Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael C. appeals a juvenile court judgment terminating his parental rights to his minor daughter A.C., and selecting adoption as her permanent plan. Father mainly argued that no sufficient evidence supported the court's underlying findings that: (1) the Agency's adoption assessment report was adequate and up to date on the child's mental and emotional status; and (2) there was no applicable exception to adoption preference. In addition, the Father sought review, by way of designating his appeal to be a writ proceeding, of certain of the juvenile court's earlier orders from the 12-month review and referral hearing, claiming he did not forfeit such claims, even though his previously appointed appellate attorney declined to file such a writ petition after the 12-month orders were made (to that end, Father argued he received ineffective assistance of counsel). Accordingly, Father now asked the Court of Appeal to consider whether the 12-month referral hearing orders were still reviewable because they failed to meet the standards of the Indian Child Welfare Act regarding sufficient evidence: (1) of "ICWA detriment" to return the child to his custody; and (2) whether "active reunification efforts" were made that allowed the juvenile court to rule that his reunification services were adequate and could properly be terminated at the 12-month review and referral hearing. After careful consideration of these arguments in light of the trial court's record, the Court of Appeal determined there was no adequate showing in support of Father's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, and further, he has forfeited the substantive arguments he raised about the orders made at the 12-month review hearing. "Even if we were to consider those claims on a writ basis, we would find them meritless." Regarding the judgment that terminated his parental rights and selected adoption as the permanent plan for the child, the Court found no prejudicial error or abuse of discretion occurred, and that the judgment was supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re A.C." on Justia Law

Anthony B. (Father) appealed a juvenile court order terminating his parental rights to minor, Anthony B. (Anthony), and choosing adoption as the appropriate permanent plan. The San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition on Anthony's behalf, believing neither Anthony's mother nor father could safely care for him. The Agency cited the mother's mental illness, the father's failure to protect, the lack of a suitable living condition, and the parents' previous separate failures to reunify with siblings due to domestic violence and substance abuse to justify the removal. Anthony was removed from Father and his mother and placed in a foster home. Reunification services were ordered for Father but bypassed for the mother. The Agency requested the court terminate Father's reunification services at the 18-month permanency review hearing because Father failed to maintain sobriety and did not have a safe and stable environment for Anthony to live in. The court terminated Father's parental rights at the section 366.26 hearing, finding Anthony adoptable, and that no exception to adoption existed. Father alleges the court erred in finding the parent-child beneficial relationship exception inapplicable. He argued he met both prongs required by the exception and sought a reversal of the termination order. Finding no abuse of discretion, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "In re Anthony B." on Justia Law

Mother appealed the trial court's order terminating her parental rights with regard to her daughter. At issue on appeal is compliance with notice provisions of the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that there is a duty under the IWCA to send updated notices to the relevant tribes when additional information regarding a child's ancestors is obtained after the original ICWA notices were sent. In this case, because the Department failed to send updated notices after it obtained additional information, the court reversed the order terminating parental rights. View "In re I.B." on Justia Law

The Alameda County Juvenile Court sustained the allegation that Alberto C., the presumed father, had sexually molested I.C., his four-year-old daughter. Several weeks later, the court declared I.C. a dependent child, and placed her in the custody of her mother. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting arguments that the findings were not supported by substantial evidence and that the lengthy period between the jurisdictional and the dispositional hearings was excessive, unjustified, and contrary to section 352 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court acknowledged the problem of a minor child’s accusation of parental molestation, especially when there is no direct or tangible proof that any molestation occurred, but noted that the hearsay statement was found in the caseworker’s report and was also contained in the video recording of the minor being interviewed. Iin viewing it the juvenile court was exercising its power to judge credibility. The juvenile court’s decision to receive evidence of the minor’s statement—both in the form of words in the caseworker’s report and the recording—was supported by substantial evidence and properly served as the basis for asserting the jurisdiction of the juvenile court over the minor as a dependent child. View "In re I.C." on Justia Law

Joshua was the 13-year-old son of Charlotte. In October 2014, Joshua was removed from his mother's care after she became intoxicated and scratched and pinched him. Police officers observed that Charlotte was "delirious" and "obviously intoxicated." Charlotte denied she had a drinking problem. The Agency filed a section 300 petition on Joshua's behalf. In its court report, the Agency detailed seven earlier referrals to child protective services concerning Joshua's safety, and Joshua's prior adjudication as a juvenile court dependent. When the dependency proceeding at issue here was initiated, the social worker asked Charlotte for placement options for Joshua. Charlotte identified her boyfriend Luis. Luis did not have any criminal or child protective history. Charlotte brought Luis with her to visit Joshua after he was detained. Joshua was happy to see his mother but was uncomfortable with Luis, asking the social worker if Luis was allowed to yell at him. Joshua later told the social worker he wanted some time away from his mother and hoped she would obtain treatment so she would not drink. He did not want to live with Luis. Charlotte challenged the finding that her boyfriend, Luis, did not qualify as a nonrelative extended family member (NREFM) for placement of her son Joshua. She contended the juvenile court erred as a matter of law when it ruled a parent is not a relative within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.3, subdivision (c)(2) for purposes of determining NREFM status. Charlotte also argued the juvenile court erred when it did not order the San Diego County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) to evaluate Luis's home as a placement option for Joshua. The Agency agreed the juvenile court misinterpreted section 362.7 when it ruled Luis was not an NREFM. The Agency contended, however, the error was harmless because the juvenile court found it was not in Joshua's best interests to be placed with Luis, which would have disqualified the placement had the court correctly determined Luis's NREFM status. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded the juvenile court erred as a matter of law when it ruled a parent was not a relative within the meaning of 361.3, subdivision (c)(2) for purposes of determining NREFM status within the meaning of section 362.7. However, the court did not abuse its discretion when it determined placement with Luis was not in Joshua's best interests. Because placement was not in Joshua's best interests notwithstanding Luis's status as an NREFM, the court was not required to direct the Agency to complete its evaluation of his home. The order was affirmed. View "In re Joshua A." on Justia Law

Appellant L.M. was the biological father of A.J. (child). Father appealed a juvenile court order from the Welfare and Institutions Code, section 366.261 permanency planning hearing that denied him supervised visitation with the child based on a finding of detriment. “Detriment is a familiar standard in child welfare determinations; but, as several courts have acknowledged, the notion of detriment is at best a nebulous standard that depends on the context of the inquiry . . . . It cannot mean merely that the parent in question is less than ideal . . . . Rather, the risk of detriment must be substantial, such that [the proposed action] represents some danger to the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” The Court of Appeal concluded that while substantial evidence did support the court’s finding of detriment, it wished to clarify that the trial court was not required to make such a finding because, as a mere biological father, father was not considered a “parent” for purposes of section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C) and thus was not presumptively entitled to visits during guardianship. As the juvenile court pointed out at the section 366.26 hearing, it would be an “anomaly or quirk in that throughout the length of the case, it was perfectly appropriate to deny [father] visitation based on [the child’s] best interest or the court’s discretion” but now that a permanent plan had been established the court could only deny visitation if it could make a finding of detriment. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Legislature did not intend to create such an anomaly or quirk, and that it fully intended the term “parents” in section 366.26, subdivision (c)(4)(C), to include only mothers and presumed fathers. For this reason, the juvenile court here did not have to make a finding of detriment before denying father visits with the child during the guardianship. View "In re A.J." on Justia Law

Plaintiff Isidora appealed the trial court's issuance of a mutual restraining order against her and her husband under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act (DVPA), Fam. Code, 6200 et seq., insofar as the order enjoins her conduct. The court concluded that a trial court may issue a mutual domestic violence restraining order under section 6305 only if both parties have filed requests for such relief, so as to give the requisite notice to the opposing party. In this case, the trial court erred in making the restraining order mutual in the absence of an affirmative request by the husband for such protection. Accordingly, the court reversed the mutual restraining order insofar as it restrains Isidora. View "Isidora M. v. Silvino M." on Justia Law

Mary is the child of the marriage of Marion and Herbert Sanders. Marion executed a will in California, placing her separate property assets in the Trust and providing that Mary would receive the Trust income during her lifetime. Upon Mary’s death, the remainder of the Trust was to be distributed “for the benefit of the then living issue” of Mary. The will defined ‘’issue" as lawful lineal descendants of all degrees, including legally adopted children. If Mary had “no living issue” surviving, Jody was to become the income beneficiary of the Trust. In 2013, Mary adopted Andrew, the adult son of a close friend, and sought a declaration of Andrew's rights. The probate court concluded that Andrew did not fall within this definition of “issue” because he had been adopted as an adult under Texas adoption statutes. The probate court believed that a Texas parent-child relationship did not encompass the same rights and duties as a California parent-child relationship. The court of appeal reversed. California cannot devalue a parent-child relationship simply because it was created, whether by biology or adoption, in a sister state that imposes different rights and duties. Those policy choices do not alter the status of the relationship. View "Sanders v. Yanez" on Justia Law

Christopher Olson filed for divorce from Heather Olson, requesting joint custody of their two young children. After Heather did not respond, a default judgment of dissolution, which included a custody order, was granted. Heather petitioned for a modification of the custody order over a year later and Christopher objected. The court held that a parent has standing under Family Code section 3087 to request a modification of a child custody judgment notwithstanding that the judgment sought to be modified was a default judgment taken against the parent who is petitioning for the change. The court denied the petition, treating the appeal as a petition for a writ of mandate. View "Marr. of Olson" on Justia Law

Mother challenged the juvenile court's jurisdictional and dispositional order regarding her two children. The court agreed with Mother's contention that her failure to obtain a protective order following a 2007 domestic violence incident with father did not expose the children to a current risk of harm, and the evidence was insufficient to establish that she knew or should have known of father's criminal history and sex offender status and placed the children at risk of harm by allowing him access to them. Accordingly, the court modified the order to strike the allegations based on mother's failure to protect the children from father. The court affirmed the order in all other respects. View "In re M.W." on Justia Law