Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Mother appealed the juvenile court's order terminating her parental rights to her two children, arguing that the juvenile court should have applied the beneficial parent-child relationship exception pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1)(B)(i). The Department's section 300 petition alleged, among other things, that mother has a history of illicit drug abuse and the drug use renders her incapable of providing the children with proper care and supervision. The court affirmed the order, concluding that the juvenile court reasonably concluded that the mother failed to show her relationship with the children outweighed the benefits of adoption. View "In re Noah G." on Justia Law

In this marital dissolution case, the trial court found four investment accounts held in joint title by wife Billie Miller and husband Dane Cooper during their marriage to be wife's separate property. The trial court also ordered that wife be reimbursed for her down payment on the marital residence on the ground her separate property was the source of the down payment. After the parties separated, wife lived in the marital residence for approximately eight years. For this time period, the trial court determined wife should have been reimbursed for monies she paid to maintain the residence. On appeal, husband contended: (1) the jointly titled investment accounts were community property for which wife was not entitled to any reimbursement; (2) wife introduced insufficient evidence to show the separate property nature of the funds used to purchase the marital residence; and (3) the trial court abused its discretion by allowing wife to live rent-free in the marital residence during the years after separation while making husband pay half of the maintenance and repairs for which the community received no benefit. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court erred in ordering her to be reimbursed for the down payment, and that wife owed the community "Watts" charges for periods when she had exclusive use of the marital residents. Wife was entitled to "Epstein" credits for the periods when she owed "Watts" charges. The Court affirmed in all other respects; the case was remanded for further proceedings. View "In re Marriage of Cooper" on Justia Law

In this case the competent spouse, Lynn Bower unquestionably paid for the support and maintenance of her conservatee husband David. In fact she devoted about 72 percent of the couple’s $200,000 marital estate income to making the $12,000 a month payments to a home specializing in Alzheimer’s care for David. What she didn’t do was comply with the letter of an order of the probate court to pay lump sum large professional fee claims directly to David’s conservator and several other creditors. Instead she either paid those claims directly herself, or those claims were paid indirectly from escrows based on liens asserted by the relevant professionals. Based on the literal noncompliance with the terms of the order, the probate judge ordered the community estate of the Bowers divided, with the conservator receiving David’s share. Because the probate court erroneously proceeded on the premise that article 3 of part 6, division 4 of the Probate Code, section 3089, was triggered by noncompliance with orders to pay professional fees directly to the conservator in a lump sum, rather than refusal to comply with an order to support the conservatee spouse, the Court of Appeal reversed an order dividing the estate and remanded the matter to the trial level for application of the proper standard to the facts of this case. View "Conservatorship of Bower" on Justia Law

Mother Jessica O. and Father Scott O. were the parents of D.O. Mother had three older children (Je.O., Y.O, and Jo.O., collectively, Siblings) by another father. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition after D.O.'s mentally ill father committed several acts of domestic violence and the mother failed to take protective action or otherwise cooperate with the Agency. After the Agency filed the petitions, the mother absconded with D.O. and Y.O. At the time of the detention hearing, their whereabouts were unknown, and neither parent attended the hearing. The court made a prima facie finding on the petition and ordered D.O. detained out of the parents' custody. One week later, police located D.O. with the father in a grocery store parking lot when the mother was caught shoplifting. D.O. and Y.O. were detained together in one foster home; their brothers were detained together in another. A recommendation was made, and the juvenile court terminated parental rights as to D.O. and ordered adoption as her permanent plan. On appeal, the mother and the Siblings contended the juvenile court erred when determining whether there would be substantial interference with D.O.'s sibling relationships by improperly considering the caregivers' assurances that sibling visits would continue, instead of by considering the factors specifically enumerated by statute. The Court of Appeal found the juvenile court cited five evidentiary bases supporting its conclusion. "Notably, the court did not rely solely on unsupported assurances from the caregivers that they would allow future visits; rather, the court cited the caregivers' proven track record of facilitating visits, and the paternal grandmother's commitment to the mother's new baby (who is related to D.O. but may not be related to the paternal grandmother). … And although the minor clearly enjoyed the time she spent with her half siblings, there was no evidence that the detriment she might suffer if visits ceased presented a sufficiently compelling reason to forgo the stability and permanence of adoption by caretakers to whom she was closely bonded." The Court of Appeal affirmed the termination of parental rights. View "In re D.O." on Justia Law

The family court determined appellant Bruce Frencher, Sr., owed $11,083.84 in child support arrears. Frencher contends the family court erred in its calculation because the excess Social Security derivative benefits paid for his child should have been applied to the arrears owed by Frencher. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed there was a miscalculation and reversed the judgment. View "In re Marriage of Hall & Frencher" on Justia Law

Mother C.S. appealed an order awarding sole custody of her children to Father A.G. Mother argued the trial court erred by: (1) not basing its order on the children’s best interests; (2) committing prejudicial evidentiary rulings; (3) denying Mother’s request during trial for a continuance to obtain counsel; and (4) committing separate errors that constituted cumulative error. The Court of Appeal disagreed with Mother’s contentions and affirm the order. As part of its decision, the Court also concluded the "doctrine of implied findings" applied in this case where the parties did not request a statement of decision, the court did not prepare one, and the settled statement used by the parties did not contain an express statement by the trial court that it complied with the procedures required for adopting a statement of decision and that the settled statement serves as the court’s statement of decision. View "A.G. v. C.S." on Justia Law

The single mother of five children, 8 to 15 years old, struggled with abusive relationships, homelessness and unemployment. They lived primarily in Marin County from 2000 until they moved to Richmond in 2009. In 2015, Mother asked Contra Costa Children & Family Services to place the four youngest children in foster care. CFS did so and filed petitions alleging Mother’s failure to protect and inability to provide support. The court ordered supervised visitation and that CFS refer Mother to substance abuse treatment and parenting education. CFS's disposition report recommended that the court order family reunification services and transfer the case to Marin County. Mother was participating 12- step meetings and alcohol abuse education in Marin and expected to secure a Marin apartment. Marin County court accepted the transfer and continued the case. Later, Marin’s Health and Human Services Department asked the court to transfer the cases back to Contra Costa because it had discovered that a county employee had a familial relationship to the parties, rendering the Department unable to continue services. Mother opposed the transfer; there was no evidence that the proposed transfer served the children’s best interests. The court of appeal remanded the cases to Marin, noting that all of the parties conceded error. View "In re Nia A." on Justia Law

Mother challenged the juvenile court's jurisdiction orders that adjudged two minors, Mia and Angel, to be dependents of the court. Mother has three children: Destiny (now deceased), Mia, and Angel. The court concluded that the evidence supports a finding that, if Mother had not neglectfully allowed Destiny to walk away from the family home unattended, then she would not have been crushed to death by a falling gate. Mother’s neglect in allowing Destiny to walk away from the family home unattended was a substantial factor, along with Destiny’s own locomotion, and along with the children who pushed down the gate, in causing her death. The evidence in the record supports a finding of factual, “but for,” causation between Mother’s negligent supervision and her daughter’s death. The court also concluded that the dependency court correctly exercised its jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (f) - sibling abuse - and the court need not explore whether another ground for jurisdiction exists. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re Mia Z." on Justia Law

The child's ("Isabella G.") father and paternal grandparents appealed the denial of the grandparents' petition for placement of the child. The father also appealed the termination of his parental rights. This case involved repeated requests by the child's grandparents for placement of the child, starting when the child was first detained in protective custody. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) did not conduct an assessment of the grandparents' home as required under Welf. & Inst. Code section 361.3, governing relative placement. Instead, the Agency placed the child in the home of a nonrelative extended family member and secured the cooperation of the grandparents and other relatives by representing that the Agency could not change the child's placement for a year. After a year, the grandparents again requested placement. The Agency did not conduct an assessment of their home as required. After reunification services were terminated, the Agency disregarded the grandparents' new request for placement. The grandparents retained counsel and filed a section 388 petition. Only then did the Agency complete a relative home assessment, approving the placement in less than three weeks. At the hearing on the petition, the juvenile court denied the grandparents' request to proceed under section 361.3, instead applying the caregiver adoption preference under section 366.26, subdivision (k). The Agency conceded the juvenile court erred in applying the adoption preference prior to terminating parental rights. The Agency maintained, however, that section 361.3 did not apply because the grandparents' request for placement was made after the reunification period ended and no new placement was necessary. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that when a relative requested placement of the child prior to the dispositional hearing, and the Agency does not timely complete a relative home assessment as required by law, the relative requesting placement was entitled to a hearing under section 361.3 without having to file a section 388 petition. Consequently, the Court reversed the juvenile court's orders denying the grandparent's request for placement under section 366.26, subdivision (k), necessarily reversed the orders terminating parental rights, and remanded for a relative placement hearing under section 361.3. View "In re Isabella G." on Justia Law

Uncle, the half-brother of the child’s biological father, supported mother after father abandoned her during the pregnancy and has been very involved in the child’s care. Father has had very little interaction with the now-three-year-old girl. The trial court denied uncle’s petition to establish a parental relationship, as a third natural parent, finding that uncle met the statutory criteria of a presumed parent, but that the presumption was rebutted under amended Family Code section 7612(c) and (d). Pursuant to section 7612(c), the trial court found that recognizing only two parents—mother and father—would not be detrimental to child, and ruled that, under section 7612 (d), an earlier filed judgment of parentage for father rebutted uncle’s presumed parent status. The court of appeal reversed; the trial court failed to consider all relevant factors, particularly the willingness and availability of one of the parents to take custody of child, if such a need were to arise, and whether a familial relationship exists between that parent and child such that the recognized value of two parents can be fulfilled in a meaningful way. That value may be expressed in the opportunity for financial support and its appurtenant rights and benefits. View "Martinez v. Vaziri" on Justia Law