Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In 2017, the Public Guardian sought to establish a conservatorship of the person for Minor, age 16, who was admitted to John Muir Behavioral Health Center. Minor had been placed in the care of Alameda County’s Child Protective Services (CPS) over a year earlier and suffered multiple involuntary hospitalizations. She presented at John Muir “with suicidal ideation and poor impulse control.” The court appointed the Public Guardian as Minor’s temporary conservator. Trial testimony indicated that Minor suffered from PTSD, heard voices telling her she had no reason to live, had threatened to smother her roommate, engaged in “superficial self-injury,” and missed a lot of school. The court of appeal affirmed the order appointing the Public Guardian as the conservator of her person under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act, Welf. & Inst. Code, 5000, rejecting arguments that the conservatorship investigator failed to conduct an investigation of all available alternatives to conservatorship; that the Public Guardian failed to prove she was gravely disabled; and that there was insufficient evidence to support her placement. There was sufficient evidence to support a finding of “grave disability” and that the placement was not more restrictive than necessary. View "Conservatorship of M.B." on Justia Law

Sally H. (Mother) appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to her child, E.H. Mother's sole claim on appeal was that the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to ensure that the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) fully complied with the inquiry and notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 and related law. Among other alleged errors, Mother contended the Agency failed to fulfill its duty to inquire of E.H.'s maternal great-grandmother, Sally Y.H., in order to obtain identifying information pertaining to Sally Y.H.'s father, and failed to provide notice of such information to an Indian tribe named the Tohono O'odham Nation. Mother further contended the failure to provide notice of Sally Y.H.'s father's identifying information to the Tohono O'odham Nation was prejudicial because he was likely the source of E.H.'s possible American Indian heritage. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother that, considering Sally Y.H.'s statement to the Agency that her paternal family had Tohono O'odham Nation heritage, the Agency had a duty to attempt to obtain Sally Y.H.'s father's identifying information and to provide notice of any such information obtained to the Tohono O'odham Nation. If Bruno Y. was Sally Y.H.'s father, and E.H.'s great-great-grandfather, the Agency failed to properly describe his ancestral relationship to E.H. on the notice provided to the Tohono O'odham Nation. Finally, given that Sally Y.H. told the Agency that her paternal family had heritage from the Tohono O'odham Nation, the Court could not conclude the Agency's errors were harmless. Accordingly, the trial court judgment was reversed for the limited purpose of having the Agency provide the Tohono O'odham Nation with proper notice of the proceedings in this case. View "In re E.H." on Justia Law

D.Y. appealed the juvenile court's termination of dependency jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal relied on its independent review and rejected D.Y.'s contention that Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(a) and In re Joshua S., (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1341, obligated the juvenile court to retain dependency jurisdiction in this case. The court held, however, that in the context of this long-running case, in which maintenance of the status quo had been the norm for 16 years and remained the recommendation of DCFS, it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to abruptly terminate jurisdiction without alerting all of the interested parties to that possibility. Accordingly, the court reversed the juvenile court's judgment. View "In re D.Y." on Justia Law

Nineteen-year-old M.W. was a nonminor dependent of the court until it terminated dependency jurisdiction over him in August 2017. One of the acceptable living arrangements for nonminor dependents was a “‘[s]upervised independent living placement’” (SILP). The court terminated dependency jurisdiction over M.W. because he had moved in with a former foster mother, and the court believed a former caregiver’s home could not qualify as a SILP. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred: "Nothing in the law disqualifies a former caregiver’s home as a SILP. Even the document on which plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), relied for its argument—a form developed by the California Department of Social Services—does not disqualify a former caregiver’s home." The Court determined the error was prejudicial to M.W. and therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider whether to retain or terminate dependency jurisdiction. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

Married in 1996, the parties had four children between 1997 and 2008. Patricia, previously a nurse, stayed home to raise their children. The couple separated in 2010. In 2012, John became Chief Technology Officer for the Lending Club. His compensation includes a base salary; an annual performance bonus (around half of his base pay); and stock option grants. A judgment of dissolution was entered in December 2012. John was to pay a base monthly spousal support, plus 12.5 percent of John’s earnings over his annual base salary, up to $1,200,000, plus $5,200 per month in base child support and 14 percent of his earnings over his annual base salary as “bonus” support, plus "necessary” education expenses, and uncovered medical expenses. John’s stock options started to vest in 2013; John’s income more than tripled from 2012 to 2014. In 2014, John paid $32,000 per month in child support. John sought to cap his income for calculating bonus child support at $1.2 million per year. The court granted the motion under Family Code 4057(a)(3)’s extraordinarily high earner provision. The court of appeal reversed. Section 4058(a)(1) includes all compensation that is available to the employee; available compensation from stock options should be included in gross income, regardless of whether the parent elects to exercise the option. The trial court applied the incorrect legal standards in determining the “needs of the children” (section 4057(a)(3)), and failed to provide required explanatory findings (section 4056(a)). View "In re: Marriage of Macilwaine" on Justia Law

T.B. and L.B. appealed findings and orders adjudicating their younger son a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(j), and removing him from their custody under section 361(c)(1). T.B. and L.B. had two sons, six-year-old Jordan, and two-year-old D.B. A teacher noticed Jordan bleeding through his jeans; examination revealed numerous linear marks, mainly on his right thigh, in different stages of healing. When questioned, L.B. said T.B. had given Jordan a beating. The parents said they routinely disciplined Jordan by hitting him with a belt or by making him exercise. L.B. and T.B. each said they were disciplined in a similar manner when they were growing up and, in later interviews, described childhoods with significant physical, and in L.B.'s case, sexual abuse. They physically disciplined Jordan approximately four times a month using a belt. T.B. said he kept the buckle in his hand, folded the belt, and hit Jordan between five and 15 times, depending on the situation. T.B. did not believe it was appropriate to hit a child with a broom or other household item, but believed it was appropriate to hit a child for two to five minutes. The child should be told why he was being hit. The parents denied using physical discipline on D.B., who was then 18 months old. D.B. did not have any bruises, marks or injuries. A pediatric child abuse specialist determined Jordan's injuries were consistent with inflicted child abuse. The pattern of injuries on his body indicated he was hit with a belt and belt buckle. The parents did not challenge findings and orders under sections 300(a) and 361, made on behalf of Jordan, but they contended there was not substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for D.B. Finding substantial evidence to support the dispositional findings and orders, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's order terminating mother's parental rights to J.W. and freeing J.W. for adoption. The court held that the trial court reasonably concluded that J.W. was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time by his prospective adoptive parents or some other family. The court rejected the notion that a child suffering from Reactive Attachment Disorder was unadoptable. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that continuing the parent-child relationship did not outweigh the permanency and stability of an adoptive placement that J.W. so badly needed. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed a child custody order awarding child custody jointly to mother and father. The court explained that Family Code section 3044 requires family courts to make specific findings, in writing or on the record, about seven factors, including whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a batterer's treatment program. In this case, conduct of counsel -- repeatedly interrupting -- terminated the hearing while the family court was in the middle of stating its reasons. Therefore, the court remanded for the family court to hold a new hearing and to provide the statement of specific reasons for its decision. View "Jaime G. v. H.L." on Justia Law

H.S. and James E. appealed an order terminating parental rights to their son, Collin E. In July 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (b) on behalf of the 13-month-old Collin. The petition alleged Collin's mother, H.S., had left him unattended in her car while she was under the influence of a prescription narcotic medication. Police officers arrested H.S. for willful cruelty to a child and being under the influence. H.S. told officers she had taken 50 mg of morphine prescribed for pain caused by a brain tumor. The Agency alleged Collin had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness due to his parents' inability to provide adequate care. James (father) and H.S. argued there was no substantial evidence to support the Indian Child Welfare Act finding that continued custody of the child by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. They also argued the juvenile court erred when it determined the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply and terminated parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Collin E." on Justia Law

In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals addressed whether Family Code section 4504(b) required derivative benefits received by the child of a disabled parent to be credited against a noncustodial obligor's child support. In this case, the Social Security Administration (SSA) took six years to approve Father's application. In 2015, it made a lump-sum payment for past-due derivative benefits to custodial parent Y.H. (Mother), as Daughter's representative payee. In the intervening six years, Father had continued to pay child support and was not in arrears. The Court of Appeals held section 4504 (b) indeed permitted retroactive child support credit from Daughter's lump-sum payment where there was no child support arrearage. View "Y.H. v. M.H." on Justia Law