresolved substance abuse and mental health issues; her failure to seek treatment continued up to the permanency planning hearing. View "In re Caden C." on Justia Law

Penovatz and Rothert dissolved their marriage in 2006. Penovatz was to pay child support for Christopher, born in 1997, based on Penovatz having 69 percent timeshare with Christopher, and Rothert having 31 percent. The court ordered both parties to maintain health insurance coverage for Christopher. In 2007, the court modified Penovatz’s child support obligation, such that he owed $400 per month, based on the same time share percentages. Christopher’s primary residence was with Penovatz in Hollister. In 2010-2011, Rothert began living with Look in Carmel Valley; the two did not have a formal agreement requiring Rothert to contribute to living expenses. In 2011, Penovatz and Rothert agreed to change the custody arrangement so that Rothert and Look’s home became Christopher’s primary residence; they disagree as to whether they reached an agreement regarding child support. Apparently, statutory child support would have been over $1,500 per month. Penovatz continued to pay $400 per month and provide health insurance through Christopher's high school graduation. Look later testified that he was concerned Penovatz would detain Christopher, or remove Christopher to Serbia if Rothert persisted in seeking increased support. In 2015, Look sought reimbursement under Family Code section 39501 for funds he expended for Christopher. The court of appeal affirmed the rejection of his claim. Penovatz satisfied his child support obligation under the law. View "Look v. Penovatz" on Justia Law

In January 2013, the family court ordered respondent C.P. to pay monthly child support. From September 2013, through August 2017, C.P. was incarcerated in federal prison. Less than a month after his release, C.P. promptly filed a request for the court to adjust the child support arrears that accrued during his incarceration—which the parties and the family court handled under the then-current Family Code section 4007.5. (Stats. 2015, ch. 629, sec. 2, eff. Oct. 8, 2015). The court granted C.P.'s request over the objection of appellant San Diego County Department of Child Support Services (Department) The Court of Appeal determined the family court erred as a matter of law in granting C.P.'s request: “Given the unambiguous language in current section 4007.5 and the timing of C.P.'s child support order, incarceration, and request for adjustment of arrears, the statutory relief awarded is unavailable to C.P. under current section 4007.5.” Subdivision (f) expressly provided that the statute applied only to child support orders issued on or after October 8, 2015, and C.P.'s child support order under consideration was issued in January 2013. Furthermore, contrary to the family court's stated reasons, at the time of the repeal of former section 4007.5 (Stats. 2010, ch. 495, sec. 1), C.P. did not have a vested statutory right to have his support order adjusted, and current section 4007.5 did not contain a saving clause pursuant to which former section 4007.5 could have provided statutory protection for incarcerated child support obligors like C.P. However, the Court determined C.P.'s request could be read to have sought the adjustment in child support arrears under former section 4007.5, which was repealed as of July 1, 2015; but the parties did not brief and the trial court did not consider whether former section 4007.5 contains a saving clause that provides C.P. with a statutory basis on which to have obtained the requested relief. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal reversed the order granting C.P.'s request and remanded with directions to consider, as appropriate based on briefing to be requested, whether former section 4007.5 included a saving clause that allowed its application to C.P.'s request and, if so, whether C.P. made a sufficient showing for relief. View "County of San Diego Dept. of Child Support Services v. C.P." on Justia Law

C.W. was born in 2002. His father, Rusty, moved to Louisiana and started a new family. Before Rusty left, the four-year-old daughter of a friend had accused him of sexual abuse. Rusty had practically no contact with C.W. In Louisiana, Rusty was arrested on aggravated rape charges and spent 10 months in jail. Rusty admitted having sexual intercourse with a third minor, claiming it had been consensual. C.W. entered the child dependency system at age 10. During a “trial home visit” with Rusty, C.W. deteriorated, experiencing trouble in school, conflict with his father, sexual misbehavior and trouble with the law. Rusty sent C.W. to live in a Louisiana children’s group home at the urging of local law enforcement officials. Meanwhile, in California, C.W.'s mother, Heather, had overcome homelessness and drug addiction and become gainfully employed. Heather sought C.W.’s return. The Sonoma County juvenile court terminated his dependency case when C.W. was 16, awarding sole legal and physical custody to Rusty. While an appeal was pending, Louisiana authorities removed C.W., on an emergency basis, from Rusty’s custody, and sent C.W. to California. The court of appeal reversed, first noting that under the Uniform Child Custody Enforcement Act, California has continuing, exclusive jurisdiction over the permanent disposition of C.W.’s custody. The juvenile court abused its discretion. Rusty participated in barely any reunification services, engaged in no sexual abuse counseling, and lives far from local child welfare officials. View "In re C.W." on Justia Law

Husband appealed a restraining order issued under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA) commanding him, among other things, to stay at least 100 yards away from his wife and three children. The Court of Appeal held that the part of the restraining order prohibiting husband from posting anything about his divorce case on Facebook constituted an overbroad, invalid restraint on his freedom of speech. Accordingly, the court reversed that provision and directed the trial court to strike it from the restraining order.The court affirmed the restraining order in all other respects, holding that substantial evidence supported the trial court's abuse finding; husband forfeited his void for vagueness challenge to the DVPA; the restraining order properly included the adult daughter as a protected person; and the trial court properly ordered husband to participate in an anger management program as a restrained party under the DVPA. View "Molinaro v. Molinaro" on Justia Law

Husband co-founded DigiDesign before his 1989 marriage to Wife. They separated in 2009. In a dissolution action, the court applied the “Van Camp” formula to apportion the appreciation of the DigiDesign stock during the marriage and characterized that increased value as return on Husband’s separate property. The court found that Husband did not contribute to the growth of the business after the date of marriage. The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the use of the Van Camp approach to determine the reasonable value of the community’s services, allocate that amount to community property and the balance to separate property. While the trial court may have erred in finding Husband made no contribution to DigiDesign post-marriage, the record includes substantial evidence demonstrating his post-marriage contributions were not the chief factor in DigiDesign’s growth, despite the court’s seemingly contradictory findings. Substantial evidence also supported a finding that Husband’s DigiDesign salary during the marriage represented adequate compensation to the community so that the remaining increase in the stock value was Husband’s separate property. View "Brooks v. Brooks" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1993; in 2007 Wife sought dissolution. After the court declined to enforce a 2008 purported marital settlement Agreement, it held a 15-day trial, reconsidered its previous ruling and entered judgment incorporating the Agreement. On remand, the trial court rejected Husband’s request that the court value certain community assets as of the 2012/2013 trial date and assign certain real properties to him. The court ordered that the properties be appraised and sold; it characterized one property, “La Madrona,” as partially Husband’s separate property, despite the parties’ prior stipulation that it was a community asset subject to Husband’s right to reimbursement of separate property funds used for its purchase. The court found that Husband used presumptively community funds to make a $600,000 equalization payment to Wife under the Agreement, thus requiring Wife to reimburse Husband only half of that amount. Determining neither party to be credible, the court denied numerous other claims, including Husband’s request for Epstein credits based on his alleged payment of certain community expenses following the parties’ separation. The court of appeal upheld the order for appraisal and sale of the real properties, and the denial of Husband’s request for Epstein credits. Husband did not object in the trial court to the characterization of the $600,000 payment as being from a community source. The trial court erred in characterizing La Madrona as partially Husband’s separate property given the parties’ stipulation. View "Oliverez v. Oliverez" on Justia Law

This case involved a divorced, elderly couple who each requested a restraining order against the other. The trial court granted both requests and ex-husband appealed.The court affirmed and held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a domestic violence restraining order (DVRO) against ex-husband, because there was substantial evidence of his past acts toward ex-wife, which constituted threatening and harassing behavior; "dwelling" in Welfare and Institutions Code 15657.03, subdivision (b)(4)(B), encompasses the residence, i.e., apartment unit of the protected person, and not the entire apartment building; the trial court's issuance of the DVRO and elder abuse restraining order (EARO) did not amount to mutual restraining orders that required specific findings of fact; and, although ex-wife's attachment of a confidential custody evaluation report to her appellate belief was sanctionable conduct, the court refrained from imposing sanctions as it would create an unreasonable financial burden on her. View "Herriott v. Herriott" on Justia Law

Appellant C.T. (Mother) appealed an order changing primary physical custody of her minor son, A.B. to A.B.’s father, respondent R.B. (Father), in Arkansas. A.B. lived with Mother since his birth in 2006; Mother and Father separated in 2007. The trial court entered a final child custody order in 2010, with Mother’s home ordered A.B.’s primary residence. In 2011, Father moved from California to Arkansas and lived with his parents. In 2017, Mother and Father both requested sole physical custody of A.B. Mother contended Father failed to meet his burden of establishing that moving A.B. to Arkansas would not cause detriment to A.B., and that the change in physical custody was in A.B.’s best interests. After review of the specific facts of this case, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the child custody order awarding Father primary physical custody. View "In re the Marriage of C.T. and R.B." on Justia Law