Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After twenty-three years of marriage, husband and wife separated when wife was convicted of seven counts of unlawful sexual intercourse with a minor under 16 years of age and three counts of oral copulation of a minor 18 years of age. Wife filed a motion for support five weeks before her release from prison, set to be heard three days after her release. The hearing was continued because husband was out of the country and then the hearing was continued a second time when husband could not obtain wife's vocational examination. The trial court concluded that its jurisdiction expired and issued an order denying spousal support to wife. At issue is the marital settlement agreement, which provided that the trial court will reserve jurisdiction to award long-term spousal support "until" wife is released from prison. The court concluded that the parties' conduct after wife's release from prison demonstrates that they did not contemplate the hearing on the issue of long-term support would take place the day of wife's release. Wife requested support before she was released and the hearing went forward as soon as reasonably possible. Therefore, the trial court retained jurisdiction to award long-term spousal support. It would be inequitable to so narrowly construe the word "until" when the parties' conduct and action evince no such interpretation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "In re: Marriage of Schu" on Justia Law

Elenita Fajota appealed a trial court order granting her ex-husband, Romer Fajota, joint legal custody of the couple's three children. According to Elenita, Romer admitted to engaging in acts of domestic violence, and the trial court found that Romer had committed domestic violence against her. Elenita argued on appeal that in awarding Romer joint legal custody, the trial court failed to apply the rebuttable presumption set forth in Family Code1 section 3044. The Court of Appeal agreed with Elenita that the trial court abused its discretion by failing to apply the mandatory presumption set forth in section 3044 when it determined that the parties would share joint legal custody of the children. Therefore, the Court reversed the custody order of the trial court contained in the judgment of dissolution, and remanded the matter to the trial court to apply the mandatory presumption in determining the custody of the children.View "Marr. of Fajota" on Justia Law

Two minors were removed from the home of their mother and placed in the homes of their respective biological fathers in early 2013 pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 361.2. After a contested disposition hearing, the dependency court upheld the removals, ordered the fathers to assume custody of the minors, declined mother’s request for reunification services, and ordered Marin County Health and Human Services to conduct home visits and report back within three months pursuant to section 361.2, subdivision (b)(2). The court of appeal previously upheld those rulings. Mother then appealed from the dependency court’s subsequent orders which again denied her reunification services and terminated its jurisdiction as to one child, arguing that she had a due process right to a further evidentiary hearing on the home visit reports that could not be conditioned on the sufficiency of her offer of proof. The court of appeal affirmed, noting that mother failed to demonstrate that an evidentiary hearing would have alleviated the court’s concerns.View "In re A.B." on Justia Law

Sweeney issued a subpoena for bank records in the course of divorce proceedings with his wife, Evilsizor. The subpoena sought records from his wife’s accounts, but the records included financial information about her father. Her father, John, moved to quash the subpoena. Sweeney responded by agreeing to amend the subpoena to exclude information about John’s account activities. John then withdrew his motion to quash, but did so belatedly. The trial court sanctioned him by ordering him to pay a portion of the attorney fees Sweeney incurred in responding to the motion. The court of appeal affirmed. A trial court may impose sanctions under Code of Civil Procedure section 1987.2 against a litigant for pursuing a motion to quash that, even though legitimately filed, was rendered unnecessary by a subsequent amendment or withdrawal of the subpoena.View "Evilsizor v. Sweeney" on Justia Law

J.S. (mother) and L.S. (father), appealed juvenile court orders denying their petitions for modification and terminating parental rights to their minor children. The parents argued the court applied the wrong burden of proof in denying their petitions for modification and abused its discretion in concluding there was insufficient evidence to grant the requested modification. The parents also contend the court and the El Dorado County Health and Human Services Agency (Agency) failed to comply with the notice requirements of the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). Finally, the parents argued the court erred in failing to find they had established the beneficial parental relationship exception to termination of parental rights. The Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court’s failure to apply the proper burden of proof in ruling on the petitions for modification and the errors in the ICWA notice required reversal.View "In re L.S." on Justia Law

Mother, age 19, was released from jail and needed a place to stay, so she moved in with A., age 45, who had an extensive criminal history. Mother began prostituting at A.’s request. Both were arrested. A. remained incarcerated until November, 2010. Mother was released, learned she was pregnant, and notified A. In March 2010 mother began living with new boyfriend, B. A. unsuccessfully sought to obtain a declaration of paternity form. B. was present at the baby’s birth and married mother two months later. Mother filed a parentage action naming A. as father. Days later, A. was released and attempted to file a paternity action, but was informed that an action already was pending. Mother never served A. and nothing happened until A. filed a response a year later. A. saw the baby three times before he was incarcerated again and gave mother $20 for diapers. Mother had another child with B. The children moved in with B’s mother, who would not allow A. to see the baby and who sought guardianship of both children due to mother’s substance abuse. A DNA test confirmed that A. is the child’s biological father. As of January 2013, mother and B. had obtained an apartment and were employed. The court ruled that A.’s status controlled. The appeals court reversed, noting that A. provided only minimal financial support, threatened the baby’s caregivers, and did not vigorously assert his legal rights until the Department was required to step in.View "In re D.S." on Justia Law

Jason H. (father) appealed the juvenile court’s determination to deny him reunification services with the minors, now 16-year-old D.H. and seven-year-old T.H. The trial court found two reunification bypass provisions applied: (1) father had previously had reunification services and his parental rights terminated to the minors’ half siblings and father had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings; and (2) father was incarcerated and the provision of services would be detrimental to the children. Father argued these bypass provisions did not apply as he had made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings and reunification services were in the minors’ best interest; and, it would not be detrimental to the minors for him to be provided reunification services. Upon review, the Court of Appeal agreed with father that there was not sufficient evidence to support the finding that he had not made reasonable efforts to treat the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings, because the record revealed that the problems that led to the removal of the half siblings (unsafe and unhealthy conditions) were different from those presented in this case (alcohol abuse, anger management problems and domestic violence); nor did the record establish any connection between the two sets of problems or even that father received services in the prior case for the problems manifest in the present case. However, the Court found sufficient evidence to support the finding that father was incarcerated and it would be detrimental to the minors to provide services. Accordingly, the Court affirmed the juvenile court.View "In re D.H." on Justia Law

Father, convicted of sexual abuse of a child under 14 years old in 1987, appealed the jurisdiction findings and disposition order declaring his children dependents of the juvenile court. Welfare and Institutions Code section 355.1 subdivision (d), creates a rebuttable evidentiary presumption that a parent who has previously been convicted of sexual abuse or is required as the result of a felony conviction to register as a sex offender poses a substantial risk of harm to a child in his or her care or custody. The court concluded that Father adequately rebutted the presumption of current dangerousness by identifying contrary evidence in the Department's own records. The court reversed and remanded with directions because the juvenile court improperly relied solely on the presumption to sustain the allegations in the dependency petition relating to Father, rather than evaluating the totality of the circumstances of the evidence in the record.View "In re Quentin H." on Justia Law

The Mendocino County Health and Human Services Agency filed a petition under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300 on behalf of Minors, ages 3, 7, and 8, alleging that Mother had a substance abuse problem that inhibited her ability to parent her children and that the parents were not providing adequate food or shelter. Deputies found the children in the care of men at a home with drugs and dangerous objects. There was no refrigerator; the toilet would not flush. There was no running water, and there were dead mice in the house. An open power panel posed a significant fire danger. The children had been wearing the same clothes since Mother had left them four nights earlier. Mother appeared to be “extremely high.” She provided a urine sample, saying it would be “dirty.” The Minors were subject to the Indian Child Welfare Act, 25 U.S.C. 1901. For several months, Mother did not engage in services, despite repeated efforts to contact her. The juvenile court found that Mother had partially complied with her case plan, that there was no substantial probability Minors would be returned to her custody within 18 months of their removal, that reasonable services had been offered, and that active efforts had been made to prevent the breakup of the Indian family. The court terminated reunification services and set a hearing under section 366.26 to determine a permanent plan for the children. The appeals court affirmed. View "C.F. v. Superior Court" on Justia Law

Mother appealed an order terminating her parental rights to her one-year-old son based on her long term substance abuse. The court concluded that Mother was not denied effective assistance of counsel where her trial attorney did not file a Welfare and Institutions Code section 388 petition to modify an order bypassing reunification services. The court held that an attorney in a dependency case has no obligation to file a futile section 388 petition to modify an existing order. In this case, given Mother's history of parenting two older children who were removed from her custody and care, the filing of such a petition would have been futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed.View "In re Ernesto R." on Justia Law