Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding over the child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b). The court held that the juvenile court's finding was not supported by substantial evidence where there was no evidence of past police raids, gang retaliation, nor shoot-outs in the home based on father's admitted gang membership and his possession of a firearm. Furthermore, the Department of Children and Family Services did not argue that evidence that one parent is a gang member, without more, can serve as a basis for taking jurisdiction of a child. View "In re C.V." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court's jurisdictional finding over the child under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and his removal from mother's custody. The court held that the Department of Children and Family Services failed to meet its burden of proof to demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence that mother had failed to adequately supervise or protect the child; to provide him with adequate food, clothing, shelter, or medical treatment; or to provide regular care for him. In this case, the juvenile court's finding that the child comes within the juvenile court's jurisdiction was not supported by substantial evidence. View "In re Joaquin C." on Justia Law

At a special hearing, the juvenile court issued a permanent restraining order prohibiting the child's stepfather from having any contact with the child (C.M.). The child's mother, E.S., appealed an order the juvenile court issued at the same hearing, directing the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) to immediately remove her child from her care if there is "any evidence that the minor has been exposed to [his stepfather] or if mother violates the restraining order." While the Court of Appeal appreciated the juvenile court's assessment of the need to warn E.S. in no uncertain terms there would be serious consequences if C.M. has any contact with the stepfather, the Court concluded issuing a conditional removal order was not the way to warn her. “Removal, including a temporary detention, must be made on a timely assessment of risk to the child. Here, the court may have informed E.S. about the potential legal consequences of exposing C.M. to [the stepfather], including removal from her custody and termination of parental rights. The court may have directed the Agency to immediately bring to its attention any evidence of contact between C.M. and [the stepfather] and to set a hearing to address the issue. However, the conditional removal order disregards the dependency scheme, which is carefully calculated, not only to protect the child, but also to guarantee procedural and substantive due process to the child and the parent.” View "In re C.M." on Justia Law

In September 2014, Andrew, less than one month old, was admitted to the hospital with a skull fracture, bilateral hematomas on both sides of the brain, diffused retinal hemorrhage in his right eye, and multiple old fractures of the ribs. Andrew and his five-year-old half-sibling were taken into custody. Andrew was placed with his maternal great-grandparents. After an extended contested hearing, the juvenile court concluded that Andrew’s father was responsible for the infant’s serious injuries and denied father reunification services. Father had admitted to causing Andrew’s injuries during a pretext phone call with Mother and had been arrested. Both parents subsequently continued to deny responsibility. Mother reunited with Father and claimed that she made the pretext call under duress. She sought to establish that Andrew’s injuries were congenital while Father asserted that the five-year-old might have hurt the baby. The juvenile court terminated mother’s reunification services with respect to Andrew and set a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. The court of appeal affirmed, concluding that substantial evidence supported the court’s jurisdictional findings and dispositional orders. Neither parent was even willing to acknowledge that nonaccidental injury occurred, conduct amounting to “a willful denial of the injuries themselves.” View "In re Madison S." on Justia Law

A child who seeks a declaration of paternity after her putative father is deceased presents a justiciable controversy when the child requests no financial remuneration. The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court's dismissal of plaintiff's paternity lawsuit, holding that plaintiff had standing to bring her suit. The court held that Family Code section 7630 contains no conditional requirement that the child express a pecuniary interest as a condition of the paternity suit. Nor does it contain an age limitation. The court reasoned that plaintiff's interest in identifying her father was independent of a claim for financial remuneration, afforded her standing, and demonstrated a justiciable controversy. View "Dent v. Wolf" on Justia Law

The juvenile court possesses the statutory authority to terminate its jurisdiction at disposition in an appropriate case upon releasing the dependent child to a custodial parent. In this case, the Court of Appeal affirmed the juvenile court's declaration that Destiny was a dependent child of the court; decision to release Destiny to the custody of her mother, limiting father to monitored visitation with the child; and termination of its jurisdiction. The court held that the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by terminating its jurisdiction at the disposition hearing. Having dismissed the allegations concerning domestic abuse on the ground the restraining order obtained by mother eliminated any risk of harm, the juvenile court focused on the risks father's alcohol abuse posed for Destiny in connection with father's visitation rights and whether mother's insight into the effects of such alcohol abuse were too recent to adequately protect Destiny from harm. The juvenile court modified the superior court's visitation order to require monitored visitation for father and prohibited mother from serving as the monitor, thereby eliminating those risks and concluded that further supervision was unnecessary. View "In re Destiny D." on Justia Law

For over 20 years, Orlando was employed by Friendship House Association of American Indians, a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program providing treatment services to Native Americans. The program’s CEO was also Orlando’s mother-in-law. While Orlando and his wife were experiencing marital difficulties, his wife informed the CEO that Orlando had a gun and was angry at Friendship House employees. The CEO first placed Orlando on leave; after his wife obtained a restraining order, the CEO terminated his employment. Orlando then filed suit under the Fair Employment and Housing Act, Gov. Code, 12940, for wrongful termination, claiming discrimination on the basis of his marital status and that Friendship House had failed to conduct a reasonable investigation before discharging him. The court of appeal affirmed summary judgment in favor of the defendant. Orlando failed to establish a prima facie case of marital status discrimination and failed to demonstrate his employer had a duty to investigate. Orlando was an at-will employee and his claim was not predicated on alleged animus toward the married state, itself. View "Nakai v. Friendship House Association of American Indians, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal of a dependency petition filed on behalf of two minors under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. In this case, the juvenile court concluded that the evidence presented in support of the dependency petition was insufficient to establish that the minors were at substantial risk of harm under section 300, subdivisions (b) and (j). The minors have argued that the evidence showed that Mother failed to protect and her boyfriend's sexual abuse of one of the minors' siblings placed them at substantial risk of harm, but the minors have not argued or demonstrated that the evidence was uncontradicted and unimpeached, and of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial determination that it was insufficient to support a finding. View "In re Luis H." on Justia Law

Noemi Mendoza appealed after a trial court denied her request to make a permanent spousal support order retroactive to the filing date of her petition for marriage dissolution. The trial court based its denial on Mendoza’s failure to request temporary spousal support. The Court of Appeal agreed such failure was fatal to Mendoza’s retroactivity request. The Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Mendoza & Cuellar" on Justia Law

Paternal great-grandparents Ed and Yvonne H. appealed an order denying their request for joinder and petition to seek visitation with their great-grandchildren. Ed and Yvonne's argued the court erred in finding they lacked standing to join as parties seeking visitation. Specifically, they argued the court erred by determining that Family Code sections 3103 and 3104, which allow a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if certain conditions are met, did not permit great-grandparent visitation. Alternatively, Ed and Yvonne contend the court erred by not considering that their grandson, the father of the great-grandchildren, consented to and joined in their request for visitation, and by not considering whether they had standing as psychological or de facto parents. The Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend section 3104 of the grandparent visitation statutes to authorize great-grandparents to petition for visitation, and thus the court did not err by concluding Ed and Yvonne lacked legal standing to seek visitation. View "Ed H. v. Ashley C." on Justia Law