Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

K.C. (Mother) was born in California. She was deported from Mexico to the United States. San Diego Police Department officers responded to a call regarding a female (Mother) who might be unfit to care for her two children. On their arrival, the officers found A.C., then six years old, and E.C., then 15 months old, sitting on the ground with Mother. Mother appeared manic and confused about her detention and expressed irrational beliefs (e.g., she could communicate telepathically). Based on their belief Mother was gravely disabled and unable to care for herself and her two children, the officers detained Mother pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 5150 and transported her to a San Diego County mental health facility for evaluation. Her children were transported to the Polinsky Children's Center (PCC). Mother appealed juvenile court orders that ultimately terminated parental rights to her sons. She contended the court erred by concluding it had subject matter jurisdiction over her children's cases under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act (UCCJEA). Mexico was the children's home state; although the court sent two e-mails to Mexico courts inquiring whether they declined to exercise jurisdiction over the children's cases in favor of California's assumption of jurisdiction, Mother argued the court erred by not verifying and authenticating on the record that those e-mails were sent to the correct e-mail addresses and appropriate judicial authorities in Mexico and that those e-mails were actually received by those authorities. She further argued that, in any event, the court could not exercise subject matter jurisdiction because there is no evidence showing that the children and at least one parent had significant connections to California other than mere physical presence or that there was substantial evidence available in California concerning the children's care, protection, training, and personal relationships. Finding no reversible error with the juvenile court’s orders, the Court of Appeals affirmed. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Marianne and Richard obtained a judgment of legal separation a few months before his death. Notwithstanding the separation, the couple‘s agreement dividing their assets reflected Richard‘s intent that Marianne would receive the pension benefits available to a surviving spouse after his death. The Contra Costa County Employees‘ Retirement Association Board, however, denied Marianne those benefits, concluding she was not Richard‘s “surviving spouse” for purposes of the governing statute. In the absence of an applicable statutory definition of the term, the Board relied on the definition found in the Probate Code. The trial court agreed. The court of appeal reversed. Because the entry of a judgment of legal separation does not terminate a marriage, but only separates a couple‘s economic interests, the plain meaning of the term “surviving spouse” includes a legally separated person. While the Probate Code defines “surviving spouse” generally not to include a person who is legally separated, several substantive provisions of the Probate Code treat legally separated spouses in the same manner as a surviving spouse; no meaningful conclusion can be drawn from the Probate Code‘s definition. The Board has not articulated any plausible public policy that would be furthered by the denial of continuance benefits in these circumstances. View "Irvin v. Contra Costa County Employees' Retirement Association Board" on Justia Law

A.J. and R.G. were the parents of three children, then-aged ten, nine and seven years old. In November 2011, A.J. was arrested and deported to Mexico after he assaulted R.G. R.G. obtained an order prohibiting A.J. from having contact with her and the children. After A.J. was deported, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) investigated 13 child protective services referrals on behalf of the children. The referrals were largely related to R.G.'s alcohol use and failure to supervise the children. In February 2013, October 2013, and February 2014, the Agency substantiated allegations that R.G. was neglecting the children. In October 2015, the Agency detained the children in protective custody and initiated dependency proceedings after an "extremely intoxicated" R.G. was arrested and jailed on charges of grand theft. A.J. appealed after a 12-month review hearing at which the juvenile court returned his children to their mother's care. He contended the court erred when it found that he had been offered or provided reasonable services. The Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the reasonable services finding as to A.J. In all other respects, the findings and orders were affirmed. View "In re A.G." on Justia Law

Family Code section 271 does not authorize the court to award sanctions to non-parties, but rather is intended to promote settlement of family law litigation through shifting fees between the parties to the litigation. In this case, the Court of Appeal agreed that the trial court was without authority to award sanctions to respondents because they were not parties to this action. The court reasoned that sanctions may not be awarded under section 271 to a party's attorney when it was that attorney who was requesting the sanctions for the sole benefit of the attorney. Accordingly, the court reversed the order for sanctions. View "Webb v. Webb" on Justia Law

About four months before his 20th birthday, defendant-appellant Jesse S. filed, in propria persona, a request under section 388.1 of the Welfare and Institutions Code to return to juvenile court jurisdiction and the foster care system, because the couple who adopted him the day before his 18th birthday was no longer supporting him, even though they were receiving payments on his behalf from California’s Adoption Assistance Program (AAP). The judge denied the request, noting that under the literal language of section 388.1 the very fact the couple were still receiving AAP payments on Jesse’s behalf precluded Jesse from reentry into the juvenile dependency system. The Court of Appeal "reluctantly" affirmed: the trial judge understood the plain language of the statue and concluded there was no question Jesse’s adoptive parents were still collecting adoption assistance program payments on Jesse’s behalf, the judge was forced to conclude Jesse was not eligible for reentry under the statute. View "In re Jesse S." on Justia Law

Notwithstanding the parties’ stipulated retroactivity provision, the California Court of Appeals concluded the trial court erred in awarding Russell Stover a child care credit for any period before May 10, 2011, when he filed his motion to modify support, because any such credits effectively modified the support award and incurred arrearages retroactively in contravention of the Family Code statutes governing modification of support orders. Furthermore, the Court concluded that while Eileen Bruntz failed to timely challenge an April 2007 order containing the stipulated retroactivity provision, public policy considerations precluded the Court of Appeal from judicially estopping her from challenging the order now. Bruntz and respondent Stover shared two children and years of acrimony-fueled court contests following the demise of their romantic relationship. Bruntz challenged several orders related to Stover’s alleged failure over the ensuing years to fully pay $1,000 in monthly child support under an April 2007 support order, which contained a contested stipulated retroactivity provision. View "Stover v. Bruntz" on Justia Law

As part of their 2010 marital settlement agreement, respondent Misti Janes (Wife) was awarded $113,392 from the retirement account of appellant Tim Janes (Husband). In 2014, the money was still in the retirement account. Wife sought the amount of the award, plus and gains or losses resulting from that money sitting in the account. The family court granted Wife’s request for a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (QDRO) reflecting Wife was entitled to $113,392 and the resulting gains or losses dating back to the date of separation. Husband appealed, arguing: (1) the family court lacked jurisdiction to modify the 2010 judgment of dissolution by awarding the gains and losses to Wife; and (2) the family court erred by dating the gains and losses back to the date of separation, rather than the date of the dissolution judgment. Finding that Husband failed to explain why he was entitled to gains earned on the$113,392, the Court of Appeal was unpersuaded by Husband's interpretation of the agreement. The trial court did not modify the agreement by its award, nor did it err by dating the gains or losses earned on the award back to the state of the 2010 judgment. View "Marriage of Janes" on Justia Law

In 2010, Stupp filed a petition for the dissolution of his marriage to Schilders. Since then, the parties have been involved in contentious legal proceedings. A stipulated judgment of dissolution was entered in 2014, but custody of the parties’ child, who was just a few months old when the original petition was filed, remains subject to temporary orders. Schilders appealed several family court orders: giving Stupp temporary sole legal custody of the child, requiring that only the parents transport the child to his therapy appointments, continuing a custody trial, requiring Schilders to undergo a vocational evaluation, and reserving jurisdiction over the allocation of the cost of the evaluation. The court of appeal concluded that the family court abused its discretion in ordering the vocational evaluation when there was no support motion pending, and dismissed the appeal as to the remaining orders because they are not appealable. View "Marriage of Stupp and Schilders" on Justia Law

As part of marital dissolution proceedings, appellant Valerie Grissom sought a domestic violence restraining order against her husband, respondent Louis Grissom. The trial court denied the request. On appeal, Valerie contended the court erred by concluding that because her injuries were suffered during and as a result of physical confrontations she instigated, they did not constitute " 'abuse' " within the meaning of Family Code section 6203. The Court of Appeal found that although section 6203 defined abuse to include an intentionally or recklessly caused bodily injury to the complainant, a finding of abuse was not mandated merely because the complainant shows he or she suffered an injury caused by the other party. The Court concluded the trial court properly recognized that a person who responded reasonably to an aggressor in this way did not commit abuse within the meaning of section 6203. View "Marriage of Grissom" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeal reversed the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders because, even assuming Daughter was at substantial risk of harm, the juvenile court erred in asserting dependency over her. Substantial evidence does not support a finding that Father was somehow unfit to parent or neglectful with respect to caring for Daughter; despite Father's best efforts, Daughter's own behavior and mental health challenges resulted in her risk of harm; and Daughter does not fall within any of the categories of children the dependency system seeks to protect. View "In re Priscilla A." on Justia Law