Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant-appellant C.K. (father) appealed the juvenile court's disposition order removing his child, A.K., from his custody after declaring her to be a dependent of the court. He argued on appeal that the evidence failed to establish that he suffered from substance abuse such that removal was the only means of protecting her. Finding no reversible error in the order, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re A.K." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders over H.R. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that father was H.R.'s alleged but not biological father. In light of the conflicting statements before the juvenile court, the court could not that say the juvenile court erred in awaiting the results of genetic testing to prove biological paternity, or that it erred in finding him only an alleged father. Further, under the facts of this case, the court could not say that the juvenile court erred in holding him responsible for H.R. and sustaining the allegations of failure to provide support. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "L.A. County DCFS v. E.C." on Justia Law

Father appealed the juvenile court's jurisdiction and disposition orders over H.R. The court concluded that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court's determination that father was H.R.'s alleged but not biological father. In light of the conflicting statements before the juvenile court, the court could not that say the juvenile court erred in awaiting the results of genetic testing to prove biological paternity, or that it erred in finding him only an alleged father. Further, under the facts of this case, the court could not say that the juvenile court erred in holding him responsible for H.R. and sustaining the allegations of failure to provide support. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "L.A. County DCFS v. E.C." on Justia Law

In order to avoid foreclosure, Wife sold the marital home to Lawyer, who already had a junior lien on the property in the form of a family law attorney's real property lien. On appeal, Wife challenged the superior court's order disqualifying Lawyer from representing her in divorce proceedings with Husband. Husband argues that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Lawyer because Lawyer violated California State Bar Rules of Professional Conduct, rule 3-300, which prohibits lawyers from entering into unfair business agreements with their clients. The court concluded that the trial court erred in disqualifying Lawyer on Husband’s motion because Husband had no standing where he has no personal stake; regardless of Husband's standing, the court saw no continuing effect Lawyer’s alleged misconduct will have on the subsequent proceedings and concluded that no grounds otherwise support disqualifying Lawyer; and therefore, the court reversed the judgment. View "Murchison v. Murchison" on Justia Law

In their one-day dissolution trial, Paul was represented by his attorney. Susan was not represented by counsel. The court denied Susan’s continuance request and admitted Paul’s 22 exhibits into evidence.The court entered a judgment dissolving the marriage, declining to award spousal support to either party, dividing the couple’s property, stating that Susan waived future spousal support and that the court would not have awarded spousal support in any event because “each party was self-supporting,” and finding that Paul was entitled to a credit of $2,500 for support payments he had made to Susan in 2012 and 2013. Susan timely filed notice of appeal. Because there had been no court reporter, Susan requested a settled statement under California Rules of Court, 8.137. The court of appeal vacated; the order cannot stand because it was entered without a motion, without the required findings, and based on the false premise that Susan was responsible for the protracted nature of the proceedings on her motion. View "Mooney v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Bianka, a 13-year-old girl from Honduras, hopes to avoid deportation by obtaining “special immigrant juvenile” (SIJ) status. Pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), SIJ status is a classification created by Congress to provide special immigration protection to undocumented, unaccompanied children entering the United States who have been the victims of parental abuse, neglect, abandonment or some similar circumstance. Bianka initiated a parentage action under the Uniform Parentage Act, Fam. Code, 7600 et seq., naming her mother as the respondent. Bianka also filed a pretrial request for order asking the court to place her in the sole legal and physical custody of her mother and to make the additional findings necessary to allow her to petition for SIJ status, namely that she cannot reunify with her father because he abandoned her and it is not in her best interest to return to Honduras. The trial court declined to make the requested finding. The court concluded that the UPA is the exclusive means by which unmarried adults may resolve disputes relating to rights and obligations arising out of the parent-child relationship, including child custody, visitation and support. In an action between natural, alleged and/or presumed parents, the parentage of each party to the action is squarely at issue and is adjudicated before issues of custody, visitation and support are considered. The court further concluded that under the circumstances present here, where Bianka’s father’s identity and whereabouts are known, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by requiring Bianka to join her father to the pending action. Finally, the court provided instructions to Bianka on the next steps in seeking a custody order and/or SIJ findings. View "Bianka M. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

When Mother was about one-month pregnant, she and N.S.’s father were arrested for illegally growing and possessing marijuana for sale in their Hayward home. About two weeks after N.S. was born, they were again arrested for possessing marijuana for sale in their home. The Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a dependency petition alleging that N.S. faced a substantial risk of harm (Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b)). N.S. was placed with a maternal relative who lived in a two-unit building in Union City. Mother moved into the other unit. Visits between Mother and N.S. went well. Mother regularly attended a support group, participated in therapy, repeatedly tested negative for drugs, had no contact with Father, and moved out of the Hayward home, listing it for sale. N.S. had no medical issues and was not alleged to have suffered any physical harm in her parents’ care. The Agency nonetheless recommended that the juvenile court take jurisdiction because Mother had been arrested twice for serious charges. The court sustained the dependency petition, concluding that there was a current risk of harm. While appeal was pending, the juvenile court dismissed dependency jurisdiction, awarding custody to Mother, with supervised visits for Father. The court of appeal dismissed an appeal, noting that Mother suffered no harm as a result of the jurisdictional findings below. View "In re N.S." on Justia Law

Raul and Ingrid married in 1978 in Santa Cruz County. In 1993, the family moved to Chile, where Ingrid had been born. The couple separated in 1995. Since 2010, Raul has resided in New York. In 2012, Ingrid filed a dissolution petition in Santa Cruz, seeking attorney fees and spousal support. Raul signed a receipt for papers mailed to New York, but did not appear. The court ordered him to pay support plus attorney fees. Later, the court garnished Raul’s wages. In 2013, Ingrid sought an order determining Raul’s arrearages. Raul appeared on his own behalf. The court ruled that the support order was valid and awarded arrearages. Months later Raul moved to quash service for lack of jurisdiction and to set aside the 2013 orders and garnishment. Raul asserted that Ingrid “has lived and continues to live in Chile since . . . 2000 or 2001.” Ingrid introduced evidence showing her presence in the county for at least part of the six months prior to her filing. The court found that Raul had submitted to jurisdiction and later entered default. The court of appeal reversed. While Raul’s appearance constituted a general submission to jurisdiction and he forfeited his objection to an untimely hearing notice, the court erred by entering default while Raul’s court of appeal petition was pending. View "In re: Marriage of Obrecht" on Justia Law

The parties were married for almost 22 years before they separated. Appellant Kim Shimkus appealed a postjudgment order granting respondent Jeffrey Shimkus' (Jeff) request to terminate spousal support. She contended the court erred when it did not automatically admit declarations into evidence; failed to apply the disentitlement doctrine; found there was a change of circumstances warranting termination of spousal support; and failed to require Jeff to prove inability to work. She also claimed procedural errors: the court did not provide a statement of decision, failed to set out its analysis of the factors in Family Code section 4320, and failed to make findings as to its denial of attorney fees. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err when it refused to consider the declarations that were never offered into evidence. Nor was it error to find the disentitlement doctrine did not apply. Further the court properly found a change of circumstances allowing it to consider whether support should be modified. However, in making its decision the court was required to consider all of the section 4320 factors. The Court concluded it could not determine whether the trial court did so because it failed to issue a statement of decision. Therefore, the case was reversed and remanded for the trial court to consider all of the applicable section 4320 factors, issue a statement of decision, and to make findings as to its denial of attorney fees. View "Marr. of Shimkus" on Justia Law

Shannon L., the biological mother of minor Donovan L., Jr. (DJ), and her husband Donovan L., Sr. (Donovan) appealed a juvenile court's June 2015 disposition order. The juvenile court ruled that although Donovan was DJ's conclusively presumed father under Family Code section 7540, David S. was DJ's presumed father under section 7611, subdivision (d), and DJ had three parents under recently enacted section 7612, subdivision (c). After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred in applying section 7612, subdivision (c) in this case, given its determination that David and DJ lacked an existing parent-child relationship. Accordingly, the Court reversed the disposition order insofar as it determined David was DJ's presumed father under Family Code section 7612, subdivision (c) and ordered services and visitation for David. View "In re Donovan L." on Justia Law