Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Father appealed from a dispositional order denying his request for custody of his son and daughter, who were removed from their mother's custody under Welfare and Institutions Code section 361. The court concluded that the juvenile court erred when it failed to consider father's custody request under section 361.2. The court rejected the Department's contention that a parent is precluded from requesting custody under section 361.2 based on jurisdictional findings made under a preponderance of the evidence standard. However, the error was harmless because the juvenile court made a finding under section 361, by clear and convincing evidence, that placing the children with father would pose a substantial danger to their physical health and well-being. View "In re D'Anthony D." on Justia Law

Adoptive Mother appealed the juvenile court's removal of her adoptive son from her care under Welfare and Institutions Code section 300. The court affirmed the juvenile court's finding of jurisdiction over the child under subdivision (j) and affirmed the disposition order because there is a substantial and current risk to the child that warrants his removal. Further, the evidence indicates that the child is not a member of an Indian tribe, nor is he the biological child of a member of a child. Consequently, the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1912(a), 1903(4), is inapplicable to his dependency case, regardless of adoptive Mother's own Indian tribal membership. View "In re Francisco D." on Justia Law

Plaintiff challenged an order denying her request to renew a domestic violence restraining order against her former spouse. On rehearing, the court reinstated the original opinion reversing the order denying the request for a renewal of the domestic violence order. The court concluded that the trial court erred in concluding that the denial was appropriate because nothing happened in the three years since the restraining order. Further, the trial court incorrectly concluded that Ritchie v. Konrad required a reasonable apprehension of future physical abuse. Under the circumstances, the order denying the renewal request must be reversed and remanded to the trial court for further proceedings.View "Eneaji v. Ubboe" on Justia Law

Father appealed two orders affirming the decision of social workers not to commence dependency proceedings on behalf of his sons. The court concluded that had the Legislature intended an order by the juvenile court affirming a social worker's decision not to commence dependency proceedings to be appealable, the Legislature would have so stated. In this case, because the Legislature has not expressly made appealable a juvenile court's order affirming a social worker's decision not to institute dependency proceedings, such an order is not appealable. Accordingly, the court dismissed the appeal.View "In re Michael H., Jr., et al." on Justia Law

San Mateo County Human Services received referrals indicating that Jaden (age 7), was chronically tardy and absent from school and routinely picked up late from his after-school program. His school behavior had deteriorated rapidly, including: refusing to go to class; hiding; throwing items; failing to complete assignments; grinding against another student; leaving school grounds; peeing in a sink; growling and clenching his fist when confronted for misbehaviors; and altercations with other students. Jaden had no close friendships. He refused to eat at his class table in the cafeteria, saying the smell of other foods made him gag. According to school staff, Jaden was exhibiting symptoms of anxiety and depression. Jaden admitted to hitting his mother; his mother had not pursued recommended health services. According to school staff, mother was“struggling with anxiety, and probable substance use. Mother took Jaden to the Daly City Police Department, stating that she could no longer handle him; she took Jaden home, but left him with his father for several days. The Agency had significant evidence that mother had an ongoing substance abuse problem. Domestic violence was a concern. Ultimately, the juvenile court terminated discretionary reunification services mother was receiving (Welfare and Institutions Code 361.2). The appeals court affirmed. When a minor is placed with a previously noncustodial parent at disposition under section 361.2, a reasonable services finding need not be made at subsequent hearings monitoring that placement. View "In re Jaden E." on Justia Law

J.S. was born in January 2012. Mother and Father were developmentally delayed. Later that year, the Riverside County Department of Public Social Services received a referral reflecting Mother and Father were neglecting J.S. Both Mother and Father denied having Indian ancestry. The Department took J.S. into protective custody; J.S. was subsequently placed in foster care with his paternal great-grandparents, who notified the Department that J.S. may have Cherokee ancestry (the great-grandfather provided the Department with documentation that J.S.'s great-great-grandfather was Cherokee). The Cherokee Nation verified J.S.'s eligibility to affiliate with the Nation. The Department then filed a petition alleging Mother and Father failed to protect J.S. Specifically: (1) Mother and Father suffered from mental health issues and cognitive delays; and (2) they engaged in domestic violence.The juvenile court terminated the parents' rights. On appeal of that decision, Father contended the juvenile court erred by finding ICWA was inapplicable in this case. Father also argued errors were made in relation to the ICWA inquiry and notice requirements. Mother joined and expanded upon Father’s ICWA arguments. Mother also requested a different judicial officer preside over the case upon remand. Finding no reversible error, however, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

Family Code section 4325 establishes a rebuttable presumption against an award of spousal support to a spouse who has been convicted of an act of domestic violence against the other spouse. At issue was whether the family court erred in terminating spousal support to a wife where the wife pleaded no contest to and was convicted of an act of domestic violence before enactment of section 4325, but where the husband thereafter entered into a stipulated judgment providing for spousal support to the wife in ignorance of section 4325. The court concluded that section 4325 must be given retroactive application, the stipulated judgment was modifiable, and the doctrines of res judicata, waiver, and equitable estoppel did not bar application of the presumption of section 4325. Accordingly, the court affirmed the family court's order terminating the wife's spousal support.View "Marriage of Kelkar" on Justia Law

The children were born in 2000 and 2002. By 2004, the parents were no longer living together. Mother alleged abuse and obtained temporary restraining orders against Father in 2004, 2005, and 2006. Mother was granted sole legal and physical custody of the children; Father was granted visitation at Mother’s discretion. The court issued a three-year domestic violence restraining order against Father in 2008; he was granted two hours of supervised visitation a month. In 2011 the court awarded Mother sole legal and physical custody, with supervised visitation for Father, and granted another TRO and later granted a two-year domestic violence protective order. In 2013 Father alleged that Mother had violated the restraining orders and made false accusations in order to separate him from his children. The court ordered Mother and Father to share joint legal and physical custody of the children, and established a schedule under which they would spend each weekend with Father. The appeals court reversed. The only arguably changed circumstance was that Father’s six-year-old daughter from another relationship had begun living with him part-time. Father did not argue, and the trial court did not find, that this constituted a substantial change so that it was “essential or expedient for the welfare of the child[ren] that there be a change” or that that children would suffer detriment absent a change in custody.View "Christina L. v. Chauncey B." on Justia Law

In August 2012, Mother requested a restraining order to protect herself and the Minor, born in 2006, from Father, stating that she and Father previously lived in Texas and were in a relationship that ended in 2010. She described instances of domestic violence and threatening conduct by Father that caused her to leave Texas with the Minor in August 2011. According to the declaration, in May 2012, Father picked up the Minor from his daycare in California and absconded with the Minor to Nevada. Mother sought return of the Minor and modification of a 2011 Texas custody order that provided for shared custody of the Minor. Mother informed the superior court that, in July 2012, the Texas court indicated it no longer had jurisdiction over custody because the parents and the Minor no longer lived in Texas. The superior court issued a restraining order, finding that it had jurisdiction under the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, Fam. Code, 3400, and awarded custody to Mother. The court of appeals affirmed the restraining order and dismissed the appeal, noting that the superior court impliedly found that no court of any other state had jurisdiction under the UCCJEA at the time the restraining order was issued.View "Keisha W. v. Marvin M." on Justia Law

Spouses entered into a written agreement to resolve the property rights to their residence. Husband agreed to buy out the wife's interest for one-half the value of the equity. At issue was whether a property settlement agreement was valid and enforceable when executed by spouses after they have separated but before a petition for dissolution of marriage has been filed and without an exchange of disclosure declarations. The trial court ruled that such an agreement was enforceable and stated the terms of the agreement would be incorporated into the judgment of dissolution of marriage that divided the community property. The court interpreted section 2105(a) and the other provisions of Chapter 9 to mean that an exchange of disclosure declarations is not required for a pre-petition agreement to be enforceable, even when spouses make the agreement in contemplation of dissolution. The court did not read In re Marriage of Burkle as supporting an interpretation that extends the statutory disclosure requirements to pre-petition agreements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the trial court.View "In re the Marriage of Evans" on Justia Law