Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Father and mother divorced in 2004. They had two children. With regard to child support, the judgment of dissolution incorporated the parties' marital settlement agreement, which provided: "A. So long as both parties are gainfully employed, the goal is for [father and mother] to share equally the children's day care expense, health insurance, clothing and food, and other necessaries until the children turn age 18. [. . .] It is understood that, at this time, [mother] is making a steady income from professional employment; and that [father] is currently unemployed and has no income. [Father] expects to return to work next month, in a self-employed capacity, [. . .] For these reasons, the parties wish to provide for an increase in the amount of [father's] child expense contributions over a period of time." The Court of Appeal, in review of the dispute the parties presented in the enforcement of the judgment of dissolution, assessed the central issue to this case as "a harsh reminder of the severe consequences that may result from a judicial officer's failure to properly handle a statement of disqualification filed under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(1)." Father appealed a series of post-judgment orders over the accounting of child support and related fees. As to a October 25 order, father contended the court abused its discretion in awarding the fees because of mother's superior financial condition and higher percentage of parenting time. The Court concluded father did not meet his burden of establishing a clear abuse of discretion and affirmed this order. Father argued that November 22 orders were invalid because, among other reasons, the commissioner who made it was disqualified under Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, subdivision (c)(4). Here, the Court of Appeal agreed and, reversed these orders and remanded the matter to the superior court for further proceedings. View "Marriage of M.A. and M.A." on Justia Law

At the start of the dependency proceedings, the juvenile court and Ventura County Human Services Agency believed the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901, did not apply to Eskimo families. Father and mother appealed from the order terminating parental rights to their two minor children and selecting adoption as the permanent plan, Welf. & Inst. Code 366.26. The court of appeal reversed. Evidence submitted for the first time on appeal established that the children are Indian children under ICWA. The federal definition of "Indian" includes "Eskimos and other aboriginal peoples of Alaska." The Noorvik Native Community, a federally-recognized Alaskan Indian tribe confirmed that the minors are tribe members. Before terminating parental rights to an Indian child, the juvenile court must satisfy ICWA requirements, including finding that "active efforts" were made to provide services designed to prevent the breakup of the Indian family, and that parents' continued custody of minors "is likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage." Having found ICWA inapplicable, the juvenile court did not consider these requirements before terminating parental rights; NNC was not afforded an opportunity to intervene. View "In re H.G." on Justia Law

In November 2013 the Los Angeles Department of Children and Family Services filed a dependency petition on behalf of Elizabeth’s three children, ages 10, eight and six, alleging Elizabeth had a history of substance abuse and had tested positive for methamphetamines and marijuana; the father of Heather (Allan) had abused marijuana; and the home Allan shared with Elizabeth and the children was filthy and unsanitary. The detention report indicated previous referrals had been received in 2004 and 2006 alleging drug use by Elizabeth. The juvenile court entered jurisdiction findings and disposition orders declaring the children dependents of the juvenile court, removing them from Elizabeth’s care and custody and placing them with their respective fathers under the supervision of the Department. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting Elizabeth’s arguments that the juvenile court deprived her of due process by assuming the function of an advocate rather than an impartial tribunal; violated Welfare and Institutions Code section 3521 by continuing the jurisdiction/disposition hearing without good cause; and violated section 350(c), by improperly considering evidence submitted after the Department had presented its case-in-chief. View "In re Emily D." on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew V. (Father) filed a petition for writ of mandate / prohibition and a request for an immediate stay of respondent court’s “temporary” move-away order of January 14, 2015. Jessica V. (Mother) opposed the petition and stay request, and already had moved out-of-state with the minor children. Father and Mother were married in 2003 and have two children, a girl, born in December 2002, and a boy, born in November 2005. They permanently separated in 2006 and a judgment of dissolution was finalized in June 2008. The judgment of dissolution provided for Father and Mother to share joint legal and physical custody. In July 2014, Mother filed a request for an order allowing her to move away with the two minor children to the State of Washington due to a job transfer and promotion. Father opposed the move-away request. According to the transcript and minute order, the child custody investigator was not available to testify at the January 14, 2015 hearing. Respondent court recognized that Father’s counsel had a right to cross-examine the child custody investigator, and the court further acknowledged that Father’s counsel was physically unable to represent Father at the hearing because of counsel’s illness. As a result, respondent court continued the hearing on Mother’s move-away request until March 4, 2015. Despite this, respondent court issued a “temporary” move-away order allowing Mother to relocate with the minor children to the State of Washington based upon the written recommendations of the child custody investigator. The Court of Appeal concluded that the superior court erred in construing California law to allow for a "'temporary' move-away first and hearing later." The Father's request for a stay of the temporary move-away order was granted. The children were ordered to return to California; the superior court's order was vacated, and the case remanded for further proceedings. View "Andrew V. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The Department of Children and Family Services filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 300 (b) on behalf of five-year-old Cole, alleging that Father allowed Amber, an unrelated adult and current drug abuser, to reside in the home with unlimited access to Cole. Methamphetamine and a syringe were found in the home accessible to Cole. Amber was under the influence of illicit drugs and possessed prescription medication not prescribed to her while Cole was under her care. Father “had a positive toxicology screen for methamphetamines and amphetamines” and had a history of drug abuse. The court declared Cole a dependent of the court; terminated the case with a family court order granting physical custody to Mother and monitored visitation to Father of a minimum of four hours per week; and required Father to complete counseling programs as a condition to modifying the family court custody order. The court of appeal held that substantial evidence supported the juvenile court’s jurisdictional order, but that the dispositional order must be reversed to the extent it conditioned the family court’s modification of the juvenile court’s custody and visitation exit order upon proof of Father’s completion of drug and parenting programs and counseling. View "In re Cole Y." on Justia Law

Mother "T.A." appealed a judgment finding that R.M. was the presumed father of her biological daughter. T.A. conceived the child through artificial insemination procedures, and R.M. was not the biological father. The trial court declared R.M. to be the child's presumed father by applying the parentage presumption in Family Code 7611(d). Mother claimed she chose to be a single parent of the child and raised numerous constitutional and other legal challenges to the manner in which the presumed parent statutory scheme was applied in her case. Based on the fundamental constitutional right to parent one's child without interference, she requested that the Court of Appeal establish a rule that a decision to form a single parent family should be afforded the same constitutional protection as a two parent familial arrangement. She also asserted the standards associated with the presumed parent statute did not adequately protect the constitutional rights of a single parent "by choice." After review, the Court of Appeal held that application of the presumed parent statutory scheme in this case did not constitute an unconstitutional interference with T.A.'s fundamental right to parent her child. Furthermore, the Court held the evidentiary record supported that R.M. was the child's presumed parent and that the presumption was not rebutted. View "R.M. v. T.A." on Justia Law

Mother was incarcerated when she gave birth to Angelina in 2012. The father was unknown. Angelina was detained in foster care. Mother was a registered controlled substance abuser, tested positive for methamphetamine, and was in prison for burglary. DCFS alleged that Mother’s substance abuse placed Angelina at risk of harm, and that, as a result of Mother’s history of illicit drug use, her two older children (with a different father) were current dependents. Mother stated that she believed that her cousin Latisha would take good care of her daughter. The court detained Angelina after a hearing and gave DCFS discretion to release the baby to any appropriate relative, ordering monitored visits for Mother if she was not under the influence. Mother was released from prison. She denied that she had used drugs. She did not have a home. Angelina had been placed with Latisha. Ultimately, reunification services were terminated and Mother’s petition under Welfare and Institutions Code 388 was denied, and her parental rights were denied. The court of appeal affirmed. View "In re Angelina E." on Justia Law

Israel was born in Mexico in 1999 and is not a U.S. citizen. He came to the U.S. with his mother in 2005 and has no contact with his father in Mexico He was adjudged a ward of the juvenile court as a result of admitting to misdemeanor receiving of stolen property. Israel requested that the court make findings that would qualify him for special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status under federal law (8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(27)(J), which would allow Israel to pursue regularization of his immigration status. The juvenile court declined to make findings that reunification “with one or both” parents was not viable due to abuse, neglect, or abandonment; that Israel was a dependent of a juvenile court or committed or placed with a state agency; and that it was not in his “best interest” to be returned to Mexco. The court of appeal remanded. USCIS currently interprets and applies section 1101(a)(27)(J) to include, as “SIJ eligible children” those who may be living in this country “with a foster family, an appointed guardian, or the non-abusive parent” and the trial court did not make a finding on whether it is in Israel’s best interest to return to Mexico. View "In re Israel O." on Justia Law

Mother pled no contest to a petition filed by the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) that asked the juvenile court to assume jurisdiction over three-month-old J.C. because the child was born with methamphetamine in his system and mother had a long history of drug abuse, Welf & Inst. Code 300(b). Father submitted on the petition based on the various DCFS reports and other documentary evidence admitted in evidence. The trial court assumed jurisdiction of J.C. based on J.C.’s positive test, mother’s drug abuse, and on father’s failure to protect J.C. from mother’s drug abuse. The trial court denied reunification services for mother, placed the child in foster care, and ordered reunification services for father. The court declined to place the child with either father or paternal grandparents based on father’s and mother’s previous history with the DCFS, which included incidents of domestic violence and drug use and questions about father’s mental health. The court of appeal affirmed, rejecting father’s clams that there was insufficient evidence that he knew or could have done anything to stop mother’s drug use during her pregnancy and that there was no evidence he posed a risk of harm to J.C. View "In re J.C." on Justia Law

C., born in 2000, and her half sibling lived with mother in the maternal grandparents’ home. Other maternal family members lived in the same apartment complex. In 2013 interview, C. told a social worker that mother hit her, but she could not recall any resulting bruises; mother called S. fat and told her she would not get married or have babies; mother called C. names, told C. mother never liked her and that father left them because C. was horrible; mother threatened suicide; mother slept a lot when she took her medication but mother believed she did not need medication because there was nothing wrong with her. C told the social worker that she saw father on weekends and things were better there, but she did not want to live with him. A series of incidents involving mother led to the juvenile court’s order granting physical custody of C. to the Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services for placement with maternal grandparents. The court of appeal reversed, finding insufficient evidence that placement with father would be detrimental to C. under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2(a), Father provided financial support and maintained a relationship with C. View "In re C.M." on Justia Law