Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

S.K. was born with methamphetamine in his system and, after defendant-appellant, R.B. (mother), absconded with him, he was hospitalized with toxic levels of oxycodone in his system. The juvenile court removed S.K. from mother based on her untreated substance abuse. On appeal, mother challenged the court’s finding that the social worker exercised due diligence in conducting an investigation “to identify, locate, and notify” S.K.’s relatives of his removal. In April 2017, DPSS filed a petition alleging that (1) S.K. tested positive for methamphetamine and opiates at birth, and approximately a month later, he suffered a seizure and had high levels of oxycodone in his system, (2) mother had an extensive and untreated history of abusing controlled substances, (3) father’s whereabouts were unknown and he had failed to provide for S.K., and (4) mother failed to cooperate with preplacement preventative services. Department of Public Social Services attempted to locate all persons identified by mother, and the trial court found "based upon the limited information we have gathered from the mother thus far, will make a finding that [DPSS] is actively working towards relative assessments if there are any available. The duty is ongoing. It does not end simply because we had a hearing denying services to one side or offering services or other [sic]. [DPSS] must continue to do so.” Mother argued the trial court abused its discretion in finding DPSS exercised due diligence in trying to locate relatives for placement of S.K. The Court of Appeal disagreed: "Mother’s own conduct held back the investigation." Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the child's removal. View "In re S.K." on Justia Law

In April 2016, M.H. was born with a positive toxicology screening for methamphetamine and cocaine; his mother has a history of substance abuse and psychiatric illness. The identity of his father was unknown. Days later, M.H. was placed in the foster home where he remains. M.H.’s great-aunt E.W., who resides in Minnesota, expressed an interest in having M.H. placed with her. Mother’s services were terminated and E.W’s home was approved. The court granted the foster parents the status of de facto parents.The agency report described M.H. as a happy child with a positive relationship with his foster family; during five visits, the child was comfortable with E.W., who is 66 and has raised five children and has close ties to her extended family. The child welfare worker opined that with proper services M.H. would overcome the grieving process and settle into his new placement and that he had considered culture, heritage, and family connections. M.H. is African-American and his foster family is not. The court of appeal affirmed a ruling in favor of the foster family, rejecting an argument that the court disregarded the statutory preference for relative placement (Welf. & Inst. Code 361.3) in favor of the statutory preference for caretaker placement (section 366.26(k)). Neither preference applies; the trial court was best able to make the hard call of which placement was in M.H.’s best interests. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

In April 2016, M.H. was born with a positive toxicology screening for methamphetamine and cocaine; his mother has a history of substance abuse and psychiatric illness. The identity of his father was unknown. Days later, M.H. was placed in the foster home where he remains. M.H.’s great-aunt E.W., who resides in Minnesota, expressed an interest in having M.H. placed with her. Mother’s services were terminated and E.W’s home was approved. The court granted the foster parents the status of de facto parents.The agency report described M.H. as a happy child with a positive relationship with his foster family; during five visits, the child was comfortable with E.W., who is 66 and has raised five children and has close ties to her extended family. The child welfare worker opined that with proper services M.H. would overcome the grieving process and settle into his new placement and that he had considered culture, heritage, and family connections. M.H. is African-American and his foster family is not. The court of appeal affirmed a ruling in favor of the foster family, rejecting an argument that the court disregarded the statutory preference for relative placement (Welf. & Inst. Code 361.3) in favor of the statutory preference for caretaker placement (section 366.26(k)). Neither preference applies; the trial court was best able to make the hard call of which placement was in M.H.’s best interests. View "In re M.H." on Justia Law

In 2016, Mother, who is intellectually disabled, was raising boys, ages eight, four and two, single-handedly. The San Francisco Human Services Agency learned Mother had not been giving the eldest boy medications he needed for severe asthma, eczema, and environmental allergies. A home visit showed the children were living in unsanitary conditions. All three were detained, jurisdiction was assumed, and reunification services were ordered for Mother. Services were terminated for Mother in November 2017, and the court set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26. Mother claimed she was not provided reasonable reunification services. The court granted Mother’s petition for relief. There was not substantial evidence the Agency had provided or offered reasonable services to Mother designed to address her special needs. Mother was wait-listed for a significant time on critical components of her case plan—individual therapy, in-home counseling, and parenting education—and was provided no assistance with in-home support services, anger management or housing. View "T.J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In 2016, Mother, who is intellectually disabled, was raising boys, ages eight, four and two, single-handedly. The San Francisco Human Services Agency learned Mother had not been giving the eldest boy medications he needed for severe asthma, eczema, and environmental allergies. A home visit showed the children were living in unsanitary conditions. All three were detained, jurisdiction was assumed, and reunification services were ordered for Mother. Services were terminated for Mother in November 2017, and the court set a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26. Mother claimed she was not provided reasonable reunification services. The court granted Mother’s petition for relief. There was not substantial evidence the Agency had provided or offered reasonable services to Mother designed to address her special needs. Mother was wait-listed for a significant time on critical components of her case plan—individual therapy, in-home counseling, and parenting education—and was provided no assistance with in-home support services, anger management or housing. View "T.J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

In a complex custody proceeding involving two states and three different venues, N.S. (Mother) appealed the denial of her motion to recover attorney's fees, travel expenses, and childcare costs from D.M. (Father) associated with the parties' litigation in Santa Clara County, California and Illinois. She claimed she incurred expenses in both places to challenge Father's Illinois petitions and return the custody case to Santa Clara County, where the initial custody determination was made. On appeal, she argued the trial court erred in denying expenses under Family Code sections 7605 (a) and 3452 (a). After review, the Court of Appeal determined Mother was not entitled to recover expenses under section 3452, but she could seek a need-based fee and cost award under section 7605. Therefore, the Court vacated the order and remanded for the trial court to consider her request under that statute. View "N.S. v. D.M." on Justia Law

In August 2009, Tonya and Donald Pearson dissolved their marriage and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) in which they agreed to the division of their marital assets and that Donald would provide ongoing spousal support to Tonya. Despite this, the parties engaged in extensive litigation over the course of the next six years. Tonya appealed a superior court postjudgment order deciding various requests for orders to modify spousal support, adjudicate omitted assets, and award sanctions or attorney's fees. Tonya argued: (1) the superior court erred in concluding the term "bonus" in the MSA did not include certain restricted stock and relocation monies; (2) the court erred by placing a cap on the amount of Donald's future bonuses available for support; (3) the court erred in determining that she had the ability to work; (4) erred in awarding Donald attorney's fees in the form of sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 2711; and (5) erred by denying her request for additional needs-based attorney's fees pursuant to section 2030. With respect to most of these rulings, we conclude the court did not err. With respect to the orders modifying spousal support, the Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly determined that Donald's increase in bonus pay constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of spousal support, but that substantial evidence did not support certain of the court's findings regarding Tonya's ability to work. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for limited further proceedings. View "Marriage of Pearson" on Justia Law

In August 2009, Tonya and Donald Pearson dissolved their marriage and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) in which they agreed to the division of their marital assets and that Donald would provide ongoing spousal support to Tonya. Despite this, the parties engaged in extensive litigation over the course of the next six years. Tonya appealed a superior court postjudgment order deciding various requests for orders to modify spousal support, adjudicate omitted assets, and award sanctions or attorney's fees. Tonya argued: (1) the superior court erred in concluding the term "bonus" in the MSA did not include certain restricted stock and relocation monies; (2) the court erred by placing a cap on the amount of Donald's future bonuses available for support; (3) the court erred in determining that she had the ability to work; (4) erred in awarding Donald attorney's fees in the form of sanctions pursuant to Family Code section 2711; and (5) erred by denying her request for additional needs-based attorney's fees pursuant to section 2030. With respect to most of these rulings, we conclude the court did not err. With respect to the orders modifying spousal support, the Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly determined that Donald's increase in bonus pay constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of spousal support, but that substantial evidence did not support certain of the court's findings regarding Tonya's ability to work. Therefore, the Court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for limited further proceedings. View "Marriage of Pearson" on Justia Law

Appellant challenged a post-judgment order denying his motion to terminate spousal support of his former wife. The wife did not file any opposition and did not appear at the hearing on the motion; she filed an income and expense declaration prior to the hearing; but she did not serve it to appellant. The trial court initially did not consider the wife's declaration but, after the hearing, relied on the declaration in making its ruling. The Court of Appeal held that the trial court should not have considered the wife's declaration without an opportunity for cros-examination. The court explained that, absent that declaration, the record contained no information about the wife's current circumstances from which the trial court could make an assessment of the factors the trial court was required to consider in determining whether to continue spousal support. In this case, appellant met his burden of showing changed circumstances and, absent evidence of a continuing need, the trial court abused its discretion in continuing his spousal support obligations. View "Marriage of Swain" on Justia Law