Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

David W. appealed a postjudgment order establishing a duty of parental support to former spouse Cecilia W. for their adult child, Robert W., pursuant to Family Code section 3910.2 David contended: (1) the trial court lacked jurisdiction; (2) applied incorrect legal standards; and (3) did not have substantial evidence to support its order finding Robert to be incapacitated from making a living and without sufficient means. After review of the record, the Court of Appeal found jurisdiction but agreed the trial court failed to apply correct legal standards, and there was no substantial evidence to support its order. The Court reversed the order and remanded with directions. View "Marriage of Cecilia & David W." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the juvenile court's jurisdictional findings and disposition orders declaring her son to be a person described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (b), and removing the son from Mother’s custody. The court concluded that substantial evidence supports the jurisdictional finding as to Mother where Mother has significant limitations, has very little control over her limbs, could not speak, used a wheelchair, and relied on others to meet all of her activities of daily living. Further, the evidence before the juvenile court also set forth specific social worker concerns about Mother and her unwillingness to parent her son to the extent she was able, and Mother failed to provide any care and control over her son. Finally, substantial evidence supports the juvenile court's disposition orders and finding of reasonable efforts. Accordingly, the court affirmed the orders. View "LA Cnty. Dept. of Children and Family Serv. v. Maritza M." on Justia Law

Mother has five children who became the subjects of dependency proceedings in 2010. In 2014, after a contested hearing spanning multiple hearing dates, the juvenile court dismissed the case and entered an order stating, “Conditions do not exist which would justify initial assumption of jurisdiction under section 300 and are not likely to exist if supervision is withdrawn.” The juvenile court dismissed the dependency and ordered informal family maintenance. The court of appeal affirmed, citing Welfare and Institutions Code section 3641 and reasoning, that when the social services agency opposes termination of dependency jurisdiction, it bears the burden of proof to show the existence of the conditions section 364(c) specifies must be proven to support retention of dependency jurisdiction. In this case, however, the social services agency recommended dependency jurisdiction be terminated. Counsel for the dependent children opposed the recommendation and bore the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions justifying initial assumption of dependency jurisdiction either still existed or were likely to exist if supervision were withdrawn. View "In re Aurora P." on Justia Law

A single mother of five children subject to dependency proceedings sought to reverse a court order denying her further reunification services with respect to her three oldest children and to stay a hearing under Welfare and Institutions Code 366.26 that had been set for September 16, 2015. She claims the court erred in denying her further reunification services because she has made and continues to make reasonable efforts to address the problems that led to the removal of her children, so denial of additional services is not in the children’s best interests. The court of appeal stayed the hearing, but ultimately denied the petition and lifted the stay. Mother has received extensive child welfare services and has taken advantage of them only sporadically. The children have been involved with the dependency system for 11 years, and have spent six years in out-of-home placement with multiple caregivers, not always in healthful circumstances. Mother’s drug abuse, mental instability, and abusive relationships with men, have exposed the children to a continuing risk of harm, delayed their educational development, and left them without a stable home. The court’s factual findings in determining to withhold further services were supported by substantial evidence. View "D.T. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

In this appeal, Glenn Drake challenged the trial court’s order requiring him to pay adult child support for his emancipated son, Dallas. His appeal raised two issues: (1) whether the conditions of Family Code section 3910, subdivision (a) for payment of adult child support met; and (2) whether the trial court erred by ordering that adult child support payments be made to Terri Drake, Dallas’s mother and Glenn’s ex-wife, and allowing her to use those payments for her personal expenses. Although the trial court misconstrued the standard for an award of adult child support, the Court of Appeal concluded the trial court did not err by ordering Glenn to make support payments because the evidence established that Dallas was incapacitated from earning a living and without sufficient means. The trial court erred, however, by ordering that Glenn make the adult child support payments to Terri. The Court of Appeal affirmed the order awarding adult child support but reversed to the extent it required support payments be made to Terri. On remand, the trial court had to consider and decide the best means for paying adult child support to Dallas. View "Marriage of Drake" on Justia Law

Defendant-appellant S.H. (mother) was the biological mother of C.G. (born in 2013), the child at issue here, and B.H. (born in 2011), who was C.G.’s half sibling. Both children were removed from mother’s custody, and her parental rights were eventually terminated. On appeal, mother argued that the order terminating her parental rights as to C.G. should have been reversed for failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian and Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA). After review of the specific facts entered into the trial court record, the Court of Appeal agreed, reversed and remanded. View "In re B.H." on Justia Law

In 2012, Cueto obtained a two-year domestic violence prevention restraining order against Dozier, the father of her eight-year-old son. Shortly before the order was set to expire, Cueto sought permanent renewal of that order. Following a hearing, the trial court denied Cueto’s request, finding that she had not established an objectively reasonable fear of future abuse by Dozier. The court of appeal reversed and remanded for the trial court to determine whether the restraining order should be renewed for five years or permanently under 14 Fam. Code, 6345(a). While the trial court relied on the fact that Dozier had not violated the order, it should have considered his history of violence and failure to attend anger management classes as required for visitation with his son. View "Cueto v. Dozier" on Justia Law

Six days after F.A. (F.) was born exposed to methamphetamine, she was placed with Mr. and Mrs. S., foster parents who hoped to adopt her. Unfortunately, when F. was almost seven weeks old, the Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) removed F. from the S.s’ care, mistakenly believing exigent circumstances required the removal, and immediately placed the baby with Mr. and Mrs. M., who were also foster parents who hoped to adopt her. When SSA realized its mistake and decided to re-place F. with the S.s, the M.s filed a grievance, which kept F. in the M.s’ home during the grievance process. The S.s and the M.s filed competing Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petitions. The court ordered SSA not to remove F. from the M.s’ home pending the court’s decision on the competing petitions, and granted visitation rights to the S.s. After many continuances, the court found both couples would be excellent adoptive parents, but granted the M.s’ petition and denied the S.s’ petition, finding the M.s had a “slight edge” because the M.s had an approved adoptive home study and because the baby had flourished under the M.s’ care for the last 100 days. On appeal, the S.s contended: (1) this appeal should have been treated as a writ petition; (2) SSA should have returned F. to the S.s before the M.s could file a grievance; (3) the court abused its discretion by granting so many continuances; (4) the court exceeded its authority by overriding SSA’s decision to return F. to the S.s, rather than reviewing SSA’s choice for an abuse of discretion; and (5) this case was not moot because it presented an issue of continuing public importance which is capable of repetition, yet evading review, and therefore the Court of Appeal should offer guidance to prevent future heartbreak to foster parents from whom a child is wrongly removed. After review, the Court of Appeal found no merit as to the S.s’ first four contentions, but concluded that what happened to the S.s was wrong, and potentially could have been prevented had regulations and policies been in place allowing the foster parents to promptly challenge the grounds for removal before SSA placed the child with another couple. The Court nevertheless concluded the court did not abuse its discretion under the difficult circumstances presented, and accordingly affirm the court’s orders. View "In re F.A." on Justia Law

At trial, the prospective adoptive parents, the B.’s, "pulled out all the stops" in their effort to show that D.N. did not merit the status of a “Kelsey S. father.” D.N. tried to stop the adoption of his child, T.K., by challenging the B.'s assertion that he made no demonstration of his willingness to financially support the child, or a willingness to emotionally support the mother during her pregnancy. The Court of Appeal upheld the trial court's conclusion that D.N. did not demonstrate the full commitment required to establish either the financial or emotional elements. He did not pay any of the mother’s (K.K.’s) substantial pregnancy expenses. He did not, as was within his power, save up for the future expenses of supporting a child. In fact, he raided the small fund the couple initially established for child expenses and never paid it back. He even falsified his check book register to make it look like he had sent money to her when he had not. As to emotional support, during the pregnancy D.N. engaged in a campaign of cyber-stalking K.K. that in some instances bordered on the downright "creepy." He showed up at a medical appointment he would not have known about unless he had hacked into her cell phone. When she had an appointment with an attorney to discuss this adoption case, D.N. just happened to email the attorney at the moment that appointment commenced. He also used contact information from K.K.’s cell phone to try to block the adoption. Given the lack of a full financial commitment and the negative emotional effect of the cyber-stalking during pregnancy, the Court of Appeal could not say the trial court erred in concluding D.N. did not qualify as a “Kelsey S. father.” Accordingly, it affirmed the order terminating D.N.’s parental rights and freeing T.K. for adoption by the B.’s. View "Adoption of T.K." on Justia Law

Christine L. appealed a placement order in the juvenile dependency case of her minor children Liam L., M.L., and Angel L. The order placed the minors with their presumed father and noncustodial parent, J.L. Christine argued the evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the minors' placement with J.L. would not be detrimental under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a). By its terms, and under the California Supreme Court's decision in "In re Zacharia D."(6 Cal.4th 435, (1993)), that statute applied only when the minor was first removed from the custodial parent, generally at the time of the disposition hearing. "Under the current statutory scheme, a noncustodial parent who requests placement or custody for the first time after disposition must file a modification petition under section 388 to make such a request. [. . .] given the underlying presumption in California's dependency scheme that a minor should be placed with a noncustodial parent, absent a finding of detriment, such a placement is inherently in the minors' best interests. A noncustodial parent under these circumstances who files a section 388 petition is therefore entitled to custody unless the party opposing placement establishes that placement with the noncustodial parent would be detrimental to the minors' safety, protection or physical or emotional well-being." The Court of Appeal concluded that J.L.'s failure to file a section 388 petition was harmless because the issue of placement with J.L. was before the court with the consent of all parties. The Court further concluded that the juvenile court's finding that the minors' placement with J.L. would not be detrimental was supported by substantial evidence. The Court therefore affirmed the juvenile court's placement order. View "In re Liam L." on Justia Law