Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After the juvenile court found by clear and convincing evidence that there was a substantial danger to the children and no reasonable means to protect them other than removal from father's custody, the juvenile court ordered the children removed only from father and remain placed with mother. Father was also ordered to participate in random, on-demand drug testing and to participate in a parenting program, as well as individual counseling. The court concluded that there was substantial evidence for the juvenile court to infer that father's negligent conduct - possessing a loaded gun in an accessible location and possessing methamphetamine in his car - was likely to recur and did not represent a momentary lapse in judgment. Under Michael S., the court concluded that the juvenile court could reasonably conclude that it was appropriate to remove the children only from father and allow them to remain with mother. In this case, there was substantial evidence that mother was unaware of father's negligent conduct, and once made aware of it, was committed to doing what was necessary to protect the children from such conduct in the future. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dispositional orders. View "In re Yolanda L." on Justia Law

In July 2015, plaintiff-respondent San Bernardino County Children and Family Services (CFS) was contacted by the maternal grandmother of five children whose mother, defendant-appellant M.G. (mother), had “left the children with her” and then “took off.” The juvenile court declared J.R. and M.R. to be dependents of the court, placing them with the maternal grandmother, and ordering reunification services for mother, but not their father, defendant-appellant R.R. With respect to Ro.R., the juvenile court found two men, R.R., and defendant-respondent S.H., to be presumed fathers. The juvenile court initially took jurisdiction over Ro.R., but subsequently dismissed his dependency petition, awarded sole legal and physical custody to S.H., and set the terms of visitation for mother and R.R. to remain in effect until modified by the family court. Mother argued on appeal that the juvenile court erred by failing to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), requiring reversal of its orders terminating jurisdiction over Ro.R. and its custody and visitation orders, and remand for compliance with ICWA. R.R. argued ICWA notice was deficient with respect to J.R. and M.R., as well as Ro.R. R.R. also asserted the jurisdictional findings against him under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (g) with respect to the three children were unsupported by substantial evidence. Additionally, R.R. challenged the trial court's finding that S.H. was a presumed father of Ro.R. and contested the custody and visitation orders issued by the juvenile court with respect to Ro.R. upon termination of its jurisdiction. After review, the Court of Appeal reversed the jurisdictional findings against R.R.; the trial court‟s exercise of jurisdiction over Ro.R., J.R. and M.R. on other bases, and all other orders appealed were affirmed. View "In re M.R." on Justia Law

Jeffrey E. and Anna M., parents of A.E., share equal custody of the child. After Anna sought a child support award, evidence established that Davis F., Anna's friend and A.E.'s godfather, financially supports Anna and pays her expenses of over $30,000 a month. The court rejected Jeffrey's argument that Davis's financial support should be considered in determining the amount of Jeffrey's child support obligation. The court concluded that regular, recurrent gifts to a parent may be characterized as income to that parent for purposes of calculating guideline child support, but they do not indicate gifts must be so characterized in every case; the trial court has discretion to consider gifts as income when they are a regular, recurrent monetary benefit to the parent; and courts are mindful not to base a child support calculation on monies a parent does not actually have. In this case, the court concluded that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in failing to characterize Davis's gifts to Anna as her income when calculating the child support. The court explained that the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to reasonably conclude the financial support Davis provides Anna does not represent a regular, recurrent monetary benefit fairly representing income for purposes of calculating the child support award. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Anna M. v. Jeffrey E." on Justia Law

In its order of dissolution for the marriage of respondent Colleen McLain and appellant Bruce McLain, the family court: (1) ordered Husband to pay Wife $4,000 per month in spousal support; (2) awarded Wife $5,500 in attorney’s fees; and (3) denied Husband’s request for reimbursement of alleged separate property contributions used to construct a house. Husband appealed, arguing the family court: (1) erred in its spousal support order by concluding Wife had a right to retire; (2) erred in awarding attorney’s fees; and (3) erred he did not sufficiently tract his separate property, thereby erring by denying his request for reimbursement on that separate property. Finding no errors, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Marriage of McLain" on Justia Law

The parties married in 1992 and divorced in 2005. During their ongoing “litigation war” the court granted husband Family Code section 2711 sanctions of $767,781.23, including: $500,000 for wife’s “relentless and culpable conduct” in “driv[ing] up the cost of the litigation” and “purposefully frustrat[ing]" the settlement; $180,000 for causing a reduction in the sale price of property awarded to husband in the dissolution judgment; and $45,000 in interest on husband’s attorney fees. The court also awarded husband $28,510 in rents and security deposits that wife received on properties awarded to husband in the dissolution judgment. The court of appeal reversed in part. Section 271 sanctions are limited to “attorney’s fees and costs” so the court erred by imposing sanctions for conduct in increasing the cost of the litigation and frustrating settlement and for causing a reduction in the sale price of real property. The court otherwise affirmed, rejecting wife’s arguments that the court erred by granting the rents motion; the court violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (42 U.S.C. 12101) by denying her requests for accommodation and holding a motion hearing in her absence; and that husband was not entitled to attorney fees because he used the services of an attorney who previously represented wife. View "Sagonowsky v. Kekoa" on Justia Law

In 2012, B.C., age 30, suffered cardiac arrest and brain damage from the use of methamphetamine and alcohol. She initially lived with and was cared for by her mother. When her mother died, B.C. inherited $450,000. She also received disability payments. Although she had limited cognitive function, she subsequently married Jesse, with whom she had been “partying” at the time of her cardiac arrest. In 2014, B.C.’s aunt, C.S., sought appointment as probate conservator. Through counsel, B.C. opposed the petition. Jesse participated in hiring and advising the attorney. The court appointed the Ventura County Public Defender to represent B.C. An appointed conservator for B.C.’s estate sought reimbursement of $30,000, for disability benefits that Jesse had diverted to himself. Jesse has no assets and is responsible for five children. After a bench trial, the court appointed C.S., Prob. Code 1800. The court of appeal affirmed. Probate conservatorships do not require a personal waiver of the right to a jury trial because the proceedings pose no threat of confinement and are conducted according to the law relating to civil actions, including trial by jury if demanded by the proposed conservatee. B.C.’s attorney had authority to waive a jury trial on her behalf, even if the court failed to recite that B.C. had a right to a jury. The record supports the finding that B.C. cannot take care of her own needs, nor can her husband be trusted to do so. View "Conservatorship of B.C." on Justia Law

D.R., born in November 2004, lived with her maternal grandmother since she was an infant and was “thriving” in her grandmother’s care. D.R.’s two half siblings lived separately with mother and their father in the same apartment building. Dependency proceedings were initiated in 2013, following a violent incident involving the father of D.R.’s two half-siblings. Mother failed to comply with reunification plans. D.R.’s father, who initially was described as “whereabouts unknown,” eventually was located living at the home of his mother and stepfather. Father had been convicted of statutory rape of D.R.’s mother and did not see D.R. after he was released from incarceration. His name was not on D.R.’s birth certificate. Father visited D.R. for a four-month period during the dependency proceedings, after which he stopped visiting. Father did not attend conjoint therapy with D.R. As D.R.’s permanent plan, the juvenile court selected legal guardianship over adoption by her grandmother. The court of appeal reversed, holding that the trial court was required to select the more permanent plan of adoption. No substantial evidence supported the court’s rationale for selecting legal guardianship instead of adoption. View "In re D.R." on Justia Law

In 2013, the juvenile court terminated reunification services for B.B. (Father) and appointed H.B.'s (the minor) maternal aunt as legal guardian. In 2016, the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a new petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 and sought to terminate the guardianship. Father petitioned for extraordinary relief for review of the juvenile court's order terminating the guardianship and setting a section 366.26 hearing to determine a new permanent plan for H.B. He contended the Agency erred when it filed a new section 300 petition instead of a petition under section 388 to terminate the guardianship. He argued this error was prejudicial because it denied him the opportunity to seek reunification services at a 60-day review hearing following termination of the guardianship. The Court of Appeal concluded any error was harmless and denied Father's writ petition. View "B.B. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

After Donn Michael Schu and Genise Gomez filed for divorce, Schu paid Gomez $500 per month temporary spousal support. Gomez became sexually attracted to her son's best friend while he was still a child. Gomez subsequently pled no contest to seven counts of unlawful sexual conduct with a minor, and was sentenced to six years in prison. The trial court denied Gomez support under Family Code section 4320, subdivisions (i), (m), (n), and (k). Gomez contends that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing Schu to introduce evidence of fault and by using that evidence to deny support. The court explained that it need not consider what role the fault of a party may have on the award of spousal support in the ordinary case. However, in this case, the court concluded that the trial court was more that justified in denying Gomez spousal support under section 4320, subdivision (n). The trial court also took into account the balance of the hardships to each party and that Gomez had assets of her own. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Marriage of Schu" on Justia Law

Respondent is a successful director and producer. After the trial court granted respondent's request to reduce his monthly child support payment to $9,842, from the original amount entered into at the time of dissolution of $17,500, appellant claimed that respondent’s reduced income did not constitute a material change in circumstances in light of his extreme wealth. Appellant further contends that the trial court imputed an unreasonably low rate of return to respondent’s substantial assets, valued at over $67 million. The court concluded that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of a material change in respondent’s circumstances for purposes of meeting his child support obligation; in light of respondent’s overall wealth, the reduction in his employment income did not materially impair his ability to pay the agreed upon child support; and the trial court imputed an unreasonably low rate of return to respondent’s tens of millions of dollars in assets. View "In re Marriage of Usher" on Justia Law