Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

R.T. was born in 1996. When R.T. was 14, she began running away for days at a time, not attending school, falsely reporting that her mother abused her, and at least once throwing furniture. R.T. began having children when she was 15. Mother went looking for R.T. whenever she left home; arranged for R.T. to live with mother’s parents because R.T.’s grandfather used to work with troubled juveniles and because R.T.’s false reports were made when R.T. and mother were alone; called the police for help; and asked the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for assistance. She declined to voluntarily submit R.T. to the Department’s jurisdiction. R.T. remained “out of control.” The Department filed a petition to declare then-17-year-old R.T. a dependent of the juvenile court under Welf. & Inst. Code 300(b)(1). The court asserted jurisdiction, denying mother’s motion to dismiss, and issued a dispositional order authorizing the Department to place R.T. elsewhere while reunification services were provided. The Department placed her back with her grandparents. The court of appeal affirmed. Regardless of parental blameworthiness, when a child faces a substantial risk of serious physical harm, a parent’s inability to supervise or protect a child is enough to invoke dependency jurisdiction. View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

A petition filed in 2008 by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) alleged that D.A., born late 2007, and his half-brother Z.S., born early 2006, were at risk of harm under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The children had been living with mother, who had a history of violent altercations with father in the children’s presence and were placed together in foster care. In 2009 father was incarcerated. DCFS recommended that family reunification services be terminated. Mother gave birth to K.A. in 2009. Father was found to be K.A.’s presumed father. K.A. had tested positive for marijuana at birth and mother’s marijuana use interfered with her ability to care for him. In 2013 the court terminated parental rights and finalized the adoptions of the children. The court of appeal dismissed father’s appeal as untimely and an appeal by maternal grandmother for lack of standing. Father, who failed to maintain contact with DCFS, visited the children only sporadically, and often did not appear at noticed hearings even while not incarcerated, did not explain how the result of the hearing would have been different if there had been perfect compliance with notice requirements. View "In re Z. S." on Justia Law

Mother Tami Winternitz appealed the denial of her move away request involving her daughter Jamison (born 2001) with ex-husband-father Dr. William Winternitz. Mother argued the custody evaluator failed to comply with California Rules of Court, rule 5.220 and it was legal error for the family court to deny her motion to strike the evaluator's defective report. She also claimed the family court did not apply the correct legal standard in assessing her relocation request, including: (1) failing to consider her presumptive right to move under Family Code section 7501; (2) not weighing all of the factors set forth in "In re Marriage of LaMusga," (32 Cal.4th 1072 (2004)); and (3) not giving meaningful consideration to Jamison's custodial preference to remain in her care as required by Family Code section 3042. She also argued the family court abused its discretion by failing to award her any need based attorney fees after May 21, 2013. Finding no reversible error, the Court of Appeal affirmed. View "Winternitz v. Winternitz" on Justia Law

Aaron S. was adjudged a dependent minor when he was 16 years old and became a non-minor dependent when he turned 18,Welf. & Inst. Code, 11400(v). The juvenile court terminated dependency jurisdiction shortly before Aaron turned 19, finding that by not enrolling in school or having a job, Aaron failed to participate in his Transitional Independent Living Case Plan. Aaron claimed that the Santa Clara County Department of Family and Children’s Services did not provide him a 90-day transition plan. The court of appeal affirmed. Even assuming the issue was not forfeited, termination without proof of a 90-day transition plan was harmless here because the Department separately provided information to Aaron regarding each of the categories that would have been included in the plan. For housing, employment, educational and continuing support services information, the emancipation letter that was mailed to Aaron before the termination hearing referred him to his Independent Living Program case manager and provided contact information for Transitional Housing Program providers. That letter also informed Aaron he was eligible for health benefits through Medi-Cal, and the section 391 report indicated the Department mailed Aaron a copy of the advanced health care directive form. View "In re Aaron S." on Justia Law

In 2009, father punched mother in the face once. In 2013, they separated. The three children lived primarily with mother and attended weekend visits with father. In 2014, the children attended a party with father, who drank alcohol. When mother picked up the children from the party she gave father a ride. Father became upset upon seeing hickeys on mother’s neck. He pinched her neck, grabbed her sunglasses off her face and broke them. At his house, he took her belongings from the car and threw them in the street, punched and slapped her. Mother got into the car and drove to the police station. The Department of Children and Family Services alleged that the children were endangered, based on father’s conduct and mother’s failure to protect the children. Father pled no contest. Mother argued that she should be stricken from the petition because she could not have known that father would have reacted as he did. The court sustained the petition, ordered that the children remain with mother, and continued father’s unmonitored visits. The court of appeal reversed. The findings under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(a) and (b)(1), were unsupported by substantial evidence because Mother took the proper actions to protect her children when Father assaulted her. View "In re Jonathan B." on Justia Law

Mother had legal and physical custody; Father had visitation. Mother obtained a restraining order, prohibiting Father from harassing or contacting Mother except to facilitate visitation, and requiring him to stay 100 yards away from her, her home, her workplace and her vehicle. In 2013, Mother submitted a declaration that Father contacted her through calls and texts every day; followed her; waited outside her house; harassed her in the street; picked up the children without informing her; and denigrated her to the children. The restraining order was made permanent. A month later, the Department of Children and Family Services received a report that Mother had left the children (ages 12 and 10) unsupervised and allowed them to ride their bicycles around the neighborhood unsupervised. In interviewing Mother, the caseworker learned of domestic violence committed by Father before their separation and that Father had repeatedly violated the restraining order, which was traumatizing to the children, especially when she called the police to report violations. Mother reported that Father did not mistreat the children. The court of appeal reversed the juvenile court’s order asserting jurisdiction. A finding that Father’s conduct placed the children at risk of emotional injury could not support jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300(b), which requires proof of physical harm or substantial risk of such harm. View "In re Jesus M." on Justia Law

Appellant, de facto parent of minor M.M., appealed a juvenile court’s order removing the minor from her home at the selection and implementation hearing. She argued on appeal she was entitled to notice and a hearing prior to the minor’s removal, and that the juvenile court abused its discretion in summarily ordering the removal. After review, the Court of Appeal agreed that appellant was entitled to notice and the opportunity to object and request a hearing prior to the minor’s removal. Furthermore, the Court agreed that the removal was an abuse of discretion, as it was unsupported by the evidence in the then-existing record. The order was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "In re M.M." on Justia Law

After a long and contentious child custody dispute, during which Father made multiple accusations against Mother, the family court issued an order declaring Father a vexatious litigant and prohibiting him from filing any new litigation in propria persona without first obtaining leave of court, and ordered him to pay some of Mother’s attorney fees. Father later unsuccessfully applied to vacate the prefiling order and remove his name from the Judicial Council’s list of vexatious litigants. The court of appeal held that Father’s challenges were untimely because they should have been raised in an appeal from the September 2012 prefiling order, rather than from the later order denying his application to vacate that order. The court noted that it would rejected Father’s arguments that the prefiling order was improper because Mother failed to show Father had no reasonable probability of prevailing in the custody case; that in concluding he was a vexatious litigant, the family court improperly took into consideration applications he had made to hold Mother in contempt; and that the family court erred in awarding attorney fees to Mother. View "In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty" on Justia Law

The Fresno County Department of Social Services took custody of Cindy’s children, ages 14, 9, and 2, in 2010, after Cindy was arrested for being under the influence of PCP and for child endangerment. She had been using PCP for 30 years. The juvenile court denied Cindy reunification services and the department placed the children in the home of their maternal uncle, Frank. The court found it would be detrimental to the children to terminate Cindy’s parental rights, ordered them into permanent kinship guardianship with Frank, and terminated its dependency jurisdiction. In 2013 Cindy sought to modify the order under Welfare and Institutions Code 3881. She stated that she completed substance abuse treatment and parenting classes, maintained sobriety for three years and attended Alcoholics/Narcotics Anonymous meetings. She had liberal visitation with the children. The children expressed desire to return to Cindy and her home was found to be suitable. The juvenile court ruled that section 388 did not authorize termination of the guardianship. The court of appeal reversed. Although kinship guardianship is a permanent plan and there is no need for ongoing court and social services supervision, the juvenile court maintains jurisdiction over the child and can vacate its order, sections 366.3(a) & (b); 366.4. View "In re Priscilla D." on Justia Law

In 2011, 16-year-old Roxanne exhibited signs of emotional problems. Her parents failed to pursue counseling, after being advised to do so. Roxanne later told her teachers that she had suicidal thoughts because she was being bullied. Despite a counselor’s advice, Mother was unsupportive and angry. Roxanne was taken to a hospital and placed on a section 5585 hold for psychiatric evaluation. Mother told the counselor that she was going to remove Roxanne f against medical advice. Roxanne did not continue with therapy. Roxanne was hospitalized three more times in 2013. Mother “appeared not [to] care and stated that she could not leave work because no one was going to pay her bills.” Mother did not visit Roxanne and refused home services. Father cursed at Roxanne about her hospitalization. Mother then began taking her to therapy and sought an individualized education plan at her school. Roxanne began consistently taking antidepressants and attending counseling. DCFS filed a section 300 petition, alleging that the Parents caused Roxanne serious emotional damage. The juvenile court found it had jurisdiction over Roxanne. The court of appeal affirmed, finding substantial evidence that Roxanne was suffering from serious emotional damage and at risk of further serious emotional damage due to Parents’ failure to obtain mental health services. View "In re Roxanne B." on Justia Law