Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

E.K. (Mother) appealed the termination of her parental rights as to her three children. A petition pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 was filed in 2016, as to three minors, then age three years, two years, and 20 months, respectively. The children’s father, R.R., died of a heroin overdose a month prior. The petition alleged that mother was unable to provide adequate care for the children and endangered them as a result of her abuse of controlled substances and her untreated mental health issues. The petition was sustained on June 15, 2016, and reunification services were ordered. Mother had overdosed on heroin several times before the petition was filed. She overdosed again in August 2016. Ultimately, reunification services were terminated. The children were placed in a prospective adoptive home. Parental rights were terminated on October 2, 2017. Mother filed a timely notice of appeal on October 5, 2017. The sole issue Mother raised was lack of compliance with the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, or ICWA (25 U.S.C. 1901, et seq.), and with Welfare and Institutions Code sections 224 et seq. The Court of Appeal agreed with Mother’s contention, and conditionally reversed and remanded for compliance with those statutes. View "In re K.R." on Justia Law

Joseph Connolly appealed various orders entered during his long-running dispute with his ex-wife Diane Connolly over spousal and child support arrearages. Joseph challenged a 2015 order that denied his motion to terminate the jurisdiction of California courts over his support obligations and imposed interest, under California law, on a judgment of consolidated arrearages obtained in Utah. He also challenged a 2016 order that denied his motion to stay enforcement of the 2015 order. At the heart of his appeal, Joseph's claimed: (1) California lacked jurisdiction to enter the orders because the Utah judgment on arrearages was the “controlling order” under the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA); and (2) by adding interest to the arrearages, California failed to grant full faith and credit to the Utah judgment, which did not include interest. The California Court of Appeal concluded that the judgment entered in Utah was not a controlling order under UIFSA, but nonetheless the trial court erred in adding California interest to this final money judgment. The Court reversed the portion of the 2015 order that purported to add interest to the Utah judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Connolly" on Justia Law

Minors N.C., P.G., J.G., and D.G. appealed orders denying the Imperial County Department of Social Services' petition to remove them from the care of their paternal aunt under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 387 and 361.3. Minors contended that in view of the court's finding that the three youngest children were diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive while in their aunt's care, the court erred in determining that continued placement with their aunt was appropriate and in their best interests. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the children to remain with a caregiver who failed to provide adequate food to them, causing serious injury to the health and well-being of the three youngest children. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

Minors N.C., P.G., J.G., and D.G. appealed orders denying the Imperial County Department of Social Services' petition to remove them from the care of their paternal aunt under Welfare and Institutions Code sections 387 and 361.3. Minors contended that in view of the court's finding that the three youngest children were diagnosed with nonorganic failure to thrive while in their aunt's care, the court erred in determining that continued placement with their aunt was appropriate and in their best interests. The Court of Appeal agreed, concluding the trial court abused its discretion in ordering the children to remain with a caregiver who failed to provide adequate food to them, causing serious injury to the health and well-being of the three youngest children. View "In re J.G." on Justia Law

In 2014, W.S. filed a petition to establish a parental relationship, claiming to be daughter’s biological father. He stated he had a relationship with S.T., daughter’s mother, while she was married to, but separated from, her husband with whom she later reconciled. W.S. requested joint legal and physical custody, equal time visitation, and mediation to work out a parenting plan. He also requested daughter’s last name be changed. The trial court denied W.S.’s requests, finding he was not a presumed parent within the meaning of Family Code section 7611(d). The court of appeal affirmed, upholding the lower court’s determination that “receiving daughter into his home” under the statute required more than physically taking daughter into his home and required regular visitation and the assumption of parent-type obligations. The court also rejected W.S.’s argument that as daughter’s biological father, he had a right to visitation under section 3100 notwithstanding his failure to achieve status as a presumed parent. Equal protection challenges to the statute were “conclusory” and unsupported. View "W.S. v. S.T." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to R.H., an Indian child, and selecting adoption as his permanent plan. The court held that the juvenile court could implicitly conclude that the Tribe had no present interest in participating in the determination of R.H.'s permanent plan; R.H. has never had any contact with the Tribe and was bonded to his prospective adoptive parents, with whom he has lived since he was four months old; and there was good cause to depart from the Indian Child Welfare Act's, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., placement preferences. Furthermore, the court declined to consider Mother's proffered additional evidence. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile courts order terminating her parental rights to R.H., an Indian child, and selecting adoption as his permanent plan. The court held that the juvenile court could implicitly conclude that the Tribe had no present interest in participating in the determination of R.H.'s permanent plan; R.H. has never had any contact with the Tribe and was bonded to his prospective adoptive parents, with whom he has lived since he was four months old; and there was good cause to depart from the Indian Child Welfare Act's, 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., placement preferences. Furthermore, the court declined to consider Mother's proffered additional evidence. View "In re R.H." on Justia Law

Before marrying Claudia, Mathew downloaded a form and drafted a premarital agreement, describing Claudia's rights in real property owned by Matthew. Matthew retained attorney Chernick to represent Claudia. Chernick advised Matthew to seek independent legal counsel. Matthew stated he would represent himself. Chernick spoke to Claudia outside Matthew’s presence, revised the agreement and, on March 5, sent a red-lined version to both, containing additional provisions and stating that each party had had more than seven days to review the agreement before executing it. The parties signed a final version on March 6. Matthew executed a waiver of legal counsel. The parties separated. Claudia sought enforcement of the agreement. The court of appeal affirmed that the agreement was unenforceable under Family Code 1615(c)(2), because Matthew was not presented with the final version of the agreement at least seven days before its execution and, under Family Code 1615(c)(3), because Matthew had not been provided with a written advisement of the rights he was relinquishing and did not execute a waiver of those rights. When the evidence shows an unrepresented party to a premarital agreement was not provided with the seven-day review period, the agreement’s recitation that the review period was provided is not binding. Section 1615(c)(3) applies to an agreement that was initially generated by the unrepresented party. View "Marriage of Clarke & Akel" on Justia Law

Before marrying Claudia, Mathew downloaded a form and drafted a premarital agreement, describing Claudia's rights in real property owned by Matthew. Matthew retained attorney Chernick to represent Claudia. Chernick advised Matthew to seek independent legal counsel. Matthew stated he would represent himself. Chernick spoke to Claudia outside Matthew’s presence, revised the agreement and, on March 5, sent a red-lined version to both, containing additional provisions and stating that each party had had more than seven days to review the agreement before executing it. The parties signed a final version on March 6. Matthew executed a waiver of legal counsel. The parties separated. Claudia sought enforcement of the agreement. The court of appeal affirmed that the agreement was unenforceable under Family Code 1615(c)(2), because Matthew was not presented with the final version of the agreement at least seven days before its execution and, under Family Code 1615(c)(3), because Matthew had not been provided with a written advisement of the rights he was relinquishing and did not execute a waiver of those rights. When the evidence shows an unrepresented party to a premarital agreement was not provided with the seven-day review period, the agreement’s recitation that the review period was provided is not binding. Section 1615(c)(3) applies to an agreement that was initially generated by the unrepresented party. View "Marriage of Clarke & Akel" on Justia Law

Father appealed from the order terminating his parental rights to his daughters under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The Court of Appeal agreed with Father that there was an inadequate investigation of Mother's claim of Indian ancestry under the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. In this case, although the name of the tribe Mother identified did not directly correspond to that of a federally recognized Indian tribe, the Department failed to satisfy is affirmative obligation to interview family members and others who could be expected to have relevant information concerning the children's status, and the juvenile court failed to ensure an appropriate inquiry had been conducted before concluding ICWA did not apply to these proceedings. Accordingly, the court remanded to allow the Department and the juvenile court to remedy that violation. The court otherwise affirmed the order. View "In re Elizabeth M." on Justia Law