Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Father appealed from the juvenile court's order of dependency over the child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1) (failure to protect). The court held that the evidence was insufficient to show a substantial risk of serious physical harm or illness to the child and thus reversed the juvenile court's order as to the father. In this case, there was no evidence that at the time of the jurisdictional hearing that the domestic violence between mother and father was on-going or likely to continue. View "In re E.D." on Justia Law

Alameda County Social Services recommended termination of the parental rights of Mother so that her son, Christian, could be adopted by Christian’s paternal grandmother and her husband, who live in Denmark. The juvenile court agreed, selecting adoption as the permanent plan, and ordered a case plan calling for Christian to undergo weekly therapy. Because of delays and scheduling issues, Christian attended fewer sessions than planned. In the meantime, his grandparents visited Christian several times in the U.S. Christian was upset when his visits with his mother were suspended and he was informed that he would be moving to Denmark. At a post-permanency review hearing, Christian’s counsel argued that Christian needed additional services to prepare for the move and that a planned trip should be delayed; the court nonetheless approved an extended trip to Denmark, while agreeing that Christian would benefit from additional therapy. In the meantime, the court of appeal reversed the order terminating parental rights because Mother had met her burden of establishing the beneficial-relationship exception to adoption. The court of appeal then concluded that approving the trip was proper under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.3(g) to protect Christian’s stability and to facilitate and expedite his adoption. View "In re Christian K." on Justia Law

In August 2009, Tonya and Donald Pearson dissolved their marriage and entered into a Marital Settlement Agreement (MSA) in which they agreed to the division of their marital assets and that Donald would provide ongoing spousal support to Tonya. Despite this agreement, the parties engaged in extensive litigation, primarily initiated by Tonya, over the course of the next six years. Tonya appealed a postjudgment superior court order deciding various requests for orders to modify spousal support, adjudicate omitted assets, and award sanctions or attorney's fees. With respect to the orders modifying spousal support, the Court of Appeal concluded the court correctly determined that Donald's increase in bonus pay constituted a change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of spousal support, but that substantial evidence does not support certain of the court's findings regarding Tonya's ability to work. The Court therefore affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the matter for limited further proceedings. View "Marriage of Pearson" on Justia Law

The law requires an officiant to return the marriage license to the county; however, noncompliance by a nonparty does not necessarily invalidate an otherwise lawful marriage. Nor was the marriage invalidated by the parties' conduct in keeping the license or claiming "single" status to tax authorities and a bank. In this case, after three years of dating and cohabitation, appellant and respondent applied for a confidential marriage license and exchanged vows at a solemnization ceremony. For personal and financial reasons, the parties did not return the signed license to the county. Respondent filed for dissolution four years later, but appellant moved to quash on the ground that she and respondent were not married. The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of the motion to quash. The court held that once the parties secured a license from the county, exchanged vows at a solemnization ceremony, and the license was authenticated, the parties were married. View "Chaney v. Netterstrom" on Justia Law

Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

Robert and Janice married in 1964; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received nothing. The trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed, contending: (1) under federal law, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to make any award to Janice based on Robert’s receipt of either veteran’s disability benefits or CRSC; (2) the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest; (3) the trial court erred by making its award of spousal support nonmodifiable; (4) because the judgment dividing the community property was long-since final, the trial court could not give Janice any remedy for the loss of her community property interest in the retired pay; (5) all of Robert's income was exempt, therefore could not be required to satisfy Janice's claim; and (6) Janice was not entitled to spousal support, and the trial court abused its discretion by finding otherwise. The Court of Appeal agreed federal law prohibited the trial court from compensating Janice, in the form of spousal support or otherwise, for the loss of her share of Robert’s retired pay. However, it could properly modify spousal support, provided it did so based on the relevant factors and not as compensation. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to hold a new trial on Janice’s request for a modification of spousal support. View "In re Marriage of Cassinelli" on Justia Law

Mother and Stepfather appealed the juvenile court's finding that Minor's biological father (Bio-Father) was a Kelsey S. father. The Court of Appeal held that the juvenile court's paternity finding was barred by collateral estoppel and reversed the juvenile court's finding that Minor had three parents; the juvenile court reasonably concluded that Minor would benefit from visits with Bio-Father, and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by ordering visitation; and the juvenile court reasonably concluded that there was a need for ongoing supervision. View "In re M.A." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's renewal of a domestic violence restraining order against defendant with whom plaintiff shared a minor child. The court held that the trial court was within its discretion to conclude that the totality of the evidence indicated it was more probable than not there was a sufficient risk of future abuse to find that plaintiff's apprehension was genuine and reasonable. Therefore, the trial court did not err in renewing the restraining order. The court also held that the trial court's order modifying the parenting plan to prohibit defendant from attending extracurricular activities during plaintiff's parenting time unless she gave him written permission was not vague and overbroad. Furthermore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in modifying the order where it implicitly considered the child's best interest. View "Rybolt v. Riley" on Justia Law

E.K. (Mother) appealed the termination of her parental rights as to her three children. A petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 was filed in 2016, as to three minors, then age three years, two years, and 20 months, respectively. The children’s father, R.R., died of a heroin overdose a month prior. The petition alleged that mother was unable to provide adequate care for the children and endangered them as a result of her abuse of controlled substances and her untreated mental health issues. The petition was sustained on June 15, 2016, and reunification services were ordered. Mother had overdosed on heroin several times before the petition was filed. She overdosed again in August 2016. Ultimately, reunification services were terminated. The children were placed in a prospective adoptive home. Parental rights were terminated on October 2, 2017. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on October 5, 2017. The sole issue Mother raised was lack of compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, or ICWA (25 U.S.C. 1901, et seq.), and with Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224 et seq. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother’s contention, and conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with those statutes. View "In re K.R." on Justia Law

Joseph Connolly appealed various orders entered during his long-running dispute with his ex-wife Diane Connolly over spousal and child support arrearages. Joseph challenged a 2015 order that denied his motion to terminate the jurisdiction of California courts over his support obligations and imposed interest, under California law, on a judgment of consolidated arrearages obtained in Utah. He also challenged a 2016 order that denied his motion to stay enforcement of the 2015 order. At the heart of his appeal, Joseph's claimed: (1) California lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders because the Utah judgment on arrearages was the “controlling order” under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA); and (2) by adding interest to the arrearages, California failed to grant full faith and credit to the Utah judgment, which did not include interest. The California Court of Appeal concluded that the judgment entered in Utah was not a controlling order under UIFSA, but nonetheless the trial court erred in adding California interest to this final money judgment. The Court reversed the portion of the 2015 order that purported to add interest to the Utah judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Connolly" on Justia Law