Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A father objected to a California court order confirming the registration of an Italian child and spousal support order pursuant to the Uniform Interstate Family Support Act (UIFSA). On appeal, Father argued the trial court: (1) “misallocated to Father the burden of proving that Italy is not a state under UIFSA,” (2) “improperly deprived Father of an evidentiary hearing to refute the notion that Italy is such a state,” (3) “erroneously refused to render a statement of decision,” and (4) “erred as a matter of law in concluding that Italy is a state under UIFSA.” Finding no merit to these contentions, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order. View "Cima-Sorci v. Sorci" on Justia Law

After a juvenile court has terminated its jurisdiction, the family court has jurisdiction over domestic violence orders and may issue a renewal. In this case, the juvenile court issued a protective order and enjoined defendant from specified acts of abuse, and the order remained effective after the juvenile court terminated its jurisdiction. The Court of Appeal held that the family court erroneously concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to renew plaintiff's restraining order and remanded to the trial court to apply Family Code section 6345 to determine if plaintiff was entitled to a five-year or permanent restraining order. View "Garcia v. Escobar" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's denial of father's request to reduce child support, finding that father controlled the Douglas Mae Trust, order requiring father to pay the requested orthodontic expenses, and grant of mother's sole authority to make decisions regarding the children's orthodontic care. The court held that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it allowed mother to reach the Trust to satisfy father's child support obligations and the trial court's earlier orders; the court rejected father's contention that the trial court erred by declining to vacate or reconsider an earlier statement of decision and order on mother's request for a turnover order and sanctions; and the court declined to enter father's requested order to conduct a hearing about whether mother converted company assets. View "Marriage of Furie" on Justia Law

Plaintiff Marla Hogue sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act against her estranged husband, defendant Jerry Hogue, after moving back to California from Georgia. In April 2016, defendant made a special appearance through counsel to move to quash the action for lack of personal jurisdiction. The trial court granted the motion on April 27, 2016. Never having been served with notice of entry of the order, plaintiff timely filed her notice of appeal on October 21, 2016. Plaintiff contended California had jurisdiction over defendant because either his conduct came within the “special regulation” basis for specific jurisdiction, or otherwise justified specific jurisdiction as a continuing course of conduct commencing in California and thereafter directed toward California after defendant left the state. The Court of Appeal agreed with the former premise (which plaintiff conceded obviated the latter argument), and vacated the order quashing service. The Court remanded for consideration of the merits of her petition. View "Hogue v. Hogue" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal vacated the juvenile court's order terminating parental rights and remanded the matter to the juvenile court to make the findings necessary to determine jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA) and, to the extent mandated by those findings, comply with the procedural requirements of the UCCJEA. The court held that California was not the child's home state on the date of the commencement of the proceedings, and the juvenile court erred by not raising the issue of subject matter jurisdiction under the UCCJEA when it initially detained the child or when it made its jurisdiction findings and subsequent child custody orders. View "In re Aiden L." on Justia Law

Appellants Gordon and Donna Runyon were once married. In 2010, respondent Comerica Bank (Comerica) obtained a joint and several judgment for breach of guaranty against Gordon and some other defendants. Gordon and Donna then divorced, the other judgment debtors settled with Comerica, and post-divorce, Comerica obtained an order to show cause why real property that was formerly community property but then owned as separate property by Donna, should not be sold to satisfy the remaining debt owing on the judgment. Donna and other debtors each paid certain sums, and eventually the judgment was satisfied in full. Gordon filed an application for order of contribution contending he paid more than his proportional share of the judgment through his community property interests. He requested contribution from the cojudgment debtors. The court denied the motion on grounds the application failed to demonstrate it was timely filed. In this appeal, Gordon argued he satisfied the requirements of Code of Civil Procedure sections 881 through 883 under which he sought contribution, because when his application was heard Comerica had not yet filed a satisfaction of judgment and therefore it was timely filed. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed as to Gordon. However, the Court found Donna lacked standing, so her appeal was dismissed. View "Comerica Bank v. Runyon" on Justia Law

The Department recommended that the child remain removed from her legal guardians' custody and placed in suitable out-of-home care until her legal guardians could make adequate progress to return her to their custody. The court held that the juvenile court prejudicially erred by finding mother lacked standing to participate in the child's dependency proceedings and by denying her request for appointed counsel at the disposition hearing. The court reversed the juvenile court's dispositional order and remanded for a new disposition hearing at which mother shall be allowed to participate with appointed counsel. View "In re Kayla W." on Justia Law

In 1986, Brillantes married Minerva, a U.S. citizen, so that he could come to the U.S. from the Philippines. In 1991, Brillantes sought dissolution of the marriage in Nevada, declaring himself a “bona fide resident” of Nevada. Minerva’s sister, who was also Brillantes’ ex-wife, filed an affidavit in support of Brillantes’s action. Minerva, then living in Seattle, submitted to the court’s jurisdiction. Brillantes was granted a Nevada “Decree of Divorce.” Minerva and Cesar married weeks later. They had three children together. They separated in 2005. Minerva filed a petition for dissolution. Cesar sought a nullity of marriage, alleging that his marriage to Minerva was “void” and “bigamous” because Brillantes resided in California when he obtained a divorce by falsely claiming to be a Nevada resident. Brillantes testified that he had resided in Nevada from early April 1991 through late July 1991, then returned to California, The court denied Cesar’s request, finding that Cesar was estopped from challenging the validity of the divorce decree. The court of appeal reversed. Since the undisputed facts did not show that Cesar was a party to the decree, that he had procured it, assisted in procuring it, or had full knowledge of the circumstances under which it was procured, the court erred in finding that quasi-estoppel applied. Cesar was not “apprised of” facts that Minerva was “ignorant of,” so equitable estoppel was inapplicable. View "In re Marriage of Kalinawan" on Justia Law

Defendant Nan Hui Jo was convicted by jury of child custody deprivation, for which she was sentenced to 175 days in county jail and thirty-six months probation. She appealed, raising nine alleged evidentiary and procedural errors that occurred at trial, all of which she contends entitle her to a reversal of her conviction. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded defendant’s first and second arguments had merit, but the errors were harmless. View "California v. Jo" on Justia Law

K.S. was detained by the San Francisco Human Services Agency shortly after her birth in January 2017, due to a referral indicating that mother had tested positive for methamphetamines during a recent prenatal visit. The dependency petition cited mother’s long history of substance abuse for which she failed to receive treatment; the termination of mother’s parental rights with respect to four older children based on her untreated polysubstance abuse; the parents’ history of domestic violence; father’s history of substance abuse, for which he failed to seek treatment until June 2017; and the termination of father’s parental rights to three other children. Mother and father challenged the juvenile court order denying them reunification services with respect to K.S., their only child in common, and setting a permanency planning hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26. Under section 361.5(b)(10) and (b)(11), reunification services need not be offered to a parent if the court has previously terminated reunification services or parental rights with respect to a sibling or half-sibling of the child and the parent “has not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal.” The court of appeal affirmed; the record sufficiently supports the juvenile court's determinations and declining to apply a “best interests” analysis. View "Jennifer S. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law