Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

D.Y. appealed the juvenile court's termination of dependency jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal relied on its independent review and rejected D.Y.'s contention that Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(a) and In re Joshua S., (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1341, obligated the juvenile court to retain dependency jurisdiction in this case. The court held, however, that in the context of this long-running case, in which maintenance of the status quo had been the norm for 16 years and remained the recommendation of DCFS, it was an abuse of discretion for the juvenile court to abruptly terminate jurisdiction without alerting all of the interested parties to that possibility. Accordingly, the court reversed the juvenile court's judgment. View "In re D.Y." on Justia Law

Nineteen-year-old M.W. was a nonminor dependent of the court until it terminated dependency jurisdiction over him in August 2017. One of the acceptable living arrangements for nonminor dependents was a “‘[s]upervised independent living placement’” (SILP). The court terminated dependency jurisdiction over M.W. because he had moved in with a former foster mother, and the court believed a former caregiver’s home could not qualify as a SILP. The Court of Appeal determined the trial court erred: "Nothing in the law disqualifies a former caregiver’s home as a SILP. Even the document on which plaintiff and respondent, San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS), relied for its argument—a form developed by the California Department of Social Services—does not disqualify a former caregiver’s home." The Court determined the error was prejudicial to M.W. and therefore reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider whether to retain or terminate dependency jurisdiction. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law

Married in 1996, the parties had four children between 1997 and 2008. Patricia, previously a nurse, stayed home to raise their children. The couple separated in 2010. In 2012, John became Chief Technology Officer for the Lending Club. His compensation includes a base salary; an annual performance bonus (around half of his base pay); and stock option grants. A judgment of dissolution was entered in December 2012. John was to pay a base monthly spousal support, plus 12.5 percent of John’s earnings over his annual base salary, up to $1,200,000, plus $5,200 per month in base child support and 14 percent of his earnings over his annual base salary as “bonus” support, plus "necessary” education expenses, and uncovered medical expenses. John’s stock options started to vest in 2013; John’s income more than tripled from 2012 to 2014. In 2014, John paid $32,000 per month in child support. John sought to cap his income for calculating bonus child support at $1.2 million per year. The court granted the motion under Family Code 4057(a)(3)’s extraordinarily high earner provision. The court of appeal reversed. Section 4058(a)(1) includes all compensation that is available to the employee; available compensation from stock options should be included in gross income, regardless of whether the parent elects to exercise the option. The trial court applied the incorrect legal standards in determining the “needs of the children” (section 4057(a)(3)), and failed to provide required explanatory findings (section 4056(a)). View "In re: Marriage of Macilwaine" on Justia Law

T.B. and L.B. appealed findings and orders adjudicating their younger son a dependent of the juvenile court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(j), and removing him from their custody under section 361(c)(1). T.B. and L.B. had two sons, six-year-old Jordan, and two-year-old D.B. A teacher noticed Jordan bleeding through his jeans; examination revealed numerous linear marks, mainly on his right thigh, in different stages of healing. When questioned, L.B. said T.B. had given Jordan a beating. The parents said they routinely disciplined Jordan by hitting him with a belt or by making him exercise. L.B. and T.B. each said they were disciplined in a similar manner when they were growing up and, in later interviews, described childhoods with significant physical, and in L.B.'s case, sexual abuse. They physically disciplined Jordan approximately four times a month using a belt. T.B. said he kept the buckle in his hand, folded the belt, and hit Jordan between five and 15 times, depending on the situation. T.B. did not believe it was appropriate to hit a child with a broom or other household item, but believed it was appropriate to hit a child for two to five minutes. The child should be told why he was being hit. The parents denied using physical discipline on D.B., who was then 18 months old. D.B. did not have any bruises, marks or injuries. A pediatric child abuse specialist determined Jordan's injuries were consistent with inflicted child abuse. The pattern of injuries on his body indicated he was hit with a belt and belt buckle. The parents did not challenge findings and orders under sections 300(a) and 361, made on behalf of Jordan, but they contended there was not substantial evidence to support the jurisdictional and dispositional orders for D.B. Finding substantial evidence to support the dispositional findings and orders, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's order terminating mother's parental rights to J.W. and freeing J.W. for adoption. The court held that the trial court reasonably concluded that J.W. was likely to be adopted within a reasonable time by his prospective adoptive parents or some other family. The court rejected the notion that a child suffering from Reactive Attachment Disorder was unadoptable. The court held that substantial evidence supported the trial court's finding that continuing the parent-child relationship did not outweigh the permanency and stability of an adoptive placement that J.W. so badly needed. View "In re J.W." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed a child custody order awarding child custody jointly to mother and father. The court explained that Family Code section 3044 requires family courts to make specific findings, in writing or on the record, about seven factors, including whether the perpetrator has successfully completed a batterer's treatment program. In this case, conduct of counsel -- repeatedly interrupting -- terminated the hearing while the family court was in the middle of stating its reasons. Therefore, the court remanded for the family court to hold a new hearing and to provide the statement of specific reasons for its decision. View "Jaime G. v. H.L." on Justia Law

H.S. and James E. appealed an order terminating parental rights to their son, Collin E. In July 2015, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 (b) on behalf of the 13-month-old Collin. The petition alleged Collin's mother, H.S., had left him unattended in her car while she was under the influence of a prescription narcotic medication. Police officers arrested H.S. for willful cruelty to a child and being under the influence. H.S. told officers she had taken 50 mg of morphine prescribed for pain caused by a brain tumor. The Agency alleged Collin had suffered, or was at substantial risk of suffering, serious physical harm or illness due to his parents' inability to provide adequate care. James (father) and H.S. argued there was no substantial evidence to support the Indian Child Welfare Act finding that continued custody of the child by the parents was likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child. They also argued the juvenile court erred when it determined the beneficial parent-child relationship exception did not apply and terminated parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Collin E." on Justia Law

In an issue of first impression, the Court of Appeals addressed whether Family Code section 4504(b) required derivative benefits received by the child of a disabled parent to be credited against a noncustodial obligor's child support. In this case, the Social Security Administration (SSA) took six years to approve Father's application. In 2015, it made a lump-sum payment for past-due derivative benefits to custodial parent Y.H. (Mother), as Daughter's representative payee. In the intervening six years, Father had continued to pay child support and was not in arrears. The Court of Appeals held section 4504 (b) indeed permitted retroactive child support credit from Daughter's lump-sum payment where there was no child support arrearage. View "Y.H. v. M.H." on Justia Law

Husband appealed an order setting aside a default judgment that incorporated a marital settlement agreement (MSA). He contended the trial court erred by considering evidence not presented, submitted, or admitted at the hearing, in violation of Family Code section 217. He further argued the court erroneously relied upon an incorrect legal standard when it found the failure to complete preliminary and final disclosures provided sufficient grounds to vacate the judgment. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding that if husband disagreed with the court’s assessment, he should have stated his position on the record and requested the opportunity to present live testimony as authorized by section 217. Having failed to do so, the trial court did not err in allowing wife to “‘rest on the pleadings’” instead of presenting evidence. In deciding to set aside the judgment, the trial court found that husband failed to complete the preliminary and final disclosures, as evidenced by : (1) there were no supporting documents attached to the preliminary disclosure; (2) the stipulation was prepared by husband’s attorney; (3) wife never actually exchanged any documents with husband; (4) husband was unable to produce copies of the documents that support the preliminary disclosure; and (5) husband has over $400,000 in cash and checking accounts that was not disclosed in his income and expense declaration. Here, husband prepared the necessary preliminary declarations of disclosure; however, he failed to provide the supporting documentation. Wife never completed or exchanged any declarations of disclosure, despite executing the stipulation stating that she had done so. Given the lack of compliance with the statutory requirements, the stipulation was insufficient to act as a waiver of the final disclosure. The trial court therefore correctly concluded that there had been a mistake of fact by the parties regarding whether the statutory requirements had been satisfied, and properly vacated the judgment on that basis. View "In re Marriage of Binette" on Justia Law

Beginning in December 2006, plaintiffs made several loans to defendant Lee, who is You’s father. Lee defaulted. In July 2013, a judgment was entered against Lee for $1,143,576. No part of the debt has been paid. In October 2016, plaintiffs filed a complaint against Lee and You, seeking to set aside allegedly fraudulent conveyances and an accounting, claiming that in 2013, Lee paid $104,850 to Northeastern University for You’s tuition and other expenses, knowing that he had incurred, or would incur, debts beyond his ability to pay, intending to “hinder, delay, or defraud” his creditors, including plaintiffs. You contended Lee’s transfers were not fraudulent because they did not lack consideration and that You was not a beneficiary of the transfer, having received only the intangible benefits of an education. The court of appeal affirmed the dismissal of the complaint. Noting that there is no authority on whether creditors may attack college tuition payments as fraudulent transfers under the Uniform Voidable Transactions Act (Civ. Code 3439) the court reasoned that a parent can reasonably assume that paying for a child to obtain a degree will enhance the child's financial well-being which will, in turn, confer an economic benefit on the parent. View "Lo v. Lee" on Justia Law