Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against her three siblings, on behalf of her 88-year-old mother. Plaintiff claimed that her siblings' actions individually and while serving as trustees of her mother's revocable living trust constituted financial abuse of an elder or dependent adult. The siblings demurred. The mother, separately represented by counsel, intervened and joined the demurrer to the amended complaint. The trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend and dismissed the elder abuse action on standing grounds. The court concluded that the trial court did not err in ruling that plaintiff lacked standing to bring the elder abuse action because she has not be personally aggrieved by her siblings' actions. The court rejected plaintiff's claims to the contrary and affirmed the judgment. View "Tepper v. Wilkins" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs-parents Gabrielle A. and Nicholas G., and John A. and Gregory A. (the children) appealed a judgment following the trial court’s decision to grant a motion for summary judgment by the County of Orange (the County) and several social workers. Plaintiffs’ claims related to the detention of the children for six months. Gabrielle went into early labor, and gave birth at Hoag Hospital to Gregory at 31 weeks. Three days later, Gabrielle was released, and she returned to her mother Barbara’s home. Gregory remained in the Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU). A few days later, Hoag employees filed a referral for an immediate response from the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA). Hoag staff reported to Villa that Gabrielle had appeared at Hoag with John and Barbara, wearing a trench coat with nothing on underneath, displaying “irrational and aggressive behavior,” including removing the trench coat and walking around unclothed. She had previously asked for Gregory to be placed back inside of her, and she asked a nurse to cut her ankles for blood letting. According to staff, she attempted to wheel Gregory’s isolette out of the NICU and became violent with them. Hospital employees informed Villa that Gabrielle had expressed thoughts of hurting her children and demonstrated paranoia. Gabrielle disputed this version of events, but did not dispute that she was placed on a hospital hold pending evaluation. The trial court found that exigent circumstances existed to detain the children without a warrant at Hoag, and that Nicholas’s arrival at Hoag after the children were detained did not alter matters; there was no evidence to show conduct by the social workers to establish a claim for deliberate indifference, or behavior that shocks the conscience; the social workers were entitled to immunity because there was no evidence of material false statements; numerous claims by the plaintiffs were barred by the parents’ pleas of no contest in dependency court. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the parents’ knowing and voluntary pleas of no contest to the jurisdictional allegations during dependency proceedings defeated their claims, and the social workers were entitled to immunity. “[E]ven if we were to disregard the no contest pleas and the relevant immunity doctrines, defendants correctly argue they met their burden to establish they were entitled to summary judgment on each cause of action, and plaintiffs failed to raise triable issues of material fact. Accordingly, we affirm.” View "Gabrielle A. v. Co. of Orange" on Justia Law

The juvenile court terminated defendants-appellants, J.K.’s (Mother) and J.S.’s (Father; collectively Parents), parental rights as to J.S. (born in June 2014). On appeal, Mother argued: (1) the appeal must be construed to include the order denying her Welfare and Institutions Code section 3881 petition; (2) court erred by denying her an evidentiary hearing on her section 388 petition; (3) the court violated her due process rights by preventing her from testifying regarding Minor’s relationship with his sibling; and (4) the court erred by finding the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights inapplicable. Father joined Mother’s arguments insofar as a resolution in her favor would benefit him. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court’s prohibition against further questioning regarding Minor’s bond with his sibling eliminated any evidentiary basis for Mother to argue the sibling relationship exception applied. Indeed, the Court found no other evidence in the record to suggest Mother had custody of any of her other children and that they had any relationship with Minor. In fact, the evidence in the record suggests the contrary, that Mother no longer had custody of any of her other children. Thus, if Mother testified that she had regained custody of one of her children this would have placed the sibling relationship exception at issue because Mother had also regained custody of Minor for nearly a year during the juvenile court proceedings. The error cannot be deemed harmless because we cannot say how long Minor and his sibling may have lived with one another, what the degree of their bond might have been, and what credibility the juvenile court would have given Mother’s testimony on the issue. Therefore, the matter must be reversed and remanded for a hearing on the degree, if any, of any relationship between Minor and his siblings. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Deanna Huntley challenged the trial court's denial of her motion to divide unadjudicated community property. Deanna filed her motion more than two years after entry of a default judgment that dissolved her marriage to Frank Huntley. The trial court denied the motion on grounds Deanna had not first moved to set aside the default judgment. On appeal, Deanna argued: (1) Family Code section 2556 conferred the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to adjudicate omitted community property without having to first move to set aside the judgment; (2) the dissolution judgment's silence as to the division of any property meant all of the community property remained to be divided; and (3) the trial court's error should have been reversed for proper division of the parties' community property. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded section 2556 provided the trial court with continuing jurisdiction to divide omitted or unadjudicated community property. The default judgment's silence as to any division of property required reversal and the Court remanded for further proceedings under Family Code sections 2550 and 2556. View "In re Marriage of Huntley" on Justia Law

The California Constitution provided that litigating parties could stipulate that the matter may be heard and decided by a temporary judge. Without qualifying a commissioner to act and without such a stipulation, any ruling by or judgment of the commissioner is void. In this case, the parties appeared in propria persona. Marc Djulus (Marc) appealed the judgment of dissolution entered in December 2015. Among other contentions, Marc asserted the commissioner lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the cause because the record contained insufficient evidence to support the commissioner's finding in June 2014 that Marc consented to the commissioner hearing the cause as a result of his participation as a pro se litigant in the initial hearing of the parties in March 2014, when the commissioner made several rulings ostensibly not in Marc's favor. The commissioner made this finding at the outset of a June hearing after realizing the parties had not yet been provided with and signed a form ("Stipulation for Court Commissioner to Act as Temporary Judge for All Purposes" (D-204 form)). Although Kelli McClintock (Kelli) and her counsel then signed the D-204 form, Marc refused. Rather than taking the simple step of stopping the proceedings and sending the cause back for reassignment, the commissioner instead ruled the tantamount stipulation doctrine applied, despite the absence of any evidence that Marc knew, or should have known, at the outset of the March 2014 hearing that the judicial officer was a commissioner, and despite the evidence in the record, summarized ante, that this judicial officer was initially referred to as the "court" and as a "judge" but, unfortunately, not as a "commissioner." Because on this record there was insufficient evidence to support the application of the tantamount stipulation doctrine, the Court of Appeal agreed with Marc's contention. As such, the Court felt "constrained" to reverse not only the judgment of dissolution, but all orders made by the commissioner leading up to the judgment (including any restraining order(s)). View "In re Marriage of Djulus" on Justia Law

K.B. appealed a judgment terminating her parental rights to her two children, Jc.L. and Ja.L. K.B. contended the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights because the court failed to comply with "the inquiry/notice requirements" of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). After review of the trial court record, the Court of appeals concluded the trial court properly determined that the Agency did not violate ICWA's inquiry and notice provisions. View "In re J.L." on Justia Law

R.C. appealed the juvenile court's denial of his petition to adjust his parental status from alleged to presumed father. The juvenile court had also terminated R.C.'s parental rights. The court concluded that, although R.C.'s right to proper notice may have been violated because he did not receive a form informing him of his right to seek presumed father status, any error was harmless. In this case, R.C. received notice of each hearing, as well as copies of the petition and various reports, throughout the dependency hearing; he waited more than 20 months to seek an adjustment of his parental status, well past the 18-month maximum period for reunification efforts; he appeared at the last moment before his rights were to be terminated; and the child's permanent plan was in place and schedule for approval. The court explained that the child's best interest lay in remaining in the only home she had ever known with the only parent she had ever known and her half-brother. Because there was no basis to find the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying the petition, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Isabella M." on Justia Law

In consolidated dependency actions, Mother contested the juvenile court's detention and dispositional orders temporarily denying her visitation to her infant son. In the published portion of the opinion, the court joined the Third District in concluding that parental visitation may be denied during the reunification period if such visitation would be inconsistent with the physical or emotional well-being of the child. In this case, Mother was hospitalized after having been badly beaten by Father; it was unclear whether it was Mother or Father who had intentionally burned and bitten the child, thereafter abandoning him at a Starbucks in "very poor" condition; if Mother was responsible for these odious and life-threatening actions, she showed an utter disregard for the well-being of her six-week-old son and clearly represented a physical and emotional threat to him; and, even if Father was responsible, mother's conduct still showed a gross lack of concern for the child's safety and well-being. Therefore, the court affirmed the juvenile court's challenged visitation orders. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, the court denied Mother's writ petition challenging the juvenile court's decision to terminate her reunification services. View "In re Matthew C." on Justia Law

Jason P., a sperm donor, sought to establish that he is a legal parent of a child conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF) using his sperm, and that he is entitled to joint legal and physical custody of the child with the child’s mother, Danielle S. Jason and Danielle were involved in a romantic relationship. In this second appeal, Danielle challenged the family law court's finding that Jason is a presumed parent and the family law court's custody order. The court concluded that the family law court correctly applied the law governing presumed parentage, and its finding that Jason is a presumed parent was supported by substantial evidence; however, the family law court's award of joint custody was premature because it had not yet received evidence that Jason completed the requirements that court deemed necessary to rebut the Family Code section 3044 presumption; and thus the court affirmed the parentage finding, but conditionally reversed as to the award of custody. The court directed the family court on remand to determine and make findings as to whether Jason satisfied the conditions the family court deemed necessary to rebut the section 3044 presumption. View "Jason P. v. Danielle S." on Justia Law

Mother of Z. appealed the trial court's order awarding child support from Father, a successful director and producer, in an amount that deviated downward from the statewide uniform guideline by a substantial amount. The court concluded that the trial court's failure to comply with the requirements of Family Code section 4056, subdivision (a), mandated reversal, despite the existence of evidence sufficient to warrant a deviation from the guideline; the trial court's reliance on Mother's and Z.'s expenses and lifestyle, rather than on those of Father and his children, precluded the court from implying findings adequate to support the deviation ordered by the court; and thus the court reversed and remanded for reconsideration of child support criteria under the correct criteria. View "Y.R. v. A.F." on Justia Law