Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

In August 2009, Tonya and Donald Pearson dissolved their marriage and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) in which they agreed to the division of their marital assets and that Donald would provide ongoing spousal support to Tonya. Despite this, the parties engaged in extensive litigation over the course of the next six years. Tonya appealed a superior court postjudgment order deciding various requests for orders to modify spousal support, adjudicate omitted assets, and award sanctions or attorney's fees. Tonya argued: (1) the superior court erred in concluding the term "bonus" in the MSA did not include certain restricted stock and relocation monies; (2) the court erred by placing a cap on the amount of Donald's future bonuses available for support; (3) the court erred in determining that she had the ability to work; (4) erred in awarding Donald attorney's fees in the form of sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 2711; and (5) erred by denying her request for additional needs-based attorney's fees pursuant to section 2030. With respect to most of these rulings, we conclude the court did not err. With respect to the orders modifying spousal support, the Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly determined that Donald's increase in bonus pay constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of spousal support, but that substantial evidence did not support certain of the court's findings regarding Tonya's ability to work. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for limited further proceedings. View "Marriage of Pearson" on Justia Law

In August 2009, Tonya and Donald Pearson dissolved their marriage and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) in which they agreed to the division of their marital assets and that Donald would provide ongoing spousal support to Tonya. Despite this, the parties engaged in extensive litigation over the course of the next six years. Tonya appealed a superior court postjudgment order deciding various requests for orders to modify spousal support, adjudicate omitted assets, and award sanctions or attorney's fees. Tonya argued: (1) the superior court erred in concluding the term "bonus" in the MSA did not include certain restricted stock and relocation monies; (2) the court erred by placing a cap on the amount of Donald's future bonuses available for support; (3) the court erred in determining that she had the ability to work; (4) erred in awarding Donald attorney's fees in the form of sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 2711; and (5) erred by denying her request for additional needs-based attorney's fees pursuant to section 2030. With respect to most of these rulings, we conclude the court did not err. With respect to the orders modifying spousal support, the Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly determined that Donald's increase in bonus pay constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of spousal support, but that substantial evidence did not support certain of the court's findings regarding Tonya's ability to work. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for limited further proceedings. View "Marriage of Pearson" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged a post-judgment order denying his motion to terminate spousal support of his former wife. The wife did not file any opposition and did not appear at the hearing on the motion; she filed an income and expense declaration prior to the hearing; but she did not serve it to appellant. The trial court initially did not consider the wife's declaration but, after the hearing, relied on the declaration in making its ruling. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court should not have considered the wife's declaration without an opportunity for cros-examination. The court explained that, absent that declaration, the record contained no information about the wife's current circumstances from which the trial court could make an assessment of the factors the trial court was required to consider in determining whether to continue spousal support. In this case, appellant met his burden of showing changed circumstances and, absent evidence of a continuing need, the trial court abused its discretion in continuing his spousal support obligations. View "Marriage of Swain" on Justia Law

Father appealed from the juvenile court's order of dependency over the child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the child and thus reversed the juvenile court's order as to the father. In this case, there was no evidence that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing that the domestic violence between mother and father was on-going or likely to continue. View "In re E.D." on Justia Law

Alameda County Social Services recommended termination of the parental rights of Mother so that her son, Christian, could be adopted by Christian’s paternal grandmother and her husband, who live in Denmark. The juvenile court agreed, selecting adoption as the permanent plan, and ordered a case plan calling for Christian to undergo weekly therapy. Because of delays and scheduling issues, Christian attended fewer sessions than planned. In the meantime, his grandparents visited Christian several times in the U.S. Christian was upset when his visits with his mother were suspended and he was informed that he would be moving to Denmark. At a post-permanency review hearing, Christian’s counsel argued that Christian needed additional services to prepare for the move and that a planned trip should be delayed; the court nonetheless approved an extended trip to Denmark, while agreeing that Christian would benefit from additional therapy. In the meantime, the court of appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights because Mother had met her burden of establishing the beneficial-relationship exception to adoption. The court of appeal then concluded that approving the trip was proper under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(g) to protect Christian’s stability and to facilitate and expedite his adoption. View "In re Christian K." on Justia Law

In August 2009, Tonya and Donald Pearson dissolved their marriage and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) in which they agreed to the division of their marital assets and that Donald would provide ongoing spousal support to Tonya. Despite this agreement, the parties engaged in extensive litigation, primarily initiated by Tonya, over the course of the next six years. Tonya appealed a postjudgment superior court order deciding various requests for orders to modify spousal support, adjudicate omitted assets, and award sanctions or attorney's fees. With respect to the orders modifying spousal support, the Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly determined that Donald's increase in bonus pay constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of spousal support, but that substantial evidence does not support certain of the court's findings regarding Tonya's ability to work. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for limited further proceedings. View "Marriage of Pearson" on Justia Law

The law requires an officiant to return the marriage license to the county; however, noncompliance by a nonparty does not necessarily invalidate an otherwise lawful marriage. Nor was the marriage invalidated by the parties' conduct in keeping the license or claiming "single" status to tax authorities and a bank. In this case, after three years of dating and cohabitation, appellant and respondent applied for a confidential marriage license and exchanged vows at a solemnization ceremony. For personal and financial reasons, the parties did not return the signed license to the county. Respondent filed for dissolution four years later, but appellant moved to quash on the ground that she and respondent were not married. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to quash. The court held that once the parties secured a license from the county, exchanged vows at a solemnization ceremony, and the license was authenticated, the parties were married. View "Chaney v. Netterstrom" on Justia Law

Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law