Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Noemi Mendoza appealed after a trial court denied her request to make a permanent spousal support order retroactive to the filing date of her petition for marriage dissolution. The trial court based its denial on Mendoza’s failure to request temporary spousal support. The Court of Appeal agreed such failure was fatal to Mendoza’s retroactivity request. The Court, therefore, affirmed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Mendoza & Cuellar" on Justia Law

Paternal great-grandparents Ed and Yvonne H. appealed an order denying their request for joinder and petition to seek visitation with their great-grandchildren. Ed and Yvonne's argued the court erred in finding they lacked standing to join as parties seeking visitation. Specifically, they argued the court erred by determining that Family Code sections 3103 and 3104, which allow a court to grant visitation rights to grandparents if certain conditions are met, did not permit great-grandparent visitation. Alternatively, Ed and Yvonne contend the court erred by not considering that their grandson, the father of the great-grandchildren, consented to and joined in their request for visitation, and by not considering whether they had standing as psychological or de facto parents. The Court of Appeal concluded the Legislature did not intend section 3104 of the grandparent visitation statutes to authorize great-grandparents to petition for visitation, and thus the court did not err by concluding Ed and Yvonne lacked legal standing to seek visitation. View "Ed H. v. Ashley C." on Justia Law

In 1990, appellant Matthew Albert Parker and respondent Mary Katherine Parker divorced. Mary and Matthew shared two children. In 2014, Matthew sought an order (1) requiring respondent San Bernardino County Department of Child Support Services (the Department) to prepare an accounting of the child support arrears owed by Matthew; and (2) discharging the child support arrears for the period in which the children resided with Matthew (Trainotti credits). The family court denied Matthew’s requested order. Matthew appealed, arguing: (1) res judicata and collateral estoppel do not bar an award of Trainotti credits; and (2) the family court erred by not applying the doctrine of laches to discharge the arrears owed to the Department. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "Marriage of Parker" on Justia Law

D.H. was removed from, and failed to reunify with, his paternal grandparents, who had been caring for him under a probate guardianship. The entire case, from the petition, to removal, to termination of services, focused on the grandparents, not the child’s father. In this dependency appeal, D.H., Sr. (father), the presumed father of D.H., argues on appeal of that decision, the juvenile court violated due process by terminating his parental rights without making an unfitness or detriment finding against him by clear and convincing evidence at any point in the proceedings. Respondent Riverside Department of Social Services (DPSS) urged the Court of Appeal to adopt, in the dependency context, the best interest of the child standard for terminating parental rights under Probate Code section 1516.5. The Court declined: Probate Code section 1516.5 applied when a legal guardian seeks to have the child declared free from the custody and control of one or both parents and was designed to “mak[e] it easier for children in probate guardianships to be adopted by their guardians.” That provision did not apply in a case like this, where the only reason the court was considering terminating parental rights was because the state brought a successful dependency action against the guardians. “Father’s entitlement to the constitutional safeguards articulated in Gladys L. does not vanish simply because D.H. was under a legal guardianship at the outset of the dependency.” View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

When a dependency court declares children dependent and removes them from a parent's custody, it is an abuse of discretion to order a reunification plan with which the parent indisputably cannot comply due to a language barrier. Determining that this case was not moot, the Court of Appeal held that the trial court abused its discretion in failing to order effective reunification services. The court reversed the portion of the disposition order requiring father to participate in a full alcohol treatment program with aftercare, a 12-step program with court card and sponsor, and parenting. The court remanded to the dependency court to reconsider its order terminating jurisdiction and for further proceedings. View "In re J.P." on Justia Law

The sperm of Brian Cole was used to inseminate Mie Tsuchimoto, who gave birth to a boy (the child). When the child was six years old, the County of Orange filed a complaint to declare Cole to be the child’s father and to seek child support from Cole. Cole defended on the ground that under Family Code section 7613, he could not be the child’s parent. The trial court found that, notwithstanding section 7613: (1) there was a rebuttable presumption under section 7611(d) that Cole was the child’s parent because Cole had received the child into his home as his natural child and openly held out the child as his own; and (2) Cole had not rebutted that presumption. The Court of Appeal affirmed, finding the trial court’s findings regarding section 7611(d) were supported by substantial evidence. "The inability to establish parenthood under section 7613 does not preclude a finding of parenthood under section 7611(d)." View "County of Orange v. Cole" on Justia Law

In an earlier action in which Florencia Garcia petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Juan Garcia (Dissolution Action), the family court found that Florencia did not meet her burden of establishing a valid marriage and quashed service as to Juan and dismissed the action. Florencia then filed the underlying action in which she petitioned for nullity of marriage (Nullity Action). In the Nullity Action, Juan appealed two family court orders: (1) one in which the court found that Florencia was Juan’s spouse or putative spouse, and she could proceed with the claims in her petition (Putative Spouse Order); and (2) one in which the court directed Juan to pay Florencia spousal support arrears, ongoing spousal support and attorney fees and costs (Support Order). In challenging the two orders, Juan raised a single legal issue for review on appeal: under res judicata, did the judgment in the Dissolution Action bar the relief Florencia sought in the Nullity Action? The Court of Appeal concluded the Dissolution Action and the Nullity Action involved different primary rights, and thus affirmed the Support Order. Because the Putative Spouse Order was not final, the Court dismissed Juan’s appeal. View "In re Marriage of Garcia" on Justia Law

L.L. was a ten-year-old girl when the juvenile court issued an order finding B.S. was her presumed father pursuant to Family Code1 section 7611, subdivision (d), and also finding he was a third parent pursuant to section 7612, subdivision (c). T.L., another presumed father of L.L., and D.Z., L.L.'s mother (Mother), appealed that order, arguing: (1) there was insufficient evidence to support the court's finding that B.S. was a presumed father of L.L. under section 7611, subdivision (d); (2) the court erred in interpreting section 7612, subdivision (c), and by finding B.S. was a third parent under that statute; and (3) the court erred by not conducting the weighing process between the claims of the two presumed fathers that section 7612, subdivision (b), required. The Court of Appeal concluded there was substantial evidence to support the court's finding that B.S. was a presumed father of L.L., but the court erred in interpreting section 7612, subdivision (c), by finding B.S. was a third parent under that statute, and by not conducting the weighing process required under section 7612, subdivision (b). View "In re L.L." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's order declaring her children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b)(1). DCFS cross-appealed and moved to dismiss Mother's appeal as moot. The Court of Appeal denied DCFS's motion to dismiss, affirming the juvenile court's order sustaining the section 300 petition as amended, and dismissed DCFS's cross-appeal. The court rejected DCFS's argument that In re A.B., supra, 225 Cal.App.4th 1358, was applicable in this case. The court reasoned that if the juvenile court was without jurisdiction to rule on the section 300 petition, it was also without jurisdiction to consider the section 387 petition. In this case, substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that the children were persons described by section 300, subdivision (b)(1), which brings a child within the juvenile court's jurisdiction when the child has suffered, or there is a substantial risk that the child will suffer, serious physical harm or illness. View "In re Travis C." on Justia Law

In 2012, Vikash, a U.S. citizen born in Fiji, married Ashlyne, a citizen of Fiji, in Fiji in an arranged marriage. Vikash filed an immigration visa petition on Ashlyne's behalf, which was approved, and submitted an I–864 affidavit of support, under which the sponsor agrees to “[p]rovide the intending immigrant any support necessary to maintain ... an income that is at least 125 percent of the Federal Poverty Guidelines ... that person may sue you for this support.” According to Ashlyne, Vikash abused her and “tricked” Ashlyne into going to Fiji in 2013, where he abandoned her. Her legal permanent resident stamp was torn out of her passport. Ashlyn obtained temporary documents from the U.S. Embassy and returned to the U.S. Vikash sought an annulment. Ashlyne indicated she had applied for government assistance and argued that by signing the I–864 affidavit, Vikash agreed to support her for 10 years. The court awarded temporary support and ordered Ashlyne to make efforts to get the necessary paperwork "to work in this country if she is intending on remaining.” The court later terminated support and denied Ashlyne’s request to enforce the I–864 because Ashlyne was “not using best efforts to find work.” The court of appeal reversed. An immigrant spouse has standing to enforce the I-864 support obligation in state court and has no duty to mitigate damages. View "In re: Marriage of Kumar" on Justia Law