Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Respondent is a successful director and producer. After the trial court granted respondent's request to reduce his monthly child support payment to $9,842, from the original amount entered into at the time of dissolution of $17,500, appellant claimed that respondent’s reduced income did not constitute a material change in circumstances in light of his extreme wealth. Appellant further contends that the trial court imputed an unreasonably low rate of return to respondent’s substantial assets, valued at over $67 million. The court concluded that substantial evidence did not support the trial court’s finding of a material change in respondent’s circumstances for purposes of meeting his child support obligation; in light of respondent’s overall wealth, the reduction in his employment income did not materially impair his ability to pay the agreed upon child support; and the trial court imputed an unreasonably low rate of return to respondent’s tens of millions of dollars in assets. View "In re Marriage of Usher" on Justia Law

Mother appeals from the termination of her parental rights over her daughter, Charlotte V., on the ground the juvenile court failed to comply with the strict notice requirements specified in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. A juvenile dependency petition alleged that Mother repeatedly rammed her car into Father's while Charlotte was sitting in the back seat of Mother's car; Mother also brandished a loaded handgun at Father; the handgun was within Charlotte's reach inside the car; Mother and Father wrestled for the handgun; and Father was arrested for concealing a firearm and Mother was arrested for child endangerment. The court concluded that the record contains substantial evidence of proper notice to the Blackfeet Nation where DCFS provided two notices by certified mail to the tribe containing information about Mother, Father, and Charlotte's grandmother and uncle; the Blackfeet Nation was given a copy of Mother's tribal identification card and number as well as information about Mother's time at the reservation and Charlotte's health care at a health clinic on the reservation; and, because Charlotte claims Indian ancestry from Mother, that information would be sufficient for meaningful review. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Charlotte V." on Justia Law

The children, ages two and four, were detained after their parents‘ residence was raided by the Mendocino Major Crimes Task Force. Both parents allegedly had substance abuse problems. Father was in Mendocino County jail. Months later, the court ordered the children to be returned to Mother under a family maintenance plan. Weeks later, Mother was arrested in another raid; drug paraphernalia and honey oil were found within the children‘s reach. The children were detained. Father‘s reunification services were later terminated for lack of compliance. Mother’s services were terminated for lack of compliance and inability to have the children returned to her by the 12-month review. Over mother‘s objection, visitation was later terminated, due to distance. The court eventually terminated parental rights. The parents appealed, arguing failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. The minors‘ possible Wailaki Native American ancestry was first noted in the initial petition. Father‘s attorney informed the court that Father had provided to the social worker a completed ICWA-020 form indicating he had both Wailaki and Pomo heritage. The court of appeal reversed the termination of parental rights. Not all of the Pomo Indian Bands were noticed. View "In re: O.C." on Justia Law

All parties to this matter appealed a district court’s judgment. Orange County Social Services Department (SSA) sought to remove Z.G. and I.L. from their parents’ custody, C.G. (Mother) and H.L. (Father), after Children’s sibling, H.L., Jr. (Junior), died. The juvenile court found Parents’ “neglect” was a cause of Junior’s death. Despite the Parents essentially doing nothing to move the family towards reunification, the court found reunification was in the “best interest” of Children. The Parents appealed the jurisdiction and disposition orders and argued there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding their neglect was a cause of Junior’s death. Thus, they contend the court erred by concluding Children were subject to jurisdiction under section 300, subdivision (f), and that Parents were subject to the reunification services bypass provisions of section 361.5, subdivision (b)(4). The Children appealed the disposition order and contended there was insufficient evidence to support the finding reunification with Parents is in the best interest of Children. Hence, they argued, the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents under section 361.5, subdivision (c). SSA joined the Children’s argument. After review, the Court of Appeals concluded there was sufficient evidence to support the court’s finding Parents’ neglect was a cause of Junior’s death, but there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s finding reunification with Parents was in Children’s best interest. Therefore the court abused its discretion by ordering reunification services for Parents. Consequently, the Court reversed that portion of the disposition order, but affirmed the jurisdiction and disposition orders in all other respects. View "In re Z.G." on Justia Law

Contra Costa County Children and Family Services filed petitions concerning P.W., then 12 years old, and his sister, M.W., 11, alleging Mother caused P.W. serious physical harm during an altercation and her untreated mental condition impaired her ability to adequately parent. The children reported that they did not feel safe. Family members and close friends reported concern for the children’s well-being and had asked Mother to seek treatment, suspecting she might be bipolar. The children were placed in foster homes. Mother was granted supervised visitation. The disposition report advised that Mother had several previous dependency cases since 1994. Her parental rights to two other children had been terminated. There was an earlier dependency case involving P.W. and M.W., which concluded in reunification. Mother did not appear at a continued permanency review hearing 18 months later. The court found that returning the children to Mother’s custody would create a substantial risk of detriment to the children’s safety and physical or emotional well-being, remarking this was “not even a close call.” It found Mother had been offered reasonable reunification services and declined to continue the matter, noting that the children still feared Mother and opposed visitation. The court scheduled a hearing for terminating Mother’s reunification services. The court of appeal declined Mother’s petition to set aside the order scheduling that hearing. View "N.M. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Appellant Luis Fregoso appealed the superior court's grant of a domestic violence restraining order sought by his spouse, Adriana Hernandez. He contended the court abused its discretion because after the court issued a temporary restraining order (TRO), Hernandez invited him to a birthday party and had consensual sex with him. However, Hernandez testified that in one recent incident, Fregoso grabbed her forcefully enough to bruise her arm, and then held her face into a mattress so she could not breathe. Hernandez testified she was afraid of Fregoso, explaining that the consensual sex was part of their pattern of violence followed by attempted reconciliation. Because substantial evidence supported the court's finding of abuse under the Domestic Violence Protection Act (DVPA) the Court of Appeals affirmed the superior court’s order. View "Marr. of Fregoso & Hernandez" on Justia Law

Amber G. appealed a juvenile court order terminating her parental rights and ordering a permanent plan of adoption for her son, Isaiah S. Amber argued on appeal that the juvenile court: (1) did not ensure the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) complied with the relative placement statute (Welf. & Inst. Code 361.31); (2) abused its discretion by not exercising its independent judgment on the issue of relative placement' and (3) erred by not applying the sibling relationship exception to termination of parental rights. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's order. View "In re Isaiah S." on Justia Law

The presumed father of 10-year-old Anthony Q. appeals the juvenile court's disposition order under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361, subdivision (c), removing Anthony from his physical custody. The juvenile court found that there would be a substantial danger to the physical health, safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being of the child if he were returned to father's home. Father contends that the juvenile court lacked authority to make a removal order because Anthony was residing with his maternal stepgrandmother, not with father, at the time the section 300 petition was filed in this case. The court agreed that the juvenile court cited the incorrect statutory provision in ordering Anthony removed from father's physical custody, but disagreed that section 361, subdivision (c), provides the sole statutory authority for the removal of a child from the physical custody of a parent who has been found to pose a substantial danger if allowed to live in the same home as his or her child or otherwise to exercise that parent’s right to legal and physical custody. The court concluded that, in this case, the juvenile court's error in relying on section 361, subdivision (c), rather than the broader grant of authority in sections 361, subdivision (a), and 362, subdivision (a), was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the order. View "In re Anthony Q." on Justia Law

Mother and Miguel Z. had two children during their marriage, Minor 1 born in 2009, and Minor 2 born in 2010. Mother and Miguel Z. filed for divorce in 2014, but the divorce was never finalized. Miguel Z. said he separated from mother because he could not stop using drugs and he was in and out of prison. In April 2015 after he got out of prison, he moved to Arizona in order to help support his sobriety. After separating from Miguel Z. mother had three children with Anthony R. Anthony R. challenged a juvenile court's denial of his request to be declared a third parent under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) for mother's two children with Miguel. The juvenile court concluded section 7612, subdivision (c) was inapplicable because it found there was no existing parent-child relationship between Anthony R. and the children. The Court of Appeals agreed with that reasoning, adding that Anthony R. failed to meet his burden to establish a parentage claim under the Uniform Parentage Act, which was necessary to seek third parent status under section 7612, subdivision (c). View "In re M.Z." on Justia Law

In 1964, appellant Robert Cassinelli and respondent Janice Cassinelli were married; in 1986, they divorced. In the meantime, after 20 years of service, Robert had retired from the United States Air Force. In a stipulated judgment, the trial court awarded Janice her community property interest in Robert’s military retired pay. In 2012, it was determined that Robert had a combat-related disability. As a result, he became eligible to receive both veteran’s disability benefits and combat-related special compensation (CRSC); to do so, however, he had to waive his retired pay. Before the waiver, Robert received $791 a month and Janice received $541 in retired pay (taxable). After the waiver, Robert received $1,743 a month in veteran’s disability benefits and $1,389 a month in CRSC, for a total of $3,132 (tax-free); Janice received zero. As a result, the trial court ordered Robert to start paying Janice $541 a month in permanent and nonmodifiable spousal support. Robert appealed. The Court of Appeals agreed that the trial court erred by using spousal support as a remedy for the loss of a community property interest. However, it could properly order Robert to reimburse Janice for her lost community property interest; doing so would not have violated either federal law or finality principles. Accordingly, the Court reversed and remanded with directions to enter an order awarding Janice the same amount on a different theory. View "Marr. of Cassinelli" on Justia Law