Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

R. was born in 2012 exposed to methamphetamine, marijuana, opiates, and benzodiazepines. Alameda County Social Services Agency filed a petition, alleging that the parents have a history of drug abuse and domestic violence and failure to reunite with another son, Gabriel (age 16). Over father’s objection, the agency placed R. in the home of Victoria, father’s former girlfriend, with whom Gabriel and other half-siblings had been placed. Father told the agency he wanted R. placed with a relative. Paternal aunts sought custody. The agency initiated home inspections, but told the aunts that it favored the current placement. Both parents urged the court to place the child with an aunt. The court ordered a permanent plan of placement with Victoria. The parents attempted to relinquish parental rights and to designate an aunt and uncle as adoptive parents. The agency would not accept the choice. The court found that relinquishment of parental rights is not effective until an agency accepts it and that it lacked authority to require acceptance. The juvenile court ordered R. placed for adoption. The court of appeal reversed, acknowledging that what is in R’s best interests 30 months after his birth may differ from what would have been his best interests when he was an infant. Meaningful redress for past mistakes may not be possible, but the lower court erred in failing to apply the statutory preference for relative placement. View "In re R.T." on Justia Law

In this case of first impression, the issue this case presented for the Court of Appeal's review was whether California was the home state of a child who was born in Hawaii, remained in Hawaii for six weeks with his mother, then traveled to California with his mother, where, within 24 hours of his arrival, custody proceedings were commenced by his father in a California court. The answer turned on whether the term "lived," as it was used in the statute, meant simple physical presence in a state or, as father insisted, required an intent to remain in that state. The trial court determined that mother, who lived and was employed in California prior to the child's birth, went to Hawaii to give birth but intended to return to California. The court thus concluded that mother and the child "lived" in California, and their time in Hawaii was merely a temporary absence from California. The Court of Appeal disagreed: the child lived in Hawaii by virtue of the child's presence in Hawaii for the six weeks following his birth, leaving the state and traveling to California only 24 hours before father initiated these proceedings. Furthermore, the Court concluded this fleeting presence in California prior to commencement of these proceedings did not alter the conclusion the child lived in Hawaii. Because the child was born in Hawaii and lived in Hawaii with his mother following his birth, Hawaii was the child's home state. View "Ocegueda v. Perreira" on Justia Law

Gilda filed for dissolution of marriage. She and former husband, Murray, agreed to resolve property and support issues through mediation, during which they purportedly exchanged financial disclosure declarations mandated by the Family Code. They executed a marital settlement agreement, which was incorporated into a stipulated judgment. Shortly after entry of judgment, Gilda learned that Murray recently sold a company he founded during the marriage. In the settlement agreement, Gilda relinquished her community share of the company for $10 million. Murray received approximately $75 million from the sale. Gilda sought to set aside the judgment on grounds of fraud and duress and served discovery on Murray requesting the financial disclosure declarations that were exchanged prior to entry of judgment. Murray refused to produce the declarations, asserting they were covered by the mediation confidentiality statutes, insofar as they constituted writings that were prepared for the purpose of, in the course of, or pursuant to, mediation. (Evid. Code, 1119(b).) The trial court a motion to compel on mediation confidentiality grounds. The court of appeal vacated, noting the Family Code’s stated public policy to promote “full and accurate disclosure of all assets and liabilities” in dissolution proceedings View "Lappe v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Jacqueline W. and Garrett J. were the unwed biological parents of Baby Boy W. When Jacqueline knew Garrett was Baby Boy W.'s biological father, but she denied Garrett's requests that she sign a voluntary declaration of paternity that would have established Garrett as Baby Boy W.'s statutory presumed father. She then sought to have A.H. and M.H. (the Hs) adopt Baby Boy W. at birth, despite the fact that Garrett had repeatedly stated that he wanted to raise Baby Boy W. himself. Garrett filed a petition to establish his paternity, and Jacqueline and the Hs (collectively, appellants) filed a petition to terminate his parental rights. The trial court found that Garrett established his paternity rights under "Adoption of Kelsey S.," 1 Cal. 4th 816. The trial court denied appellants' petition, and entered judgment in Garrett's favor, thereby halting the adoption. Appellants argued on appeal that: (1) the trial court misunderstood and misapplied Kelsey S., and (2) there was not sufficient evidence to support the trial court's Kelsey S. findings. The Court of Appeal disagreed in both respects and affirm the judgment: "We understand that the consequences of our decision, i.e., halting the Hs' adoption of Baby Boy W., will undoubtedly be heartbreaking for the Hs, who have had custody of Baby Boy W. since the day after his birth. We also realize that removing Baby Boy W. from the Hs and placing him with Garrett and/or Jacqueline will require a period of adjustment for Baby Boy W. However, those emotional considerations, precipitated by Jacqueline's unilateral decision that adoption was in Baby Boy W.'s best interests, do not override Garrett's constitutional right to establish a parental relationship with Baby Boy W." View "Adoption of Baby Boy W." on Justia Law

David and Melinda’s two children lived with Melinda, and David paid child support. The Napa County Department of Child Support Services moved to modify David’s child support obligation. (Fam. Code, 17400). After a hearing, the court found that David’s income, for purposes of calculating child support, was the monthly Social Security disability payment he received, ordered him to pay a portion of that to Melinda as child support, and found Melinda received $796 per month in derivative Social Security disability benefits as the representative payee of the children based on David’s disability, 42 U.S.C. 402(d). Melinda argued these benefits should be treated as part of David’s income when calculating his monthly income for purposes of his support obligation. The court concluded the derivative benefits were the income of the children, not of David, so that the $796 in derivative disability benefits would partially satisfy David’s support obligation. The monthly benefits would be credited first toward his current child support, and any excess would be credited to pay off arrears. The court of appeal affirmed. View "Daugherty v. Daugherty" on Justia Law

Mother was arrested for child endangerment after her four-year old daughter, Maya, fell from the trunk of a moving vehicle. Maya scraped her knee, but was otherwise uninjured. The incident was witnessed by a police officer and was part of an altercation between mother and her sister. Mother, apparently intoxicated, also got into an altercation with arresting officer. Maya was subsequently declared a dependent child of the court pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 3001 and placed in the custody of her father. At the six-month review hearing, the trial court terminated jurisdiction and entered a family law order providing father physical and legal custody of Maya. The court of appeal affirmed, noting mother’s previous problems with alcohol, that Maya told the social worker she wanted to continue living with her father and stepmother, mother’s denial of having any problem with alcohol, her failure to accept responsibility for her actions and her inability to understand how her actions had caused her child to be detained from her, and the erratic behavior of mother’s family members.View "In re Maya L." on Justia Law

Stepfather sought to adopt nine-year-old I.M. Mother signed her consent. Father did not consent. Stepfather sought an order freeing I.M. from father’s custody and control, stating that mother had sole legal and physical custody of I.M. and that father was incarcerated for felony convictions and had not had contact with I.M. since 2006. The court issued a citation to show cause why I.M. should not be declared free from his custody and control. Father sought continuance and a removal order under Penal Code section 2625 so that he could be present for the hearing, and requested that the court appoint Attorney Sperling to represent him. Sperling appeared to contest the petition. The probation office and DCFS recommended granting stepfather’s petition. After several weeks, the court conducted a trial. Father’s counsel appeared. The court found father had left I.M. with mother for a period greater than one year, and had failed to communicate with I.M. and pay for her care, support, and education during that time and that father’s failures were willful and without lawful excuse and ordered that the consent of father was not necessary. The court of appeal affirmed.View "Adoption of I.M." on Justia Law

In this marital dissolution case, petitioner Leslie O. moved to have the child custody evaluator removed for bias and her evaluations stricken. Under the totality of the circumstances, the court concluded that the child custody evaluator's communications and her conduct in stepping out of her role as an evaluator to help the real party in interest, Thomas O., demonstrate bias sufficient to warrant her removal and the striking of her evaluations. The trial court denied the motion. The court granted the petition and issued a peremptory writ of mandate, concluding that the trial court erred in finding insufficient evidence of bias and denying the motion.View "Leslie O. v. Super. Ct." on Justia Law

The issue on appeal in this case was one of first impression in California. An unmarried heterosexual couple had two children together, and a paternity test established that the child belonged to defendant-appellant, George Vargas. The couple separates and appellant moves out. Later, the couple attempts reconciliation, which lasted for nine months. The reconciliation failed, and appellant moved out of the house. Appellant claimed he was entitled for credit for the actual, in-home child support he afforded the children during the nine months he was "reconciled" with them and the mother. The trial court concluded the father was not eligible for any such "Jackson" credits, because this case did not fit the "Jackson" pattern of a child support order which originated in a divorce proceeding, and also because there wasn’t a total reversal of custody, but rather a period of shared custody in the context of an attempted reconciliation. The Court of Appeal reversed, believing the same equitable considerations that apply to support orders arising out of marital cases should also apply to support orders arising out of paternity cases. "We see no reason to differentiate total changes of custody from periods of living together in the same household; actual support is actual support."View "Helgestad v. Vargas" on Justia Law

Mother appealed from the juvenile court's dispositional order declaring two of her children dependents of the court under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a), (b), and (j), removing them from the custody of their father, and releasing them to Mother with family maintenance services. The court concluded that Mother's objection to the order requiring her to participate in a domestic violence support group was sufficient to preserve the issues raised on appeal; the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion by leaving the term of Mother's enrollment in a domestic violence support group open ended; but, the juvenile court erred by granting the program's counselors unfettered discretion to decide, based on their own criteria, when Mother has satisfied her court-ordered case plan. Accordingly, the court reversed a portion of the order and remanded to the juvenile court for further proceedings.View "In re Daniel B." on Justia Law