Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The parties petitioned for dissolution of marriage in 2006. Cheryl Walker filed for bankruptcy in December 2007. Cheryl's bankruptcy schedule A listed two real properties held in cotenancy, including the family home. The proceeds (beyond the amount needed to pay the secured lender) from the sale of the family home was available for distribution to the parties. The question this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether the should have been distributed equally or was one spouse entitled to a greater share because of the bankruptcy discharge? The trial court awarded Cheryl a larger share of the proceeds than her ex-husband Roy Walker, ruling that to do otherwise would enforce a discharged debt against Cheryl and thereby violate federal bankruptcy law. The Court of Appeal reversed: "Though a secured lender's potential right to a deficiency judgment (i.e., in personam liability) can be discharged in bankruptcy, the lender's lien on real property (i.e., in rem liability) is unaffected by a discharge in bankruptcy. Here, the lien was extinguished at closing by payment of the current amount owed on the loan, a necessary condition to selling the property and thereby benefitting both Cheryl and Roy. Under state law, the parties were entitled to equal shares of the proceeds. This result is consistent with bankruptcy law." View "In re Marriage of Walker" on Justia Law

The Juvenile Court found R.G., a nonminor dependent within the transition jurisdiction of the juvenile court (Welf. & Inst. Code, 450), ineligible for extended foster care support payments between January 13 and March 13, 2015, because he was neither employed at least 20 hours per week nor participating in a program or activity that promoted or removed barriers to employment, as is required to receive financial support pursuant to section subdivisions (b)(4) and (b)(3) of section 11403 of the California Fostering Connections to Success Act, under which certain youth in foster care may continue receiving financial assistance after turning 18. The court of appeal agreed and reversed. The undisputed evidence indicated that R.G.’s activities, which were primarily self-directed, included formulating a specific job search plan; applying online and in person to numerous jobs; following up with prospective employers; receiving feedback from an independent living skills program specialist on how to improve his resume and job applications; and maintaining contact with the social worker on his progress. This evidence showed that he was working toward his goals during the period in question as contemplated by the statute. View "In re R.G." on Justia Law

Michael B., a presumed father of infant Emma B., appealed a juvenile court order denying his motion for paternity testing. He argued the trial court had an obligation to order such a test because biological paternity was a relevant fact and in denying his motion, the court prevented him from rebutting his presumed father status under Family Code section 7611, subdivision (a). After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal disagreed that a biological paternity determination was an essential or relevant issue in the underlying proceedings and affirmed the order. View "In re Emma B." on Justia Law

Mother Mari M. appealed a juvenile court order that her son M.M., born June 2013, was a child described by Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivision (a). The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency received a report of severe domestic violence between mother and Rogers M., minor's father, which had taken place on December 2, 2014 and which had been witnessed by minor. The domestic violence included father choking mother while holding minor; father throwing mother into a piano, a table and onto the floor while minor was "at their feet"; father pinning mother on the floor at least two times; father breaking mother's phone; and mother hitting and kicking father and shredding his shirt among other allegations. The December 2 domestic violence incident came to light two days later when Mother contacted father's naval command and sought a military protective order (MPO). Mother contended the juvenile court erred when it: (1) assumed permanent jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act after officials and a supreme court judge from minor's "home state" of Japan unambiguously and repeatedly stated it was inappropriate under their legal system for a Japanese court to communicate with the juvenile court regarding this case; (2) failed to advise her that she could commence a separate custody action in Japan; and (3) found minor a dependent under subdivision (a) of Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, rather than under subdivision (b) of that statute. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

Father appealed an order terminating his parental rights to his son, D.P., born in 2013, under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26.1 Father contended the juvenile court erred in deeming him an alleged father, without ordering requested paternity testing. According to Father, this prevented him from establishing parenthood and from obtaining reunification services and custody of his son. After review of the trial court record, the Court of Appeal rejected father’s contentions and affirmed the judgment. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Peter Michaels and defendant Peggy Turk lived with each other from 2001 to 2006 and had one child together, a son born in 2002. For nearly a decade, they have been litigating over child custody, child support, and various restraining orders. Except for the restraining order at issue here, all of the litigation took place in Orange County. Peggy appealed a domestic violence restraining order issued against her under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act by a commissioner of the Riverside County Superior Court. The order prohibited her appellant from posting negative and harassing communications online about Peter. Appellant argued that the order was void because as a self-represented party, she did not consent to having a commissioner hear the matter. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed and reversed the restraining order. View "Michaels v. Turk" on Justia Law

Linda Brandes appealed a judgment awarding Charles Brandes a business he founded before the parties married, Brandes Investment Partners (BIP), as his separate property, and awarding the community an equitable allocation (under the "Pereira" approach for the early period during which the growth was primarily attributable to his personal efforts, and under the "Van Camp" approach for the later period during which the growth was primarily attributable to other factors). Under a variety of theories, Linda argued the court erred by not determining the community owns all or most of BIP. In addition, Linda argued the court erred by denying her prejudgment interest on her share of the community's interest in BIP as of the end of the Pereira period, by characterizing profit distributions BIP labeled as W-2 income as Charles's separate property, and by awarding Charles 10,000 shares of BIP stock he purchased from a third party in two transactions during the marriage. Linda claimed 4,000 of the shares are community property because Charles used community funds to purchase them. She contended the remaining shares were presumptively community property under the lender's intent doctrine, because the purchase was financed under a promissory note entered into during the marriage, and Charles did not rebut the presumption by showing the seller relied primarily on his separate property for payment. Charles also appealed, contending the court erred by awarding Linda $450,000 per month in spousal support. Alternatively, he argued the support was excessive given her actual expenses. After review, the Court of Appeal partially agreed with Linda on the lender's intent doctrine: the doctrine applied to the percentage of the 6,000 shares purchased under the promissory note, and the court erred by not finding in accordance with the community property presumption since Charles did not rebut it. In all other respects, the Court disagreed with Linda's theories. The Court declined to address Charles's issue raised on appeal, because on remand it might become moot. On remand, the trial court had to revisit the spousal support issue, because the order was based, in part, on a spouse's separate estate, and Linda's separate estate might increase. View "Marriage of Brandes" on Justia Law

D.B. was taken into protective custody in 2012 when he was seven years old. Mother N.B. appealed the juvenile court's order pertaining to the continued dependency of D.B. She argued that Welfare and Institutions Code section 364(c) required the juvenile court to terminate jurisdiction because the evidence established continued supervision was unnecessary to protect D.B. from risk of harm. The Orange County Social Services Agency (SSA) agreed with Mother that the juvenile court should have terminated dependency jurisdiction but, unlike Mother, believed D.B.'s father, A.K., should have been granted visitation rights. The Court of Appeal reversed and remanded, finding that substantial evidence did not support the juvenile court's finding that the conditions justifying initial assumption of jurisdiction still existed. To the contrary, SSA took the position and proved those conditions no longer existed. View "In re D.B." on Justia Law

The dependency petition alleged that mother "K.B." had beat X.B., her youngest son, with a belt causing welts and bruises to his chest, shoulder, arms, and legs, and that she pushed X.B.’s head into a pillow to muffle his screams, causing him to feel as if he were suffocating. The petition alleged that mother had a history of using inappropriate discipline techniques on her sons, such as beating them with belts, humiliating K.B. in public, and forcing K.B. to complete strenuous exercise routines as punishment. The petition also alleged that mother allowed her live-in boyfriend to inappropriately punish K.B. and to smoke marijuana in the children’s presence. K.B. appealed the trial court’s order placing X.B. with his nonoffending and noncustodial biological father, K.D. (father), who lived out of state. She argued that the court erred by failing to find under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2, subdivision (a), that it would be detrimental to X.B.’s emotional well-being to be separated from his maternal family. Mother requested that X.B. be placed with his older sibling in the home of his maternal grandmother. She also argued that the court failed to give proper notice under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re K.B." on Justia Law

Irwin and Linda divorced in 1987. They are now in their early 80’s. Their marital termination agreement, which merged into a judgment, required Irwin to establish a life insurance trust for Linda, subject to certain terms. In 2013, Linda filed a Request for Order to Disclose Insurance Information, asking for a court order requiring Irwin to provide “proof” that the insurance policy was in existence. Irwin filed a Responsive Declaration consenting to disclose information about his existing life insurance for Linda’s benefit, attached some documents, and did not appear at the hearing. At the hearing, the family court judge construed the Request for Order To Disclose Insurance Information as a motion to enforce the marital termination agreement, and issued an order after the hearing which, among other things, required Irwin to establish a $126,916.00 trust with Linda as beneficiary. The court of appeal reversed, holding that Irwin was denied due process because the trial court’s orders exceeded the relief requested by Linda in the Request for Orders, he had inadequate notice of the relief, and the family court impermissibly modified a judgment that was nonmodifiable on its terms. View "In re: Marriage of Siegel" on Justia Law