Justia California Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

J.P. appealed an order denying her request for a hearing to suspend visitation with her father and/or terminate his reunification services under Welfare and Institutions Code section 388, subdivisions (a) and (c). Specifically, she argued the juvenile court erred when it ruled that: (1) the statutory framework of the dependency system as well as principles of due process required the juvenile court to hold a six-month status review hearing to determine whether reasonable services were offered or provided to the parent before it could consider a request to terminate reunification services under section 388, subdivision (c); and (2) the allegations in the child's section 388 petition did not state a prima facie case to show that the action or inaction of the parent created a substantial likelihood family reunification would not occur, or that a modification of the prior visitation order was in the child's best interests. After review, the Court of Appeal concluded that the juvenile court misinterpreted section 388, subdivision (c) when it denied J.P.'s request for a hearing to terminate her father's reunification services: "section 388 (c) requires a reasonable services finding, the juvenile court is not required to hold a six-month review hearing to determine whether reasonable services have been offered or provided to a parent before it holds a hearing on a petition to terminate reunification services." In addition, the juvenile court erred when it found that J.P.'s petition to terminate her father's reunification services and/or suspend visitation did not state a prima facie case. The Court nevertheless concluded reversal was not necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. In view of the lack of any challenge on appeal to the juvenile court's findings at the six-month review hearing that visitation was not detrimental to the child, and the father was making progress with his case plan and it was likely that reunification would occur by the next review hearing, any error in not granting a hearing on the section 388 petition was harmless. Accordingly, the Court affirmed. View "In re J.P. CA/41" on Justia Law

Plaintiff S.A. appealed a judgment entered in favor of defendants Jan Maiden and Does 1 through 50 (together Maiden), after the trial court granted her Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16 anti-SLAPP motion to strike his complaint alleging causes of action against Maiden for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. On appeal, he contended the trial court erred by granting Maiden's anti-SLAPP motions because he established there was a probability he would prevail on his causes of action. Wife N.A. retained attorney Jan Maiden to represent her in obtaining restraining orders against her husband, S.A. With regard to one such order, N.A. withdrew her request for a permanent restraining order against S.A. and the trial court accepted her voluntary dismissal of that request. Because N.A. had moved to Orange County and filed for legal separation, child custody, and child and spousal support in the Orange County Superior Court, she no longer believed a permanent restraining order against S.A. was necessary. S.A. filed an order to show cause (OSC) why he should not be awarded attorney fees and costs as sanctions against N.A. for her extensions of the temporary restraining order, which was based on false allegations, and her subsequent dismissal of her request for a permanent restraining order. The trial court granted the motion, finding S.A. was the prevailing party, and awarded him $3,500 in attorney fees and costs. The Court of Appeal concluded that S.A. did not, and could not, establish there was a probability he would prevail on any of the causes of action he raised. Finding no reversible error otherwise, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court's judgment. View "S.A. v. Maiden" on Justia Law

A.S. (mother) and P.B. (father) appealed orders asserting dependency jurisdiction over their children, N.S. and J.S., and removing the children from their custody. In a partially published opinion, the Court of Appeal held that there was sufficient evidence to support the removal of the children from both parents based on domestic violence. Furthermore, the Court held that, even though the father’s 1997 Kentucky conviction for second degree sexual abuse was a misdemeanor under Kentucky law, it constituted a "violent felony" for purposes of the denial of reunification services under California law. The Court modified the jurisdictional findings, and affirmed the jurisdictional and dispositional orders of the trial court. View "In re J.S." on Justia Law

After his father left Jayden with his paternal grandmother with an eye infection and no provision for support, the Department of Health and Human Services petitioned the juvenile court alleging that Jayden comes within the jurisdiction of the court because of the father’s untreated substance abuse problem and history of domestic violence, and the mother’s prostitution and substance abuse. The court sustained the petition and placed Jayden with his paternal aunt and uncle. Reunification services were offered to both parents, but father failed to use the offered services, and mother only partially engaged in services. After several months of services both parents expressed a desire to waive reunification services. Their reunification services were terminated at the six-month review hearing based on the Department’s recommendation. Neither parent appealed this decision. When Jayden was placed with his paternal aunt and uncle, they expressed an interest in adopting Jayden. Several months later, based on an assessment that the paternal aunt and uncle were meeting Jayden’s needs and aiding him in his speech and motor skills development, a permanency plan suggested that Jayden remain with them to be adopted. However, on the day of the scheduled selection and implementation hearing, Jayden’s counsel requested ex parte that the court change its order requiring a noticed petition to move Jayden from his placement with his paternal aunt and uncle because the Department had developed concerns about the caregivers and no longer believed the placement was in Jayden’s best interest. The court continued the selection and implementation hearing to investigate other potential relative placements to ensure that the Department could locate a suitable home for Jayden. At the continued selection and implementation hearing, counsel for the Department said Jayden was going to be placed in an adoptive home that same day. Jayden’s counsel was supportive of terminating parental rights and of removing him from his aunt and uncle’s home. Father’s counsel entered “general objections,” and specifically objected to the finding that the child was likely to be adopted and the recommendation that father’s parental rights be terminated. Mother’s counsel objected to the termination of mother’s parental rights and to the court’s finding of Jayden’s adoptability. On appeal, the parents contended: (1) the Department and the juvenile court erroneously removed Jayden from his prospective adoptive parents without complying with the statutory procedures; (2) there was insufficient evidence Jayden was adoptable; and (3) the juvenile court violated parents’ rights to effective assistance of counsel and a fair hearing and abrogated its duty to make an independent decision when it denied mother’s request for a continuance of the hearing in light of the Department’s failure to provide an updated assessment of potential adoptive placements to the court. The Court of Appeal disagreed with the parents' allegations and affirmed the juvenile court’s orders. View "In re Jayden M." on Justia Law

Father appealed from the order adjudicating his son a dependent child under Welfare and Institutions Code 300(b) and (g) and the ensuing disposition order. The court concluded that there was no evidence that, at the time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing, Father was unwilling to provide the son with the necessities of life. Therefore, there was no evidence to support the finding of jurisdiction under section 300(b) based on Father's alleged failure to support. The court also concluded that, even if the juvenile court found that giving custody of the son to Father was not in the son's best interest, there was no evidence that Father could not make other arrangements for the son's care, including with the paternal grandmother who already had an established relationship with the son, or even with the maternal grandmother with whom the son was already placed. That placing the son with Father might not yet (or ever) be in the son's best interest, is not relevant to the only issue under section 300(g) - whether Father was able to arrange for the son's care at the time of the jurisdiction/disposition hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed the dispositional order and remanded for a new hearing. View "In re Christopher M." on Justia Law

A 17-month-old Indian child was removed from the custody of her mother, who has a lengthy substance abuse problem and has lost custody of at least six other children, and her father, who has an extensive criminal history and has lost custody of one other child. This case involves the placement preferences set forth in the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq. The court concluded that the trial court correctly required that the foster parents demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that there was good cause to depart from the ICWA's placement preferences. However, the trial court's application of the good cause exception to the facts before it was legally erroneous and the error was prejudicial to the foster parents. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "In re Alexandria P." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from a juvenile court order declaring her two daughters dependents of the court based on mother's failure to provide for the children. The court concluded that, because jurisdiction was proper based on Father's conduct, the court need not consider whether it was also proper based on Mother's conduct. In the alternative, the court concluded that Mother waived the issue of whether substantial evidence supported jurisdiction based on her failure to provide. Further, there was sufficient evidence regarding Mother's failure to protect the minors from Father's conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the juvenile court's jurisdictional order. View "In re A.R." on Justia Law

Mother appealed from an order terminating her parental rights to her son, contending that the juvenile court erred in finding that the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901-1963, did not apply. Mother had the right to appeal the juvenile court's order at the dispositional hearing but she did not do so. She only challenged the juvenile court's failure to provide notice under the ICWA approximately one and a half years later which was after the juvenile court terminated parental rights. Accordingly, the court held that Mother failed to timely appeal the juvenile court's order and affirmed the judgment. View "In re Isaiah W." on Justia Law

Mother challenged a juvenile court order terminating jurisdiction over her son and ordering regular visitation for the son's paternal grandmother, contending that the visitation order impermissibly infringed on her fundamental parenting rights under the Fourteenth Amendment. Mother also argued that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her petition requesting that the court terminate or modify the order for the son to visit the paternal grandmother. The court concluded that the juvenile court did not violate Mother's fundamental parenting rights by issuing an order granting the paternal grandmother visitation where the juvenile court was authorized by statute to issue a visitation order, the visitation order did not infringe on Mother's fundamental right to parent; and the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in denying Mother's petition seeking modification of the visitation order. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "In re J.T." on Justia Law

Father appealed from a judgment on reserved issues granting joint physical custody of his son to him and his mother, and allowing her to take the son with her to live in Israel during the school year. The court concluded that the trial court was not required to make findings under Family Code 3048 regarding whether measures were necessary to prevent the Mother from abducting the son; the trial court imposed adequate protective measures for international relocation; the custody order was not an abuse of discretion considering the son's best interest and the trial court made the necessary findings; and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to set aside the judgment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "J.M. v. G.H." on Justia Law