Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The parties married in 1993 and separated in 2007. Their divorce was “contentious” and “highly litigated.” In 2008, both parties signed a purported marital settlement agreement, which set forth terms determining child custody, spousal and child support, and division of community assets, obligations, property rights, and other financial rights. In 2009, husband moved to enter judgment based on the Agreement. Wife argued that the parties “never fully agreed to the terms of the proposed settlement agreement.” In 2010, Judge Morse denied husband’s motion, ruling that there was never a “meeting of the minds.” Later, the case was transferred to Judge Siegel. After a 15-day trial Judge Siegel indicated that he was going to reconsider Judge Morse’s ruling and allowed the parties to brief the issue. The court stated that the prior ruling denying the motion was “improvident and erroneous … not supported by … any evidence. No witnesses testified and no exhibits were offered.” The court found insufficient evidence to support wife’s claim that she was under duress, coercion, fraud, or undue influence. The court entered the judgment of dissolution, incorporating the Agreement into the judgment. The court of appeal reversed, finding the ruling erroneous and prejudicial to wife. View "In re Marriage of Oliverez" on Justia Law

Shortly after his birth in 2003, the County of San Diego Health and Human Services Agency (the Agency) placed a dependent child named J.J. with appellant Rita Marshall. Marshall cared for J.J. for two and a half years and began the process of adopting him. However, in June 2006, the Agency commenced proceedings that led to J.J.'s removal from Marshall's care and his placement in another home for adoption. Marshall filed this action against the County of San Diego and several County social workers who were involved in the proceedings that led to J.J.'s removal. In the causes of action relevant to this appeal, Marshall brought two claims pursuant to 42 United States Code section 1983 claiming her right to due process in removing J.J. without providing her adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard, and in making deliberately false statements to the trial court that led to the removal. Marshall also brought a section 1983 claim against the County, alleging that the social workers violated her constitutional rights pursuant to a County custom or policy. The trial court concluded that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Marshall's claims against them because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that the social workers had violated Marshall's "clearly established" constitutional rights. The court also concluded that the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law with respect to Marshall's section 1983 claim. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that Marshall had a clearly established constitutional right not to have J.J.'s placement terminated based on a social worker's statement that was either deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for its truth. However, the Court concluded further that the social workers were entitled to qualified immunity with respect to Marshall's claims premised on this theory of liability because there was no evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that that J.J.'s placement with Marshall was terminated based on statements that were either deliberately false or made with reckless disregard for their truth. The Court rejected the remainder of Marshall's other claims, and affirmed the judgment. View "Marshall v. Co. of San Diego" on Justia Law

Defendant and appellant John Ervin challenged a restraining order issued against him under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act. He also argued the trial court erred in failing to issue an order restraining his former domestic partner, plaintiff-respondent Carolina Altafulla. The trial court's orders arose out of Ervin's discovery that Altafulla had been unfaithful. In response to the discovery of Altafulla's unfaithfulness, Ervin sent emails to Altafulla's employer and their mutual friends. Furthermore, he attempted to traumatize Altafulla's children with graphic descriptions of his claims of Altafulla's infidelity. Among other things, Ervin argued on appeal to the Court of Appeal that the trial court record was not sufficient to support a DVPA restraining order. After review, the Court disagreed: Ervin's email campaign and emotional abuse of Altafulla's daughters amounted to conduct that was alarming, annoying and harassing, served no legitimate purpose, would cause a reasonable person substantial emotional distress, and actually did cause substantial emotional distress. As such, Ervin's conduct constituted harassment within the meaning of the DVPA and was therefore sufficient to support issuance of a restraining order. View "Altafulla v. Ervin" on Justia Law

Evilsizor and Sweeney married in 2010. Sweeney claimed that her son from a previous marriage had access to her cell phones, which were not password protected. The couple’s daughter was born in 2012. Sweeney became concerned that he might not be the child’s biological father after he read a message on his stepson’s phone, indicating that Evilsizor had received fertility treatments without his knowledge. He downloaded the contents of Evilsizor’s phones and confronted her. He went, uninvited, to the home of Evilsizor’s parents and disclosed private, sensitive information about Evilsizor. The parties separated; dissolution proceedings were initiated. Evilsizor sought to increase Sweeney’s support payments on the ground that her income had decreased because her father had fired her from her job with his company. Sweeney alleged that Evilsizor had colluded with her parents to make it appear she had been fired. Sweeney attached text messages supporting his opposition. Evilsizor sought a restraining order under the Domestic Violence Prevention Act to stop Sweeney from further disseminating the downloaded information. Finding that Sweeney’s actions amounted to abuse under the DVPA, the trial court prohibited Sweeney from distributing the information without court permission. The court of appeal affirmed, holding that the order did not violate Sweeney’s constitutional rights to free speech. View "Evilsizor v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

Defendant and her husband appealed their conviction of three counts of child custody deprivation, contending that the underlying order of the family law court did not confer custody or visitation rights on the paternal grandparents and thus there was no violation of Pen. Code, section 278.5. The court found, however, that the family law court order conferred visitation rights on the parental grandparents. Because defendants deprived the parental grandparents of a right to visitation within the meaning of section 278.5, the court affirmed the judgment. View "People v. DeJongh" on Justia Law

This dispute concerns the real estate partnership interest that husband and wife own. Husband had owned the interest before marrying wife. The court held that when a spouse places separate property in joint title form, the transmutation requirements of Family Code section 852 must be satisfied before the joint title presumption of Family Code section 2581 applies. In this case, the documents do not contain an express transmutation of husband's separate property interest in the partnership, and therefore, it remained husband's separate property. The court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The court asked the parties for additional briefing on the character of loan proceeds received by the partnership after the modification. The court remanded for the trial court to determine whether the lenders intended to rely on the parties' community property to satisfy the loans. View "In re: Marriage of Lafkas" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jane J. (Mother) and real party Christopher J. (Father) were the parents of two boys, an older son, born in the fall of 2002, and a younger boy, born in January 2006. The couple separated in 2006 and divorced in October 2009. At the time of the divorce, Mother lived in Wisconsin, with the two children. Father was an active duty pilot in the military, stationed in Hawaii. Mother and Father agreed to a marital settlement, which was approved by a Wisconsin family court commissioner. The parents agreed to joint legal custody, but because of the family's "unique" situation, Mother was given 92 percent primary physical custody, with Father having 8 percent physical custody. In 2012, Mother and the children moved from Wisconsin to Orange County, where Mother was living with her fiance. The Wisconsin court held a hearing and approved Mother's move-away. Father returned to the United States and received transfer orders to Fort Rucker in Alabama. Newly remarried, he relocated there in December 2013. In January 2014, Father registered the October 2009 Wisconsin custody order in California. In April 2014, he filed a request for order (RFO) to modify the 2009 Wisconsin custody order, either to increase visitation, or to give him primary physical custody over the boys. He also sought to modify the support amounts. Mother opposed Father's RFO. She highlighted her "serious disagreements" with him concerning the children's future medical treatment and exact custody schedule, but asserted that she "[did] not have an issue working with [Father] regarding child custody and visitation." At the conclusion of the subsequent hearing, the respondent court expressed its doubts about Mother's willingness to facilitate Father's visitation with the children. The court determined that the 2009 Wisconsin custody order "wasn't a final order[] in any event." As a result, the court concluded that Father did not have to establish changed circumstances. The court granted the Father's request, acknowledging that its order would require the children to immediately change school in the middle of the school year. The court declined Mother counsel's request to defer the timing of any order until the end of the school year, and directed that its order take effect in four days, by February 16, 2015. The court made no orders regarding Mother's visitation rights other than a visitation over the children's second spring break in April 2015, with Father to pay for the children's visitation expenses "for this occasion only." The court stayed immediate removal of the children from California to Alabama; Mother then filed a timely petition for writ of mandate and a request for an immediate stay of respondent court's move-away order. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that because "petitioner's entitlement to the relief requested is so obvious that no purpose could be served by plenary consideration of the issue," and issued a peremptory writ of mandate in the first instance. "Prompt disposition under the accelerated Palma procedure will enable respondent court to exercise its reasoned discretion to fashion appropriate visitation and custody orders under correct legal principles, and considering all the pertinent factors." View "Jane J. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

The Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services filed a dependency petition, alleging that D., an infant born in 2014, came within the provisions of section 300 (b) (failure to protect), (c) (substantial risk of serious emotional damage), and (j) (abuse of sibling). After a hearing, the juvenile court detained D., and ordered supervised visitation for the parents. The petition included the allegation that D. was placed into protective custody because he was at substantial risk of harm due to father’s repeated domestic violence against mother and mother’s inability and unwillingness to protect the child from exposure to domestic violence. At a hearing, the juvenile court admitted a jurisdiction/disposition report that recommended that the juvenile court declare D. a dependent of the court and that the parents receive family reunification. The court of appeal affirmed. Although D. has not yet suffered emotional harm, he was already exposed to constant arguments and domestic violence and to his father’s alcoholism. Mother was unable to protect D. from exposure to domestic violence and father’s alcoholism; her history of domestic violence with D.’s father and in different relationships is further evidence that D. is at risk of future emotional harm. View "In re D.P." on Justia Law

The parental rights to A.M. had been terminated when he was four years old; he had been a dependent of the juvenile court almost since birth. Throughout his life, A.M. had been cared for by professionals at a health care facility. A.M. was born with severe genetic defects that left him deaf, blind and lacking cognitive functioning. The juvenile court had approved A.M.'s placement for adoption with a woman who had a history of adopting children with special health care needs. Counsel appealed on A.M.'s behalf. In the published portion of this opinion, the court of Appeal held that under Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.28, which restricts the appealability of a specific placement order after parental rights have been terminated, the challenged order was nonappealable; however, the Court found good cause to exercise its discretion to deem the failed appeal to be a writ petition. In the unpublished portion of this opinion, the Court held that the adoptive placement was not an abuse of discretion. View "A.M. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

Andrew is the biological father of Emilio who was born in July 2013. Katherine is Emilio’s biological mother. Andrew and Katherine never married. Before the pregnancy, Andrew pled guilty to possession of metal knuckles and trespassing and was put on probation. After Katherine became pregnant, several incidents occurred that confirmed her belief that Andrew could be violent and unpredictable. Late in her pregnancy, Katherine sought to have Emilio adopted by the Gs in San Francisco. The Gs filed a petition to terminate the parental rights of Andrew. The court found that although Andrew was Emilio’s biological father, he had not established that he was Emilio’s presumed father with the attendant right to withhold his consent to adoption and concluded that the adoption would be in Emilio’s best interest. The court of appeal affirmed, finding that substantial evidence supported the findings and that the court did not abuse its discretion in terminating Andrew’s parental rights. View "Adoption of Emilio G." on Justia Law